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Abstract 
 
The world, in recent decades, has witnessed an incalculable surge in global “wicked” policy 
problems that have long-term, and most often irreversible, impacts, not least terrorism, 
climate change, biodiversity losses and desertification. Wicked problems are wicked 
because there is no single epistemological system that can adequately coordinate policy 
action for addressing them. Literature abounds with international case studies of opposition 
to national institutions that are designed to put into effect global and regional policies for 
resolving wicked problems. This raises questions about what constitutes reasonable 
institutions, how such institutions can be designed and why societies sometimes fail to 
develop such institutions despite the obvious need for them.  
As a point of entry into these issues, the thesis adapted and extended the Northean (2007, 
2012) macro meta-theoretic framework for studying the violence-development relationship, 
which focuses on the role of political and economic competition in the emergence of ‘right’ 
institutions that promote development, while containing violence. The Northean framework 
conceptualises two mutually exclusive social orders – the limited access order and the open 
access order – which provide the socio-cultural context for the evolution of specific 
institutions. The macro meta-theoretic framework was transformed into a micro meta-
theoretic framework in such a way that the limited access order and the open access order 
co-existed in the evolution of specific institutions. This reconceptualisation built on 
Bromley’s (2004, 2006) two realms of public policy: the realm of reasons (legislative-judicial 
system) and the realm of rules (administrative system) as well as the feminist concept of 
epistemic violence, which broadened the concept of violence from being exclusively physical 
to including the sociocognitive. The feminist concept of epistemic oppression logically fitted 
into, and became a new sub-category of, Commons’ (1899, 1924, 1934) theories of 
sovereignty and negotiational psychology. The innovations showed that either of these 
realms can be a limited access order, while the other can be an open access order or both 
can be open access orders or both can be limited access orders.  
The conceptual innovations were then used as an interpretive scheme in analysing the 
evolution of the South African invasive alien species regulatory reforms under the National 
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Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004, using a case study of the trout sector, 
which was the most opposed to the reforms. There was a general perception among socio-
economic sectors that utilise invasive alien species that the regulatory reform processes for 
the governance of such species had institutionally isolated the sectors. Because of this 
perception, the regulatory reform process was contested, and implementation of the Fifth 
Chapter of the Act, which deals with the governance of invasive alien species, was delayed 
for nearly a decade. The thesis evaluated whether institutional isolation existed and how 
and why it came to be since it has implications for the reasonableness of emerging 
regulatory institutions, economic performance of sectors and efficient allocation of fiscal 
resources in institutional design processes. A mixed methods methodology was used, which 
included data analysis techniques such as semiosis, exploratory factor analysis, econometric 
estimation and document analysis. Policy documents, an online survey and key informant 
interviews comprised the data. 
The findings suggested six dimensions of institutional change that a theory of institutional 
change might have to address: the origin and continuity of pecuniary institutions; self-
reinforcing mechanisms of the limited access policymaking order; succession and 
disbandment of the limited access policymaking order; exclusivity of negotiations in 
institutional design; tiers of institutional isolation; and the role of administrative 
discontinuities. Findings suggested that institutional isolation existed in the regulatory 
process, manifesting in three forms: administrative isolation, epistemological isolation and 
sectoral isolation.  
Administrative isolation was the most complex of the three in that it also involved a less 
obvious process of institutional isolation in the form of administrative redefinition of 
opportunity sets that were already legislatively redefined. The mechanisms of institutional 
isolation through which administrative isolation was sustained were administrative 
financing of research and careerism. The two mechanisms created a revolving door-type 
scenario through which invasion biologists supplied the administrative agency with 
candidates for senior (decision making) positions and the administrative agency, in turn, 
demanded specific types of knowledge over which the same epistemic community had a 
monopoly. The revolving door-type scenario was found to ideologically and physically 
entrench invasion biologists into the regulatory community. The consequence of the 
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entrenchment was institutional hegemony, which manifested itself through the mechanism 
of epistemic violence insofar as the invasion biologists became the epistemic arbiters about 
what kinds of ideas and institutions really mattered in the governance of invasive alien 
species.  
Econometric estimates suggested that the extent to which an emerging institution is 
perceived to be reasonable by regulated sectors depends on the extent to which the 
institution is designed in a participatory and inclusive manner (that is, using integrative 
knowledge systems), the extent to which the designers used credible evidence and 
contextualised international evidence as well as the extent to which the emergent 
biodiversity governance institution was anthropocentric. However, findings suggested that 
the South African regulatory reform process fell short on all these four dimensions of 
reasonable institutions, which is characteristic of institutional design process shaped by 
hegemonic social imaginaries, resulting in institutional isolation.  
Emerging from the findings are several theoretical insights. Bush’s (1987) concept of 
institutional spaces under the Veblenian Dichotomy was extended, the result of which was 
identification of two stable institutional equilibria – one ceremonial and another 
instrumental. The ceremonial equilibrium was a typical limited access policymaking order 
and was responsible for the historical and present emergence of regressive institutions. 
Findings also suggested that the entrenched invasion biologists ceremonially encapsulated 
the knowledge fund that had been accumulated since the 1980s, which could have 
facilitated the consensual design of regulatory institutions for invasive alien species without 
protracted controversy. Findings suggested that a limited access policymaking order could 
only be disbanded by the intervention of an external sovereign agent (in this case the office 
of the state president) since the administrative agency, and the epistemic community that 
advised it, adopted the solutions that were empirically tested and proposed in the 1980s 
only after the intervention of the external sovereign agent. The instrumental equilibrium 
repealed the contested prisoner’s dilemma that was characteristic of the policy process and 
turned it into an assurance policy game by facilitating the identification of common 
interests. This finding logically links the study to a recent theoretical development in 
institutional theory – Ordonomics – which focuses on the causality between ideas and 
institutions.  
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The findings imply that it is possible to design reasonable institutions as long as integrative 
(transdisciplinary) knowledge systems, including the non-scientific knowledge of the 
resource users, are incorporated. Integrative knowledge systems facilitate semantic 
innovations, which create social DNA, but epistemic violence destroys social DNA. They also 
imply that reliance on unidisciplinary knowledge systems in institutional design induces a 
large and inefficient transaction cost burden of public policy on the fiscus and private agents 
alike because of the inevitability of controversy, especially for wicked policy problems. 
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Chapter 1  
Problematising institutional isolation  
 
1.0. Introduction 
Humanity through knowledge has become, as it were, “clueless” of how to solve 
environmental, political, economic and social problems of global dimensions, which through 
knowledge it first created. The oxymoron of a sustained increase in problems and an increase 
in epistemic communities, which implies a significant increase in knowledge, is a puzzling 
phenomenon. The Club of Rome describes the oxymoron as an “era of scientific and 
technological advancement [that] has brought us unparalleled knowledge and power, [yet] we 
are witnessing the sudden emergence of a “world problematique”” (Botkin et al. 2014, p.1). 
Max-Neef (2005, p.5) defines problematiques as “problems of global and long term impact” 
and whose “adverse trends are steadily strengthening” (Botkin et al. 2014, p.1). In their 
seminal paper, Rittel and Webber (1973, p.155) describe the problematiques as “wicked 
problems”, which are untameable policy problems simply because there are divergent social 
theories, belief systems and value systems that cannot satisfactorily coordinate resolution 
processes. Yet, “science has developed to deal with “tame” problems” (Rittel and Webber 
1973, p.155) or as King (1993, p.106) puts it: “the great forte of science” for centuries has been 
the resolution of tame problems. 
The Club of Rome states that increases in knowledge mean increases in power. The question is 
power for what - power to destroy or power to take corrective action? If the latter, how is the 
power used to address the problems? Whose knowledge and, therefore, whose power 
matters? As far as problematiques are concerned “none of them can be adequately tackled 
from the sphere of specific individual disciplines” (Max-Neef 2005, p.5). However, Max-Neef 
(2005, p.6) observes another problematique – “consolidation of academic prestige” – which 
leads to compartmentalisation of society’s knowledge fund and is the fundamental cause of 
the “cluelessness”, as it were, on how best to address the problematiques. Epistemic power is 
a major problematique. Max-Neef’s (2005) observation suggests that integrative knowledge 
systems will provide a long term solution to global/national policy problematiques. The 
integrative knowledge systems, as the Club of Rome puts it, must take into account the 
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“human element” and never “relegate their impact on human beings to secondary 
importance” (Botkin et al. 2014, p.4, emphasis in original).  
Adopting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the United Nations General Assembly 
(2015) also emphasised that the 17 goals “are integrated and indivisible and balance the 
three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental.” 
The economic and the social dimensions deal with the human element, while the 
environmental dimension deals with the planet. The essence of the SDGs is to create 
sustainability in all “areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet” (UN General 
Assembly 2015). The UN General Assembly (2015) believes that the human element can 
only be adequately addressed if “the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all 
people” is engendered. Participatory governance at all levels matters in sustainability. In 
fact, the SDGs make clear the fact that a “people-centred” agenda is critical in protecting 
both the environment and the people.  
Environmental policy in all its dimensions, that include biodiversity policy and climate change 
policy, is a cross-cutting issue. It has been plagued by the problematique phenomenon not only 
as nature adversely feeds back in response to human-induced changes, but also because 
compartmentalisation of knowledge has increasingly hindered consensual solutions quite 
often. The problem also lies in another contended issue – “the society–nature problematic” 
(Castree and Braun 2001, p.2). In many countries and global processes in general, policies for 
redressing environmental problematiques are often framed as natural science processes 
(Bromley 2012, Degnbol et al. 2006, Haas 1992, Han 2015, Jentoft 2006, Norgaard 2007, 
Ostrom 2014a, Ostrom and Cox 2010). Castree and Braun (2001) argue that the conventional 
practice of viewing nature as “nonsocial… can lead not only to confusion but also the 
perpetuation of power and inequality in the wider world.” Castree and Braun (2001, p.5) 
axiomatise that “nature has never been simply ‘natural’... Rather, it is intrinsically social, in 
different ways, at different levels, and with a multitude of serious implications.” Similarly, 
Bromley (2012, p.19) emphasises that nature is a “social construction” and “shared mental 
objectification” of those who experience its effects. From a pragmatist’s point of view, people 
know nature by its effects on them because “[o]ur idea of anything is our idea of its sensible 
effects” (Peirce 1878, p.293). 
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To the extent that society’s knowledge fund is compartmentalised and the sensible effects of 
nature differ from person to person, from group to group and from one epistemic community 
to another, it evidently follows that environmental policy deals with some of the wickedest 
problematiques globally and nationally. Such is the case with management of alien and 
invasive species. Selge et al. (2011, p.3089) points out that despite indisputable ecological 
impacts of alien species, “public opposition to the removal of non-native species has 
repeatedly delayed interventions, sometimes to the point where eradication has become 
impossible.” One of the reasons for opposition, as Selge et al. (2011) argues, is that invasion 
ecologists have been playing multiple roles of classifying species, prescribing management 
actions and, to some extent, implementing the self-generated policy prescriptions usually with 
ineffective involvement of other key stakeholders.  
Insofar as unidisciplinary approaches to management of alien and invasive species have been 
predominant, Han (2015, p.811) has characterised them as “[a]uthoritarian 
environmentalism”. Authoritarian environmentalism simply means “exclusive groups of 
scientists and technocrats, dominate the policy process” (Han 2015, p.811). Bromley (1985, 
p.789) characterises authoritarian environmentalism as the “the myth of management”.  The 
myth of management is the mistaken believe that policymakers are omniscient and their teams 
of experts command all the requisite knowledge to address the policy problem. However, the 
problem arises when the teams of experts are drawn from the same discipline; they simply 
cannot have all the knowledge required to solve the problematique (Max-Neef 2005).  
In policymaking, the problem is no longer limited to having rules to influence desirable 
behaviour, but also extends to “rules for changing rules” (Bromley 1985, p.789). That is, who 
has access to the policy arena to participate in defining how the process of institutional change 
must take place. Whose knowledge has to define the process of change? Unidisciplinary 
approaches to problematiques usually create “incongruent institutional structures (rules)” 
(Bromley 1985, p.790) insofar as such rules serve the interests of the group controlling the 
policy arena. Lack of harmonisation with rules in other realms creates conflicting opportunity 
sets.  
Generally, in developing nations, there is an unguarded and innocent zeal to transplant 
environmental governance systems from advanced societies without contextualising them to 
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the stage of development of the adopting societies, which often leads to opposition by the 
general public. Bromley (1985) emphasises that this copy and paste mode of governance 
underpins the myth of management and is characterised by enactment of legislation and 
policies that unreasonably prohibit access to, and utilisation of, environmental resources. 
Bromley (1985, p.790), however, believes that such governance practices provide “perverse  
incentives  at the local level  where  it  suddenly  becomes  an  act  of  honor  to  defy  stupid  
institutional arrangements,  and  a  necessity  for  survival  as  well.”  Veblen (1914, p.25) calls 
stupid institutional arrangements “imbecile institutions” and Louis Junker, in the foreword to 
Clarence E Ayres’ book on the Theory of Economic Progress, calls them “zombie institutions” 
(Ayres 1996, not paged). An important argument is that sustainable development has to be 
contextualised by “taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of 
development and respecting national policies and priorities” (UN General Assembly 2015). 
Gore (2000) discusses the inevitable struggle that policymakers face between normative 
developmental nationalism and methodological internationalism versus normative 
developmental internationalism and methodological nationalism. The normative framework 
concerns itself with how a nation evaluates what it finds in the best interest of its national 
development, and it has to use a global explanatory framework, the results of which are 
contextualised to the normative developmental nationalism outcomes. The 
methodological/explanatory framework concerns how development policies are diagnosed 
whether national factors should be used or global factors in this interpretive analysis. The copy 
and paste approach to environmental governance relies on normative developmental 
internationalism (global norms determine how institutions must be adjusted) and 
methodological nationalism. The tendency in this case is the design of acontextual institutions.  
Concepts such as authoritarian environmentalism, the myth of management, nonsocial 
conception of nature and compartimentalisation of society’s knowledge fund sit at the core of 
a phenomenon that can be conceptualised as institutional isolation. Simply put, institutional 
isolation is marginalisation of persons, groups or sectors from a policy process that they have 
constitutionally defensible rights to be part of. Legally, it might be taken as absence of 
administrative due process of law (Commons 2009, Mashaw 1980; 1981). Even when a person, 
group or sector takes part in the process, the participation might be ineffective for the reason 
that their input is not being valued by those charged with the responsibility for making 
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decisions (Code 2008, Dotson 2011, Medina 2011, Walsh 2004). Béné and Neiland’s (2006) 
characterisation of inequitable natural resource governance processes closely describes the 
phenomenon of institutional isolation. To them, equity in governance processes is a 
multidimensional concept that consists of participatory equity; equitable access to the natural 
resource; equitable distribution of transaction costs of policy adjustment; and equitable 
distribution of economic benefits from a resource. The absence of this equity implies 
institutional isolation. 
The problem of sectoral marginalisation and how it affects sectoral development and 
contribution to local economies has been examined in the context of rural agriculture in 
developing countries (Bromley 2008b; Bromley 2008c). The analysis has been extended to 
studies of isolation of marine capture fisheries in some developing countries in terms of sector 
exclusion from the development policy agenda (Libecap 2009, Thorpe et al. 2005).  
Since institutions are legal and non-legal rule systems that define fields of civil, political and 
economic liberty for individuals or groups in their interaction (Bromley 2008a, Hodgson 1998a, 
North 1990, Ostrom and Ostrom 2014), institutional isolation might also imply existence of 
regressive institutional arrangements or absence of facilitative institutions. Thus, sectoral 
institutional isolation is a multidimensional concept and a macro level problem that manifests 
in sectoral exclusion from the development policy agenda of a country, in weak regulation and 
policing and in the absence of, or uneven enforcement of, policies and authoritarian 
environmentalism among other dimensions (Bromley 2008b, Degnbol et al. 2006, Han 2015). 
The present study evaluates the evolution of a perceived phenomenon of institutional isolation 
in the evolution of biodiversity governance institutions in South Africa.   
1.1. Knowledge, power and policy change 
Arguing that economics must be a science of social provisioning, which makes it a processual 
science, Dugger (1996a, p.33) emphasised that the process of economic change “opens up new 
struggles between the underdogs and topdogs.” The argument is that economic analysis 
inevitably is a study of conflict rather than harmony (Commons 1924b). The conflict is always 
between the more powerful and the less powerful. Commons (1931, p.648) also characterises 
policy processes as simultaneously exhibiting “conflict, dependence and order”. The process of 
economic change, as reflected in changing policies, is a process of redistributing economic 
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advantages and redefining the structure and nature of social provisioning (Bromley 2004a; 
2008a, Commons 2009).  
What makes a topdog a topdog? And what makes an underdog an underdog? Institutional 
economics from all its facets conventionally locates power in property, politics and moral 
systems such as religion (Ayres 1996, Commons 2009, Dugger 1996b, Rutherford 2011, 
Valentinov 2009). The topdogs often are the economically powerful, the socially powerful, the 
politically powerful and the spiritually powerful (Bush 2009, Hayden 2003, Ramstad 1991, 
Veblen [1899] 2005). Such systems tend to arrange society in a means-ends continuum, with 
the rest of society organised as means to the attainment of the ends of powerful interests. 
Dugger (1980) and Hickerson (1982) characterise such a means-ends arrangement as a 
manifestation of institutional hegemony. Others have observed the role of corporatocracy, 
which is a type of institutional hegemony, in shaping the evolution of socio-economic and 
environmental policies (Bolduc 2009, Hayden 2003; 2011, Norgaard 2007, Valentinov 2015, 
Waller Jr 1987). Corporatocracy is a manifestation of power through the institution of property 
and the legal power of liberty, which can be civil, political, or economic (Commons 1942, 
Parsons and Commons 1942). Institutional isolation is likely to be prevalent in societies 
characterised by political, economic and social inequalities insofar as “processes of change 
more often lead to cumulative inequalities and outright domination” (Dugger 1996a, p.33). 
While knowledge is considered a critical input into policy change (Hayden 2006, Mayhew 1981, 
Rutherford 2011), the relationship between knowledge and power in the determination of the 
rate, extent and nature of institutional change remains an underexplored institutional issue. 
The Veblenian Dichotomy, which is discussed in Chapter Two, does theorise the role of 
diversion of knowledge from problem resolution by those who hold the power to “manipulate 
the nature and the flow of information” (Dugger 1996a, p.34). Within the Veblenian 
Dichotomy, knowledge that generically advances the human life process is instrumental, but 
powerful interests constrain the application of such knowledge to social problems if it 
adversely alters their benefit streams in the status quo arrangement (Ayres 1996, Bush 1987; 
1989, Veblen [1899] 2005). In fact, all knowledge from the arts and sciences is conceptualised 
as instrumental in the Veblenian Dichotomy, but belief systems, cultural systems, myths, 
customs, traditions, superstitions and legends are usually assumed to be inhibitive to 
progressive social change (Bush 1987, Hayden 1982; 2006, Rutherford 2011).  
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Recent work in Ordonomics, which investigates the relationship between knowledge and 
institutions, has just begun to demonstrate how resistance to the application of knowledge to 
humanity’s common problematiques can be eliminated or minimised (Hielscher et al. 2012, 
Petrick and Pies 2007, Valentinov 2015). When North (1990), within a choice theoretic 
framework, gave careful thought to the causal links between knowledge, ideology and 
institutions, it left him with an unresolved puzzle, which Ayres (1996), so to say, addressed 
before Douglass C North discovered it. However, institutionalists have not explored any further 
some of Clarence E Ayres’ postulations about the knowledge-ideology-institutions nexus. Thus, 
this is a fertile area for studying the process of institutional change. The thesis situates itself 
within this framework of institutional theory which continues to expand, especially as 
knowledge becomes epistemically differentiated and epistemic integration in policy processes 
increasingly is becoming elusive (Max-Neef 2005).  
1.2. Overview of South African biodiversity policy challenges 
South Africa today is battling with the control and eradication of alien and invasive species 
whose presence can mostly be attributed to the short-sighted actions of nature lovers who 
“scoured the earth for new species and advocated liberal introduction laws” (Simberloff 2007, 
p.882). Generally, the search for variety in nature resulted in influential individuals “exhorting 
lovers of nature to ‘beautify the countryside’ and offering seeds of alien plants for the 
purpose” (Smout 2003, p.12). Some species were introduced with all good intentions such as 
for controlling soil erosion, for forestry, for agriculture, for ornamental purposes, for food and 
for trade, but they gradually became some of the worst invasives (De Moor and Bruton 1988, 
Macdonald and Jarman 1985, Richardson 2011, Van Wilgen and Impson 2011). 
Wynberg (2002, p.236) summarised evolving threats to biodiversity in the 1990s in South Africa 
stating that  
“16.5% of terrestrial habitats had been transformed for crop forestry, industry and 
human settlements. 50% of wetlands has been transformed for crop cultivation, 
forestry, industry and human settlements. 10% of terrestrial habitats has been 
degraded through over-use and poor management. 8% of terrestrial and riparian 
habitats is heavily infested by alien vegetation… [Similarly], 15% of plant species, 14% 
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of bird species, 24% of reptile species, 18% of amphibian species, 37% of mammal 
species [and] 22% of butterfly species [were threatened].” 
To address the evolving ecocide, South Africa initiated a nationally government-funded 
programme in 1995 called the Working for Water programme, which is described as “the 
world’s most comprehensive initiative to clear invading alien plants” (Van Wilgen et al. 2012, 
p.8). Estimates also indicate that a value of approximately USD 650 million in potential 
ecosystem goods and services is lost every year due to invasion by alien plants (Van Wilgen et 
al. 2012). Without management and control measures, the value of ecosystem goods and 
services lost would have been approximately USD 4.2 billion per year (Van Wilgen et al. 2012).  
One of the greatest threats of invasive plants that the South African society is presently 
experiencing is water insecurity (Moran et al. 2013, Richardson 2011, Richardson and Van 
Wilgen 2004). Beyond immediate effects on physical water scarcity, alien plants have also 
destroyed ecological capital and productivity of water and land resources (Macdonald 2004, 
Richardson and Van Wilgen 2004, Van Wilgen et al. 2011).  
While, until recently, aquatic ecosystems have not received systematic scientific assessment 
relative to their terrestrial counterpart, studies have illustrated the extinction of amphibians, 
insects, indigenous fishes as well as trophic cascades of significant proportions due to invasion 
by alien fish species (Ellender and Weyl 2014, Karssing et al. 2012, Rivers-Moore et al. 2013, 
Shelton 2013, Shelton et al. 2014). Monetary evaluation of the loss in ecosystem goods and 
services attributable to alien fishes has not yet been carried out, but socio-economic 
contribution of trout has been analysed on a localised scale (Du Preez and Hosking 2011, Du 
Preez and Lee 2010a; 2010b, Gatogang 2009, Nicholson and Snowball 2014). 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the economic burden imposed by invasive plant management on the 
South Africa government. The amount of land cleared of invasive plants steadily increased and 
stabilised at an average of 140 000 hectares per year, but follow-up clearance stood at an 
average of 377 000 hectares per year. On average, South Africa has been spending USD 56 000 
per hectare per year to clear alien and invasive species. What is evident from Figure 1-1 is that 
cleared land requires significant monitoring (follow-up clearance) expenditures or it gets re-
invaded quickly as some new invasive species that were waiting for an opportunity to emerge 
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germinate, while old ones re-colonise the land. The burden is ever increasing at an increasing 
rate. 
 
Figure 1-1: Invasive species burden in South Africa 
Source: Christos Marias (2013) Affidavit for Department of Environmental Affairs 
Estimates of total hectrage invaded and under threat from effects of invasion in South Africa 
range between 10 million and 20 million hectares (Richardson 2011, Richardson and Van 
Wilgen 2004, Van Wilgen et al. 2001, Van Wilgen et al. 2004). Invaded land was expected to 
double in a short space of time (Van Wilgen et al. 2004). One cannot avoid concluding that the 
loss of biodiversity in South Africa is a national problematique with global dimensions. But, why 
does management of alien and invasive species face opposition? It is puzzling that with such 
indisputable evidence of the damage to ecological capital some social groups oppose proposed 
institutional arrangements for addressing the problem of invasives.  
The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) has for the past decade attempted to develop 
regulations for alien and invasive species without success. Since the process began in 2004, the 
DEA only successfully promulgated the regulations towards the end of 2014. One of the sectors 
that withstood the regulatory reform process was the trout sector. The thesis used the trout 
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sector as a case study to illuminate discussions on the theory of institutional change and on 
whether there was institutional isolation or not.  
 
Figure 1-2: Some media themes on regulation of trout between October 2013 and August 
2014 
Source: Author’s compilation from various media 
Figure 1-2 illustrates some of the headlines that frequented the media between 2013 and 
2014. The trout sector, the DEA, invasion biologists or other parties such as journalists were 
addressing the controversy over the regulation of trout. Headlines such as the “nationalisation 
of nature”; “environmental extremism”; “fight to save trout industry”; “South African trout 
industry swimming against tide of biodiversity priorities”; and “no threat to trout industry” 
illustrate several dimensions of the problem. This was a battle between anthropocentric 
(people-centred) and biocentric/ecocentric (conservation-centred) interests. 
1.3. Goals of the Research 
The overall objective of the study was to evaluate the process of institutional change in the 
governance of biodiversity and in particular, economically useful alien and invasive species 
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in South Africa. Specifically, the thesis set out to [1] examine, using a case study of trout, the 
nature and cause of hitherto perceived institutional isolation and its potential economic 
effects on sectors utilising alien and invasive species; [2] evaluate the role of institutional 
entrepreneurship in the trout sector in trying to mitigate the effects of hitherto perceived 
institutional isolation; and [3] examine the governance and management preferences of the 
sectors utilising alien and invasive species, using the case study of the trout sector. Ultimately, 
it is hoped that a critique and contribution to the theory of institutional change, using the trout 
regulatory reform controversies, will be made. These goals can be reduced into the abductive 
hypotheses framework presented in Figure 1-3. 
 
Figure 1-3: Study hypotheses 
The goals of the research can be framed in an agency-structure relationship in which 
knowledge systems are the base institutional structure that underpins epistemic and 
functional differentiation in policy design processes at a time t. This differentiation implies 
existence of dominant epistemological systems (instituted social imaginaries) in policy 
design and marginalised epistemological systems at time t. Essentially, this epistemic 
exclusion has implications about the nature of emergent economic institutions and the 
redistribution of economic and political advantages that follow. This epistemic 
differentiation creates and underpins a particular administrative ideology (governance 
culture) in the governmental agency that is influenced by a particular scientific persuasion at 
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a time t. It is hypothesised that the administrative ideology influences the nature of 
economic (including environmental) institutions that emerge at a time t and the 
consequences of such institutions are hypothesised to include institutional isolation and 
other associated effects like high transaction cost burden of the emergent regulatory 
regime. Dissatisfied with the consequences of regressive economic institutions at time t, 
depending on the economic resources and political power possessed by the participants 
(insiders and outsiders) in the policy process, political and epistemic competition unleash 
dynamic forces that generate repeated planning cycles that fail to resolve the problem. 
These repeated planning cycles are hypothesised to be planning curses and their role is to 
invite parliamentary and judicial scrutiny into the policy implementation process, which 
dissipates the impoverishing Nash institutional transitional equilibria leading to reasonable 
economic institutions and the social desired economic and environmental outcomes at time 
t+1. 
Based on the framework of hypotheses, several questions can be invoked to guide the 
falsification process. Why was the process of regulating trout controversial? Did institutional 
isolation exist in the first place? Why did it exist? What forms, if it existed, did it assume? By 
what mechanisms was it sustained, if it existed? Who were the key players and what power 
did they possess in the entire reform process? What arguments did the rival social groups 
use and how did those arguments shape the evolution of biodiversity legislative and 
regulatory reform processes in South Africa? By what criteria did the Department of 
Environmental Affairs weigh the competing arguments against each other in the process of 
choosing the most reasonable ones that became national legislation and regulations? The 
thesis is concerned with offering an explanation of the dynamics of institutional change in 
the evolving South African biodiversity problematique.  
To answer these questions, a mixed methods research methodology was utilised. The 
qualitative component, which was the major aspect of the thesis, employed methods such 
as semiosis, document analysis and interview analysis. Generally, an abductive 
epistemological framework, with a nuanced combination with inductive analysis, was used. 
The objective was to reduce the qualitative data into a set of conclusions about institutional 
change. The quantitative component provided a deductive framework of confirming and 
testing, using online survey data for the trout industry, some of the emerging postulates in 
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the qualitative component. However, the quantitative and qualitative components were not 
carried out in a strictly sequential manner. 
1.4. Synopsis of subsequent thesis chapters 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the theory of institutional 
change from the Original Institutional Economics (OIE) perspective. The chapter is divided 
into the OIE of Thorstein B Veblen’s tradition and the OIE of John R Commons’ tradition. 
Chapter 3 reviews the New Institutional Economics (NIE) critique to the OIE. However, 
Douglass C North’s tradition is the main focus of the review. A working integrated 
institutionalist framework that incorporates Douglass C North’s social orders into the 
Veblenian Dichotomy, while making the social orders an ontological framework for John R 
Commons’ negotiational psychology in an evolutionary framework is also presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 Chapter 4 sets forth the research methodology and specific methods used in each 
subsequent chapter. Each of the subsequent chapters – 5 through 8 – is a results chapter 
approaching the research problem from a different angle so as to pin down the real issues 
behind the intensity of the regulatory reform controversy and the nature of institutional 
isolation.  
Chapter 5 uses economic theory to review the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act (NEM:BA) of 2004. The chapter presents institutional dissonance between 
the NEM:BA and the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998 as well as 
between the NEM:BA and the Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1996. Chapter 6 gives 
a retrospective evaluation of how the institutional dissonance came to be and why the 
NEM:BA developed into the controversial law that it became during the past decade.  
Chapters 7 and 8 discuss institutional change using the case study of the trout sector. 
Chapter 7 econometrically evaluates perceptions of the trout industry regarding the 
reasonableness of the last draft of alien and invasive species regulations that was published 
in February 2014 by the DEA. An online survey of the trout sector provided the data for this 
analysis. Chapter 8 presents semiotic analysis of the entire regulatory reform process from 
2004-2014. This analysis is important for one reason: it reveals important dynamics that 
interview data, quantitative analysis and submissions made by the trout sector to the DEA 
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could not reveal. The chapter gives a grand overview that highlights major signposts that 
illuminate interview data analysis and quantitative analysis. Chapter 9 presents discussions 
of the thesis’ findings in light of broader literature from policy sciences that include 
institutional economics and concludes the thesis with recommendations and suggestions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Old institutionalism  on institutional change, knowledge and power  
 
 “If a man keeps cherishing his old knowledge so as continually to be acquiring new, he may 
be a teacher of others.” 
The Life and Teachings of Confucius (Legge 1909, p.124) 
 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter reviews Original Institutionalist theory of institutions and institutional change. 
It first discusses the theory of institutions as postulated by all institutionalist schools, not 
least the Veblenian School, the Commonsian School and New Institutional Economics. While 
there are still differences in how institutions are conceptualised, there is a general tendency 
towards convergence of thought. After a brief discussion of institutions, the chapter 
proceeds to review theories of change of the two Original Institutionalist schools – the 
Veblenian and the Commonsian.  
2.1. Institutions 
The term institution has been variously defined, but three strands of definitions can be 
found in the literature based on whether the analysis is focusing on emergence, persistence 
or behavioural outcomes of an institutional system (Mäki, Gustafsson and Knudsen 1993). 
Mäki et al. (1993, p.12) emphasise that “no completely satisfactory definition of the concept 
of institution is available in social science literature”. North (1991, p.97) emphasises that 
institutions “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction”. Hodgson (2007b, p.96) also emphasises that “Institutions are systems of 
established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions”. For purposes of 
this thesis, it is sufficient to characterise an institution as consisting of structural and 
relational patterns functionally correlated by a value system in human interactions in social 
processes (Bromley 2006, Bush 1987). Bush (1987, p.1076) characterises society as 
consisting of “a set of institutional systems,” with an institutional system comprising “a set 
of institutions”, and an institution being defined as a “set of socially prescribed patterns of 
correlated behaviour.” North (1990) differentiates an institution from an organisation, 
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rendering organisations to be players and institutions to be rules of the game played. Since 
an organisation is a nexus of institutions, legal and social power relationships and values, it 
is an institutional system. Hodgson (2007b) believes that organisations are special 
institutions and are subsets of institutions. North’s (1990) distinction is somewhat 
restrictive. Linarelli (2010, p.83) similarly asserts that “[o]rganizations are Institutions” and 
Ménard and Shirley (2008, p.283) also conceptualise an organisation as a “nexus of 
contracts”, and contracts are institutions. At best, an organisation is a structural 
arrangement of institutional roles (Dugger 1980). The Original Institutional Economics (OIE) 
does not differentiate an institution from an organisation because the former is a habitual 
rule of relational action, while the latter provides a framework for structuring the relations 
(Bush 1983; 2009, Hamilton 1919). 
The emphasis on social prescription in the broader definition of an institution, at once, 
reveals that institutions are “collective action in restraint, liberation, and expansion of 
individual action” (Bromley 2008a, p.229). The point is that an institution performs multiple 
functions simultaneously. It creates rights (capacities) and duties; it creates liberties and 
exposures; it creates immunity and liability (Commons 1924b, Hohfeld 1913; 1917). An 
institution defines what individuals can/cannot, must/must not or may/may not do 
(Bromley 2007; 2008a; 2009, Commons 1924b; 1931; 1934; 2009, Hiedanpää and Bromley 
2012). Thus, an institution defines the opportunity set or “realms of choice (fields of action) 
for individuals” (Bromley 2008a, p.229). By performing these functions, institutions stabilise 
expectations in human interactions and facilitate order (Galiani and Sened 2014, North 
1990) or as Hodgson (2007b, p.108) puts it, “institutions lead to regularities of behaviour 
[and] concordant habits are laid down among the population, leading to congruent 
purposes and beliefs.” 
Insofar as an institution prescribes behaviour, it requires an authority system (sovereignty) 
that enforces the prescriptions and proscriptions (Bromley 2008a, Commons 1899a; 1899b; 
1899c, Dawson 1998, Dugger 1996b, Hodgson 2007b). Society and therefore, an institution, 
predate and postdate an individual (Albert and Ramstad 1998, Hodgson 2003a). Commons 
(2009, p.74) emphasised that “individuals… are always… members of a concern in which 
they come and go, citizens of an institution that lived before them and will live after them.” 
There is a bidirectional causal relationship between individual agency and an institution.  
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Hodgson (2007b, p.108) also succinctly argued that “any single individual is born into a pre-
existing institutional world, which confronts him or her with its rules and norms.”  
Since all individuals are born into a societal context that has complex institutions such as 
laws, norms, legends, language, property, power, reciprocities, conventions, taboos, mores, 
ceremonies, beliefs, religion and traditions, they are instituted agents (Commons 2009, 
Hayden 2006, Veblen 1914). They have “institutionalized minds” (Commons 2009, p.638) 
because “they are embedded in existing customs and rules” (Bazzoli 2000, p.9). The 
institutionalised minds enable people to comply with the prescribed and proscribed 
patterns of behaviour willingly (Bush 2009, Hodgson 2007b).  
2.2. Institutions and value systems 
According to Bush (2009) and (Hayden 2006), values are standards of judgment. Society 
derives values from culture and knowledge systems such as science, beliefs, religion and 
legends. Bush (1987, p.1076) points out that by defining an institution as a “set” it implies 
that elements within an institution are functionally interrelated. Original institutionalists 
insist that the value system has the task of correlating agent behaviour in institutions (Bush 
1983; 1987; 2009, Hayden 2006; 2009).  
The value system, however, is dualistic in that it comprises ceremonial values and 
instrumental values. Ceremonial values are invidious and discriminatory on grounds such as 
propertied/non-propertied, male/female, rich/poor, race or some such grounds (Bush 1983, 
Hickerson 1987). Since ceremonial values have their ground in invidiousness, they favour 
particular classes of society and, thus, the favoured classes have every interest in 
perpetuating the status quo (Ayres 1996, Bush 2009).  
Tool (1994) and Veblen (1914; [1899] 2005) draw attention to the fact that instrumental 
values orient society towards the continuation of the human life process and culture; to the 
fullness of human development; and to the greatest possible provision of the material 
necessities of life. Instrumental values are alternatively defined as technological values, 
where technology is broadly defined as tools, skills and scientific (tacit and communicable) 
knowledge (Ayres 1996, Elsner 2012, Hayden 2006, Mayhew 1981). It follows, therefore, 
that ceremonial and instrumental value systems are dialectical (Bush 1983; 1987, Hayden 
1982; 2006; 2009). Two behavioural systems are similarly evident: ceremonial behaviours 
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and instrumental behaviors. Ayres (1996) and Bush (2009) describe ceremonial behaviours 
and values as regressive, but the instrumental behaviours and values as progressive. The 
former are past-binding, but the latter are progressive (Hayden 2006).  
The foregoing characterisation of an institution, value systems and behavioural systems is 
an elaboration of the Veblenian Dichotomy, which, as Tool (1977) emphasised, explains 
instituted processes as consisting of ceremonial systems and instrumental (technological) 
systems. Veblen (1914, p.25) observed the prevalence of ceremonial institutions in his day, 
which continue in various shades today, and described them as “imbecile institutions” or 
“zombie institutions” as Louis Junker put it in the foreword to Clarence E Ayres’ book on the 
Theory of Economic Progress (Ayres 1996, not paged). To Thorstein B Veblen, such 
institutions were inhibitive to social progress and, therefore, irrational in the broader 
scheme of things (Rutherford 2011, Veblen 1914, Veblen [1899] 2005). Instrumental 
systems were facilitative of the continuation of the human life process in its fullness. The 
Veblenian Dichotomy constitutes a central construct in OIE theoretical development in the 
Veblenian tradition. Parallel, but complementary to the Veblenian tradition, is John R 
Commons’ institutional economics, which focused on collective action and legal-economic 
analysis of the capitalist economy. 
Therefore, the OIE views instituted processes as consisting of value systems, institutional 
systems and social interactions within a defined institutional structure. The value system is 
the lubricant of the institutional structure. A breakdown in the value system, leads to 
dysfunctional institutions and, consequently, undesirable results. Bush (2009) argues that 
ceremonial systems use a valuation criterion of ceremonial adequacy to decide the 
feasibility or non-feasibility of a proposed institutional adjustment. They rely on the logic of 
sufficient reason (purpose/final cause) (Bush 1987, Hickerson 1987). In this class of systems, 
Veblen (1914) placed the judiciary’s common-law method of developing law as a ceremonial 
system because it works on the basis of sufficient reason and authority to authenticate 
received legal principles. Because of this classification system, the tendency in the Veblenian 
tradition is to treat institutions as ceremonial (Ayres 1996, Bush 1983, Hayden 1982; 2006, 
Rutherford 2011) even though some institutions play an instrumental role (Brinkman and 
Brinkman 2006, Rutherford 2011). Brinkman and Brinkman (2006, p.1022) emphasise that 
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“the Veblenian Dichotomy does not infer that all institutions served ceremonial functions” 
(italics in original). 
The instrumental system, on the contrary, utilises instrumental efficiency as a valuation 
criterion under the logic of “efficient cause” (Bush 1987, p.1080, Veblen 1914, p.292). 
Efficient cause focuses on objective and non-teleological causal explanation. The OIE 
postulates that society is ever in search of instrumentally efficient ways to promote the 
continuity of life (Hayden 2006). Instrumental behaviour necessitates technological 
innovation, broadly defined as growth of society’s knowledge fund (Bush 1987). Every new 
piece of knowledge, tool or material is a combination and recombination of existing tools, 
materials and knowledge to produce new instrumentalities and new instituted processes 
(Ayres 1996). Evidently, at the core of the OIE is the process of the growth of knowledge in 
the arts and sciences, which underpins instrumental systems. It is the heart of a democratic 
system (Hayden 2006). The Deweyan view is that the instrumental process is a technological 
growth process, which is a knowledge growth process by democratic participation (Dewey 
[1930] 2001, Dewey and Bentley 1960).  
2.3. Original Institutionalist theory of institutional change 
This school of thought has its foundations in William James’ evolutionary psychology of 
habits and instincts, in the pragmatism of John Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce and 
Darwinian evolutionism (Hodgson 2003b). The basic tenet of this brand of pragmatism is 
that truth is known by its effects or consequences (Peirce 1905). Hayden (2006, p.21) 
identified three pillars of pragmatism as “(1) the transactional approach to science, (2) a 
problem orientation, and (3) judging by consequences.” Thus, pragmatism is an 
epistemological program (theory of truth), an evaluative approach and a practically-oriented 
philosophy (Bromley 2008d, Commons 2009). A transactional approach emphasises the role 
of trans-subjective and intersubjective knowledge generation processes in policy processes 
and interdependencies between institutional systems and the ecological system.    
Tool (1977) synthesised an emerging theory of institutional change from the works of 
Thorstein B Veblen, John Dewey, Clarence E Ayres and Fagg J Foster. From the synthesis, he 
first tendered an Original Institutional Economic (OIE) theory of value that acts as a guiding 
compass in studying the rationale for, and choices of, institutional adjustments. Of the two 
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traditions, the Veblenian (“intellectual descendants” of Thorstein B Veblen) and the 
Commonsian (“intellectual descendants” of John R Commons) (Ramstad 1989, p.770), the 
latter is the lesser-studied (Ramstad 1995) in terms of theoretical advances such as have 
been attained in the Veblenian tradition. Ramstad (1989), however, believes that the 
Commonsian reasonable value and the Veblenian instrumental value are substitutes 
because they espouse different philosophical frameworks. John R Commons sought to 
improve capitalism, while Thorstein B Veblen wanted it destroyed (Ramstad 1989). The 
Commonsian approach was a legal-economic analysis of the evolution of institutions of 
capitalism so as to create a theory of reasonable value and reasonable capitalism (Commons 
1924b).  
2.4. Veblenian theory of institutional change  
The genesis of this school is Thorstein B Veblen’s 1898 essay, Why is Economics not an 
Evolutionary Science?, which Rutherford (1998, p.464) describes as “a manifesto for an 
evolutionary economics, a methodological outline only.” Thorstein B Veblen’s envisaged 
theory of institutional change “was one of new technology changing economic conditions, 
and new economic conditions leading to new ways of thinking and to new institutions 
through a (non-intentional) process of ‘habituation’” (Rutherford 1998, p.463). The 
Darwinism of his theory lies in the role of non-intentionality of instinctual and habitual ways 
of thought, where habit is a seat of mental potential and capacity (Hodgson 2003b, 
Rutherford 1998). This generalises institutional change as a “purely causal processes of 
variation and natural selection… analogous to Darwin’s in the general sense of being free 
from teleology” (Rutherford 1998, p.465).  
Ayres’ (1996) integration of the Veblenian Dichotomy with John Dewey’s instrumental 
theory of knowledge creation (value creation) provided the foundation for a comprehensive 
synthesis of a later theory of purposeful institutional change. Several scholars in the 
Veblenian tradition attribute to Clarence E Ayres the role of an integrative fountainhead for 
the modern theory of purposeful institutional change in that tradition (Bush 1983; 1987, 
Hayden 1982, Hickerson 1987, Mayhew 1981, Rutherford 1996; 2011, Tool 1977). Through 
his integrative analysis, Ayres (1996) demonstrated that the technological process was the 
fundamental driver of the process of institutional change as it disrupted the ceremonial 
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system leading to behavior-value-institution disjunction. The disjunction set in motion 
deliberate efforts to adjust the institutional system in line with the technological innovation.  
Foster (1981c), however, was the one who synthesised the Veblenian-Deweyan-Ayresian 
emerging thought into a nascent but coherent theory of purposeful institutional change. His 
starting premise was that economics was a problem-solving science (Foster 1981c). From 
the start, the OIE was concerned with economic and social problems that were hindering 
the attainment of full human development, and this view runs through any recent or old OIE 
work that one reads (Bush 2009, Commons 1931; 2009, Rutherford 1996, Veblen 1898a; 
1898b; 1898c; 1914; [1899] 2005, Witte 1954). Witte (1954, p.132) described his mentor’s 
approach as “Commons’ philosophy of economics in action.” Commons (1924b, p.viii) 
described his institutional theory as “practical applications of a theory of Reasonable Value 
to current problems”. Thus, the OIE was conceived as an applied economics paradigm which 
also had commitments to theoretical economics (Hodgson 1998b; 2003a; 2003b, Myrdal 
1978, Ramstad 1989, Rutherford 1996, Witte 1954). Rutherford (2011, p.345-346) also 
states that progenitors of original institutionalism had “faith in the power of empirical 
scientific investigation to provide solutions to social and economic problems.”  
2.4.1. The economic problem defined 
Foster (1981c) defines a problem as the difference between ‘what ought to be’ and ‘what 
is’. This conceptualisation makes positive and normative aspects of institutional adjustment 
inseparable (Ayres 1996, Dewey 1939, Hill 1978, Ramstad 1989). ‘What is’ alone cannot 
define a problem and ‘what ought to be’ alone cannot define a problem. Foster (1981c, 
p.924) postulated that the “disrapport among human activities that are supposed to be 
correlated in continuance of the productive process” is a real economic problem. Foster 
(1981b, p.899) also asserted that a problem existed whenever “existing patterns of human 
relations prevent full application of the existing state of the arts.” Relevant solutions to 
economic problems take the form of “institutional adjustment” (Foster 1981c, p.927) to 
“restore acceptable institutional integration” (Foster 1981c, p.924). The roles of valuation, 
purposeful action and choice are central in this conceptualisation. 
This conceptualisation of a problem achieved two things. First, it dislodged the “Cartesian 
dualisms” (Bush 2009, p.295) – the subjective/objective dichotomy and positive/normative 
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dichotomy among other dichotomies – and made “inquiry into the nature of institutions and 
the processes of institutional change … inherently normative” (Bush 1987, p.1078). Foster 
(1981c) locates value in knowledge (the technological/ instrumental process), which is at 
odds with the Neoclassical Paradigm and the New Institutional Economics paradigm, which 
locate value in price (Mokyr 2014, North 1990; 1992; 1993, North and Thomas 1970, 
Robbins [1945] 2007).  
The state of society’s knowledge fund defines the technological frontier. Every society, 
inevitably, lives below its technological (knowledge) frontier because ceremonial interests 
expropriate and withhold part of the knowledge fund from instrumental application to 
societal problems insofar as the new knowledge challenges ceremonial interests (Bolduc 
2009, Bush 1983; 1987; 2009, Waller Jr 1987). Others have attributed the persistent inability 
of nations to live on their knowledge frontier to the problem of a cultural lag (Brinkman and 
Brinkman 2006, Glade 1952, Mueller 1938). It is, therefore, obvious that there is always a 
gap between what is and what ought to be, which marks the relevance of economics and 
makes purposeful institutional change continuous (evolutionary by artificial selection).  
2.4.2. Theory of social valuation 
The second effect of Fagg J Foster’s conceptualisation of a problem was that it made 
institutional change a problem-driven process rather than an incentive/price-driven process. 
Original institutional economics utilises pragmatism as its philosophical foundation and 
problem resolution is the thrust of pragmatism as the philosophy of science, the theory of 
truth and the theory of human action (Bromley 2006; 2008a; 2008d, Price 2013, Rorty 1982; 
1998). To solve problems is to adjust institutions, but it requires social valuation. It has been 
variously argued that economists cannot evaluate the existing problematic institutional 
arrangement that society wants to change using elements of that problematic institutional 
arrangement as evaluative criteria (Bromley 2007; 2008a, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2014, 
Norgaard 2010, Norgaard and Bode 1998). Insofar as institutions, such as the price system, 
are functions of property and liberty (Bromley 2006, Commons 1942, Foster 1981b, Veblen 
1914), which are integral components of the existing problematic institutional arrangement 
just as preferences and tastes are, price-based and willingness to pay-based economic 
valuations often sanctify the status quo (Bromley 2007, Dawson 1994; 1998, Dugger 1980, 
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Foster 1981b, Hayden 2003). Foster (1981b, p.899) concluded that “Prices are significant, 
but they cannot tell society what it ought to do.”  
Since what ought to be is located in the outwardly expanding stochastic 
knowledge/technology frontier and in particular, in the idle part of the accumulated fund of 
knowledge, institutional change becomes a deliberative process to decide which parts of the 
knowledge fund have relevance to the problem. The evaluation processes require criteria 
(Hayden 1995; 2006). Briefly, Fagg J Foster’s contribution was to demonstrate that 
purposeful institutional change was an application of the theory of value to problems and 
that the theory of value was a particular application of a theory of technology (knowledge).  
Although Fagg J Foster synthesised the Veblenian-Deweyan-Ayresian thought and hinted on 
the significance of the theory of value in guiding the purposeful adjustment of institutions to 
solve economic problems, he did not provide a comprehensive theory of social value (Foster 
1981a; 1981b) just as his predecessors had not done. Tool (1977; 1983) developed the 
neoinstitutionalist theory of value that is consistent with the instrumental theory of 
knowledge and democracy.1 It was Tool’s belief that “the intelligible core” of the OIE theory 
of value was the Veblenian-Deweyan-Ayresian-Foster synthesis (Tool 1977, p.824). In 
advancing the social theory of value, Tool (1977, p.824) maintained that “Reason and 
evidence” were indispensable pillars of the theory of value. He believed that value was a 
product of an instituted reasoning process grounded in evidence of and about the 
problematic situation. Other scholars have also drawn attention to the role of deliberative 
policymaking processes in social valuation (Hayden 2003, Norgaard 2007, Waller Jr and 
Robertson 1991).  
Tool (1977) concluded that democracy was the core of the instrumental theory of valuation. 
Since the purpose of institutional change was to enhance the continuity and full 
development of the human life process through the greatest possible use of the knowledge 
fund in the productive process, generation of policies that achieved broader progressive 
                                                          
1
 The term neoinstitutional economics has become a confusing term because New Institutional Economists 
also claim it. “The term “neoinstitutionalism” was coined by Marc R. Tool in his doctoral dissertation in1953…”   
(Bush 2009, 294), but “The phrase, “the new institutional economics," was coined by Oliver Williamson” 
(Coase 1998, 72) in 1975 more than two decades after Marc R Tool’s use of the term. As a result, to distinguish 
the two antagonistic paradigms, the neoinstitutionalists of Marc R Tool are now called “Original Institutional 
Economists (OIE)” (Bush 2009, 294).   
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changes inevitably called for democratic enquiry processes (Dewey [1930] 2001, Hayden 
2003; 2006; 2009). The technological process is the engine of institutional change (Ayres 
1996, Dewey [1930] 2001, Foster 1981c), and any social process that enhances technological 
accumulation is instrumental. Tool’s (1977, p.841) efforts led him to conclude that the 
criterion of social value is “the continuity and instrumental effectiveness of recreating 
community non-invidiously” through the instrumentally efficient use of knowledge. This 
criterion is about “what is valuable and worth promoting” (Ramstad 1989, p.764).  
Ramstad (1989, p.766), however, objects to Tool’s social value principle because he believes 
that it is attempting to introduce new orthodoxy in institutional economics “thereby 
putatively providing an objective and transcultural orientation to the problem of identifying 
an appropriate value criterion.” He holds that the Commonsian school is premised on a 
different theory of value using the logic of sufficient reason rather than efficient cause. 
However, by singling out reason and evidence as constitutive components of social value, 
Tool (1977), in fact, agrees with the logic of sufficient reason.  
Dewey’s (1939) instrumental logic stipulates that means and ends are inseparable and that 
they are stochastic. In his view, societies democratically assess both the means and the 
ends, which are in constant flux in an evolving social system (Bromley 2008a, Bush 2009, 
Dewey 1939). Dewey’s logic, therefore, is a means-consequence-means-consequence 
continuum. The consequences (ends-in-view as opposed to absolute ends) of the previous 
instrumental valuation iteration become the means in the next instrumental valuation 
iteration.  
2.4.3. Dynamic mechanisms hindering and propelling institutional change 
Bush (1983; 1987) gave a major restatement of a mature theory of institutional change in 
which he illustrated that within an institutional structure – ceremonial or instrumental – the 
value system correlated agent behaviour. In this work, Bush dynamised the Veblenian-
Deweyan-Ayresian-Foster synthesis by illustrating the forces that hinder or propel 
institutional change in addition to the technological process. The major point Bush (1983; 
1987; 2009) introduced was that institutional change was inherently a change in the value 
system. A change in institutions not accompanied by a change in the value system would 
ultimately fail.  Table 2-1 illustrates the dynamic processes. 
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Table 2-1: Types of ceremonial encapsulation 
 Instrumental feasibility Instrumental non-feasibility 
Ceremonial feasibility Ceremonial encapsulation 
and/ or instrumental 
embodiment 
Lysenkoan effects 
Ceremonial non-feasibility Lost instrumental efficiency Empty set 
 
Source: Bush (1987) Theory of Institutional Change  
Inasmuch as society consists of ceremonial systems (behaviours and values) and 
instrumental systems (behaviours and values) and inasmuch as ceremonial systems are 
past-binding, Bush introduced the concept ceremonial encapsulation (Table 2-1). 
Ceremonial encapsulation occurs whenever the ceremonial system dominates the 
instrumental/technological system such that ceremonial forces expropriate and withhold 
part of society’s fund of knowledge from being applied to problem resolution. Since 
ceremonial systems use the logic of sufficient reason to authenticate institutional change, a 
proposed adjustment has to satisfy the valuation criterion of ceremonial adequacy (Bush 
1987; 2009), otherwise no adjustment takes place. 
In the worst case, Bush (1987) demonstrated that ceremonial systems can completely 
dominate instrumental systems leading to a regressive outcome through a ceremonial 
encapsulation mechanism that he termed Lysenkoan effects (Table 2-1). Although 
Lysenkoism results in institutional adjustment guided by ceremonial interests, it is more of a 
future-bound phenomenon in its earlier phases. Once it has matured and has appropriated 
sovereign power, it becomes past binding. Lysenkoism is driven by political and ideological 
interests of the powerful groups, whose ideological systems constitute dominant 
epistemological systems. The other dynamic that Bush discussed in Table 2-1 is progressive 
institutional change (or rendered closely, instrumental embodiment). Within this dynamic, 
technological forces rupture ceremonial systems so that wider societal transformation takes 
place and the instrumental value system dislodges the ceremonial value systems. Usually, 
the advent of democracy marks such momentous rupturing of ceremonial systems by 
instrumental systems (Dewey [1930] 2001, Elsner 2012, Hayden 2006).  
The extent to which the ceremonial system dominates the instrumental system is called 
ceremonial dominance, which Bush (1983; 1987; 2009) measures by an index – the index of 
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ceremonial dominance. The index is the ratio of ceremonial values to instrumental values. If 
the ratio significantly exceeds one, the institutional structure is ceremonially dominated. In 
such a case, the Lysenkoan effects become prevalent and no technological change occurs 
because spurious knowledge is void of any instrumental content. Tool (1994, p.410) called 
the Lysenkoan process of change “path independent” change. If the index is slightly below 
unity, the outcome observed would be ceremonial encapsulation. In this case, some 
technological innovation takes place but the value system largely remains unaltered. Tool 
(1994) associated this species of ceremonial encapsulation with the phenomenon of 
institutional path dependence – that is, one that is deeply culturally embedded.  
Instrumental embodiment occurs if the index is significantly less than one (Bush 1983; 1987; 
2009). The index can never be zero because of the inevitable coexistence of ceremonial and 
instrumental systems in any society; they only differ in degree of prevalence. This dynamic 
force is one of progressive institutional change. Bush (1987, p.1103) asserts that “the 
growth of knowledge is both the cause and consequence of progressive institutional 
change.” Progressive institutional change follows a change in the value structure, which in 
turn follows an increase in knowledge (technological innovation). Tool (1994, p.410) called 
this process “path-determinant” change, and the instrumental theory of value considers this 
process of institutional change the most desirable.  
These three mechanisms are stages in a single process of institutional change. Lysenkoan 
ceremonial encapsulation occurs first, especially in societies that are endemically 
ceremonially dominated by non-cultural ceremonial systems such as propaganda and 
scientific ideologies. Lost instrumental efficiency occurs second as ceremonial systems 
withstand change in favour of the status quo. Finally, the occurrence of ceremonial 
encapsulation or instrumental embodiment depends on the relative dominance of each 
system (ceremonial or instrumental) in matters of feasibility of the proposed change or the 
change suggested by new knowledge (Table 2-1).  
2.4.4. Evaluating institutional change 
Although Paul D Bush managed to demonstrate that when the index of ceremonial 
dominance exceeded one, institutional change was likely going to be regressive, the 
problem is that ceremonial values and behaviours and instrumental values and behaviours 
are difficult to separate and measure. Criteria that are more definitive would make it 
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possible to evaluate the character of institutional change unambiguously. Extending his 
previous work on the social value principle, which also lacked definitive criteria, Tool (1994) 
derived criteria for evaluating the regressiveness or progressiveness of institutional change.  
Five criteria that characterise progressive institutional change are the democratic test; the 
instrumental efficiency test; the growth of knowledge test; the minimal needs test and the 
environmental continuity test. Instrumental theory of value demands that policy change be 
a democratically responsive process. The maxim in this case is that “those who receive the 
incidence of the policy… [must be] able to find and employ means to change such policy” 
(Tool 1994, p.414). He believed that interested and affected parties must retain control over 
the policy (Tool 1990). Deliberative institutional change results in “equitable solutions,” 
(Norgaard 2007, p.375).  
The instrumental efficiency test evaluates the extent to which institutional change allows 
technological processes that enhances the economic progress of society (Tool (1994). 
Hodgson (2004b, p.8) characterises “socio-economic evolution… [as] concerned with human 
welfare and well-being” and that is the essence of instrumental efficiency. Institutional 
change is instrumentally efficient to the extent that it is non-discriminatory change. 
Instrumental efficiency assesses the extent to which the new institution is pragmatic and 
not advancing a particular ideology (Tool 1990).  
Since democracy is the only political institutional arrangement consistent with instrumental 
theory of valuation (Bush 2009, Dewey [1930] 2001, Hayden 2006), institutional change is to 
be evaluated on its contribution to participatory knowledge production. The process of 
institutional change itself is a hypotheses testing process, which must yield valuable lessons 
for future processes of social change. Deliberative economics, as Norgaard (2007) named it 
(and it could be added, deliberative science and policymaking), is an indispensable 
component of valuable knowledge generation. The result would be robust policies. 
Democratic institutional change results in “deliberative learning processes” (Norgaard 2007, 
p.376). 
Forasmuch as institutional change redistributes economic advantages and access to 
necessaries of life (Bromley 1997, Dawson 1994), progressive change must satisfy the 
minimum livelihood needs of those to be affected by it (Wisman 2011). Lastly, institutional 
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change qualified as progressive if it facilitated environmental continuity. This test build on 
Veblen’s (1914) instinct of parental bent, which concerned itself with intergenerational 
equity or sustainability. A process of change that facilitated destructive utilisation of the 
environment would be regressive. Although Tool (1994) did not provide weights for the 
criteria, it is inferable that the weight of each criterion depends on the circumstance under 
investigation. An evaluation of environmental policy change, for example, would grant the 
greatest weight to the environmental continuity test. One would expect the policy to give 
adequate protection to biodiversity without losing tempered anthropocentrism. 
Tool (1994) also developed criteria for identifying regressive institutional change: possession 
of power test, status quo preservation test, invidious defence test and pecuniary gains test. 
At the heart of the possession of power test is the question of whether authoritative agents 
of the state justify their actions to the recipients of government policies and regulations. A 
system characterised by the “practice of resource management by proclamation” (Bromley 
1985, p.790) or “the old-style [of] ruling-down” (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, p.100, 
emphasis in original), in which reason-giving is lacking, characterises regressive change 
(Brandom 1995; 1997, Hayden 2006, Price 2013). The decisions that fail to pass judicial 
scrutiny, scientific scrutiny, economic scrutiny and democratic scrutiny, would be regressive. 
The status quo preservation test manifests whenever the ceremonial system overpowers 
the technological system based on arguments about property rights, some ceremonies or 
other existing institutional arrangements that are creating the problem to be corrected 
(Bromley 2007; 2009). This test assesses the extent to which self-serving interests prevail 
against the “public good” (Norgaard 2007, p.376). As it appears, the invidious defence test is 
the antithesis of the instrumental efficiency test. It is a defence along discriminatory lines, 
for example, to maintain apartheid system privileges in a post-apartheid constitutional 
dispensation.  
Lastly, the pecuniary gains test evaluates the extent to which the Veblenian pecuniary 
culture, such as arguments about profits and other private economic gains, are used as 
justification against institutional change (Hayden 2003, Norgaard 2007). One can use Bush’s 
(1983; 1987; 2009) index of ceremonial dominance to assess the degree of pecuniary 
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dominance as a ratio of pecuniary values to sustainability values (Mora and Valentinov 
2012, Valentinov 2015).  
With these definitive criteria for evaluating institutional change in place, Tool (1994) added 
the environmental continuity principle to the three principles of institutional change that 
Foster (1981c) earlier developed. The first principle of institutional adjustment is the 
principle of technological determination, which requires a problem to suggest its own 
solution as opposed to a one-size-fits-all approach (Foster 1981c). The second principle is 
that of recognised interdependences, which postulates that institutional change is to 
produce instrumentally efficient correlations of human interactions and activities in the 
post-adjustment period (Foster 1981c). This principle recognises that society is a complex 
network of interrelated instituted activities and processes that mutually depend on each 
other. Adjusting one necessarily affects the rest. The third principle is the principle of 
minimal dislocation (Foster 1981c), which requires a favourable sequencing of institutional 
change to guarantee a reasonable minimum livelihood for those to be affected by the 
change – that is, avoiding “‘shock therapy’” (Tool 1994, p.406). 
Up to Foster, the principles had not taken into account the Veblenian instinct of parental 
bent, which was to be an arbiter in deciding sustainability issues in institutional adjustment.  
Swaney (1987) argued for an original institutionalist theory of environmental economics in 
which he replaced Tool’s (1994) environmental continuity principle with an all-
encompassing coevolutionary principle. The coevolutionary principle postulates that the 
social system and the ecological system evolve together, but often the co-evolution is non-
harmonious (Swaney 1987). A policy change is progressive if it puts the social system and 
the ecological system on a sustainable co-evolutionary path (Gual and Norgaard 2010, Kallis 
and Norgaard 2010, Norgaard 1984; 1988, Swaney 1986, Valentinov 2015). This made the 
OIE paradigm a socio-ecologically balanced scientific research programme. Thus, the 
framework for explaining and evaluating purposeful institutional change is a “broad 
framework in terms of a set of meta-theoretic and methodological guidelines” (Hodgson 
1998a, p.174). 
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2.4.5. Summary 
The OIE theory of institutional change of the Veblenian tradition is premised on the 
pragmatist view of economics as a problem solving science. Since it is a problem solving 
science, human purpose plays a central role in shaping institutional change. The presence of 
purpose implies that social valuation is inescapable. Rather than leave the role of valuation 
to the markets, the OIE theory of change requires an active application of knowledge to 
decide what it is society finds best to do given its technological constraints. While purpose 
defines the OIE theory, in effect, at any one time there are in co-existence ceremonial 
purposes and instrumental purposes. This makes institutional change a dialectical process 
whose final outcome is a function of the relative dominance of instrumental purposes over 
ceremonial purpose or the converse. The OIE theory makes explicit the mechanisms by 
which progressive institutional change can be hindered or sustained: ceremonial 
encapsulation leading to path dependence; Lysenkoan effects leading to path independent 
change; and instrumental embodiment leading to path determinant change.  
The most important point is that institutional change can be evaluated using progressive 
criteria: the democratic test; the instrumental efficiency test; the growth of knowledge test; 
the minimal needs test; and the environmental continuity test. Regressive change can be 
evaluated on four criteria: the pecuniary gains test; the invidious defence test; the 
possession of power test; and the status quo defence test. The overall adjustment process 
has to be guided by four principles: the coevolutionary principle; the minimal dislocation 
principle; the principle of technological determination; and the principle of recognised 
interdependences. The application of these criteria and principles is a normative exercise. 
2.5. Commonsian theory of institutional change  
Like Thorstein B Veblen, John R Commons worked out his theory of institutional economics 
within a climate of epistemological revolution introduced by the Darwinian Theory of 
Evolution, which required explanations in terms of a pure cumulative causal process that 
was goalless (Commons 2009). Natural selection is a purposeless continuous process of 
cause and effect in which environmental conditions (selection criteria) determine which 
species survive depending on their adaptive capabilities (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a). 
Unlike Thorstein B Veblen, who embraced Charles Darwin’s natural selection mechanism in 
explaining institutional change, John R Commons was resolute that social phenomena were 
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guided by human purpose, hence institutional change was a purpose-driven process (Bazzoli 
2000, Commons 1924b; 2009, Cordes 2006; 2007). Bazzoli (2000, p.1) supports Commons’ 
view arguing that the “specificity of evolution in the area of social phenomena” makes 
artificial selection a key metaphor in social theory. The argument is that the “new Darwinian 
idea of continuous change and its abandonment of a foreordained goal” made it a “blind 
causal process” which was not directly applicable to social phenomena (Bazzoli 2000, p.4). 
2.5.1. Transaction 
Commons’ (2009, p.683) point of departure in the search for ways to improve the theory of 
economics and make capitalism reasonable was that economic theory made incomplete 
explanations of change because it sought causation of the present human activity in history. 
Rather, the future causes the present, hence the future (purpose) rather than the past 
(reflection) causes institutional change. The future is a body of expectations or “created 
imaginings” that participants possess as Bromley (2004b, p.81) puts it. Since they possess 
disparate expectations, they inevitably have to employ a psychology of negotiation with 
others in order to realise their expected future (Bromley 2004b; 2006).  
Negotiational psychology is characterised by the reciprocals: persuasions or coercions; 
commands and obedience; as well as arguments and pleadings (Bromley 2006, Commons 
1931, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012, Ramstad 1996). As is apparent, negotiational 
psychology is a manifestation of legally sanctioned power relationships between legal 
superiors and legal inferiors (commands and obedience); between legal equals (persuasions 
or coercions); and between a collective legal superior and an individual/collective legal 
inferior (arguments and pleadings) (Albert and Ramstad 1997; 1998, Kaufman 2007, 
Ramstad 1996, Valentinov 2009). 
In the Commonsian School, a transaction is “the smallest unit” of analysis (Commons 1931, 
p.652) and a transaction is an exchange of various kinds of rights (Commons 2009, 
Rutherford 1996). It is in the transaction that the three ideas of negotiational psychology, 
expectations about the future, and the causal influence of the future on the present, have 
meaning. Commons (1924b, p.121) defines a transaction as a relational process that has 
“both the economic dimensions of opportunity and power and the legal dimensions of 
reciprocal rights [and] duties”, which is regulated by the working rules. The definition unites 
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economics, law and ethics (Commons 1924a, Hodgson 2003b, Samuels 1972a). Inherent in 
this definition is the concept of property, which he defines as the “power of scarcity” 
(Commons 1942, p.370) or the power to withhold (Commons 1934; 1942; 2009, Dawson 
1998, Parsons and Commons 1942). Inherent also in the definition is the concept of liberty, 
which he defines as “bargaining power” (Commons 1942, p.370). Working rules are 
institutions, and since the working rules correlate human behaviour, to one party they 
ascribe rights and to another they impose duty; to one party they create capacity and to 
another exposure among other correlative aspects (Commons 1924b; 1931, Dawson 1994, 
Hohfeld 1913; 1917).  
Three dynamic social forces – conflict, mutuality and order – always characterise a 
transaction (Commons 2009). Since parties to a transaction necessarily have opposing 
interests and since the parties may/may not be legal equals, there is a possibility of 
exploitation and abuse leading to void and voidable transactions (Dawson 1994; 1998, 
Ramstad 2001). Yet, the parties depend on each other (mutuality) to consummate a 
transaction. Commons (2009, p.654) argues that the choice each participant makes in a 
transaction is a triadic act of “a performance, an avoidance, and a forbearance”. A 
performance is the application of “power over nature or others” (Commons 2009, p.654), 
while avoidance is a volitional choice not to act in particular ways - for example a choice not 
to enslave, exploit or cheat a weaker party in a transaction. Forbearance is the choice not to 
exert full power on others in a transaction. Commons (2009, p.654) argues that “It  is  from  
forbearance  that  the  doctrine  of  reasonableness  arises.”  
The social problems emerging from the transaction process bring a third superior collective 
authority, such as a court, into the transaction arena to create order out of the conflict 
(Bromley 2008a, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011). This order, Dawson (1994, p.36) argues, is 
the “legal power structure – a structure that was typically the source of conflict and 
reworked out in policy process.” The order usually takes the form of a court ruling, an 
injunction, a directive or some such intervention, which becomes a new institution that shall 
bind all future transactors who find themselves in a similar predicament. Therefore, “order 
refers to the reproduction of working rules” (Bazzoli 2000, p.14). The three social forces 
imply the presence of multiple parties to a transaction, some directly interested in the 
outcome, while some enforce existing working rules and create new working rules. 
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The Commonsian school distinguishes amongst three categories of transactions. First, 
bargaining transactions transpire between legal equals when exchanging property rights in 
the market employing the negotiational psychology of persuasion or coercion (Biddle 1990, 
Ramstad 1996, Valentinov 2009). Persuasion necessarily implies that the parties to the 
transaction have liberty (Commons 1942). Commons (1942) emphasises that coercion is the 
use of economic force by legally withholding a resource from a party that does not own the 
resource, but wants to own or use it. Second, managerial transactions produce wealth for a 
society and employ the negotiational psychology of command and obedience since they 
take place between an individual legal superior and an individual legal inferior (Kaufman 
2007).  
Thirdly, rationing (administrative) transactions transpire between a collective legal superior 
and an individual/collective legal inferior when the superior apportions the burdens and 
benefits of the society’s wealth-creation process to inferiors using the negotiational 
psychology of argumentation and pleading (Albert and Ramstad 1998, Ramstad 1989; 1996). 
Bromley (2004b) specifies rationing transactions as taking place in policymaking contexts, in 
court proceedings where judges and lawyers argue and plead out facts and in parliamentary 
debates among others. Commons (2009) also discusses a special class of transactions, which 
he calls strategic transactions, which arise because there might be a limiting factor, such as 
a regulatory vacuum, or overregulation, against which organised lobby groups might 
advocate or protest leading to institutional change.  
2.5.2. Principles of institutional change 
In the Commonsian framework, it is not just the three social forces (conflict, dependence 
and order) that drive the process of institutional change, but also five fundamental 
principles that configure conflict, dependence and order in every transaction. Commons 
(1924b; 2009) identifies the five principles as the principle of scarcity; the principle of 
sovereignty; the principle of efficiency; the principle of futurity; and the principle of working 
rules. Commons (2009, p.94) defines a principle as the “similarity of actions” (italics in 
original). Thus, a principle involves a flow of time. Commons (2009, p.94) emphasises that 
“because a principle involves the sequence of time it is a similarity of cause, effect or 
purpose” (italics in original). For example, the principle of scarcity in a maize market for 
household consumption might be a cause of activity (importation of maize), or an effect of 
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an activity (diversion of maize to bio-fuel production) or a purpose intended by an actor 
(commercial farmers’ union withholding maize supplies to influence price).  
Commons (2009) defines the principle of scarcity as the similarity of bargaining transactions 
in all their variety within an exchange context. The principle of efficiency is the similarity of 
managerial transactions in all their variety in a going plant (Commons 2009). The principle of 
working rules (institutions, customs) is “collective action in restraint, liberation and 
expansion of individual action” (Bromley 2008a, p.229). Commons (2009, p.737) defines 
custom as the “the binding force” of the collective will over the individual will. Ramstad 
(1986) points out that it is the principle of working rules that identifies Commons with other 
institutionalists. The principle of sovereignty is the repetitive use of the sanction of physical 
force by a superior in a variety of rationing transactions as he/she apportions the benefits 
and burdens of the going concern upon subordinates (Commons 2009, Ramstad 1996). 
Commons (2009, p.738) defines the principle of futurity as the likeness of a variety of 
repetitive transactions and their valuations performed in real time “with reference to future 
events as expected hindrances, aids, or consequences.” 
Economic theory, as Commons (2009) argues, rests on the interactive dynamics of the five-
part principles with each other and with the whole of which they are parts. Thus, Commons 
(2009, p.738) postulates that the five principles are parts of a whole that he calls the 
“principle of Willingness”. As a concept, willingness is “the complex attributes of human 
beings” (Commons 2009, p.738). Cordes (2006, p.533) describes the complex human 
attributes as “cognitive processes” such as imagination, creativity, social learning, 
dispositions, instincts, habits, beliefs, attitudes, hypotheses formation, emotions, passion, 
reason and intellect among others. However, as a principle, willingness is the variability of 
repetitive actions and transactions of volitional agents “within the limiting and 
complementary interdependence of the principles of scarcity, efficiency, working rules, 
sovereignty and futurity” (Commons 2009, p.738). 
The five principles can figuratively be thought of as five dimensions of the human will and “a 
change in one dimension changes all the others” thereby changing the “whole transaction” 
and the “whole of willingness” (Commons 2009, p.738). For example, the scarcity of clean 
(relatively non-polluted) rivers reduces efficient supply of clean water, which in turn alters 
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expectations about future water security (futurity), which in turn might cause the 
government authorities to intervene (sovereignty) with directives or regulations to control 
discharge of pollutants into rivers (that is, new working rules or institutions). This chain of 
changes transfigures the transaction and the willingness of social agents to wait or act. Thus, 
institutional change can be triggered by changes in any one of the dimensions of willingness. 
In the following subsections discussion is limited to the principle of futurity and the principle 
of sovereignty because of the centrality of these principles in the thesis. The other three 
principles automatically enter the discussion since they are holistically interdependent with 
the two. 
 a. Principle of futurity 
This principle forms the cornerstone of the Commonsian school because causation runs 
from the future to the present (Bromley 2004b; 2012, Dawson 1994). Commons (2009, p.84) 
argues that his institutional economics is a “science of Futurity”. He draws attention to the 
fact that a cursory review of human affairs demonstrates that from pre-scientific to 
scientific activities to religious activities “the principle of Futurity dominates human activity” 
(Commons 2009, p.84). Dawson (1994, p.40) emphasises that social agents make “decisions 
while moving into the void of time”. Because the future is uncertain, Dawson (1994, p.33-
34) emphasises that the void of time indicates that “uncertainty… gives rise to our feeling of 
fear, doubt, and hope”. Within a transaction context, individuals not only formulate 
expectations about the behaviour of other parties to the transaction as the working rules 
require of them, but also formulate expectations about the future in general.  
Commons (2009, p.742) reiterates that his theory of institutional change is an “economic 
theory of willingness” and “of the unfinished but attainable future”.  It is in the willingness 
that social agents are ever hopeful and creating/planning a series of futures that when 
reconciled constitutes the grand future/plan of that society, which may/may not be 
attained. Bromley (2004b; 2006; 2008a; 2010) has tendered a comprehensive discussion of 
the principle of futurity in public policy, which in essence is the process of institutional 
change. He argues that when a problem in human society emerges, it comes as a “surprise” 
(Bromley 2004b, p.80, italics in original). Since it is a surprise, it defies the existing truth 
claims about such problematic situations and its first effects on the minds of the people are 
“individualized impressions” (Bromley 2012, p.17).  
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The surprise forces individuals to carry out an investigation into that surprise using their 
impressions as data and the result would be “expressions” (Bromley 2004b, p.80, italics in 
original), which also are data for the next stage. Expressions constitute the created reality 
about the existing problematic situation that individuals begin to habitually tell themselves 
and others about as well as begin to live on that new truth as a scaffold (Bromley 2004b, 
Hiedanpää and Bromley 2002). On the basis of the expressions, the individuals begin to 
imagine the future and how their created future would play out as the problem unfolds. It is 
the created imaginings, or “history-to-come” (Dawson 1994, p.34), that put volitional beings 
to action. Cordes (2006, p.537, emphasis added) reiterates that evolved Homo sapiens have 
“the cognitive capabilities that allow them to anticipate and avoid selection effects.” Thus, 
when an individual enters the bargaining transaction context, he/she negotiates from the 
perspective of the created future with the view to realise that future if it is favourable or to 
avert it if it is expected to be adverse. 
At a societal level, there are several millions of such impressions, expressions and created 
imaginings. The collective authority has the responsibility of processing these various 
imaginings and expressions. A process of reconciliation of the “multitude of contending 
expressions” (Bromley 2008a, p.227, italics in original) and imaginings leads to an “emergent 
consensus” of the collective authority (Bromley 2004b, p.93). The process of reconciliation is 
a rationing transaction premised on the psychology of argumentation and pleading in the 
“realm of reasons” such as legislatures and courts (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, p.106, 
italics in original). The emergent consensus, after passing through democratic valuation, 
becomes the grand consensual expression of what the current situation is and the grand 
consensual created imagining (future) a society beholds for the time being.  
The grand consensus is a “valuable belief” (Bromley 2008d, p.8) upon which action unfolds 
in the “realm of rules” or administrative realm (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, p.106, 
emphasis in original), which is the phase of implementation of the valuable belief. This is a 
strategic transaction because “individuals use their intelligence to find a creative response 
to the new situation in order to adapt to, and to control, their environment” (Bazzoli 2000, 
p.8). Institutional innovation arises from strategic transactions driven by the desire to break 
out of limiting factors that the imagined future brings to light (Cordes 2006; 2007). Cordes 
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(2006, p.534) emphasises that the fundamental driving force of institutional change is 
“human cognition, wants, and creativity… [that] motivate the search for novelty.” 
On the basis of the grand future, new rules, new policies, new laws, new regulations or new 
directives and new court rulings – that is, new working rules, which constitute institutional 
change – are passed (Bazzoli 2000, Bromley 2006, Cordes 2007). From the same consensual 
emergent future, new scarcities and new conflicts emerge. Thus, the principles of futurity 
and scarcity together with the principle of working rules interact to create new transactional 
settings thereby altering human willingness to act or wait.  
Daniel W Bromley’s account reasonably predicts the emergence of global institutions of 
environmental governance such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Kyoto 
Protocol, among others. They all started as created imaginings of a group of activist-
scientists who told a story about the next great extinction, ozone depletion, climatic 
catastrophes and ocean fisheries crises. These powerful imaginings moved the global 
community of political leaders to action in order to create international covenants (Corell 
and Betsill 2001, Haas 1989; 1992, Lund 2013, Max-Neef 2005, Nelson 2010, Peterson 1992, 
Phillips 2003, Porritt 2007). Thus, the future (created imaginings) causes the present 
(institutional change). 
b. Principle of sovereignty 
Sovereignty is both a structural agent (the state) and a process by which the state extracts 
the sanction of physical violence from private hands and centralises it within itself 
(Commons 1899a; 1899b; 1924b; 2009). The bureaucratic hierarchy becomes the locus of 
sovereign power. As such, Commons (2009, p.684) argues that sovereignty “is the changing 
process of authorizing, prohibiting and regulating the use of physical force in human affairs.” 
It is by the acts of sanctioning, prescribing and proscribing that sovereignty creates order 
when deciding transactional conflicts. Order necessarily implies stability of expectations 
(principle of futurity) attained through new working rules.  
The principle of sovereignty, as Bazzoli (2000, p.9) points out, is John R Commons’ 
“conception of the source of social order, a conception that perhaps dissociates him most 
from mainstream theory.” Because conflict is ubiquitous, inherent and inevitable in 
transactions, a theory of institutional change has to explain how order emerges. Bazzoli 
38 | P a g e  
 
(2000, p.9) argues that the Commonsian view “rejects the classical view that spontaneous 
order [emerges] via the invisible hand” since “order implies that a coercive structure of 
rules” is established and enforced by a collective authority. However, other evolutionary 
social scientists maintain that self-reinforcing spontaneous orders are also ubiquitous 
(Aldrich et al. 2008, Hodgson 2003a; 2003b, Langlois and Hodgson 1992). 
Dugger (1996b, p.427) argues that sovereignty builds “on some form of power”. He 
discusses three sources of power which are three forms of sovereignty. The most basic form 
of sovereignty is that of the state, which has monopoly over physical violence. The second 
form of sovereignty is the power of property, which is the power of scarcity or the power to 
withhold (Commons 1942, Dawson 1998, Valentinov 2009) – the monopoly over economic 
violence or the sanction of poverty (Commons 1924b). Thus, property owners are able to 
participate in sovereignty. The third form of sovereignty is that exercised by “religious, 
moral, and cultural concerns, based on the power of opinion” (Dugger 1996b, p.428). It is 
evident that the multiplicities of types of sovereignty simultaneously work out their effects 
in a transaction. Dugger (1996b, p.427) also maintained that sovereignty is “multiple and 
relative.” Thus, anyone with some form of power can participate in sovereignty.  
There are, however, covert forms of power, which Bernays (1928, p.9) describes as the 
shrewd schemes of controlling the “organized habits and opinions of the masses… [and that] 
those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government 
which is the true ruling power….” He argues that the “invisible governors” govern through 
“their ability to supply needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure” 
(Bernays 1928, p.9). It follows, therefore, that there is also a possibility of including a fourth 
form of sovereignty – that of scientific communities – which is based on the sanction of 
scientific opinion or sanction of ignorance, which can be conceptualised as the power to 
silence other groups because their claims are regarded as non-authoritative or non-
scientific. This power works invisibly by creating a climate of ideas that shapes the 
ideologies and habitual assumptions of those legitimately vested with the sovereign powers 
to make public decisions (new institutions) (Ayres 1996).  
Dugger (1980) also observes tacit knowledge as a source of power derived from repetitive 
performance of institutional roles. He identifies four mechanisms by which power reveals 
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itself. Firstly, he postulates a mechanism of subreption in which corporatocracy manipulates 
all institutions of society so that they become means to the ends of corporations. Norgaard 
(2007, p.376) observes “a disconcerting mix of theocracy, corporatocracy, and crony 
capitalism” as anti-deliberation elements in biodiversity policy reforms.  
Secondly, Dugger (1980) also postulates the mechanism of emulation by which one 
institution becomes revered such that all other institutions emulate it. Thirdly, he observes 
contamination as another mechanism by which power manifests itself in the case where 
one institution assumes the motives of another, which naturally are never its motives. He 
uses an example of a religious institution modelling itself after the corporate world and 
measuring its attainments by the size of its real estate and financial power.  
Lastly, Dugger (1980) identifies the mechanism of mystification, which comes to the fore 
when the artefacts, products or some elements of an institution are granted ceremonial 
power. An example he gives is the mystical power given to prices in economic valuation 
processes so as to decide new policies, yet corporations make prices using their power of 
scarcity. It has been argued that the mystification of corporate prices allows corporations to 
invisibly take over government policy (principles of sovereignty and working rules) because 
results of economic valuation, in the main, favour the status quo (Bromley 2007, Hayden 
2003).  Dawson (1994, p.38) similarly argues that “leaving resolution [of policy problems] in 
the hands of “the market” amounted  to  legitimating  exercise of  power as  structured  by  
the  existing set of  legal  rights.” 
Taken together, the four mechanism of institutional hegemony are the ways by which 
sovereignty can be captured and employed to advance the ends of the powerful people and 
groups in a social and policy context. While they manifest in daily lives, there is reason to 
suspect them to play out to the fullest effect when policymakers plan institutional change. 
This is because institutional change redistributes economic advantages and burdens (Biddle 
1990, Bromley 2001, Dawson 1994, Ramstad 1989).  
2.5.3. Reasonable value as a theory of institutional change 
The triadic forces of conflict, mutuality and order imply that the process of institutional 
change is a problem of identifying reasonable value (Commons 2009). Since Commons’ 
theory of change was developed within the context of transactions, collective authority 
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plays a central role in the evolution of new institutions as it decides conflicts to bring order. 
Hodgson (2003a; 2004) has criticised the Original Institutionalists for some methodologically 
collectivists theoretical formulations such as the Veblenian Dichotomy whereby cultural and 
technological determinism seem to determine all social change and individual agency is 
undermined as collectivism is made to explain every aspect of institutional change. It would 
appear as though Commons’ theory instantiates methodological collectivism.  
The theory of reasonable value, however, identifies the initial purposeful emergence of 
institutions as unorganised custom, say, in the form of industrial norms and standards or 
codes of practice (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012). Here, unorganised custom does not imply 
the absence of purpose in design, but rather the absence of harmonisation and 
standardisation of the customs and practices so that they can be equitably enforced by a 
central authority. In deciding conflicts, courts create order by what can be characterised as a 
process of codifying, formalising, sanctifying and canonising the best practice out of current 
multiple alternative practices that constitute the already existing unorganised customs 
(Bromley 2006, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011; 2012).  
In essence, the process by which new formal institutions emerge (created by collective 
authority) is a secondary process that utilises as data, already existing informal institutions 
(created by individual agency) to accumulate common law precedent (Bazzoli 2000, Bromley 
2008a, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012). Cordes (2006, p.533) emphasises that the institutions 
comprising spontaneous orders “may subsequently be subject to deliberate considerations.” 
While Hodgson (1998a; 2003a; 2003b; 2004; 2007) takes issue with OIE for being 
methodological collectivists, the critique seems to be harsh because the Commonsian 
theory uses a co-evolutionary methodology for studying institutional change, which Bazzoli 
(2000, p.14) calls a “methodological middle way between individualism and holism.” She 
describes the methodological middle way as “a theory of cumulative causation between 
individual action (individual causation) and collective action (institutional causation)” 
(Bazzoli 2000, p.6).  
The negotiational psychology leading to the selection of the best practice is that of 
argumentation and pleadings – the “game of giving and asking for reasons” (Price 2013, 
p.31). Rationing transactions play a central role in driving institutional change. Bromley 
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(2006) emphasises that the logic of sufficient reason (purpose/final cause) guides the choice 
of the best custom out of rival customs. It is by this process that common law evolves over 
time thereby redefining the legal foundations of the economy; redefining opportunity sets; 
redefining rights and permissions as well as reapportioning benefits and burdens of the 
going concern (Bromley 2007; 2008a, Ramstad 1991).  
Commons (2009, p.681), thus, defines “reasonable values as reasonable transactions, 
reasonable practices, and social utility, equivalent to public purpose.” The Commonsian 
theory locates value in social practices, norms and customs because that which is valuable is 
that which the collective authority finds sufficient reasons to canonise, hence the notion of 
reasonableness. Interestingly, the Commonsian theory defines social utility as the public 
purpose, which, certainly, is not an aggregation of individual utility functions to obtain the 
social utility function that then defines social welfare. To Commons, social utility is the “Due 
Process of Law” (Commons 2009, p.681). His argument is that when procedural/ 
administrative law is adhered to in making public decisions (enforcing or changing 
institutions) a reasonable democratic citizen derives satisfaction out of that process. Social 
utility is about human dignity and human dignity is the upholding of an individual’s 
democratic rights (Mashaw 1980; 1981). 
Scholars have discussed the seeming inconsequentiality of Commons’ theory of reasonable 
value observing that it fails to yield determinate results to guide policymakers and social 
agents (Dawson 1994, Ramstad 1995). The question is how reasonable is reasonable value? 
Commons (2009, p.682) stated that “Man is not a rational being… he is a being of stupidity, 
passion, and ignorance … Hence Reasonable Value contains a large amount of stupidity, 
passion, and mistake.” This assertion not only refutes the neoclassical assumption of 
rational economic agent, but also suggests that stupidity, passion and ignorance act as 
mental filters that mediate meanings and imagination in decision-making processes. But, 
what makes stupidity, passion and ignorance? It would seem as though ideologies, dogmas, 
beliefs, habits, superstitions, traditions, fear and hope shape people’s cognitive structures 
(Ayres 1996, Galiani and Sened 2014, Mokyr 2014, North 1990), possibly leading to 
unreasonable expectations.  
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Bromley (2008d, p.4), nonetheless, argues that the supremacy of reasonable valuation is 
that “the purpose of reason is to defeat indeterminacy… Indeterminacy is the reason we 
reason. Indeterminacy explains reasoning.” Policy scientists have severally demonstrated 
that policy problems are wicked and messy, with few being tameable (King 1993, Rittel and 
Webber 1973). Usually, there is no single social theory to coordinate social agents in 
attempting to resolve the problems, thus there are non-convergent knowledge, ideological 
and belief systems about the problems, especially wicked ones (King 1993, Rittel and 
Webber 1973). A key feature of wicked problems, and perhaps, messes, is that they are 
indeterminate, hence deterministic solutions, while desirable for reasons of certitude to 
policymakers and scientists, do not help much in resolving such problems (Balint et al. 2011, 
Hartmann 2012, King 1993, Ritchey 2011, Rittel and Webber 1973). Thus, reasonable value 
is required to defeat indeterminacy. 
While messes can be solved by paying meticulous attention to the details of the puzzle, 
wicked problems cannot be resolved; they can only be managed (Balint et al. 2011). 
Managing in this case implies consensus building, hence the need for reasonable valuation 
(Commons 1942, Norgaard 2007). To Commons (2009, p.743), the reasonable value theory 
solution concept is that “It is not “what I think” ought to be, but what “we think” ought to 
be and can be attained, as a going concern.” The emphasis is on the collective will and not 
the individual will in resolving complex problems, hence rationing transactions are 
significant as sources of institutional change. 
While scholars such as Ramstad (1989) maintain that the instrumental value theory has no 
common ground with reasonable value theory because Commons rejected the Veblenian 
Dichotomy, factors that make up for the stupidity, passion and ignorance arise from what 
the Veblenian Dichotomy calls ceremonial systems. Commons (2009, p.697) himself 
maintains that in rationing transactional context, one has to know who sits “on the Supreme 
Court bench than to know what the law is. The Constitution is not what it says it is – it is 
what the Court says it is.” The judges’ habitual assumptions, ideologies, beliefs and 
preferences matter in the outcome called reasonable value, which thus includes a large 
measure of mistake, stupidity and passion (Dawson 1994). However, the negotiational 
psychology of argumentation and pleading guarantees reasonable value because it is out of 
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the practice of giving and asking for reasons that robustness in decisions arises and 
Commons (2009, p.681) maintains that the resultant working rules are “for the time being”.  
Commons’ (2009) argument that the composition of the judges on the Supreme Court 
bench determines the outcome, considered  temporally, also suggests that constitutions 
need re-interpretation because the conditions and interests that existed at the time they 
were first drafted and the present conditions and interests might be quite different (Beard 
[1935] 2012). As the process of social change takes place “new concepts of rights and 
reasonable practices” also emerge (Commons 2009, p.682). Courts decide conflicts “by the 
judicial process of weighing practices, customs, precedents, statutes, and constitutions in 
the light of changing conditions and conflicting habitual assumptions” (Commons’ 2009, 
p.690). He argues that the weighing process is an “experimental process of “exclusion and 
inclusion”” (Commons 2009, p.691). Exclusion eliminates from the meaning of a legal 
concept aspects that historically were attributed to the concept, while inclusion brings into 
the ambit of a legal concept meanings that were historically thought not to be part of it.  
In manifestation here, thus, is a purposeful Darwinian process of creating completely new 
institutions (varieties) out of the old, profoundly changing the old ones (mutation) or letting 
old institutions become extinct. Similarly, Commons (2009, p.683) argues that when 
deciding conflicts between contesting parties, the court by a “process of due evaluating” 
assigns “due weight” to each testimony and its decision is the “final word, for the time 
being, on Reasonable Value”. Thus, the process of weighing and balancing ensures 
reasonableness and context-relevance of the decision. The decision is a reasonable rule to 
live by for the time being, but will be changed as conditions or new and different conflicts 
arise.  
The reasonable value method offers “tentative and not absolute” truth (Copeland 1936, 
p.335), which is a “workable consensus” (Commons 2009, p.743). Reasonable value is “the 
consensual idealism” of the participants in a transaction context such as a court proceeding 
or a legislative debate (Commons 2009, p.743). It is the collective, inter-subjective and 
trans-subjective process of constructing reality that makes reasonable value a possibility 
and courts do that all the time (Bromley 2006, Dawson 1994, Gonce 1971, Hiedanpää and 
Bromley 2011, Max-Neef 2005). Max-Neef (2005, p.11) states that there exist “different 
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levels of perception of reality and of multi-dimensional realities”, hence the need for 
consensual idealism. 
Hodgson (2003b, p.557), however, argues that the reasonable value theory has faulty 
interpretations of the concept of habit, taking it to mean repetitive behaviour and “mental 
sensations” rather than constitutive mental capacity as intended by the psychology of habits 
and instincts. He also argues that Commons enthroned reason, belief and human will in 
place of habit and instinct thereby departing from the theoretical foundations laid down by 
Veblen (Hodgson 2003b). Hodgson (2003b) also points out that Commons failed to establish 
the causality between custom and habit; the causality between habit and reason/thought; 
the causality between the human will and habit; as well as the causality amongst instinct, 
habit and belief. As such, Hodgson (2003b) maintains that Commons transmuted pragmatist 
concepts and evolutionary psychology concepts. 
Hodgson (2003b, p.570) extends his critique of Commons’ theory for failing to recognise 
“that artificial selection was no more than a special case of “natural selection” and not an 
alternative to it”. Hodgson’s co-author, Knudsen (2002, p.444), however, emphasises that 
“neo-Darwinian explanation applies only to such economic selection processes that involve 
replication” (emphasis added). Since social systems fail the “heritability” test because it is 
proving impossible for scholars “to identify anything akin to a ‘social DNA’” (Cordes 2006, 
p.535), natural selection, as it were, becomes the special case rather than the general case 
insofar as it applies “only” to cases where the genetic inheritance law applies. Ostrom 
(2014b) tried to single out rules as genotypes because she believed rules have instructions 
encoded in them, but this only serves to illustrate the problem insofar as norms, taboos, 
habits, beliefs, superstitions, customs, conventions and many such institutions also carry 
encoded instructions. Thus, there is an identification problem when it comes to determining 
which institutions serve as genotypes (carriers of social DNA). 
It is interesting that even the progenitor of evolutionary economics, Veblen (1898b, p.188), 
adjured economists to explain how the 
“[economic man] achieved his emancipation from the law of natural selection.… [H]e 
is now able, without jeopardy to the life of the species, to play fast and loose with 
the spiritual basis of its survival… By selective necessity he is endowed with a 
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proclivity for purposeful action. He is possessed of a discriminating sense of 
purpose…”    
Veblen seems to give pre-eminence to environmental selection of the initial set of socio-
economic institutions, and then surrenders subsequent selection processes to human 
purpose “in the more advanced stages of human cultural and technological evolution” 
(Rutherford 1998, p.466). The argument is that as economic development progresses, 
artificial selection becomes predominant, although purpose is to be explained in terms of 
the “instincts [that] provide a set of original, or basic, goals of action” (Rutherford 1998, 
p.467).  
The natural selection argument is capable of explaining “origins of these cognitive 
dispositions”, but falls short in explaining continuity of socio-economic evolution (Cordes 
2006, p.536). Cordes (2006, p.536) points out that the rate of socio-economic evolution 
becomes “a qualitatively different kind and much faster pace of evolutionary change” in 
subsequent phases of cultural growth because of cognitive learning process and “accretion 
of knowledge during cultural evolution.” Perhaps, the unnatural and fast rate of 
evolutionary change experienced in subsequent periods suggests the role of Commons’ 
principle of willingness, which determines humanity’s willingness to act or wait. Ultimately, 
human intentionality cannot be ruled out (Bazzoli 2000). Perhaps, in developing his science 
of futurity, Commons had seen the relative emancipation of humanity from the law of 
natural selection, hence his insistence on a volitional explanation of institutional change. 
2.5.4. Conclusion 
Although John R Commons’s theory of institutional change is too complex to be reviewed in 
as a short a section as this owing to his holism, which connects every concept to every other 
concept, the review has demonstrated that at the core of the Commonsian theory of 
institutional change are the concepts of a problem and human purpose. The review of the 
Veblenian theory of institutional change also identified the centrality of the problem and 
human purpose. A problem emanates from transactional conflicts that necessitate the 
collective authority (sovereignty) to step in and enforce the existing working rules or modify 
them as need arises. The process of modifying the rules is a process of codifying and 
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canonising already existing customs that private agents developed in their social practices, 
which is an endogenous process of institutional innovation.  
The review noted that Commons’ theory, therefore, qualifies for a co-evolutionary 
methodology of studying institutional change since the individual agency plays a significant 
role in supplying the collective agency with data (informal institutions) for canonisation into 
the formal legal foundations of the democratic economy. The review established that the 
Commonsian theory of institutional change – the Reasonable Value theory – works on the 
logic of sufficient reason (purposeful/final cause explanation) and requires the building up 
of a grand consensus about what the future imagined by the society looks like, on the basis 
of which collective volitional action unfolds in the form of institutional change. The logic of 
sufficient reason is itself a process of experimental reasoning by which weighing and 
redefinition of legal concepts create new institutions much in the same way the Darwinian 
processes of speciation and mutation, and in addition hybridisation, operate. 
Although the Veblenian theory of institutional change operates on the logic of efficient 
cause (objective explanation) there is some reason to infer, in effect, that the Veblenian 
school operates on both the logic of efficient cause and sufficient reason. This follows from 
the centrality of reason and evidence in instrumental valuation. The knowledge frontier 
defines all that the society knows and can potentially exploit to enhance the human life 
process, yet so far it might be failing to utilise the knowledge because ceremonial forces 
encapsulated it. Thus, the knowledge frontier is the future that could be attained and it 
determines the choice of the institutional adjustment path. However, the role of culture and 
habitual assumptions also makes the past a causative agent in light of the reality of 
institutional path dependence.  
The Veblenian School and the Commonsian School seem to differ in their social value 
theory. The Veblenian School has a predetermined social value principle, which requires 
institutional change to satisfy the condition that it is non-discriminatory and facilitates the 
improvement of the human life process, while facilitating the fullest possible instrumental 
use of knowledge to that end. In the Commonsian theory, values emerge in the course of 
deliberation through the negotiational psychology of argumentation and pleading. Practices 
that obtain sufficient reasons constitute what society finds best to do for the time being. 
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Nonetheless, it can be argued that the Veblenian social value principle is merely a goal to 
which society aspires and to which actual values that emerge from deliberative process 
ought to conform. In that sense, the two value principles converge. Despite this difference, 
the two schools do not use price theory to measure value in deciding institutional change. 
A fundamental difference between the two schools is that the Veblenian school singles out 
technological evolution as the diving force of institutional change, while the Commonsian 
school considers conflicts and conflict resolution to be the primary source of institutional 
change by the common law process. While the Veblenian school takes institutions as 
sources of inertia, the Commonsian school takes institutional rigidty as pre-requisite for 
social order. However, both the Veblenian and Commonsian theories are theories of 
cumulative and circular causation process. 
Chapter 3 provides a review of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm, with a 
particular focus on the Douglass C North’s theory of change insofar as he has pioneered and 
continued to focus on the role of ideology and knowledge in economic change processes. 
After reviewing the NIE’s critique to the OIE, an integrated institutionalist framework for 
evaluating institutional change is presented. 
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Chapter 3  
new institutionalism Theories of institutional change with critiques from              
the original institutionalism 
 
“Acquire new knowledge whilst thinking over the old.” 
The Sayings of Confucius (Cranmer-Byng and Kapadia 1910, p.94) 
 
Is there anything of which one can say, 
“Look! This is something new”? 
It was here already, long ago; 
it was here before our time. 
 
Ecclesiastes 1 verse 10, Today’s New International Version,  2005  
 
3.1. New Institutional Economics theory of institutional change 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) has its foundations in the works of Ronald H Coase, 
particularly his work on property rights theory, contract theory, and alternative institutional 
arrangements of production as well as transaction costs (Coase 1937; 1960; 1992, Galiani 
and Sened 2014). Mäki, Gustafsson and Knudsen (1993, p.11), however believe that “[Carl] 
Menger has perhaps more claim to be the patron saint of the new institutional economics”. 
Hodgson (2004b, p.5) also believes that “Carl Menger’s (1871) theory of the evolution of 
‘organic’ or undesigned institutions” was foundational to the NIE although none of the 
luminaries of the NIE – Williamson, Coase, North and Ostrom – ever made the claim that 
Menger influenced them or that they were building on Menger. For example, North (1992, 
p.4; 1994, p.360) emphasises, in no uncertain terms, that “It was Ronald Coase (1960) who 
made the crucial connection between institutions, transaction costs, and neoclassical 
theory.” Again, “Coase [1937] and [1960] gave birth to the transaction costs approach to the 
study of institutions by studying the firm” (North 1994, p.610). This view is an inference 
made by Hodgson and his co-authors. The NIE is a diverse research programme that has at 
least three major sub-schools of thought: the micro-institutional (governance) economics 
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school led by Ronald H Coase and Oliver E Williamson, the macro-institutional economics 
led by Douglass C North and the integrative school led by Elinor Ostrom that puts together 
theoretical insights from the first two schools and apply them to micro-level natural 
resource governance case studies (Galiani and Sened 2014, Ménard and Shirley 2011; 2014). 
There is also a strand of literature led by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson who evaluate the 
impact of political and economic institutions on economic development, but with a greater 
emphasis on colonial institutions (see for example, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; 2012, 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001).  
One of the defining features in this diverse body of research is its underpinning 
methodological individualism, which implies that the individual agency ultimately explains 
the emergence and subsequent change in institutions (Galiani and Sened 2014, Hodgson 
1989; 1998a, North 1990; 1992; 1993). Methodological individual has the major problem 
that it presupposes that it attempts to explain all social change and structural 
reconfigurations based on human intentionality, planning and goals (Hodgson 2004b). The 
confusion in methodological individualism is that it fosters ambiguity about whether 
“individual interactions or social structures” are constituent properties of the individual 
(Hodgson 2004b, p.17). If interactions and structures are not part of the individual they 
methodological individualism is inoperable. The sum of this debate is that  
“Much of the confusion in the debate over methodological individualism stems from 
whether methodological individualism means explanations (a) in terms of individuals 
alone, or (b) in terms of individuals plus individual interactions or social structures” 
(Hodgson 2004b, p.17). 
The idea expressed in (a) is more controversial than the one in (b). However, the fact that 
the notion included in (b) is more acceptable implies that methodological individualism 
becomes “methodological structuralism” and then “it is misleading to give the individual 
exclusive representation in the label” (Hodgson 2004b, p.17). Three general problems 
confound methodological individualism. Firstly, too much explanatory burden is placed on 
the individual and the properties of social structures are inductively derived from the 
individual. Secondly, it is admitted that social structures shape the individual and 
methodological individualism is broadened a little bit to make it flexible. Lastly, the version 
of methodological individualism typical of the NIE uses agentive interactions in an 
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“institution-free ‘state of nature’” to explain emergence of social structures (Hodgson 
2004b, p.19). 
At the core of the NIE paradigm, North (1990, p.5) asserts, is the goal of unifying social 
research by “[i]ntegrating individual choices with the constraints institutions impose on 
choice sets.” To accomplish this goal, the NIE relaxes three neoclassical assumptions: 
namely, “costless exchange, perfect information and unlimited cognitive ability” (North 
1993, p.36). The emergence of networks of organisations specialising in information 
production and marketing attests to the costliness of information (Landini 2013, Stiglitz 
1986). Exchanging property rights is costly and information processing is imperfect (hence, 
bounded rationality) because of the mental filters such as culture, ideologies, beliefs, 
cognitive biases and taboos, among others, that mediate meanings (Galiani and Sened 2014, 
Ménard and Shirley 2011, North 1990; 1992; 1993; 1994; 2008, Williamson 2000). 
The NIE, as the adjective “New” suggests, emerged as a successor (or better still, rival) 
research programme to the OIE. The progenitor of the NIE, Coase (1984, p.230), described 
the OIE as “anti-theoretical, particularly where classical economic theory was concerned”, 
which evidently implies that the NIE emerged to provide a “neoclassical theory of 
institutions” (Wallis 2014, p.33) or “the neoclassical interpretation of institutions” (Wallis 
2014, p.47). Similarly, referring to progenitors of American institutional economics, North 
(1992, p.3) argued: “They did not, however, give us theory.” The search for a theory of 
institutions for the NIE began on this premise. These claims, however, seem untrue given 
the theory reviewed above. Perhaps, Hodgson’s (2004b) view that the NIE suffers from a 
major problem of neglecting the history of economic thought attests to this observation. 
3.1.1. The NIE-Northean theory of institutional change 
The section reviews North’s theory of institutional change. It is North (1990) who gave a 
comprehensive macro theory of institutional change and for that reason (in addition to the 
present thesis’ focus on national policy change) the discussion here reviews Douglass C 
North’s theory of institutional change. He occupied himself with the explanation of the 
“formation, mutation and decay of organizational forms” (Wallis 2014, p.32). The section 
identifies the sources of evolutionary dynamics in North’s theory.  
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a. Changes in relative prices  
The emergence of the firm as an alternative to the market is an instance of a process of 
institutional change. To the NIE organisations are governance structures and not 
institutions, and are meant to minimise transaction costs (Williamson 1979; 1992; 2000). 
Coase (1937; 1960) argued that the firm emerged to minimise transaction costs, which he 
conceptualised as the cost of using the price system. North (1990) defines a transaction cost 
as the cost of establishing, maintaining, policing, enforcing and exchanging property rights.  
The starting premise for North (1990, p.3) is that “[i]nstitutional change shapes the way 
societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.” To 
remedy the presumably defective foundations of the OIE, North (1992, p.5) proposed a new 
philosophical foundation for institutional analysis stating that 
“this new institutional approach fit[s] in with neo-classical theory… [in that it] begins 
with  the scarcity hence competition  postulate; views economics  as  a theory of  
choice subject to constraints;  employs  price  theory as  an  essential part of  the 
analysis of institutions; and  sees changes in  relative prices as  a major force inducing  
change in  institutions” (emphasis added). 
Since the goal of the NIE was not to “overturn or replace neo-classical theory” (North 1992, 
p.3), the neoclassical choice theoretic framework, predicated on the concept of scarcity and 
competition, remains a pillar of the NIE. As scarcity conditions change, relative prices 
change. The incentives signalled by the relative prices influence economic agents to engage 
in institutional entrepreneurship using their political and economic power to have 
institutions changed so as to facilitate exploitation of the emerging opportunities (Alston et 
al. 1996, North 1990, Galiani and Sened 2014). For example, Wallis (2014, p.34) argues that 
institutions change “because of short-run variations in relative prices that create, at some 
point in time, the incentives to restructure human organizations.” Forasmuch as scarcity 
gives rise to opportunity cost, price theory is central to the Northean theory of institutional 
change, hence the hypotheses, “fundamental changes in relative prices are the most 
important source of [institutional] change… and the only other source of such change is a 
change in tastes” (North 1990, p.84). It follows, therefore, that institutions are 
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‘commodities’ whose demand is a function of tastes and relative prices, adjusted for 
transaction costs.  
While acknowledging that there is a knowledge gap about what changes tastes, North 
(1990, p.84) maintains that relative prices influence tastes since “fundamental changes in 
relative prices over time will alter the behavioral pattern of people and their rationalization 
of what constitutes standards of behavior.” His argument is that prices reveal to the human 
agency the values that matter in any circumstance. In this case, it can be argued that prices 
generate values which are standards of judging appropriate behaviour. Ultimately, changes 
in relative prices explain institutional change directly and also indirectly through changes in 
taste. Relative prices signal incentives for organisation and individuals to maximise returns 
within existing institutional parameters or to invest in changing the current institutional 
arrangement (Mokyr 2014, North 1994; 2008, North and Thomas 1970). The change in 
relative prices is the selection criterion among competing institutional arrangements since 
the relative prices subject to the cost structure reveal the magnitude of the net payoffs of 
operating under different institutional arrangements – the status quo or some other new 
alternative.  
In evolutionary terms, transaction costs are another selection criterion that determines 
institutions that can maintain their identity (survive/persist) despite being inefficient 
because high magnitudes of transaction costs reduce the likelihood of changing such 
institutions (Galiani and Sened 2014, Ménard and Shirley 2008; 2011, North 1990). In this 
case, the Darwinian selection mechanism (transaction costs) is strengthened by the 
Northean postulation that “rational individual behavior is consistent with institutional 
choices that retard, rather than promote” social and economic progress (Wallis 2014, p.35). 
Transaction costs, in effect, are another category of relative prices, the price paid to 
facilitate exchange of rights. Transaction costs can drive institutional change by inducing the 
human agency deliberately to change institutions to reduce them, but transaction costs can 
also inhibit institutional change when they are so large that the net payoff of changing the 
institution becomes negative (North et al. 2007; 2012, Galiani and Sened 2014, Ménard 
2011). Galiani and Sened (2014) argue that the human agency has more accurate knowledge 
of the past than the future; hence, the tendency is to choose institutions that strengthen 
the status quo for reasons of certitude.  
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Insofar as scarcity entails opportunity cost to human choices, constrained optimisation, with 
institutions as additional constraints to the standard neoclassical constraints, is critical in the 
Northean model and, indeed, the NIE paradigm. Yet, price theory also explains institutions 
(North 1990; 1993, Galiani and Sened 2014). Thus, institutions are endogenous constraints 
in the choice theoretic framework. North (1990, p.5) argues that “[d]efining institutions as 
the constraints that human beings impose on themselves makes the definition 
complementary to the choice theoretic approach of neoclassical economic theory.” Within 
this choice theoretic framework, institutional change is a price- or incentive-driven process. 
Bromley (2008a, p.221) takes issue with the endogenisation of institutions and institutional 
change to the “reigning doctrine of neoclassical economics” predicated on rational choice 
theory. The endogenisation of institutions implies that they can no longer be “explained by 
the structure within which they are embedded” (Bromley 2008a, p.222) – some factors 
exogenous to the price model have to explain institutional change. However, Mokyr (2014, 
p.152) maintains that the Northean view of “thinking of institutions as analogous to budget 
constraints (which are set by relative prices) is quite helpful.”  
Wallis (2014, p.40), however, explained the role of power in driving institutional change 
stating that the “dynamics of social interactions political, economic, religious, military, and 
educational determine which changes are rejected, which are sustained, and which changes 
persist, ultimately having a large impact.” The role of relative power in institutional change 
seems to be the key point so much that Wallis (2014) makes it the decisive factor as 
opposed to ascribing institutional change to fundamental changes in relative prices. Ostrom 
(2014b, p.19) finds a consistent pattern in her micro-level studies in irrigation systems and 
forestry that conflict over scarcity of a resource “stimulate[s] changes to the use of rules”, 
thus making institutional change a problem-driven process. There is an interesting parallel 
between her meta-theoretic analysis and the Commonsian theory’s insistence that conflict 
drives institutional change and that the principle of scarcity plays a significant role in 
triggering changes in other dimensions of willingness to act or wait. 
b. Informal institutions as a normalising and stabilising power 
North (1990) argues that institutional change and stability of emerging institutions depends 
on a complex network of informal rules such as norms, traditions, beliefs and customs. The 
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informal institutions have normalising power that necessitates the building of trust and a 
sense of community amongst interacting agents. North (1990) suggests that beliefs emerge 
from habitual practices in the past that have evolved over time with the society. Since 
beliefs are past-binding, Wallis (2014) argues that they often lead to regressive institutional 
change. Not only do beliefs normalise behaviour, but also they can potentially lock society in 
inefficient institutional arrangements.  
While North (1990, p.83) argues that informal rules have stabilising power and “tenacious 
survival ability”, he also postulates that, over time, changes in relative prices eventually 
erodes norms leading to their non-enforcement or replacement with other norms. Similarly, 
“a custom or tradition may be gradually eroded and replaced with another,” as relative 
prices change (North 1990, p.86). The continuity and survival of institutions depends on 
customs and habits (the gene pool) (Hodgson 2007b, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a; 2006b). 
Literature suggests that habits, values and customs are some of the most difficult 
institutions to change and some of them, in some cases, might be transcendental (Bush 
2009, Hayden 1995; 2006). Perhaps, North’s point illustrates the limitations of making 
relative prices a major explanatory factor of institutional change. Supposing that short run 
changes in relative prices can change norms, customs, beliefs, values and traditions seems 
unrealistic. It makes institutional change and formal institutions continuously unstable as 
the foundational informal institutions that must be the sources of stability are fluctuating 
with prices.  
c. Investment in knowledge  
Organizations are purposeful agents that have the objective of maximizing wealth for their 
creators (North 1990). In order to accomplish this goal, they have to acquire knowledge 
both through learning-by-doing (tacit knowledge) and also by external acquisition of 
communicable knowledge. North (1990, p.74) casts the acquisition and generation of 
knowledge in a choice theoretic framework within which different “kinds of knowledge, 
skills, and learning that the members of an organization will acquire … reflect the payoff—
the incentives—imbedded in the institutional constraints.” The returns to knowledge 
determine the demand for particular types of knowledge which, in turn, drives technological 
innovation.  
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While knowledge produces technology, it also produces ideology. Ideology, in turn, shapes 
the demand for knowledge. Thus, North (1990) argues for bidirectional causality between 
ideology (which he defines as perceptions) and knowledge. Ménard (2011, p.8), broadly, 
defines ideology as “customs and beliefs”. Ideology provides the mental cognitive models by 
which organisations and individuals assess the extent to which the “structure of rules of the 
system is fair and just [which would] reduce costs”, but “their perception that the system is 
unjust raises the costs of contracting,” (North 1990, p.76). The Northean view is that 
ideology is a mental stage or shared ideational structure that constitutes the social fabric 
made up of norms, canons of conduct, beliefs, customs and language among others (Galiani 
and Sened 2014). They determine the choice set at a basic level.  
Through their maximising behavior, organisations set in motion the process of institutional 
change by marginally adjusting “informal constraints” (North 1990, p.78), by creating a 
technology-organisation-institution interactive dynamic, and by increased demand and 
investment in different kinds of knowledge. The technology-organisation-institution 
interactive dynamic produces adaptive efficiency (Galiani and Sened 2014, North 1994; 
2008). Institutions and cultural factors adjust gradually in favourable ways, which North calls 
adaptive efficiency. The accumulation of knowledge implies that there “are always groups 
and individuals who have an incentive to change the rules,” (Wallis 2014, p.42). Institutional 
change, therefore, is continuous even though it might be unnoticeable until it reaches a 
saturation threshold. The alternative dynamic is that the maladjustment of institutions and 
the culture lag can lead to adaptive inefficiency (Brinkman and Brinkman 2006, Mueller 
1938).  
The interesting dynamic that North (1990, p.79) reveals is that organisations deliberately 
“devote resources to changing the institutional constraints” and expected net payoffs 
determine the size of investment in knowledge that would transform the institutional 
structure. The changing of a limiting factor (institutional constraints) is equivalent to what 
Commons (2009) calls a strategic transaction. North (1990) demonstrates that in the history 
of nations, using their economic and political power, and guided by the net pay-offs of 
changing the current institutional arrangement, organisations with strong institutional 
entrepreneurial power use the polity to achieve their goals. In this case, organisational 
hegemony determines the institutional adjustment path for the overall society.  
56 | P a g e  
 
The extent to which the networks of organisations with sufficient power collaborate in 
lobbying for certain changes to the current institutional set up determines the likelihood 
and rapidity of institutional change. The converse is that the networks of organisations 
might as well withstand institutional change if the net payoff of operating under the existing 
institutional arrangement exceeds the net payoff of operating under the proposed 
institutional arrangement. North (1990) argues that the existence of huge payoffs provides a 
sufficient condition for the creation of special purpose vehicles (lobbying organisations) to 
achieve the envisaged economic gains of institutional change.  North (1990, p.86) believes 
that, by lowering transaction costs of political participation, democracy facilitates wider 
sharing of true and spurious knowledge, thus making “ideas, dogmas, fads, and ideologies 
important sources of institutional change” (emphasis added). 
The emerging point is that institutional change easily arises out of ceremonial knowledge, 
much in the same character as Lysenkoan effects (Bush 1987). North (1990, p.86) believes 
that there is an investigable and testable bidirectional causal link between “changes in 
relative prices, [and] the ideas and ideologies that form people's perceptions” with the 
possibility of illustrating how the two and their interactive dynamic influences institutional 
change. He, thus, makes the point that there is a market for ideas and ideologies in which 
changes in their relative prices determine which ideas and ideologies sell to policymakers 
for implementation as new institutions. Once the new institutions are in place, they, in turn, 
affect the relative prices in other markets other than the market for ideas and ideologies.  
d. Oxymoron of two social orders 
Institutional change entails evolution of political and economic institutions that may further 
or retard societal progress. North et al. (2012) argue that the pandemic of armed violence 
has hindered economic development in developing countries. Violence is prevalent because 
there is no one, including the governments, with monopoly over violence (sovereignty) 
(North et al. 2007; 2012). To promote development, developing countries have to resolve 
both latent and open violence. As North et al. (2012, p.2) argue, the medium-term solution 
is to establish a social order called a limited access order (LAO) that deters “the use of 
violence by creating incentives for powerful individuals to coordinate rather than fight.”  
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The LAO creates economic rents for the violent elite groups, which incentivise them to 
cooperate and refrain from violence. The benefit of the LAO is that “rents make people’s 
behavior more predictable” (North et al. 2012, p.6). As long as the rent sharing framework 
between and within groups is fair, the LAO is stable and violence would not erupt. Although 
the outcome would not be efficient, it would free some development potential. North et al. 
(2012, p.9) conclude that in the LAO there are extensive constraints on socio-political 
participation through formation of organisations that would claim shares of existing rents. 
Such constraints necessarily mean that “Local monopolies and restrictions on economic 
entry hinder competitive markets and long-term economic growth.”  
The logic of the LAO requires depriving the non-coalition members of the right to organise 
and grow politically and economically. The LAO simply is a dominant coalition’s monopoly 
over economic and political violence (sovereignty). Raising political transaction costs of 
challenging the LAO arrangement creates long-run stability and viability of the LAO, but it 
locks the society, sometimes for decades, into an impoverishing Nash equilibrium. The LAO 
stops violence, but does not address the fundamental cause of the violence, thus the 
violence remains latent. North et al. (2007; 2012) give examples of many developing 
countries, such as Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, which are LAOs. 
The LAOs vary in degree of stability: some LAOs are fragile, some basic and some mature. 
Once a LAO becomes mature, the dominant coalition finds the net payoff of transitioning to 
an open access order (OAO) higher than maintaining the status quo. North et al. (2007, p.6) 
define an OAO as a political institutional arrangement “where access to economic, political, 
and social organizations, including the freedom to form them, is open to all individuals who 
qualify as citizens in the society.” The LAO dominant coalition will begin to grant economic 
and political rights to the general citizenship with the result that there will be an increase in 
organisations, which introduces a competition dynamic in the political and economic 
spheres.  
North et al. (2007, p.17), thus, postulate that “political competition is necessary to maintain 
open access in the economy, and economic competition is necessary to maintain open 
access in the polity.” Bidirectional causality between political competition and economic 
competition begins to set the society on a sustainable development path. The society now is 
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fully democratised. Examples of OAOs that North et al. (2012) give include Western 
European nations, the USA, Canada and Japan. The central problem leading to the LAO/OAO 
hypotheses is one of who must/must not participate in the monopoly over economic and 
political violence (sovereignty). In the Northean explanation, the LAO and the OAO are 
mutually exclusive. 
The thesis argues that there is a possibility of extending the LAO and the OAO such that they 
co-exist in a single social process. To make possible the coexistence of the OAO and the LAO, 
the two realms of public policy proposed by Hiedanpää and Bromley (2011, p.106, emphasis 
in original): the “realm of reasons”, which deals with the legislative/judiciary rationing 
transactions, and “realm of rules”, which deals with administrative rationing transactions 
(implementation processes) can be used. As discussed under the Commonsian theory of 
institutional change, reasonable valuation generates valuable beliefs, which find expression 
in national legislation, constitutions and judicial precedent. The administrative level 
implements the valuable beliefs through the design of rules that operationalise the 
legislation, the precedent and the constitutional provisions. Thus, the two realms are 
theoretically separate, but they do not necessarily have to be the same policymaking order 
simultaneously. One can be a LAO, while another can be an OAO or both can be LAOs or 
both can be OAOs. Each configuration has different implications on how institutional change 
evolves. 
 It is also proposed here that the LAO/OAO can be generalised to consider various forms of 
violence in society – the bloodless and the bloody. One such covert form of violence occurs 
in policymaking and implementation processes. It can be argued that this form of violence is 
at the level of ideology, ideas, knowledge and beliefs – which can be characterised as the 
sanction of ignorance or sanction of scientific opinion. In his theoretical treatment of the 
causal linkages between relative prices, ideology and institutions, North (1990, p.85-86) 
arrived at a puzzle, which he constructed as follows: 
“institutions, by reducing the price we pay for our convictions, make ideas, dogmas, 
fads, and ideologies important sources of institutional change. In turn, improved 
understanding of institutional change requires greater understanding than we now 
possess of just what makes ideas and ideologies catch hold. Therefore, we are still at 
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something of a loss to define, in very precise terms, the interplay between changes 
in relative prices, the ideas and ideologies that form people's perceptions, and the 
roles that the two play in inducing changes in institutions” (emphasis added). 
The puzzle is that ceremonial knowledge (dogmas, ideologies, fads) drive institutional 
change despite being manifestly ceremonial. Mokyr (2014, p.151) argues that the Northean 
view is that beliefs and ideologies are mental stages that “allow us to stand on and do things 
together” ideationally in defining the opportunity sets in the realm of volitional action.  
Ayres (1996, not paged) described ideology as the “power to move communities of [people] 
to action.” He also argued that ideology has such power because it is transcendental – it is 
beyond scientific enquiry. Ayres’ (1996) distinction of ideas from ideology, perhaps, 
addresses North’s puzzle. Ideas, Ayres (1996) distinguished, were manifest by their problem 
solving power. To Ayres, therefore, ideas were instrumental, while ideologies were 
ceremonial. Ayres (1996, not paged) describes the relationship between ideologies, ideas 
and power thus, 
“Since, as  we know, social  scientists  live  in  climates  of  opinion,  there  seems  to  
be  no  basis  for  a  distinction between their theories and the group ideologies 
which they so suspiciously resemble. Thus … the ideas of [all sciences] prevail only 
through  the agency  of  organized  communities,  and  finally  through  the  triumph  
of  that  leadership  over  others  in  the  struggle  for coercive power, a struggle in 
which force supplements and qualifies “ideas”” (emphasis added). 
The solutions to Douglass C North’s puzzle are all linked in a nuanced fashion here. Theories 
are equated to ideas, but group ideologies are equated to force (sovereignty), the power 
that moves people into action. Ayres clearly argues that epistemic communities struggle to 
have sovereign authority (coercive power) over the policy space. Thus, ideologies catch hold 
because they have a spiritual dimension that is dogmatic in nature. Ideology acts as a 
legitimising framework for ideas of that epistemic community. Ideas triumph because the 
ideology buttressing them is hegemonic. 
Since policy problems might manifest violent clashes of ideologies, ideas and belief systems, 
the thesis proposes that the concept of violence as armed conflict used by North et al. 
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(2007; 2012) can be broadened to include other covert forms of non-armed violence. 
Feminist literature provides a useful way of broadening the conception of violence from the 
physical/armed dimension to the epistemological dimension. Epistemological violence, as 
feminist literature suggests, occurs whenever there are multiple epistemological systems, 
one of which is the dominant epistemological system, which also marginalises others (Code 
2008, Dotson 2008; 2014). An epistemological system is a typical instantiation of an 
“instituted social imaginary” (Code 2008, p.34), characterised by an entrenched value 
system, belief system, traditions, myths, ideologies and theories, which define the epistemic 
culture that defines how social agents construct knowledge and influence the social 
structure and, thus, institutional change. Similarly, Denzau and North (1994, p.3) postulate 
that “people act in part upon the basis of myths, dogmas, ideologies and ‘half-baked’ 
theories”. Thus, “Ideas matter” in institutional change process (Denzau, North 1994, p.3), 
but the real issue is whose ideas matter. 
The instituted social imaginary comprises the actual “implicit but effective systems of 
images, meanings, metaphors, and interlocking explanations – expectations woven through 
a social-political order” (Code 2008, p.34). The social imaginary is equivalent to what the 
Northean socio-cognitive framework for institutional analysis conceptualises as “shared 
framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess” (Denzau and North 1994, 
p.4), which constitute the interpretive concepts or schemata by which they understand their 
socio-economic environment. Thus, mental models are socio-cognitive constructs - images, 
meanings, metaphors, and interlocking explanations – that provide the bases for 
interpretation of the institutional environment by social agents. It is evident that the 
multiplicity of social groups in an institutional context implies the multiplicity of perceptual 
frameworks that constitute different social imaginaries (von Staden and Bruce 2015).  
The tendency of the dominant group’s epistemological system to displace and marginalise 
other epistemological systems amounts to epistemic violence. Code (2008, p.32) 
characterises epistemic violence as the “intransigent politics of unknowing”, which entails 
that the dominant group is not open to alternative interpretations of the reality and 
experiences of the community. Dotson (2011, p.236) also characterises epistemic violence 
as the “practices of silencing of marginalized groups.” Thus, epistemic violence has 
dimensions of intention/or lack thereof to receive and reciprocate a testimony as well as 
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“pernicious ignorance”, which Dotson (2011, p.238) defines as “[r]eliable ignorance … that is 
consistent or follows from a predictable epistemic gap in cognitive resources.” This cognitive 
gap precisely follows from scientism.  
Table 3-1: Limited Access Order and Open Access Order in policymaking and regulatory 
processes 
Legislative sphere – realm of reasons 
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Source: Author’s synthesis 
Conceptually, epistemic violence takes two forms: testimonial quieting and hermeneutic 
injustice (Code 2008, Dotson 2008; 2011; 2014). In testimonial quieting, the audience 
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refuses to accept the knowledge claims of a testifying group because they do not hold the 
group to be an epistemically qualified one to make such claims. Thus, the epistemically 
quieted social groups are marginalised from contributing towards knowledge production 
because they are denied the status of epistemic arbiters. Epistemic quieting violates a 
cardinal test of progressive institutional change – the growth of knowledge test or Deweyan 
democratic knowledge production systems (Hayden 2006, Tool 1994). Hermeneutical 
injustice is the locus of asymmetrical power relationships in ideational processes and 
knowledge production systems insofar as the dominated epistemic groups, as Dotson (2011, 
p.236) argues, are damaged so that their “ability to speak and be heard” is severely 
curtailed. Their experiences are interpreted for them by the dominant group or epistemic 
arbiters. This damaging is what Ayres (1996) described as the triumph of the leadership of 
one epistemic community over others by coercive power (sovereignty).  
In policymaking processes, testimonial quieting and hermeneutical injustice might be 
dominant manifestations of epistemic violence. This conception of violence facilitates the 
adoption of the LAO/OAO hypotheses to policy processes such that they can be used to 
explain how purposeful institutional change can become a vicious circle. The LAO/OAO 
framework can easily provide an ontological framework for studying why some 
negotiational psychologies are predominant in policy processes and others are not. 
Negotiational psychology, as is apparent, contains epistemic violence as a sub-category. 
Table 3-1 illustrates the interaction of LAO/OAO in policy processes. The rents in the case of 
epistemic violence in public policy processes need not necessarily be monetary. In the case 
of biodiversity conservation, for example, the rents might be in the form of scientific 
satisfaction derived from existence value of certain classes of species. The rents can be 
political satisfaction/pride that the claims of a particular epistemic community constitute 
the truth that is guiding society’s institutional adjustment path.  However, the rents can also 
be pecuniary to the extent that dominant epistemologies provide a sustained flow of 
consultancy contractual relationships and research funding as well as expanded 
employment opportunity sets open to members of dominant epistemic communities. 
However, for economic sectors and epistemic communities that have an anthropocentric 
inclination, the rents can take the form of economic benefits of unfettered utilisation of 
biodiversity and even alien species that might pose a threat to biodiversity. 
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Table 3-1 illustrates the evolution of regressive and progressive institutional change 
processes. In a constitutional democracy, most probably, the requirement is that policies 
and laws have to be developed democratically. It might, of necessity, also be a requirement 
that polices and laws be implemented democratically. The first scenario of a LAO-LAO 
consists of legislatures and bureaucrats engaging in “the neo-colonial practice of ruling 
down on others” and imposing their will on the polity (Bromley 2012, p.18). They are the 
sovereigns and their will is law and policy and this is the problem of determinism because it 
fails the test of public reasoning. The process of institutional adjustment is deterministic 
because government, by whatever means, would crush any form of resistance (absolute 
testimonial quieting and hermeneutic injustice), which is equivalent to raising political 
transaction costs of influencing policy change. Usually, government knows what it wants to 
achieve and seeks the advice of social and natural scientists selectively to sanctify its own 
ideas (Bromley 2007). The legislative and administrative functions are not distinctly 
separated and they share the same political and institutional will. 
The second case, in Table 3-1, exists whenever the realm of reasons is a limited access 
order, but the realm of rules is an open access order (LAO-OAO). The legislative and 
administrative wills are distinctly separate. The legislative body’s will is the law and policy, 
but how the legislative intent has to be implemented is left to democratic processes. The 
problem that emerges in this case is one of interpretive battles about what the sovereign 
will in that law or policy means (Bazzoli 2000, Dreyfus and Ingram 1976, Liroff 1972, 
Wichelman 1976). Bazzoli (2000, p.15) argues that “public purpose is fallible, ambiguous and 
changing: it is contingent upon which social groups can influence or control the common 
understanding of what is reasonable” (emphasis added). The common understanding, in this 
case, is the instituted social imaginary, which really is common in the sense of it being the 
dominant group’s collective mental model. Epistemic violence is likely to vary from being 
moderate to being high. Groups fight as they negotiate institutional spaces to entrench 
themselves in the regulatory process so that the regulations will be favourable to their 
interests. Ideologies, dogmas and fads as well as propagandas are most likely to play an 
important role (Ayres 1996, Denzau and North 1994, North 1990).  
The third case, in Table 3-1, pertains to the legislative process that is democratic, but the 
administrative process that is a limited access order (OAO-LAO). The legislative and 
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administrative wills are separate, but how implementation of the democratic will proceeds 
leads to a number of potential outcomes. Powerful groups can capture the administrative 
agency such that the law is implemented in a particularistic interpretive scheme, which may 
not necessarily be the democratic will in the law (Dreyfus and Ingram 1976, Wichelman 
1976). Epistemic violence is likely to be high if not nearly absolute in this scenario. The 
political dispensation might be such that the transaction costs of litigation are low and the 
democratic community has adequate access to the judiciary (Cortner 1976, Wichelman 
1976). Litigations against the implementation of the law in a displeasing way might unfold. 
The game of imposing the administrative will on the democratic community would be 
evident and whichever group succeeds in capturing the administrative agency becomes the 
new co-sovereign agent that sustains its sovereignty by the sanction of ignorance (epistemic 
violence).   
If the political transaction costs of monitoring the administrative authorities are high, the 
principal-agent problem intensifies and the law ends up being implemented in a 
defective/uneven way. The implementation of the law/policy might also be unduly delayed 
and cycles of planning without coming to terms with the democratic will might ensue, hence 
institutional path dependence (Galiani and Sened 2014, North 1990, Tool 1994). The process 
of numerous prolonged planning cycles that siphon significant resources from the fiscus, but 
failing to solve the problem, is conceptualised here as the planning curse. 
The last scenario, in Table 3-1, is a real open access order in which the democratic will 
reflected in the law or policy is also reflected in the implementation/regulatory strategy 
(OAO-OAO). The competition of ideas about how best to implement the law produces 
valuable solutions that facilitate progressive change. Reasonable regulations and rules are 
likely to emerge in this case. Science and democratic reason are united (Bromley 2012). The 
negotiation psychology of persuasion or coercion is most likely here. 
The intermediate categories in Table 3-1 focus on transitional conditions that can assume 
any form, in the sense that a transitional arrangement is unstable. It can relapse to a limited 
access order or progress to an open access order. Political and litigation transaction costs 
play an important role in deciding the tendencies in the transitional phase. 
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The meta-theoretic framework provided in Table 3-1 implies that institutional change occurs 
in three levels, which Bartunek and Moch (1987, p.486) conceptualise as “first-order 
change”, “second-order change” and “third-order change”. First-order change is 
characterised by marginal adjustments to the social imaginary, which serve to reinforce the 
existing social imaginary, which, thus, leads to institutional path dependence. In terms of 
Table 3-1, first-order change can be conceptualised as the change in governance strategies 
such as designing new laws, new policies and new constitutions. It is merely an incremental 
change in the laws, constitutions and incremental changes to how the judiciary and 
administrative agencies socio-cognitively work. The governance culture remains largely 
unchanged. 
Second-order change is a “conscious modification” of the social imaginary itself (Bartunek 
and Moch 1987, p.486), which is a type of a weak-form path determinant change. The social 
groups are changing their mental models, through stochastic belief updating processes 
(Bromley 2008d; 2012). In terms of Table 3-1, there is a modification of the governance 
norms. The way the realm of reasons and realm of rules operate is modified, for example, to 
facilitate participation in institutional design. The quality of participation may not be as 
holistic as the full sense of the word might imply. Second-order change is deeper than first-
order change insofar as it not only focuses on changing the governance strategies, but also 
the governance norms. 
Third-order change is a revolutionary epistemic change of the Kuhnian-type in the sense 
that the instituted social imaginary – the entire epistemological system: its myths, 
ideologies, traditions, values, customs, taboos, dogmas and spiritual proclivities – is changed 
(Bartunek and Moch 1987, Kuhn 1996). This is an example of strong-form path determinant 
change. Not only do social groups question the very socio-cognitive structures upon which 
their interpretation of reality stands, they are empowered to actually change the instituted 
social imaginary. In terms of Table 3-1, the democratic processes of political and socio-
economic governance are truly democratic and epistemic violence is minimised to its non-
reducible level.  Multiple social imaginaries and instituted social imaginaries interact in a 
transdisciplinary fashion to enrich institutional design processes. Third-order change is the 
deepest form of institutional change because it goes beyond merely changing laws to 
actually transforming the entire governance culture itself – legislative and administrative 
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cultures alike. In most developing countries institutional change ends at the level of first-
order change whereby governance strategies are copied from the developed world, but the 
accompanying governance culture is not copied (Bromley 1985). 
Using Ordonomics, which is the study of the relationship between institutions and ideas, 
Hielscher et al. (2012) and Petrick and Pies (2007) also argued that ideational competition is 
an important pre-requisite for consensual idealism or finding win-win solutions to 
perplexing policy problems. The logic behind Ordonomics is to move away from thinking in 
terms of trade-offs to orthogonal transformation of wicked problems so that a policy game 
transitions from “collective self-damage” to collective gain (Hielscher et al. 2012, p.784). 
Orthogonal transformation converts a non-cooperative game into an assurance game such 
that consensual institutional arrangements are designed which satisfy the Veblenian 
cardinal value principle that “any economic fact must approve itself under the test of 
impersonal usefulness – usefulness as seen from the point of view of the generically human” 
(Veblen [1899] 2005, p.67).  
3.1.2. Summary 
The Northean model of institutional change sheds light on some important dynamics in the 
process of institutional change, especially the role of knowledge, investment in knowledge 
and the social order within which institutional change is to take place. Although the 
Northean model ascribes pre-eminence to changes in relative prices in explaining 
institutional change, its own account suggests that it is power dynamics and the knowledge 
claims as well as ideologies of the participants that are determinative of the institutions that 
would emerge. The role of transaction costs in lobbying for institutional change or 
withstanding change is critical in determining the extent and quality of the adjustment 
process. Broadening the concept of violence beyond the traditional meaning helps adapt 
the LAO/OAO hypotheses to many applications such as analysing evolution of a policy over 
time. 
3.2. Hodgsonian-Veblenian Social Darwinian Theory of institutional change  
Evolutionary economic thought has expanded rapidly (Nelson and Winter 1982, Hodgson 
2002, Dopfer 2005). Hodgson has been advocating the revival of the Original Institutional 
Economics of Thorstein B Veblen since the 1980s. To Hodgson, the American Institutionalist 
paradigm had ideas that were too advanced and little appreciated in its day, especially the 
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works of Thorstein B Veblen (Hodgson 1998b). These works constitute raw materials for an 
advanced generalised Darwinian social theory of institutional change as Hodgson (2004b, 
p.xvii) emphasised: “I am also keen to point out the modern relevance of many of the old 
institutionalist ideas.” Hodgson (2004b, i) observed that the circumstantially supportive 
conditions in the form of the revival of pragmatism, revival of evolutionary psychology of 
instincts and habits as well as re-emergence of open systems Darwinian social modelling 
provided sufficient laboratory conditions for the rejuvenation of the original Veblenianism. 
Quite interesting, Hodgson implicated the decline in pragmatism, the displacement of 
psychology of instincts and habits with behaviourism psychology as well as the decline in 
social Darwinism for the decline of the OIE in the post-second world war era (Hodgson 
1998a; 2003b; 2004b, 2007b). In addition to these three factors, Hodgson also 
demonstrated that the decline in OIE coincided with and, partly, was caused by the 
emergence of positivism in economic methodology coupled with the departure by American 
institutionalists from Darwinian foundations of institutional economics as set up by Veblen 
(Hodgson 2003a; 2003b; 2004b; 2007c). 
The reconstruction of the Veblenian evolutionary economics faces two antagonistic forces. 
The first is that “many mainstream economists have resorted to the dismissive tactic of 
describing any broader version of their discipline, or any approach that is not based on 
individual utility maximization, as ‘not economics’” (Hodgson 2004b, p.4). The pluri-
disciplinarity of OIE broadened the scope of economics, which rendered some received 
neoclassical doctrines somehow inoperable (Hodgson 1998a; 2004b; 2006; 2007c, Witte 
1954). The second, and has gained greater currency, is the claim that started with Coase 
(1984, p.230) that: 
“The American institutionalists were not theoretical but anti-theoretical, particularly 
where classical economic theory was concerned.  Without a theory they had nothing 
to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire.” 
Coase declared that the OIE’s intellectual material had no other fate but destruction or 
some other people to develop a theory out of the “dense mass of description… scrupulously 
accurate, but so wanting in a theoretical framework” (Posner 1993, p.74). It is the latter that 
Hodgson chose to explore. As to the claim of an anti-theoretical and atheoretical 
68 | P a g e  
 
institutionalism, Hodgson (2004b, p.3) argues that “Repeated so often by so many, this 
manifestly false allegation that the old institutionalism was ‘against theory’ has regrettably 
stuck.” It is a myth. Hodgson (2004b, p.4) further stated that dismissive tactics engender by 
the Coasean claim raise suspicions, especially when the criticisms are advanced, “without 
ever once providing any evidence that they have carefully read or analysed its texts. An 
experienced historian of ideas would smell that proverbial rat.”  
He has proven in various works that the OIE made major contributions both to micro and 
macro economic theory and he believes that the neglect of History of Economic Thought 
explains why the NIE holds on to the myth that is unsupported by a single quote of material 
from the OIE that shows they were anti-theoretical (Hodgson 1989; 1998a; 1999; 2004b).  
3.2.1 Hodgsonian Critique to OIE and Revivalist agenda 
Hodgson takes issue with the post-second world war American Institutionalism for having 
abandoned the Veblenian foundations of evolutionary economics for some other 
adulterated version of Veblenianism. Hodgson (1998b, p.427) argues that the OIE 
“eventually took the road of cultural determinism … [and] its evolutionism was severed from 
biology, and its socio-economic theory downplayed the role of individual agency.” It is from 
this thesis that he began a reconstruction of the evolutionary theory of institutional change, 
which, for simplicity of reference, is here named the Hodgsonian-Veblenian theory of 
institutional change.  
Hodgson (2004b, p.xvi) has concerned himself with the development of a generalised 
Darwinian theory of social change that addresses “theoretical problems of agency, 
structure, emergence and social evolution.” He sees Veblen’s work on instincts and habits 
not only as the key to a complete Darwinian Social theory of evolutionary change (Hodgson 
2007b, Rutherford 1996), but also as a solution to the longstanding and often neglected 
social science paradox of the causality between the individual and the institution (Hodgson 
2003a). He broadly observes an epistemic dichotomy in this problem with neoclassicism and 
the NIE taking a methodological individualism framework in which institutions and 
institutional change are explained by acultural, ahistoric and acontextual individuals whose 
agency is driving institutional change (Albert and Ramstad 1997; 1998, Dugger 1979; 1996a, 
Hodgson 2009, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006c, Ramstad 1986).  
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To accomplish causal explanation the NIE requires a sweeping assumption that the initial 
condition was an “institution-free ‘state of nature’” (Hodgson 1998a, p.176). This is 
particularly a common assumption in Elinor Ostrom’s game theoretic work on the evolution 
of institutions in common pool resource governance (Ostrom 2014a, 2014b, Ostrom and 
Ostrom 2014). For example, she argues that “[i]f one wants to analyze changing rules, the 
initial situation before any rules are established is one where there are no rules” (Ostrom 
2014b, p.15, emphasis added). The major problem with methodological individualism in 
explaining institutional change, Hodgson argues, is that it makes major unrealistic 
assumptions about given norms, given language, given culture, given tastes and preference 
and given habits among other givens. The individual is data, but the individual is never 
explained why he/she behaves the way he/she does in conformance to the institution 
(Hodgson 2009). The problem he identifies with the NIE explanations of institutional change 
is that of “infinite regress” (Hodgson 2004b, p.19) because neither the institution nor the 
individual ultimately has explanatory pre-eminence. The closure rules or stopping rules 
(Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012) have to be arbitrarily fixed by appealing to “Divine, spiritual, 
miraculous or uncaused causes” (Hodgson 2004b, p.8). 
Douglass C North’s recent work, however, focuses on the role of culture and ideologies in 
institutional change (Galiani and Sened 2014), although methodological individualism 
remains a central tenet of the NIE. Von Staden and Bruce (2015, p.113) recently have 
pointed out the emerging convergence and complementarity between North’s 
“sociocognitive turn” and Veblenian research since the birth of institutionalism in the 1890s. 
They argue that North’s recent work on cognitive structures provides “an important 
ontological frame” (Von Staden and Bruce 2015, p.113) for deepening the Veblenian 
explanation of how beliefs, values, habits, preferences and interests are formed and their 
relation to institutional design. Similarly, in the present review it was shown that Northean 
social orders provide an ontological framework to Commons’ negotiational psychology since 
each social order entailed a different negotiational psychology and power structures. 
On the other extreme is the post-second world war OIE, as Hodgson claims, which follows a 
methodological collectivism in explaining institutional change. In this framework, the 
institution explains all that the individual is. Methodological collectivism neglects the role of 
individual agency in changing institutions, while institutions are influencing and changing 
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the individual (Hodgson 1989; 1998a; 2004b, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a). The process by 
which institutions reproduce themselves in individual agency by shaping motives, 
influencing and changing behaviour is what he calls “‘reconstitutive downward causation’” 
(Hodgson 2004b, p.10). He, thus, concludes, 
“Hence methodological collectivism may suggest versions of ‘structural 
determinism’, ‘cultural determinism’, ‘economic determinism’ and ‘technological 
determinism’. The versions that are close to methodological collectivism see 
individual thought or behaviour as being determined largely by structural, cultural or 
technological factors. In turn ‘structure’, ‘culture’, ‘economy’ or ‘technology’ are 
often seen as having a powerful  logic and dynamic of their own,” (Hodgson 2004b, 
p.23). 
The inclination to this extreme in the OIE, as Hodgson claims, implied that the individual 
played a passive or no role at all in institutional change. Hodgson (2003b) and Rutherford 
(2011) argued that the OIE had become cultural determinists and with the over-emphasis of 
Clarence E Ayres on technology, it could be argued that the OIE also became technological 
determinists. Rutherford (2011, p.335-336) supports this claim stating, 
“Ayres takes these ideas [of Veblen on technology as a driver of economic progress 
and the current institutional system as inhibitive] and gives them a particular 
interpretation, identifying technology with instrumental ways of thinking and 
institutions with “ceremonialism”… He does not seem to fully recognize the 
necessary functions of institutions or that institutions can themselves be more or 
less instrumental.” 
The danger here was Ayres’ use of a special case as a workhorse in advancing his integrative 
analysis of institutional change. While post-second world war institutionalism was about 
“the problem of “social control”” (Hodgson 2003b, p.570), to an extent, Ayres (1996) nearly 
took an anti-institutional view, while professing institutionalism. His student Fagg J Foster 
viewed institutions as instrumental, thus his insistence that problem resolution, in essence, 
always assumed the form of purposeful institutional adjustment (Foster 1981b; 1981c).  
71 | P a g e  
 
Ayres’ model, despite the shortcomings Rutherford (2011) highlights, has become a 
foundational building block in advanced General Systems Analysis models of institutional 
change such as Hayden’s Social Fabric Matrix (Fullwiler et al. 2009, Hayden 1982; 2006). 
While these claims by Hodgson and Rutherford seem to suggest extreme methodological 
collectivism, they have to be balanced with analytical advances in the OIE theory of 
institutional change that emphasised democratic participation in institutional change in the 
Deweyan instrumentalist tradition (Hayden 2003, Tool 1977; 1983; 1990; 1994, Waller Jr 
and Robertson 1991). For example, discussing the convulsive economic reconstruction 
programme in the post- collapse Soviet, which was designed by neoclassicists, Tool (1990, 
p.539) argued: 
“we perceive  democracy  to  mean that those who receive  the incidence  of policy 
must have and retain ultimate  discretion over that policy – that is, that  restraints  
and constraints  are,  in  effect,  self  imposed  through  responsive  and  responsible 
political  institutions  and  may  be  revised  as  the  evolving  consensus  dictates.” 
This view hardly fits into the methodological collectivism critique, but it fits into the 
purpose-driven evolutionary perspective with its reference to evolving consensus. In 
developing the theory of institutional change, Tool provided for the democratic test as a 
decisive test of progressiveness of a purposeful institutional adjustment processes and he 
censured “‘shock therapy’” (Tool 1994, p.406). Defining the democratic test, Tool (1994, 
p.414) stated: “At issue  is  whether  those  who  received  the  incidence  of  policy  are 
themselves  able  to  find  and  employ  means  to  change  such  policy.” As is clear here, the 
emphasis is on democratic control, democratic consensus and discretionary power for 
individual agency to change institutions if they deem them undesirable.  
Similarly, in the Commonsian School, institutional change is driven by problems arising out 
of individual transactions. The exercise of the individuals’ political power (share in collective 
sovereignty) to set the government machinery in motion to enforce his/her will on others 
through the process of reasonable valuation results in institutions change (Commons 2009). 
Dawson (1994, p.36) emphasises that “the polity is inescapably involved in determining the 
distribution of injury” and benefits through creative ideas that shape the policy context and 
design of new institutions. This hardly fits methodological collectivism. The impulse for 
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change has its genesis in the individual or private entity and private customs that are due for 
judicial canonisation. Bazzoli (2000) showed that there was co-existence of individual 
causation and institutional causation in the Commonsian theory. 
The instrumentalist theory of institutional change squarely builds on democracy because 
the Deweyan tradition focused on the importance of instituted processes of democratic 
participation to produce robust policy, policy change and scientific ideas that could deeply 
and positively influence society (Bromley 2004b; 2008a; 2012, Hayden 2006). Waller Jr and 
Robertson (1991) argued for a deliberative valuation economics in addressing issues of 
institutional change. In a deliberative framework, the individual agency is a considerable 
cause of institutional change through knowledge production and deliberation. 
3.2.2. Hodgsonian-Veblenian theory of institutional change 
According to Hodgson (2003a, p.86), “Darwinism means causal explanation, where a cause 
is understood as necessarily involving transfers of matter or energy.” In explaining, 
institutional change, the social scientist is concerned with a “causal analysis of process” 
(Hodgson 2003a, p.87). Since Darwinism is a processual analysis of cumulative and, perhaps, 
circular causal sequence, a theory of institutional change must address three fundamental 
Darwinian principles: namely, “sustained variation”, “heredity or continuity” and “natural 
selection” (Hodgson 2003a, p.88).  
a. Variation 
Social phenomena evolve and manifest in the emergence of diverse institutions such as 
language, laws, regulations, rules, norms, cultures, habits, traditions, mores, legends, 
superstitions and many other manifestations. Hodgson (2003a) asserts that a theory of 
institutional change, of necessity, has to explain the emergency of variety of institutions. 
Some of the institutional arrangements emerge spontaneously as though designed by an 
invisible hand, while others emerge by human purposeful design (Hodgson 2002; 2003a, 
Hodgson and Knudsen 2006c, Langlois and Hodgson 1992). As the non-human biological 
domain attains variety through speciation and mutation so also does the social domain. By 
speciation, institutions reproduce and multiply into different forms of institutions. The 
variety of biological life forms is a result of “genetic recombination and also rare mutations” 
(Hodgson and Knudsen 2006c, p.5). Although such mechanisms are prevalent in the non-
human biotic domain, Hodgson and Knudsen (2006c, p.5) point out that there “are no 
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closely analogous mechanisms in the evolution of social institutions.” Thus, it remains an 
empirical question as to how institutions recombine and mutate to produce new varieties of 
institutions (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006c).  
There is an indication, nonetheless, that this empirical question was attempted by Ayres 
(1996), notwithstanding the criticisms against him as a technological and cultural 
determinist (Hodgson 1989; 1998b; 2003a; 2004b, Rutherford 2011). Ayres (1996, not 
paged), here quoted at length, explained, 
“Technology advances  by virtue  of  invention  and  discoveries  being  made  by  
men,  of  course.  But all inventions and discoveries result from the combining of 
hitherto separate tools, instruments, materials, and the like.  These  are  capable  of  
combination  by  virtue  of  their  physical  existence.  The combining is of course 
performed by man, and especially by bright and restless men. But no one ever made 
a combination without there being something to combine. Furthermore, the more 
there is to combine in any given situation the more likely inventions and discoveries 
become unless the inveterate restless of human hands and brains is severely curbed” 
(emphasis added). 
At the core, Ayres’ argument is an evolutionary argument based on Darwinian concepts of 
variation and mutation and, in addition to them, hybridisation. To Ayres, technology is made 
up of tools, skills and knowledge, knowledge being the fundamental form of technology 
(Bush 1983, Hayden 1982, Mayhew 1981). Knowledge can be tacit (acquired through 
learning-by-doing) or explicit (communicable). This knowledge evolves over time by the 
mechanisms of combination and recombination of different types of knowledge that were 
before thought to be independent. Thus, new technological varieties emerge (by speciation 
and by hybridisation). The recombination, however, is an act of choice and purpose rather 
than an invisible hand operating in society.  
Knowledge diversity is the source of sustained speciation and hybridisation of institutions, 
since, in Ayres’ framework, technology is the dynamic force driving institutional change 
(Ayres 1996, Bush 1983, Mayhew 1981, Hayden 2006, Valentinov 2015). The Veblenianism 
of Ayres’s argument can be traced to the Veblenian gene pool (habits and instincts). Of the 
many instincts Veblen discussed, he singled out the instinct of workmanship, the instinct of 
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parental bent and the instinct of intellectual idle curiosity as critical for the continuity of 
culture and the human life process (Veblen 1898c; 1914; 1919; [1899] 2005). Technological 
evolution builds on these instincts. In the Commonsian school, the same process of 
combination and recombination of existing common law precedent is responsible for the 
evolutionary growth of the formal institutions (Commons 2009). 
In the revivalist project for Veblenian evolutionary economics the concept of habit is critical 
in explaining the evolution of institutions (Hodgson 2004b). Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a, 
p.488) have argued that “[h]abits and routines are persistent containers of encoded 
instructions for behaviour or thought,” hence making them the genes and DNA. The 
question is where do habits come from? Hodgson (2007c, p.332) answers: “Habits are 
formed through repeated thoughts or behaviors in a specific type of social setting.” The 
problem is that there remains something to be explained. For example, what causes 
thought?  
The progenitor of pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, explained habit as a function of 
belief which is a function of thought which is a function of doubt which is a function of 
surprises (Bromley 2008f, Peirce 1878). The nested function summarises Peircean theory of 
habit and truth formation. Society comprises multitudes of chaotic and orderly signs 
continuously flowing through it, and the signs that manage to catch the attention of human 
agents are surprises (Bromley 2008a). For example, biodiversity losses, climate change, new 
disease outbreaks, upsurge in inflation during a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 
regime, upsurge in crime rates when the economy seems to be prospering and is growing 
inclusively are examples of surprises. Surprises are surprises because they contradict 
existing truth claims ad beliefs about objects, processes and phenomena.  
Surprise produces doubt in the mind of the sign observer. The doubt irritates the agent and 
forces him/her to search for new beliefs (Bromley 2008f, Psillos 2009). Thus doubt leads to 
the process of knowledge production (the technological evolutionary process) (Ayres 1996, 
Bush 2009). The produced knowledge is warrantable and it may/may not necessarily be 
accepted by all who investigate the surprise (Bromley 2004b; 2008f, Peirce 1878). However, 
if the community of investigators converge on a particular knowledge claim, it becomes the 
truth for the time being (warranted knowledge) and whatever that truth represents is the 
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reality for the time being (Bromley 2008a, Peirce 1878). The warranted knowledge claim 
produces belief in the community of investigators of the surprise. This belief becomes a 
habit by repeated usage, as Hodgson (2007c) stated, and the habit becomes a rule of action 
(which is an institution) (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012). A habit itself becomes a custom if it 
is widely diffused and adopted by the broader community beyond the initial community of 
investigators of the surprise (Hayden 2006). Thus, a habit becomes part of a dominant 
epistemological system (instituted social imaginary) the moment it matures into custom. 
The Peircean account of how habits arise shows the role of new knowledge in producing 
new beliefs, which become new habits. If this line of reasoning follows, then Ayres got it 
right insofar as he defined technological evolution as a process of the growth of knowledge 
in the arts and sciences as well as knowledge encoded in tools. The emergence of new 
technology by combination and recombination of existing knowledge, skills and tools is a 
response to surprises (changes/shocks) from the human environment. In a comparable line 
of reasoning, Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a, p.482) argue that “[n]ew variation is generated 
because replication is never perfect and because replication involves recombination of 
existing variants.” They, in part, attribute variety to “replication error” and this makes 
variation a matter of chance (probability) and fate (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a, p.483). 
The Peircean account, of course, does not tell the entire story about habit formation 
because “[w]hile some habits may be learned only through conscious effort, most habit 
formation is probably unconscious” (Bush 1987, p.1077). Thus, the difference between 
Ayres and Hodgson and co-authors is respectively one between purpose and chance on the 
one hand, and reductionism and generality on the other. 
b. Selection 
For a theory of institutional change to be adequate, Hodgson (2003a) argues that it has to 
include the principle of selection. The point is why some institutions survive longer than 
others. Selection is a test of fitness. Veblen ([1899] 2005, p.126) maintained that the 
“evolution of social structure has been a process of natural selection of institutions.” In the 
Hodgsonian-Veblenian social theory, the units of selection hierarchically are institutions and 
habits/routines, but not individuals (Hodgson 2002; 2003a).  
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Broadly, Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a) identify two selection mechanisms: namely, subset 
selection and generative selection. Subset selection is non-dynamic in that it seeks to secure 
“continuity… by enduring identity among a subset of entities [/institutions]” (Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2006a, p.483). The process of subset selection maps the “anterior set” into a 
“posterior set” in such a way that identity is maintained although the posterior set will be 
smaller (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a, p.478). In this case, the subset continues to be 
decimated overtime as it interacts with environmental factors (selection criteria) until that 
species of institutions become extinct or survive if it withstands the selection pressure.  
Generative selection, on the other hand, creates variety of institutions through speciation 
and mutation (Hodgson 2003a; 2004a, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a; 2006b). Unlike the 
subset selection process, with generative selection “continuity is secured by the transfer of 
information” through “imperfect replication and recombination” of the genes (Hodgson and 
Knudsen 2006a, p.483). Hence, subset selection is about preservation of the status quo, 
while generative selection is about producing new varieties by passing on genetic and 
adaptive information, which equivalently are the “adoption and diffusion  of the  
innovations” in the social domain (Bush 1987, p.1105).  
Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a, p.477), nonetheless, have demonstrated that “neither subset 
selection nor generative selection implies improvement… neither necessarily leads to 
efficiency… [But]… can lead to extremely rapid effects in a social population.” Similarly, 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2006c, p.5) emphasised that the “outcomes of a selection process 
are necessarily neither moral nor just… there is no requirement that outcomes of a selection 
process are necessarily optimal or improvements on their precursors.” Thus, the natural 
selection of institutions does not privilege favourable outcomes; it can also lead to imbecile 
or zombie institutions (Ayres 1996, Veblen 1914). Hodgson and Knudsen’s (2006c) 
explanation highlights several references to two systems of canons that Thorstein B Veblen 
continually flags out in his works.  
In the Theory of the Leisure Class, for example, Veblen ([1899] 2005, p.241, p.257, p.260, 
p.265) discusses “canons of reputability”, “canons of honor”, “canons of anthropomorphic 
fitness and honorific worth”, and “canons of pecuniary merit” among others. He utilises 
these canons as standards of ceremonial adequacy by which the leisure class evaluates any 
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proposed institutional adjustment to decide its feasibility or non-feasibility, its benefits or 
harms to the class. These standards of judgment, Veblen (1914, p.25) argued, result in “the 
triumph of imbecile institutions over life and culture.” However, the nature of the standards 
by which such imbecile institutions gain ascendancy suggest that there is a power structure 
driving the unjust, non-moral, non-optimal or inefficient selection of surviving institutions. If 
this follows, then human intentionality (purpose), perhaps, is the most important arbiter in 
Darwinian selection of institutions. However, Hodgson and Knudsen (2006c, p.12) maintain 
that “Darwinism does not deny belief, choice, purposeful behavior or foresight: it simply 
asserts that they too are caused and worthy of explanation.” To Dugger (1980, p.897),  
“[I]ndividuals acquire motives, goals, ideals, and means… [from]  the  institutional  
structure  in  which  the  individual  is  embedded. Institutional  structure  is  the  
source  of power,  for individuals  learn  motives,  goals,  ideals, and  means  from  
their  participation  in  society's  institutions” (emphasis in original). 
The key observation here is that power is an outcome of habitual exercises and routines 
that an individual performs to fulfil an institutional role within an institutional structure. The 
subtle point is that habitual practices generate tacit knowledge, which becomes the seat of 
power. If this argument follows, it implies that human purpose rather than an invisible hand 
of natural selection is responsible for regressive or progressive institutional change (Bazzoli 
2000). The purpose of the leisure class, for example, is to protect their “social standing,” 
“social claims,” and “social assets” (Polanyi [1957] 2001, p.48), hence, the usage of invidious 
canons to evaluate feasibility of social change (Wisman 2011). Notwithstanding the 
perceived proximate role, human purpose seems inescapable in evolution of institutions. 
On the other hand, Veblen also makes reference to canons favourable to the wider society 
as opposed to the powerful classes. He discusses, for example, “canons of workmanship”, 
“canons of reality” by which people objectify processes, “canons of curiosity” and “canons 
of economic reality” (Veblen 1914, p.88, p.179; 1919, p.8, p.148). He argues that institutions 
sometimes survive on instrumental grounds because they satisfy these canons of 
instrumental efficiency. Instrumental efficiency cannot be a goalless canon. Further, in 
contrast to Hodgson and Knudsen (2006c), this suggests that the morality or immorality and 
the optimality or non-optimality of institutions is not a matter of chance but choice. The 
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canons are purposefully put in place by people either through cumulative habitual practice 
or by declaration; it does not seem as though they happen by chance. Veblen ([1899] 2005, 
p.111) characterised the selection process: 
“In whatever way usages and customs and methods of expenditure arise, they are all 
subject to the selective action of this norm of reputability; and the degree in which 
they conform to its requirements is a test of their fitness to survive in the 
competition with other similar usages and customs” (emphasis added). 
Selection happens at the level of customs and usages. The key argument here is that survival 
of institutions depends on their adequacy in satisfying some standard of judgment (a value) 
such as the norm of reputability in consumption. In productive uses, the norm of 
instrumental efficiency would be the criteria of survival of institutions that govern 
production. However, the norms arise when a “tradition gains consistency, [and] the 
common sense of the community erects it into a canon of conduct” (Veblen [1899] 2005, 
p.12). In each aspect here, purpose is the cause. 
While Hodgson differs with the post-second world war OIE on whether there is such a thing 
called the Veblenian Dichotomy, the explanation of subset selection fits OIE’s explanation of 
ceremonial systems. Ayres (1996, not paged) postulated that  
“If the technological process is the locus of value, the continuous development  of  
the  technological  arts  and  crafts  and  the  accompanying  recession  of 
superstition and ceremonially invested status is progress.” 
The point he raises here is that society has two systems of institutions that are dialectical. 
Ceremonial systems with their past-binding effect serve to retain and continue their identity 
just as subset selection does. Examples of such ceremonial systems would include myths, 
superstitions, legends, ideologies, beliefs, traditions and norms among others. Although 
some of these elements of the cultural fabric are necessary as bases for trust and mutual 
interaction, some of them are sources of resistance to institutional change (Hayden 2006, 
Rutherford 1996; 2011). Thus, the process of “recession” of ceremonial dominance is the 
equivalence of the decline towards extinction of a species under subset selection. From this 
viewpoint, Ayres (1996, not paged) argues that “culture  exhibits  another  aspect  which  is  
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inhibitory  to  the  technological process  just  as  gravitation  inhibits  centrifugence.” 
Therefore, he concludes that “[f]or all who achieve economic development profound 
cultural change is inevitable” (Ayres 1996, not paged). The other dynamic in Clarence E 
Ayres’ explanation, which is the equivalence of generative selection, is “the continuous 
development of the technological arts and crafts”. Hence, as speciation of technology 
continues, ceremonial systems get disrupted leading to institutional speciation and diversity 
(Rutherford 1998). 
Logically, the instinct of intellectual idle curiosity is the source of natural selection of 
institutions that survive since the purposeless acquisition and accumulation of knowledge 
for its own sake gradually passively creates new beliefs, which, with diffusion and adoption, 
at some stage become habitual mental models (Bush 1983; 2009, Hayden 2006). The other 
two instincts, that of workmanship and that of parental bent, have human purpose at their 
core which means they are sources of artificial selection using the logic of efficient cause 
(Veblen 1914; 1919) or sufficient reason (final cause) in the Commonsian sense (Bromley 
2006, Commons 1924b). The result is that institutional change takes place through both 
natural and artificial selection (Bazzoli 2000, Cordes 2006; 2007, Rutherford 1998). Hodgson 
and Knudsen (2006c, p.15-16) admit that “Darwinism is insufficient, but … it is also 
necessary at an abstract and highly general level.”  
The insufficiency of Darwinism seems to arise from the Hodgsonian-Veblenian 
marginalisation of human purpose in social change because if both natural and artificial 
selection mechanisms are equally considered it will be a sufficient theory. Indeed, there are 
social phenomena that emerge in an unorganised fashion, while others display the mark of a 
human designer (Hodgson 2003b, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006c). Either case is ubiquitous in 
modern society. A broader framework, it seems, would be one that integrates Darwinian 
natural selection and artificial selection process in explaining institutional change. 
  c. Heredity  
The issue of continuity of culture and the human life process dominates Veblenian 
institutional economics and as such the process of sustaining continuity requires the 
Darwinian principle of heredity (Hodgson 2002; 2003a, Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a; 
2006b). Heredity explains why certain institutional forms and arrangements persist and 
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remain relatively stable (path dependence). The process of replication maps an original 
(source, parent) to a copy (offspring). Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a) and Ostrom (2014b) 
draw attention to the fact that the social domain consists of interactors (firms, churches, 
families, governments, villages and political parties among others) and replicators (habits, 
custom and routines all of which act as genes and DNA). The parent institutions directly and 
causally produce the offspring institutions, but all that is required is similarity of the copy to 
its original rather than perfect identity (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006a). Hodgson and 
Knudsen (2006b) argue that in the process of the production of the offspring, encoded 
information is passed from the parent institution to the offspring institution. The replicators 
are the genes (habits, beliefs, custom, traditions and routines).  
To Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a), the strength of the connectedness between cultural 
settings and interactors/carriers of the replicators determines the degree of successful 
replication. Hodgson and Knudsen (2006c, p.5) also postulate, 
“In biology these mechanisms often involve genes and DNA. In social evolution we 
may include the replication of habits, customs, rules and routines, all of which may 
carry solutions to adaptive problems… There must be some mechanism that ensures 
that some such solutions (embodied in habits, routines or whatever) endure and 
replicate; otherwise the continuing retention of useful knowledge would not be 
possible.”  
In the NIE, Ostrom (2014b, p.12) has made a similar argument likening phenotypic 
structures (interactors) to the structure of the social game – the players, incentive 
structures, hierarchy – and the genotypic structures (replicators) to “the set of instructions 
encoded in DNA … [which is] a rule configuration … to produce the structure of 
relationships…” In this case the social rule is the DNA. Knudsen (2004) emphasises that a 
replicator at one social level might be an interactor at another level, thus he suggests the 
existence of a hierarchy of social DNAs (genotypic hierarchy) and a hierarchy of interactors 
(phenotypic hierarchy). However, Cordes (2006, p.535) argues that “[i]t has not been 
possible to identify anything akin to a ‘social DNA’.” Cordes (2007, p.277) has also critiqued 
the interactor-replicator (or phenotype-genotype) conception because in social evolution 
“systematic feedback between variation and selection” undermines theories of change that 
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rely on “identification of pheno- and genotypes in cultural evolution (or interactors and 
replicators in Hodgson’s terms).” The implication of this critique is that there is an 
identification problem because replicators and interactors are indistinguishable. The 
complexity here is that if a gene can become an organism and an organism a gene at 
different hierarchical levels then the two are clearly indistinguishable in the social domain 
(Cordes 2006; 2007).   
Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a) and Knudsen (2004) outline four conditions necessary for 
effective replication. Firstly, since interactors are the carriers of replicators, the continued 
survival of interactors necessarily implies continued survival of replicators ingrained in 
them. Secondly, the replicators ingrained in an interactor interact with the outside 
interactors through the medium of the interactor, thus the result is shared organisation of 
components among interactors. In a sense, this condition suggests that interaction of 
organisations of all forms in the social domain involves diffusion, absorption and replication 
of habits, custom and routines. Thirdly, replicators that are not ingrained in an interactor 
are independent of the interactor. Lastly, the expected number of subsequent replicators 
depends on the characteristics of the interactor (Knudsen 2004). An organisation that least 
interacts with others cannot pass on its routines (replicators) to others and cannot receive 
routines (replicators) from others. Overall, Darwinian selection operates at the interactor 
level, which is to say at organisational level. It also happens at the replicator level, which is 
to say at the level of habits, customs, traditions and routines, which play the roles of social 
DNA. The Darwinian selection is hierarchical, but clearly there is an identification problem. 
3.2.3. Comparative insights: Veblenian Dichotomy and Hodgsonian-Veblenian theory 
Given the contention by Hodgson that the post-second world war OIE abandoned the 
Darwinian foundations of Veblenian institutional economics, a sketchy comparative analysis 
follows. At the most fundamental level, firstly, the Veblenian Dichotomy (VD) uses the 
institution as an explanatory unit, while the Hodgsonian-Veblenian (HV) theory uses a co-
evolutionary explanation. Thus, there is a degree of methodological collectivism in the VD as 
Bush (1987, p.1077) explained “socially relevant behavior is learned and is, for the most 
part, habitual” and “institutional  change  is  discretionary  precisely  because all  social 
prescriptions  are the  outcomes of  conscious choices made  at some point  in the  life  
history  of the  culture”. In the Commonsian tradition, it was shown that a co-evolutionary 
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methodology is evident in spite of the view that institutions are collective action in restraint, 
liberation and expansion of individual action (Albert and Ramstad 1998, Bazzoli 2000, 
Bromley 2008a, Commons 1931). 
Secondly, the HV is a hierarchical model of institutional change in which the interactors (the 
social structures) and the replicators (habits, routines, traditions and customs) change by 
natural selection. Although the HV critiques the VD for reductionism, the VD is also a 
hierarchical model of institutional change. Institutional change takes place at the levels of 
the value system and the institution (structural levels) (Bush 1983; 1987). The VD postulates 
that “value is contextual and located within the existential realm of “knowing and doing” 
(Bush 2009, p.295).  
Since values have to do with knowing and doing, they deal with the realm of norm and habit 
production. Thus, values are the replicators in the VD, while habits and routines are the 
replicators in HV. Besides correlating behaviours within and between institutions, Bush 
(2009, p.295) argues that values have the warranted ability to “relate means to 
consequences in the appraisal of human action” and they are “a form of knowledge.” Thus, 
values act as standards of judgment in human decision making because they genetically 
contain knowledge encoded into them from previous generations by a cumulative causal 
process. Value judgments themselves, as Bush (2009, p.301) argues, “are not subject to 
habituation, for they are the very stuff out of which changes in habits of thought and 
behavior are initiated.” 
The important conclusion that emerges from the VD is that “institutional change must entail 
a change in the value structure of the institution” (Bush 1987, p.1078). The implication is 
that a change in the replicators (ceremonial values and instrumental values) means real 
institutional change has taken place. This is the Darwinian concept of mutation. The VD 
presumably gives an adequate explanation by virtue of isolating the ceremonial system as 
the source of inhibitive forces in institutional evolutionary process, which means the 
outcome may be that of a favourable generative selection (in the case of instrumental 
embodiment), that of adverse generative selection (in the case of Lysenkoan effects) or that 
of subset selection (in the case of prolonged ceremonial encapsulation). In effect, the 
Lysenkoan effects seem to be the equivalence of Hodgson and Knudsen’s (2006a, p.477) 
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characterisation that “subset selection and generative selection can lead to extremely rapid 
effects in a social population.” Similarly, what Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a, p.483) 
characterise as “replication error (mutation) and genetic recombination generates new 
variation” is what the VD calls weak form ceremonial encapsulation, which leads to an 
imperfect pass through of new knowledge to instrumental uses leading to some loss of 
instrumental efficiency. 
In light of this view, the VD largely is Darwinian, but it is premised on artificial selection. 
Human purpose is a deciding factor in the VD, which it is not in the HV. The VH, therefore, 
does not have a theory of valuation since selection is left to chance and fate, thus the 
possibility of generating immoral and unjust results. The VD is premised on institutional 
adjustment as a problem solving process rather than change out of chance as the HV 
postulates. Even in the case of purposeful selection, the HV requires that it be traced to the 
cause of purpose, hence marginalising the need for a theory of social value (Bazzoli 2000). 
Yet, the cause of purpose is a problem (a surprise), which is what VD postulates.  
In causing purpose, the problem does not select a response (institution), valuation guides 
the choice of an institution although the value criteria are evolutionary themselves (Cordes 
2006). The prevalence of canons of different types, standards of conduct and norms as 
valuation criteria in all of Veblen’s works suggests an oxymoron in that he embraced natural 
selection, while at the same time advocating valuation, which is purposeful (Veblen 1898c; 
1914; 1919; [1899] 2005). Either he meant the two forms of selection to go along side each 
other or he vaguely used the term natural selection to imply that human choices are natural 
selection processes in the course of cultural development. This reasoning follows from his 
clear indication that the fitness of new institutions depends on them passing the canons or 
norms, which are purposefully established, diffused and adopted standards of valuation. 
Commons (2009, p.661) seems to corroborate this argument in his critique to Thorstein B 
Veblen arguing, “Thus Veblen is compelled to introduce purpose into his instinct of 
workmanship, and thereby to change from Darwin’s “natural” selection to Darwin’s 
“artificial” selection.”  
Since valuation is central to the Veblenian discourse and cumulative causal analysis of 
process is foundational and since “artificial selection” is no more than a special case of 
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“natural selection” (Hodgson 2003b, p.570), the HV necessarily claims the place of an 
overarching generalised theoretical programme of Veblen evolutionary economics. 
However, literature within the HV suggests that HV is not necessarily a general case in the 
social domain. For example, Knudsen (2002, p.444) asserts that “the neo-Darwinian 
explanation applies only to such economic selection processes that involve replication” 
(emphasis added). Cordes (2006; 2007) draws attention to the fact that the social domain 
fails the heritability test. The qualifier “only” suggests that there are cases the HV fails to 
explain.  
Cordes (2006; 2007) has demonstrated at two levels that the HV is a partial theory because, 
while the original Darwinian framework comprises five-part hypotheses that together make 
a complete (holistic) exposition of evolution, the HV has focused on three (selection, 
variation and heredity) and excluded (descent and speciation). He also argues that the HV is 
capable of explaining origin, but fails to explain continuity of social evolution because the 
presence of social learning transforms the trajectory and rate of social evolution outside the 
normal Darwinian trajectory and rate of change (Cordes 2006, Cordes et al. 2008). 
 Lastly, there are similarities in the framing of some of the HV’s minimum conditions for 
selection and the VD’s principles of institutional adjustment. Firstly, VH’s principle of shared 
dependence of component replicators which postulates that the life of the replicators is 
dependent on the life of the interactors is related to the VD’s principle of minimal 
dislocation because a major dislocation would cause a disrapport that would extinguish 
replicators and interactors simultaneously.  Secondly, the HV’s principle of shared 
organisation of components which postulates that mutual cross pollination of interactors 
(by habits, customs and routines – the pollens) takes place through the medium of 
interactors corresponds to the VD’s principle of recognised interdependences, which 
postulates that institutional adjustment must be of such a kind that it will favourably 
correlate the emerging pattern of activities and human relations within and between 
institutions in the post adjustment period.  
Overall, the two Veblenian claimants are both hierarchical evolutionary models and only 
differ in terms of the principal replicator as well as the role of purpose and valuation on the 
one hand, and chance and fate on the other. The HV claims open system and non-
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reductionist Darwinian Theory of institutional change, which the VD seems not to claim. 
However, natural selection in the VD follows the locus of the instinct of intellectual idle 
curiosity. The VD approaches institutional change from an applied perspective, while the HV 
is cast in a theoretical sense.  
3.3. A working integrated institutionalist paradigm 
The section ties together the various pieces from the three institutionalist schools of 
thought to build an integrated explanatory framework for institutional change from the 
perspective of knowledge and power. The framework accommodates both methodological 
collectivism and methodological individualism, which is a co-evolutionary methodological 
framework. The Northean School demonstrated that social agents invest in knowledge as a 
function of net returns in order to build a strategy for lobbying for certain changes that they 
desire in the institutional structure. It also postulated bidirectional causality between 
knowledge and ideology, suggesting that ideology, fads and dogmas sometimes have a 
major influence on institutional change. This line of thought was conceptually refined with 
input from feminist literature that focuses on the role of instituted social imaginaries and 
epistemic violence.  
Generalising the concept of violence from armed conflict to socio-cognitive violence 
facilitates generalisation of the limited access and open access order hypotheses to explain 
the role of knowledge- and ideology- based epistemic violence in shaping institutional 
change. Epistemic violence is a manifestation of power – monopoly over the sanction of 
ignorance. The sanction of ignorance implies that epistemic communities that have 
sovereign power can silence others, through the mechanisms of testimonial quieting and 
hermeneutic injustice, in institutional change processes. 
To interrogate the transmission mechanisms of epistemic violence in shaping institutional 
change, John R Commons’ principles of sovereignty, futurity and working rules as well as the 
negotiational psychology of command-obedience, argumentation-pleading and persuasion-
coercion are relevant here. Since sovereignty is a process of monopolising economic and 
political violence (Commons 2009, Dawson 1998), and since the logics of LAO and OAO are 
about monopoly over violence, a special case of which is epistemic violence, the two schools 
coalesce into a useful lens for theorising institutional change. The LAO/OAO social orders 
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provide an ontological framework for John R Commons’ negotiational psychology. Insofar as 
epistemic violence has the greatest claim on sovereignty when an epistemic community 
manages to partner with governmental agencies, and since government is a process 
characterised by the continuous flow of transactions between officials of the state and the 
citizens (Commons 1924b), the LAO/OAO contains the logic of negotiational psychology.  
While in the Commonsian School, property is central to accessing sovereign power, the 
modified LAO/OAO suggests that knowledge and ideologies are potential sources of 
sovereign power especially considering the potential role of knowledge and ideology in John 
R Commons’ negotiational psychology. Further, since a democratic setting lowers political 
transaction costs of expressing social agents’ opinions (North 1990), liberty and property 
combine with epistemic violence in John R Commons’ negotiational psychology to create a 
potentially wicked institutional adjustment problem. As Commons (1931, p.654) would 
argue, “It is from forbearance that the doctrine of reasonableness arises,” but forbearance 
is the opposite of epistemic violence. Wickedness is the absence of reasonableness. 
To the extent that property, liberty and epistemic violence can be used to advance narrow 
group interests or broader societal interests, the Veblenian Dichotomy enables classification 
of various power configurations and manifestations of sovereignty into ceremonial and 
instrumental categories. The relative prevalence of ceremonial motives over instrumental 
motives (or the converse) in the unfolding institutional change dynamics, helps evaluate the 
extent to which change is progressive or regressive, and to explain the nature of dynamic 
forces hindering or propelling progressive institutional change. The definition of a problem 
as the difference between ‘what ought to be’ and ‘what is’ ties all the three schools – the 
Northean, the Commonsian and the Veblenian – in the concept of purpose. Although the 
Northean view uses the price system for valuation, it also ascribes purpose to knowledge 
acquisition and generation.  
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Figure 3-1: Institutionalist theory of social change 
Source: F Gregory Hayden (1982, p.643): The Institutionalist Paradigm 
Figure 3-1 illustrates Hayden’s (1982) synthesis of the institutionalist paradigm. Figure 3-2, 
which is a modification of Hayden’s (1982) framework, synthesises the potential 
interlinkages of the three schools in terms of the knowledge-ideology-power interactive 
dynamic in explaining institutional change. The two sides AB (ceremonial knowledge system) 
and CD (instrumental knowledge system) are antagonistic. Social ceremonies include 
institutions and values. They are past-binding. Under this category, property rights also 
belong in the event that they are used to justify a regressive outcome. For example, based 
on a property rights argument, a group might withstand an environmental policy that 
probably is democratically and socially desirable. However, property rights also incentivise 
desirable behaviour such as investing in sustainable land management practices (Armsworth 
et al. 2006, Kontoleon et al. 2007, Leal 2010, Swanson 1994). In that sense, they are 
instrumental institutions. 
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Figure 3-2: Framework for analysing knowledge and power 
Source: Modified from F Gregory Hayden (1982): The Institutionalist Paradigm 
There is a fundamental point of difference between Hayden’s framework (Figure 3-1) and 
the one depicted in Figure 3-2. To Hayden, given his utilisation of the Ayresian framework 
that takes institutions to be ceremonial and technology to be instrumental (Rutherford 
2011), all institutions such as property rights, judicial precedent, government statutes and 
the constitution are ceremonial institutions. An attempt is made in Figure 3-2 to match 
every component of social ceremonies in Hayden’s framework with an instrumental aspect. 
Ceremonial values have instrumental values as their antithesis. Ceremonial beliefs have 
instrumental beliefs as their antithesis. Since values are a form of knowledge (Bush 2009), 
there is no reason why instrumental values cannot be classified under technology. 
It is somewhat doubt-inducing that the Veblenian Dichotomy classifies the judiciary system 
as a ceremonial system on grounds that it is an authority system (Ayres 1996, Hayden 1982, 
Hickerson 1982; 1987, Mayhew 1981). Insofar as the basis for new technology is already 
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existing technology, which makes it a referential system, one wonders why the judiciary 
becomes ceremonial if the basis of common law is existing/previous knowledge (precedent). 
Since technology is a combination and recombination of previous and current knowledge, 
skills and tools, one wonders, too, why the process of growth in common law precedent is a 
ceremonial system when it operates on the same principle as technological evolution. It is a 
process of knowledge production and growth. Judiciary systems do not only utilise 
precedent, they also listen to testimonies of scientific experts if the case requires it and they 
combine all such new and existing knowledge into a new rulings which grow the knowledge 
fund of the legal foundations of the social system (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, Rutherford 
2011). The new rulings become new reasonable institutions. 
Veblen (1914, p.291) classified judicial systems under ceremonial system at the time of his 
writing because instrumentally valuable matters of “current preconceptions touching 
human rights” had no place in existing legal discourses or could not be accommodated 
because the jurists were habitually given to establishing legal principles in 
statutes/precedent that confirmed existing doctrines and avoided finding new principles 
that might have contradicted their existing judicial social imaginaries. Changing social 
conditions required utilisation of the efficient cause logic rather than sufficient reason 
(Veblen 1914). The problem was not “authentication in terms of sufficient reason”, but it 
was an absence of investigative interest in “any question of the causes to which these [legal] 
principles owed their eternal fitness in the scheme of Nature at that particular time” 
(Veblen 1914, p.292). The jurists were not questioning the foundations of the legal 
principles they so depended upon. Judicial change was falling short of third-order change. 
Commons (1924b) traced the evolution of United States judicial precedent over time from 
the transformation of the meaning of property from physical possession to economic power 
and the creation of a new category called liberty, which was important for human rights (the 
human life process that is so central to the Veblenian tradition of the OIE). It is here argued 
that this fundamental transformation of the habitual mental models of legal thought in 
judiciary practice as democratisation unfolded implies that some reclassification of this 
source of institutional change from the ceremonial category to instrumental category is long 
overdue. Commons (1942, p.369) described the new judicial way of reasoning that 
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transformed US precedent as “experimental reasoning”, which was quite distinct from the 
“historical doctrine of the rule of reason” (Commons 1942, p.382).  
In showing the evolution of judicial reasoning from backward-looking sufficient reason to 
forward-looking experimental reasoning (principle of futurity), Commons’ logic suggests that 
classifying the judiciary as ceremonial is a misclassification (Ramstad 1989, Rutherford 
2011). Appreciating this fundamental change in the scheme of evolving political and judicial 
institutions, makes for easy reconciliation of Commons’ system build on the logic of 
sufficient reason (final cause/purposeful explanation) and Veblen’s system build on the logic 
of efficient cause (pure/objective causal process explanation). Bromley’s (2006) theory of 
volitional pragmatism, which utilises the experimental reasoning logic, and is a posterior set 
of the reasonable valuation epistemological framework of John R Commons (the anterior 
set), naturally coalesces with instrumental theory of valuation despite being based on the 
logic of sufficient reason. Sufficient reason carries a different meaning in Bromley (2006) 
from the Veblenian connotation. It now carries a futuristic meaning rather than the past-
binding meaning. 
In Hayden’s framework, philosophy provides the valuation framework, which is the 
Deweyan instrumentalism based on the logic of efficient cause. In the Commonsian School, 
valuation is based on the logic of sufficient reason (final cause) as volitional agents interact, 
hence volitional pragmatism. Both forms of valuation yield the same result although they 
apply different logics. Instead of having philosophy as a guide to social value, Figure 3-2 
introduces a transdisciplinary framework as a guide to valuation. Max-Neef (2005) raised 
two fundamental issues: there are multiple levels of reality in the first instance, and in the 
second, a theory relevant to a particular realm of reality does not exhaustively explain it. 
Thus, all disciplines yield partial truths about social and natural phenomenon, and the 
complete truth is possible when various epistemic communities congregate around a policy 
issue to integrate their domain-specific warranted assertions to come up with a grand 
valuable assertion. Unlike Max-Neef’s (2005) view that theology and philosophy provide 
guidance on social valuation, it can be argued that value is generated through 
transdisciplinary reasoned discourses. Bromley (2008a, p.238) supports this line of 
reasoning arguing that volitional pragmatism requires social agents to overcome the 
modernist “Myth of the other”. The theological view is that whenever human society 
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started, God had predetermined the values for humankind, but modernism eliminated God 
and enthroned philosophy as the new source of values. 
“Philosophy became our new Other… The Myth of the Other is precisely concerned 
with the idea that tough choices cannot usefully be turned to God, or to 
philosophers, or to welfare economists. There is no Other – there is only us” 
(Bromley 2008a, p.238, emboldening in original, italics added). 
The precise point he is making is that problems are resolved by deliberation through a 
“particular game of giving and asking for reasons” (Price 2013, p.31) and that valuable 
knowledge (reasonable value) is a product of that reasoned process (Norgaard 2007). 
Philosophers alone cannot guide us to social value. The age of High Philosophy is over. 
Transdisciplinarity suits Bromley’s view because all epistemic communities bring their 
warranted claims to the discussion table and the rest of the listening epistemic communities 
jointly evaluate the claims. Those that pass the joint valuation are the truth and the 
reasonable values for the time being. The essence of having a transdisciplinary valuation 
framework is to avoid truth claims of one epistemic community graduating into institutions 
that bind the democratic community before it has evaluated them, which would be a 
manifestation of epistemic violence. 
Since volitional pragmatism and instrumentalism are premised on different logics, Figure 3-2 
introduces the four instrumental principles of institutional adjustment (technological 
determination, minimal dislocation, socio-ecological co-evolution and recognised 
interdependences) as the sufficiency criteria. The social legitimacy of institutional 
adjustment in Figure 3-2 is evaluated on the bases of constitutionality, legality and judicial 
muster, which operate on the logic of sufficient reason (final cause). Both these sufficiency 
and social legitimacy evaluation criteria depend on the democratic process of participation 
in the determination of the sovereign will through the Commonsian negotiational 
psychology, which now also includes a new category called epistemic violence.  
BD specifies evaluation criteria, while AC represents environmental/ecological systems 
(Figure 3-2). The transdisciplinary framework allows humanity to have a holistic view of the 
environmental/ecological systems. Instead of viewing it through a uni-disciplinary lens, 
which only gives the theoretical claims of a particular epistemic community, 
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transdisciplinarity consummates humanity’s view of the environment/ biodiversity through 
an instituted process of deliberative valuation that yields reasonable value (Bromley 2006; 
2008d, Norgaard 2007, Waller Jr and Robertson 1991). From this lens, one can evaluate the 
extent to which a policy process was transdisciplinary or uni-disciplinary thereby detecting 
the role of epistemic violence.  
Another fundamental difference between Hayden’s scheme (Figure 3-1) and the one in 
Figure 3-2 is that the Hayden scheme treats all knowledge from the arts and sciences as 
instrumental. However, if the Northean School is correct in postulating that knowledge also 
generates ideologies, fads and dogmas in addition to technology, and that some ideologies 
lead to regressive institutional change, then some knowledge produced by the arts and 
sciences might be ceremonial. This reconceptualisation of knowledge implies that there are 
two dialectical knowledge systems – the ceremonial and the instrumental. This 
reconceptualisation helps to capture problems such as scientism and fundamentalism in 
science, which are ceremonial in nature and are mechanisms of epistemic violence. 
Hodgson (2003a) and Rutherford (2011) support this view when they critique Clarence E 
Ayres for being a technological and cultural determinist and for attributing all knowledge 
production in sciences and arts only to “instrumental ways of thinking” (Rutherford 2011, 
p.335).  
3.4. Theory of value as theory of knowledge and of power 
At the core of valuation is the idea of purpose and knowledge because what ought to be is 
defined by the knowledge frontier. The big question is whose knowledge defines the 
knowledge frontier? A theory of power begins with knowledge and a theory of knowledge 
might begin with Dewey’s (1939, p.34) assertion that 
“valuation takes place only when there is something the matter; when there is some 
trouble to be done away with, some need, lack, or privation to be made good, some 
conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions. This 
fact in turn proves that there is present an intellectual factor – a factor of inquiry – 
whenever there is valuation…” (emphasis added). 
The thrust of Dewey’s argument is that problem resolution is a process of knowledge 
creation. Peirce (1878) argued that a problem confronts society as a surprise, which in turn 
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induces doubt in the minds of the members of society about the existing truths concerning 
the evolving problem thereby putting epistemic communities to work in search of new 
truth. According to Dewey (1939), society evaluates both means and ends in a means-
consequence-means-consequence continuum. The consequences are the expected 
outcomes of a contemplated course of action. The consequences of the action become the 
means in the next iteration. The consequence is the end-in-view that equivalently is the 
reasonable/instrumental value. 
Bromley (2004b; 2006; 2008d; 2012) characterises the Deweyan process in the formulation 
of new institutions in a democratic society. Bromley (2010, p.40) calls the first effects of the 
surprise on the minds of the members of society “impressions”. Democratic beings with 
some epistemic capacity evaluate the surprise guided by their individual impressions leading 
to “individualized expressions” (Bromley 2012, p.17). Relative to an individual’s social 
situatedness in life, the individualised expressions summarise the perceived nature of the 
problem, the perceived scale of the problem, the perceived cause of the problem and the 
perceived group(s) responsible for the problem (Bromley 2007). The individualised 
expressions become “the stories we tell to ourselves and to others” about the situation 
(Bromley 2010, p.41). The expressions (data) are “the mental stage on which we live” 
(Bromley 2010, p.41). This stage constitutes the individually perceived and constructed 
reality. Similarly, individuals with epistemic capacity begin to create a mental future (end-in-
view) as a function of the expressions (the data/means). The created future is a “set of 
created imaginings” (Bromley 2008d, p.6). As this process suggests, knowledge is being 
created at the individual level and its power is far from being felt at this stage. 
Once investigators socialised to the same epistemic community discursively evaluate their 
individualised expressions and imaginings and converge on a particular expression and a 
particular imagining, they have a set of “warranted assertions” (Bromley 2008d, p.7). The 
theoretical claims of a particular scientific community are warranted but not necessarily 
valuable. Inasmuch as policy is to be formulated and implemented democratically in a 
democratic society, warranted assertions are data into the second hypotheses testing 
phase, the “process of working out an emergent consensus” (Bromley 2004b, p.93), by the 
national political leadership in legislatures and courts. This is the “realm of reasons” 
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(Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, p.106, emphasis in original). The outcome of such a 
valuation might be a draft policy, draft regulations or some such policy-related product.  
At this stage, a third phase of hypotheses testing brings the emergent consensus that 
defines the contents of the proposed institution into democratic valuation by the broader 
political community. This is the realm of justification, which involves the “actual practices of 
giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom 1995, p.899). The warranted assertions making up 
the emergent consensus that survives this stage become “valuable assertions” (Bromley 
2004b, p.91), which constitute new habits, new laws, new directives or new regulations – 
simply new institutions – because they represent the implementable democratic will. 
Valuableness is a function of justification and informed reasoning (Price 2013). This 
somewhat linear account of knowledge production in democratic policymaking processes 
that lead to new institutions is actually non-linear. Bromley (2004b, p.82) emphasises that 
the divergent individual/group expressions and imaginings have to be reconciled in such a 
way that the emergent consensus satisfies two properties: feasibility and reasonableness. It 
is precisely for this reason that policy problems are mostly wicked. Warranted assertions 
can become new institutions before they are tested for valuableness whenever epistemic 
violence is prevalent in institutional change processes. 
Following Foster’s (1981c) conceptualisation of a problem, it follows that what ought to be 
is rooted in existing and emerging knowledge that as yet has not been incorporated into the 
bloodstream of the current institutional systems. What ought to be is defined by a 
stochastic knowledge frontier of multiple imaginings from multiple epistemic communities. 
This suggests that the theory of social value is a theory of knowledge. But not all knowledge 
can define what ought to be. Ceremonial systems are entrenched in the status quo and are 
presumably backward-looking. The institutionalist account of institutional change across the 
three schools so far is that knowledge producers are separable from knowledge users in 
policymaking processes. However, there is a possibility that knowledge producers might be 
entrenched insiders in the policymaking networks leading to a convergence of 
ceremonial/instrumental interests of the newly admitted insiders and the incumbents. This 
means ceremonial systems become forward-looking in addition to being backward looking. 
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It is the claim of the thesis that producers of knowledge have power to shape the course, 
and, sometimes, the speed and extent of institutional adjustment. It is also claimed that, as 
the value frontier is defined by knowledge (technological process), the generators of 
knowledge define society’s future course of institutional adjustment, notwithstanding the 
presence of ceremonial encapsulation. This means that communicable knowledge (the 
social imaginary) is a source of discursive power in shaping imaginings and emergent 
expressions. While the power of scarcity and bargaining power (Commons 1942) have been 
enduring avenues of participation in the determination of the sovereign will and action, 
knowledge is foundational to defining who participates in the determination of the 
sovereign will.  
The thesis claims that producers of knowledge who also belong to the community of 
policymakers in a society undoubtedly have the best opportunity of shaping the sovereign 
will and power. Epistemic communities whose membership finds itself in the community of 
policymakers stand greater chances of defining the value frontier, deciding which imaginings 
to implement, which, most likely, are the warranted assertions of their epistemic 
communities, leading to epistemic violence. Ayres (1996, not paged) similarly argued that 
“the strength of those particular forces … is indeed entrenchment, physical and ideological, 
that counts and not the power which …   accrues to ideas because they are right.”  
Physical entrenchment implies that the epistemic community has physical seats in the 
decision-making body and not just being advisors. Ideological entrenchment, on the other 
hand, implies that the epistemic community has intellectual seats in the decision-making 
body such that its instituted social imaginary (ideology, beliefs, metaphors, concepts and 
mental models) controls the thought processes in that policymaking body. The epistemic 
community becomes the “invisible governors” who govern through “their ability to supply 
needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure” (Bernays 1928, p.9). Either 
case is a manifestation of epistemic violence because “institutionally and ideologically 
entrenched authority prevails” (Ayres 1996, not paged). The inherent danger is one in which 
the warranted assertions of one epistemic community find their way into new public policy, 
regulations or law before the gestation period to qualify for valuableness is over. This then 
generates a series of bitter controversies over the newly created institution. Therefore, this 
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would be a manifestation of institutional hegemony (Dugger 1980) through the sanction of 
ignorance. 
3.5. Conclusion 
The major hypothesis emerging from the review is that knowledge is indispensable to 
progressive institutional change, but it is inseparable from the ideologies of the epistemic 
communities producing the knowledge. Thus, most epistemic claims combine ideology and 
ideas. Ideology is the source of epistemic violence especially when an epistemic community 
gains ascendency into a policymaking body. The ascendancy might be ideological or 
physical, but in each case it facilitates the epistemic community to appropriate sovereign 
power, to maintain it by epistemic violence and to participate jointly with the state in 
monopolising violence. In terms of the emerging social order, it would be the coexistence of 
an open access policymaking order and limited access policymaking order. The prediction in 
such cases is that regressive institutional change is the likely outcome, and will be 
contested, sometimes violently, which would be a wicked problem. 
Chapter 4 reviews the methodology and the research methods used in this thesis to answer 
the question of whether institutional isolation, as perceived, really existed; the mechanisms 
by which it was transmitted and its potential economic effects on isolated sectors. The 
Chapter sets out the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the study. Since the 
study employs a mixed methods methodology adapted to suit the needs for institutional 
analysis, the Chapter presents both qualitative and quantitative methods used in the study. 
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Chapter 4  
Research methodology 
 
“It is the glory of God to conceal a matter; to search out a matter is the glory of kings.” 
Proverbs 25 verse 2 – Today’s New International Version, 2005 
“[Science] cannot overcome a society’s divisions. It can only winnow out the solid core of 
facts upon which society’s arguments with itself should be conducted. But it cannot bring 
those arguments to a conclusion… The past is an argument and the functions of… honest 
historians, is simply to purify the argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies.” 
- Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, (1996, 114) 
 
4.0. Introduction 
The literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 revealed that at the core of institutional change 
are the concepts of purpose, futurity, power, knowledge and human design. It was shown 
that all three schools – the Northean, the Veblenian, the Commonsian – converged on the 
role of purpose in institutional change although they differed in terms of how the purpose 
worked out itself to produce institutional change. The ontological commitment of the 
present thesis is one of explaining the evolution of public purpose in alien and invasive 
species regulation – its configuration and execution – leading to the redefinition of the legal 
foundations, opportunity sets and potential welfare outcomes of various alien and invasive 
species-dependent groups of people in South Africa.  
Since 2004, nearly a decade had elapsed with neither the final national list of invasive 
species nor the alien and invasive species regulations in place. They were only finally 
promulgated in August 2014. Even then, the management of trout was so controversial that 
the regulations and the national list of invasive species were published without deciding on, 
and excluding, trout until further deliberations (DEA 2014e; 2014f; 2014g). A protracted 
controversy surrounding the regulatory regime that government was proposing for trout 
fisheries had been evolving since the mid-1980s. These controversies were nothing but 
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disagreements over the truth and reality about the invasive capacity of trout species and the 
appropriate regulatory framework. 
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology – the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions – and the specific methods that were used in each component of the research. 
The theoretical and conceptual purpose of the study guided the choice of the 
epistemological framework for investigating the process of institutional change. The 
objectives of the study were [1] to evaluate the process of institutional change in the 
management of biodiversity, and in particular, economically useful alien and invasive 
species; [2] to analyse, using a case study of the trout sector, the nature and cause of 
hitherto perceived institutional isolation and its economic implications on sectors utilising 
alien and invasive species; and [3] to evaluate the role of institutional entrepreneurship in 
the trout sector in trying to mitigate the effects of hitherto perceived institutional isolation. 
The thesis is concerned with the WHY question. Thus, the greatest question for this Chapter 
pertains to how the study examined the foregoing problem characterisation.  
4.1 Ontological assumptions 
To examine this complex evolutionary policy process, the thesis was organised around an 
ontological assumption about the nature of truth and reality in biodiversity management. 
The thesis assumed that society, whether through its epistemic communities, policymaking 
community or the broader political community, creates truth and reality (Bromley 2004b; 
2006; 2008a; 2008d; 2012, Dawson 1994, Hirokawa 2014). Hirokawa (2014, p.1) emphasises 
the existence of multiple “frequently conflicting and competing [social] constructions of the 
world.”  
The philosopher and progenitor of American pragmatism, Peirce (1878, p.300), defined 
truth and reality as the “opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate, is… the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.” Truth is, 
thus, consensually and trans-subjectively constructed (Dawson 1994, Max-Neef 2005) and 
that it is that opinion which prevails against rival opinions because “an increase in 
justification leads to an increased likelihood of truth” (Rorty 1998, p.24). Bromley (2012, 
p.19) characterises truth as “shared mental objectification”, thus making it transactionally 
constructed through the negotiation psychology of argumentation and pleading as well as 
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persuasion. McCloskey and McCloskey (1994, p.372) similarly argue that “knowledge 
without persuasion of an audience is useless.” By rendering such knowledge useless, they 
imply that it is valueless (devoid of truth); it still is a warrantable assertion yet to become 
warranted after deliberative processes.  
 Brandom (1995, p.900) maintains that “the notions of belief, justification, reliability, and 
truth are inextricably intertwined”. Since truth is the opinion upon which there is ultimate 
agreement, it implies that truth is belief successfully fixed. More succinctly, Bromley (2008d, 
p.8) argues that “[t]ruth is not a property of objects or events. Rather, truth is a property of 
sentences about objects or events.” Taking this further, it means reality has an inseparable 
existence from that of scientific and political opinions. The central thrust of this argument is 
that truth is that for which sufficient reasons and justifications to be believed exist 
(Davidson 1963) or as Rorty (1998, p.21) puts it, truth is “assertibility at the end of inquiry”. 
Therefore, truth and reality are never absolute; they “are always in the process of 
becoming” (Bromley 2012, p.17). 
The characterisation of truth and reality as being socially constructed is consistent with 
reasonable value and instrumental value theories as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 and 
represented in Figure 3-2. Reasonable value theory defines truth as “Reasonable Practices”, 
“workable consensus” or “consensual idealism” (Commons 2009, p.742-743) and 
instrumental value theory defines truth as that which is valuable to the efficient causation 
of full human life development and cultural growth (Tool 1977). These theories postulate 
that valuable assertions (truth) are products of the Deweyan instrumental logic, which is a 
democratic process of truth production (Dewey 1939). In the policy context, the “particular 
game of giving and asking for reasons” (Price 2013, p.31) is the process of generating policy 
truth.  
The implication of the foregoing characterisation of truth and reality is that concepts such as 
biodiversity, ecosystem, environment as well as nativity and alienness of species are socially 
constructed so much so that they might not be used as objective scientific concepts without 
considerable qualification (Chew and Hamilton 2011, Wylie 2008). For example, Bromley 
(2012, p.16) asserts that “there is no plausible, reliable, complete, irrefutable, 
comprehensive, true, and accurate account of a “forest,” or an “ecotype,” or an 
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“ecosystem.”” The argument is that the reality about environmental/ecological elements is 
known to people by their effects on them. Since the totality of the effects of biodiversity, 
the ecosystem or the environment on individuals differ from one to the other depending on 
their “situatedness in that world” (Bromley 2012, p.17), logically realities vary by epistemic 
communities, social groups or individuals (Rittel and Webber 1973). Similarly, Max-Neef 
(2005, p.15) asserts that “disciplinary investigations concern only one level of reality.” 
Valentinov (2015, p.145) also argues that “the reduction of environmental complexity is the 
main function of social systems, which thus allow people to make sense of the surrounding 
world.” The process of reducing environmental complexity is an interpretive process, which 
is a trans-subjective social process based on situatedness of the interpreters. 
The theoretical framework in Figure 3-2 illustrated that transdisciplinarity was appropriate 
for providing guidance to social value. Max-Neef (2005, p.11) emphasises that there are 
“different levels of perception of reality and of multi-dimensional realities” and that there 
are disciplines that investigate certain domains of reality as opposed to others. However, he 
maintains that the body of theories of disciplines investigating a domain of reality do not 
exhaustively explain that domain.  There is always a place for other disciplines to bring in 
alternative but complementary insights into other dimensions of the same domain of 
reality. 
 4.2 Epistemological framework - Volitional Pragmatism 
The thesis applied pragmatism as the epistemological framework for explaining institutional 
change. Whilst Charles Sanders Peirce developed pragmatism from a physical science 
perspective, William James and John Dewey popularised it in social sciences, and John R 
Commons and Thorstein B Veblen customised it to economics (Bromley 2006). Bromley 
developed John R Commons’ theory of willingness further into a theory of truth and human 
action in public policy that he calls volitional pragmatism (Bromley 2006; 2008d). The thesis 
utilised volitional pragmatism as an epistemological framework. The discussion of the theory 
follows. Some of the elements of the theory were discussed under the Commonsian theory 
of institutional change, thus they are not reiterated here.  
Bromley (2008a, p.219) defines volitional pragmatism as a theory of how societies “deploy 
reasons for choice and action”. The assumption underpinning volitional pragmatism is “that 
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we work out what it is we think we want as we work our way through what it seems 
possible for us to have (to get)” (Bromley 2008d, p.4). The first thing to note is that 
individual action is not an a priori (premeditated) choice, but the moment of choice is 
instigated by a surprise in the transactional context. The assumption ties together the five-
part principles of the Commonsian theory of institutional change (Ramstad 1986). What one 
thinks he/she wants captures the principle of willingness of which the principle of futurity 
(created imagining) and principle of scarcity are decisive parts in this case. Commons (2009, 
p.152) asserted that “Pragmatism is Futurity”. It is a theory of how habit regulates future 
volitional action. Habit eliminates uncertainty for the time being. Belief creates a set of 
habitual assumptions or mental models that guide future human action (Bromley 2008a; 
2008d, Denzau and North 1994). 
What it seems possible to get captures two principles, namely the principle of working rules, 
which define the opportunity sets (possibilities), and principle of sovereignty (what the 
collective authority is willing to do to enforce one’s will/choice upon others). In essence the 
assumption summarises the dimensions of human willingness to act or wait. While the 
individual is in the decision context, he/she like everyone else involved, is thinking about the 
“problem, problem solution, instruments by which that solution is best achieved” (Bromley 
2008d, p.8) and this leads to the process of “stochastic belief updating” leading to 
convergence of mental objectifications of actors  (Bromley 2008d, p.6, italics in original). 
4.2.1. Belief fixation 
Volitional pragmatism proffers a way of knowing that is “diagnostic” or, to borrow Weaver-
Hightower’s (2014, 117) expression, it seeks to “counter the ‘‘opacity’’ of contemporary 
policies by archaeologically uncovering multiplex influences.” Bromley (2008a; 2008d) 
asserts that volitional pragmatism seeks to answer why questions, hence its 
diagnostic/abductive nature. Since this epistemological programme is abductive, it enables 
the researcher to search for reasons for decisions and actions of policymakers, individuals 
and groups that are the policy clientele. Volitional pragmatism forces social 
agents/policymakers to ask themselves why they believe what they believe to be the right 
course of action.  Ostrom and Cox (2010, p.451) also discuss the role of diagnostic 
approaches in discovering the “source, and possible amelioration, of poor outcomes for 
ecological and human systems”. 
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In reviewing the literature, it was shown that society is perturbed by problems that come as 
surprises, which, in turn, produce impressions (Bromley 2006, Dawson 1994). The 
impressions prick social agents with doubt about the beliefs they currently hold and this 
leads to a search for reasons leading to the production of new warranted assertions 
(expressions and created imaginings) of epistemic communities investigating the surprise 
(Bromley 2004b). The warranted assertions are widely shared theoretical claims (new 
beliefs) of an epistemic community. When the scientific community successfully gives 
reasons and justifications for its claims to the democratic community (including other 
epistemic communities), the warranted assertions graduate into valuable assertions 
(Bromley 2008d, Davidson 1963). It is on the basis of valuable assertions (valuable beliefs) 
that new policies, new regulations, new habits and new laws emerge.  
The most pertinent issue in this brief account is the process of giving and asking for reasons, 
which leads to reasonable value (Brandom 1995, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, Price 2013). 
The researcher can assess a series of policy actions at any phase of that policy reform 
process to gain insight into the transactions that transpired between the sovereign agents 
and the polity. The transactions are argumentations and pleadings as well as rationalisations 
and justifications given by governmental actions. 
4.2.2 Abduction, induction and deduction 
Peirce (1878) distinguished three ways of knowing: namely deduction, induction and 
abduction. Abduction is the least discussed in literature (Staat 1993). Abduction is 
explanatory reasoning, whilst induction is classificatory/confirmatory reasoning, and 
deduction is analytical reasoning (Psillos 2009). Put differently, abduction and induction are 
“synthetic” modes of reasoning whilst deduction is “analytical” (Staat 1993, p.232).  
Whilst both induction and abduction are synthetic modes of reasoning, induction does not 
generate new ideas. Abduction is generative. Psillos (2009, p.122) maintains that deduction 
and induction operate “with the principle of ‘garbage in, garbage out’” because their 
conclusions restate what the premises already stated. Induction increases content without 
generating new ideas because it extrapolates horizontally from a specific case to the general 
(Psillos 2009). The additional content, which really is not new, comprises observable causes 
of a phenomenon under study. However, abduction vertically extrapolates and exhumes 
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(unobservable) background beliefs that are causing the phenomenon under review, thus its 
diagnostic nature (Bromley 2008d, Psillos 2009). 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Comparison of abduction, induction and deduction 
Source: Author’s construction based on the review 
Peirce (1878; 1905) attributed the growth of scientific knowledge to abductive reasoning 
because of its explanatory orientation. To him, new theories and ideas are progeny of 
explanatory reasoning, but not predictive and confirmatory reasoning. In his discussion of 
these three ways of knowing, Charles Sanders Peirce differentiated them based on two 
dimensions: uberty (fecundity) and certainty (security) (Psillos 2009). Figure 4-1 illustrates 
the argument. On the one hand, uberty captures the ability to generate new ideas and 
theories. It measures scientific fecundity or “productiveness” of a way of knowing (Psillos 
2009, p.121). The argument is that the conclusion of an abductive reasoning process is a set 
of explanatory hypotheses and it contains new content that the premises never stated since 
the premises were a surprise (Bromley 2008d). On the other hand, certainty (security) 
guarantees that the “conclusion of a reasoning process is as certain as its premises” (Psillos 
2009, p.121). 
Closely considered, these two dimensions suggest that ways of knowing that score high on 
certainty marginally, or do not, produce new knowledge, ideas and theories. However, ways 
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of knowing that score high on uberty are the foundations of scientific growth although their 
conclusions are only plausible for the meantime until testing admits them as truth. In line 
with this argument, deductive reasoning excels at certainty but scores low on uberty (Psillos 
2009). Psillos (2009, p.140) also draws attention to the fact that “deduction [is] truth-
preserving”. This claim resonates with the positivistic claim that there exists one objective 
truth/reality waiting to be discovered (McCloskey and McCloskey 1994, Robbins [1945] 
2007). Thus, once scientific investigation discovers the truth, the role of credible deductive 
science is to preserve the existing truth.  
On the contrary, abduction excels at uberty, but scores low on certainty (Psillos 2009). 
Regarding certainty, there exist varying degrees of certainty in abductive explanations – 
some are more probable than others. However, induction scores moderately on both uberty 
and certainty. Based on this distinction, and linking the argument to Peircean categories of 
firstness, secondness and thirdness, Staat (1993) demonstrates that deduction, abduction 
and induction are interdependent ways of knowing as opposed to the popular belief that 
they are mutually exclusive or rival ways of knowing. In Peircean thinking, firstness captures 
the world of possibilities; secondness captures the world of real existence; and thirdness 
captures the world of potentialities (Short 1981). The interconnectedness of these modes of 
reasoning in the theory of inquiry implies that they are different stages of a single process of 
enquiry, and much more so in mixed research methods.  
Building on the understanding of the levels of reality these three modes of reasoning 
address, Staat (1993, p.227) advanced the argument that the Peircean theory of inquiry 
leads to the ordering: “abduction, deduction, induction”. The essence of this argument is 
that abduction generates testable hypotheses, but it does not test them itself. Deduction 
and induction do the testing. Deduction invokes predictive testing, whilst induction invokes 
confirmatory testing. It becomes apparent that any scientific investigation necessarily 
involves at least two of these three modes of reasoning at the same time. What really differ 
are the relative degrees of predominance of the modes of reasoning in any given research. 
The mode of reasoning that the pragmatist employs is one that explains – and it explains 
from effect to cause (Bromley 2006). One that exhumes the myths as well as ceremonial and 
ideological interests manifesting in any given “policy ecology”, to use Weaver-Hightower’s 
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(2014, p.116) phraseology. The study, therefore, relied much more on abductive reasoning 
as the principal epistemological strategy. The thesis also employed elements of deductive 
and inductive reasoning. A typical Peircean syllogism, following Psillos (2009, p.132), that 
the thesis formulated to examine the research questions is as follows: 
The surprising fact, institutional isolation of sectors utilising invasive alien species (C), 
is observed: 
But if (A) = {hegemony over policy space by ecological invasion scientists; lack of 
administrative due process; ceremonial interests of policy administrators; regulatory 
incoherence; and environmental greed of the sectors utilising invasive alien species…} 
were true, institutional isolation would be a matter of course, 
 Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
Abductive analysis starts with a real observation that may be a puzzle – the surprising fact. 
The surprising fact (C) constitutes the irritation of doubt. A surprising fact is a regularity 
observed in a given context because regularities are rare and what are common in everyday 
life are irregularities (Bromley 2008d; Psillos 2009). Inasmuch as regularities and 
irregularities exist for a reason, explaining them amounts to the accumulation of sufficient 
reasons that account for their existence. A volitional pragmatist then formulates a family of 
explanatory hypotheses (A) that attempt to demystify the surprise. The pragmatist then sets 
out to validate/falsify the various hypotheses through deductive and inductive reasoning. If 
they turn out to be reasonable, the pragmatist has found a reasonable explanation for C. In 
the syllogism, A, which is a set of explanatory hypotheses, is nothing but a set of reasons for 
the existence of C. The plausibility of A, if confirmed, quenches doubt and fixes belief, which 
is the truth for the time being, which leads to habit formation.  
However, the volitional pragmatist carries out further archaeological iterations using the 
same syllogism in which case, for example, 
The surprising facts, (Ć) = {hegemony over policy space by ecological invasion 
scientists; lack of administrative due process; ceremonial interests of policy 
administrators; regulatory incoherence; and environmental greed of the sector that 
utilise invasive alien species…}, are observed: 
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But if Á {that is, set of reasons for A} were true, Ć would be a matter of course, 
 Hence, there is reason to suspect Á is true 
The diagnostic iterations continue until non-economic factors that explain economic 
phenomena have been identified (Bromley 2008d, Schumpeter [1954] 2013). At that stage, 
a pragmatist would suggest that sufficient reasons for the existence of C have been found. 
The degree of plausibility of A, Á…, determines the sufficiency of the reasons for C, Ć…. The 
thesis applied this epistemological framework to explain the controversies surrounding 
biodiversity governance as well as the perceived institutional isolation of sectors that utilise 
alien and invasive species.  
4.3 Mixed Research methods 
As the adjective “Mixed” connotes, these methods bring together qualitative and 
quantitative analysis thereby “exploiting the strengths of both types of research and 
offsetting each others’ weaknesses” (Starr 2014, p.242). The synergy arises from a 
combination of “the strength of confirmatory results” of quantitative analysis and ““deep 
structure” explanatory descriptions as drawn from qualitative analyses” (Castro et al. 2010, 
p.342). Although there are various ways of doing mixed method research designs, the study 
utilised a “concurrent nested” design (Castro et al. 2010, p.345). Both quantitative and 
qualitative data were collected simultaneously, but owing to the abductive nature of the 
research, qualitative data were assigned greater weight than quantitative data. To some 
extent there was a sequential element in the design because the researcher, through 
desktop analysis of various private and public documents, socialised with critical qualitative 
issues. The socialisation, in turn, informed the content of the survey questionnaire and, to 
an extent, the interviews.  
Although the collection of data was concurrent, the researcher attempted an integrative 
interpretation of the results. Bazeley (2009, p.203) emphasises: “All mixed methods studies, 
by definition, attempt some form of integration.” Integration facilitates mutual illumination 
of the qualitative and quantitative results (Jang et al. 2008). Weaver-Hightower (2014, 
p.132) also emphasises that whenever the qualitative and quantitative components are 
properly integrated, “the whole of the findings [exceed] the sum of the individual 
quantitative and qualitative parts.” Table 4-1 summarises the research design. 
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 Table 4-1: Mixed methods research design 
QUAL Study - Stage 1A (qual) 
Analytical Procedure 
 Institutional comparative analysis of NEM:BA 
2004, NEMA 1998 and the Constitution 1996, 
judicial precedent on regulatory reforms under 
the NEM:BA in 2008 
 
 Volitional pragmatic (abductive) analysis of 
public hearing reports during the formative years 
of the NEM:BA; written submissions from sectors 
interested in alien and invasive species 
 Institutional abductive analysis of evolution of 
pecuniary institutions that promoted 
development of trout e.g. Sydney Hey 1926-1928 
Inland fisheries surveys; 1867 Fish introduction 
Act 
 Trout controversies 1986 (Rhodes University 
Trout Colloquium; secondary literature 
 Strategic interviews with policymakers and 
representatives of trout industry and 
ichthyologists, invasion and aquatic scientists 
 Volitional pragmatic (abductive) analysis of 
written submissions from trout sector made to 
the DEA (2005-2014); Semiotic analysis of the 
process (2005-2014) 
 Judicial proceedings, Affidavits (Kloof 
Conservancy vs. Government 2014) 
Embedded quan phase  - Stage 1B (quan) 
(quan – identified underlying factors that might 
explain controversial regulatory reform process 
from perspective of trout sector) (Chapter 7) 
Procedure 
Stage 1: Online survey of perception survey 
Stage 2: Data cleaning 
Stage 3: Data analysis  
 descriptive analysis  
 reliability analysis 
 exploratory factor analysis 
 logistic regression analysis 
 
Outputs 
 Economic incentive structure, 
economic interpretation; 
institutional coherence; economic 
implications of verdicts; 
administrative themes censured in 
judgments (Chapter 5) 
 arguments, ideologies, expressions 
and imaginings, negotiation 
psychology (Chapter 6) 
 
 Sources of institutional path 
dependence, ceremonial and 
instrumental values and 
behaviours (Chapter 8) 
 Ideologies, solutions, causes of 
controversy (Chapter 8) 
 
 Transcripts and field notes 
(Chapter 8) 
 Arguments, ideologies, 
expressions, imaginings, 
interpretive conflicts (Chapter 8) 
 Verdict, arguments, themes from 
affidavits (Chapter 8) 
 
Integrative analysis  - Stage 2 
(qual + quan ->>qual) (Chapter 7 
and 8) 
Integrate qual and quan to 
produce a story of institutional 
change. The quan results are now 
interpreted in the larger scheme 
of qualitative factors to give 
insight into the magnitude of the 
quantitative estimates and their 
signs. Nuanced theoretical 
explanation of institutional 
change and institutional isolation 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
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4.3.1. Qualitative analysis 
Chapter 5 presents results of the qualitative component that focused on economically 
interpreting the incentive structure in the NEM:BA. The findings in the economic 
interpretation of the NEM:BA revealed paradoxes that Chapter 6 explored further through a 
legislative historical analysis of the evolution of the NEM:BA. This helped determine the 
configuration of interests that shaped the NEM:BA. Once the incentive structure in the 
NEM:BA was interpreted and the interest configuration determined, the thesis then drew 
insights from the perceptions of the trout sector to evaluate the process of institutional 
change. This case study component had two qualitative components – an institutional 
analysis of the evolution of pecuniary institutions in trout fisheries presented in Chapter 8 
and integrative analysis of quantitative and qualitative components of the current 
regulatory controversies presented in Chapters 7 and 8. 
a. Economic interpretation of the NEM:BA’s  fifth chapter 
The focus was on interpreting the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 
(NEM:BA) of 2004 using institutional theory. Since the regulation of alien and invasive 
species turned out to be controversial, it was necessary to start by explaining the economic 
incentive structure embedded in the NEM:BA. Such an analysis was also necessary as the 
entry point into investigating the hitherto perceived institutional isolation of sectors utilising 
alien and invasive species. A comparative analysis of the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA and 
the overarching environmental legislative framework (the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) of 1998) and the Constitutional provisions for environmental 
governance insofar as alien and invasive species were concerned was carried out.  
In addition, there were two court decisions one of which dealt with the development of 
regulations for captive breeding of hunting game under the NEM:BA and the other dealt 
with the denial of a permit to keep an animal that was declared an economically harmful 
species to farmers. The verdicts were critical for interpreting the economic incentive 
structure in the NEM:BA and the governance practices of the Department of Environmental 
Affairs (DEA).  
b. Interest configuration in the NEM:BA 
The findings in Chapter 5 generated a surprise – a seeming strong biological nativism in the 
NEM:BA coupled with some indications of overregulation of sectors utilising alien and 
109 | P a g e  
 
invasive species. For example, carrying dead specimens such as dead fish and dead 
timber/wood from alien and invasive plantation trees required a permit. An economic user 
needed no less than nine permits to carry out a complete operation for a restricted activity 
associated with an alien and invasive species. This surprise led to an abductive analysis into 
the interest configuration of the NEM:BA (Weaver-Hightower 2014). Questions that 
emerged here included: “Whose interests shaped the NEM:BA?”, “What imaginings and 
expressions were transacted in the formative years of the NEM:BA?”, “Which imaginings 
and expressions were selected?” “Why were those imaginings selected?”  
The arguments that were presented during public hearings and written submissions made 
by interested and affected parties in 2003 when the NEM:BA was being formulated were 
extracted and analysed. To get a firmer grip of the evolution of the epistemological system 
that influenced the NEM:BA, the researcher carried out a historical analysis of policy 
thought in the 1980s when the invasion biology research programme in South Africa was 
first institutionalised (Ferrar and Kruger 1983). The researcher extracted institutional 
themes from the South African National Scientific Programme reports (1982, 1983, 1985 
and 1988). These reports dealt with alien and invasive species. 
Following Weaver-Hightower’s (2014) definition of an argument, the researcher coded as an 
argument an utterance or a statement in a report if it satisfied three criteria. First, the public 
hearing utterance or the statement in the report had to be a “generalized argument rather 
than a question or a description limited to a specific person, place, or context,” (Weaver-
Hightower 2014, p.122). However, given that interest groups speaking at public hearings 
were highly specialized and, often, argued for their specific interests, this criterion was 
relaxed. Since arguments, allowing for some exceptions, about most alien and invasive 
species are generalisable to various other alien and invasive species the researcher coded a 
specific statement as a valid argument.  Second, the utterance or the statement in the 
report had to be directly related to some aspect of alien and invasive species, preferably in a 
broad sense. Finally, “the utterance had to be a clear assertion by the witness, not a 
quotation or reference to someone else’s position, unless the witness explicitly proclaimed 
agreement,” (Weaver-Hightower 2014, p.122).  
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The next step involved “quantitizing qualitative data—that is, taking qualitatively derived 
codes and converting them into numbers for counting or statistical description” (Weaver-
Hightower 2014, p.122). Only simple agreement and disagreement scores between views 
that were presented by groups and the text of the NEM:BA were computed to discover 
whose interests shaped the NEM:BA. 
c. Institutional analysis of pecuniary institutions of trout sector and NEM:BA controversy 
With the researcher carefully following the controversies (a surprise) over the regulation of 
trout, a decision was made to first trace the evolution pecuniary institutions that guided the 
development of trout fisheries. This step was important because it not only assisted in 
evaluating some of the arguments in the current controversies as ceremonial or 
instrumental, but it also assisted in assessing the extent to which the regulation of trout 
suffered from institutional path dependence. The data used in this subcomponent were the 
Fish Introduction Act 1867, the Inland Fisheries Surveys reports (1926-1928) by Sydney Hey 
and the Colloquium report in which “trout wars” were finally addressed at Rhodes 
University in 1986. The analysis involved recasting the storyline in these documents in terms 
of the Veblenian theory of the leisure class (Chapter 8). 
This qualitative component utilised strategic interview data; correspondence between the 
DEA and the trout sector; media releases by the DEA in response to the trout sector’s media 
campaigns against the regulations; risk assessment reports for trout species that were 
commissioned by the DEA in 2014; as well as submissions made by the trout industry. The 
interviews were “strategic” in the sense that they purposively targeted knowledgeable 
agents who were directly or indirectly involved in the regulatory decision processes and 
structures of the DEA. Seven strategic interviews with key stakeholders were carried out. 
The data collection instruments were certified by the Department of Economics Ethics 
Committee and they adhered to Rhodes University guidelines for ethical conduct for 
research involving humans. The first interview was with two senior representatives of the 
Federation of Southern African Flyfishers (FOSAF). These two interviewees had different 
areas of expertise – one was a respected environmental lawyer and another was a business 
person who ran trout fisheries and was a fly-fishing guide. 
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The third, fourth, fifth and sixth interviews were with scientists – two ichthyologists and two 
invasion biologists. These informants each participated in one capacity or another in the 
evolution of the regulatory process since 2005 and are academic authorities in their own 
fields of specialisation. These scientists disagreed among themselves about the regulation of 
trout and its invasive capacity. The last interview was with a senior official (decision maker) 
in the DEA, who is also an environmental scientist. These five interviews were critical in that 
they were a contest of scientific claims and two scientists were firmly pro- trout, while the 
other two were weakly pro-trout and another was anti-trout. 
Although the researcher had an interview guide, it was minimally used. Interviews were 
audio-recorded and later personally transcribed so as to take advantage of the cues that 
might be useful in interpreting results (Maree 2013). The interviews were spontaneous and 
the researcher interrupted the storyline only when there was need for clarity on issues 
being raised. The interviews almost approximated an unstructured interview format (Piore 
2006). The researcher emailed the interview guide at the time of requesting the opportunity 
to interview the informant. This allowed the interviewees to gather information about the 
questions. As Piore (2006, 18) argues, “people agreed to be interviewed in the first place 
only because they had a story to tell”. Interestingly, the best way to characterise these 
seven interviews is that they were a hypotheses testing process themselves because the 
researcher invoked as questions surprising and less obvious aspects of the previous 
interview in the next interview. The knowledge claims of the experts were intentionally 
played out against each other in order to distil the best possible information, thus 
enhancing the validity and reliability of the interview data.   
There was litigation against the government – Kloof Conservancy v The Republic of South 
Africa 2014 – for failing to implement the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter within the statutory 
timeframe, which required the implementation to begin after two years of the NEM:BA 
becoming law. This litigation, fortunately, provided the researcher with rare information 
that could not be accessed through any other way, perhaps not even by interviewing 
officials. By analysing the affidavits the researcher was able to evaluate the information that 
the senior official and other experts revealed during the interviews. Institutionalists have an 
established tradition of evaluating each piece of evidence (data) against other pieces of 
evidence (Dugger 1979, Wilber and Harrison 1978). Evaluated in this way, the stories told 
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during interviews were judged to be honest. This strengthened the researcher’s conviction 
about the validity and reliability of the interview data and the subsequent findings of the 
thesis. 
While the interviews were data, they were also used as “arguments for particular revisions 
in theory” (Piore 2006, p.18) and “a way of building theory, by offering a critical perspective 
on the standard theoretical assumptions” (Piore 2006, p.17). Thus, the interview data was 
used also as a critique of the assumptions of institutional economic theory about how 
individual agency influences institutional change. Piore (2006, p.18) cautioned that the 
“problem plaguing open-ended interviews as inputs into the reconstruction of theory is that 
they appear to be so personal and idiosyncratic”. The usefulness of the seemingly 
idiosyncratic data depends on the “capacity of the individual researcher to generate 
surprises, to recognize patterns, and to organize those patterns to form a theory” (Piore 
2006, p.18, emphasis added). 
The interpretations of interviews that generate surprises are “at least as much a matter of 
intuition and instinct as it has been of systematic methodology” (Piore 2006, p.18). Because 
Piore (2006, p.19) recommends “the use of theory to stimulate the interpretation of 
interviews”, the integrated institutional framework was used to interpret interviews (Figure 
3-2). Piore (2006, p.20) advises that a researcher has “to trace down systematically the 
‘surprise’ that violated [the theoretical] expectation.” The essential feature of this strategy 
is to look for “the surprise in the interviews, tracing its source in theory, and then trying to 
identify how the theory might be amended” (Piore 2006, p.20). 
As such, the thesis evaluated arguments as either ceremonial or instrumental following the 
original institutionalist theory of change. The evaluation criteria for progressive institutional 
change (democratic test, instrumental efficiency test, minimal needs test, environmental 
continuity test and growth of knowledge test) and the evaluation criteria for regressive 
institutional change (invidious defence test, pecuniary gains test, possession of power test 
and status quo defence test) were used to unlock forces shaping the evolution of the 
regulatory reform. Chapter 8 presents the analysis. 
The qualitative analysis component had a dynamic analytical component that applied 
semiosis to the NEM:BA institutional change processes and semiosis is an abductive 
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framework which aligns with volitional pragmatism (Bromley 2008d). The essence of this 
analysis was to develop a dynamic explanation of how the process of institutional change 
evolved and the forces that kept shaping it. This called for coding the affidavits and lobbying 
efforts of the trout sector using the Peircean triadic system of interpretants - emotional, 
energetic and logical. A brief discussion of the theory of semiosis follows. 
4.3.2. Method and theory of semiosis 
Epistemic communities know reality by its consequences (Bromley 2008d; Peirce 1878). 
Abductive analysis investigates reality (the cause) from its observed or perceived 
consequences (the effect). The cause is not immediately plain to the researcher, but the 
effects are ubiquitous. Consequences are signs flowing in society and they signify some 
underlying fundamental cause(s). The consequences generate reactions such as perceptions 
and actions in the minds and lives of social agents (Deledalle 2001). Thus, to know the cause 
(the object) the consequences (signs) must be interpreted (interpretants). Semiotics is a 
triadic framework that comprises an object, a sign and an interpretant (Figure 4-2).  
 
Figure 4-2: Semiotic process - an illustration 
Source: Author 
An object determines its sign and its interpretant (Short 2007). A sign represents an object 
and social agents can understand the obscure object through the vehicle of its sign. An 
interpretant is the meaning, conception, perception, idea, thought, feeling or action that a 
sign invokes in the mind of an interpreter (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012, Short 2007). 
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a. Immediate, dynamic and final interpretants 
An immediate interpretant is an objective and purposeful interpretation of a sign and it is 
the “right understanding of the sign” (Short 2007, p.181). Objectivity enhances the 
assessment of whether the “purpose in interpretation … is in process of being satisfied” 
(Short 2007, p.182). An immediate interpretant is a ‘maybe’, that is, one of a number of 
possibilities.  
A dynamic interpretant is “the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really determines” 
(Short 2007, p.181) such as anger, agitation, outrage, road shows, media wars, propaganda 
as responses, for example, to perceived ill-implementation of a law. Thus, a dynamic 
interpretant is a single event that actualises or instantiates the immediate interpretant. A 
dynamic interpretant is one actually formed, but an immediate interpretant is one 
represented in the sign.  
The final interpretant is the “Normal Interpretant” or “Genuine Interpretant” in that it gives 
the fullest meaning of the sign thereby revealing all that it says about an object (Short 2007, 
p.182). The final interpretant is normative; it is a ‘would be’ (a potentiality). The final 
interpretant is “one to which all other signs are relevant” (Short 2007, p.183). It is the 
convergence of “mental objectification” (Bromley 2012, p.19) of social actors in the process 
of interpreting a sign. The final interpretant is normative, while the dynamic interpretant is 
positive (Short 2007, p.183).   
Charles Sanders Peirce did not demystify the difference between the dynamic interpretant 
and the final interpretant in terms of actual sources of the difference. The way people 
interpret a sign is influenced, in large measure, by the instituted social imaginary that 
comprises culture, beliefs, habits, norms, customs, traditions, taboos, power, economic 
interests, fads, dogmas, ideologies and epistemological systems (Ayres 1996, Brinkman and 
Brinkman 2006, Bush 1987, Denzau and North 1994, Galiani and Sened 2014, Mokyr 2014, 
North 1990, Veblen [1899] 2005). These factors constitute the gap between the positive and 
the normative. They are filtering forces and hindrances to the fullest possible interpretation 
of a sign.  
From a Veblenian Dichotomy perspective, a ceremonially warranted interpretation of the 
NEM:BA falls far short of the final interpretant. It leads to ceremonial encapsulation of part 
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of what could have been known had the interpreter(s) utilised all relevant facts and 
knowledge about the sign. An instrumental interpretation is likely to reduce the gap 
between the dynamic interpretant (an actuality) and the final interpretant (a potentiality) 
because it carefully attempts to unpack all that there is in a sign. What the provisions of the 
NEM:BA really mean and ought to mean is the final interpretant, but the actual 
interpretations of the DEA, or of the trout industry, are dynamic interpretants. However, 
either interpretations might be partial or one might be the fully correct one.  
In the interpretive process, “recognition of the sign as such to a comprehension of its 
meaning, suggests a progression from an immediate to a final interpretant,” (Short 2007, 
p.184) (emphasis added). It is possible to observe an iterative process from an immediate 
interpretant to successive dynamic interpretants until a final interpretant finally obtains. For 
example, the DEA commenced the drafting of AIS regulations and development of a national 
list of invasive species from 2005/6 through to 2014 and this process is likely to continue 
until the last iteration of the AIS regulations captures the entire essence of the NEM:BA’s 
fifth chapter.  
b. Emotional, energetic and logical interpretants 
The trichotomy of emotional, energetic and logical interpretants is critical in studying the 
process of institutional change and necessarily gives flesh to immediate, dynamic and final 
interpretants. An immediate, dynamic, or final interpretant might be an emotional, 
energetic, or logical interpretant. An emotional interpretant is the feeling that a sign 
produces in the interpreter of the sign (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012, Short 2007). It is a 
possibility. An energetic interpretant is the action that the sign causes the interpreter to 
take. For example, a misapplication of the biodiversity law that has potentially ruinous 
economic and social consequences for interested parties might generate agitation, outrage 
or anger. These are emotional interpretants. When the outrage, anger or agitation explodes, 
action becomes manifest. The action might take the form of litigation, demonstration, road 
shows and campaigns in media against the administrative decision. These are energetic 
interpretants.  
The policymaker responds with energetic interpretants such as an invitation to a public 
hearing, negotiating table or a public justification of the policymaker’s actions, which is a 
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process of supplying sufficient reasons that the energetic interpretants might be demanding 
(Brandom 1995; 1997, Price 2013). The outcome of the negotiations, which is a logical 
interpretant, might be a change of the policy or implementation strategy to pacify the 
outraged people. It would be a habit change. Since institutions are habitual patterns of 
correlative behaviour and rules for volitional action, fixing belief and generating new habits 
is the process of creating new institutions (Bromley 2008d). 
4.3.3. Quantitative analysis  
The subsection discusses the survey design and the data analytic strategies that were used 
in this component. It also discusses how the questionnaire was developed. The method that 
was used to distribute the questionnaire is also explained. 
a. Survey design 
The study used an internet-based survey design to solicit perceptions of the trout sector. 
The trout industry is diverse. It includes trout aquaculture, hatchery operators, guiding 
services, tackle dealing, accommodation and agro-processing among other activities. The 
size of the sector, especially the fly-fishing component, is not known because government 
has not been measuring the economic contribution of this sector (McCafferty et al. 2012). 
Leibold and van Zyl (2008) is the only known non-peer reviewed nationwide study on 
recreational fishing in South Africa that estimated that there were 45,000 fly-fishers in 
South Africa, of which 4,500 were affiliated to clubs.  
Since it was costly to administer the questionnaire instrument to a dispersed trout-based 
community, the researcher decided to conduct an uncontrolled online survey. An internet-
based survey was appropriate because the target population was difficult to access through 
traditional survey methods such as mail and telephone (Couper 2000, Fricker 2008). This 
strategy was also preferred because of affordability, timeliness of responses as well as the 
possibility of high response rates (Couper 2000, Schonlau et al. 2002).  
Fricker (2008) and Schonlau et al. (2002) argue that internet-based uncontrolled surveys are 
convenience-sampling procedures, which suffer from non-representativeness. Since the 
objective of the study was not to generalise based on the perception survey, but to 
triangulate the findings of the qualitative analysis, issues of representativeness were not 
necessarily a major concern. It was difficult to draw a sampling frame from which to draw 
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survey participants, and, as is typical of all online surveys, the design suffered from self-
selection bias because there was no way of generating a random sample (Fricker 2008, 
Schonlau et al. 2002). Because the internet survey was anonymous, it was difficult to control 
for multiple submissions of responses and determine response rates. Couper (2000) draws 
attention to the fact that a person may respond or not, depending on whether s/he has 
vested interest in the research and, usually, those with vested interest in the research 
overwhelmingly participate. Schonlau et al. (2002) warned that theoretically spurious, but 
statistically significant relationships might be derived from internet-based survey data 
especially if it generates a high response rate. Fricker (2008) also warns that inferential 
statistics must be applied to internet-based survey data with caution since the validity and 
reliability of the online survey data is often indeterminate.  
Although the validity and reliability of the data from internet surveys is difficult to establish, 
the questionnaire had items that were used to evaluate the reliability of the data. 
Conformity of the survey to previous South African studies as it regards descriptive statistics 
such as racial composition, education levels, income levels, destination choices and 
perceptions on policy issues was also used to test the reliability and validity of the data 
collected through the uncontrolled online survey. Theoretical consistency of the estimates 
was also another mechanism for inferring the validity of the data. 
b. Questionnaire design and distribution 
Following the publication of the July 2013 interim AIS regulations that listed trout as a 
species that had to be compulsorily controlled under a species management programme, 
the trout industry formed a lobby group called Trout South Africa (Trout SA) which, together 
with the Federation of Southern African Flyfishers (FOSAF), led campaigns and protests 
against the AIS regulations as well as writing articles for the public media, which were 
described by the DEA as “provocative” (DEA 2014d, not paged). To solicit the perceptions of 
the trout industry, the questionnaire was designed using the content of the draft AIS 
regulations, submissions made to the DEA by the FOSAF as well as the FOSAF and Trout SA, 
the content of media articles on the policy process and media releases made by the DEA in 
reaction to the trout sector’s campaigns against the draft regulations. The major reason for 
doing this was to ensure that the instrument captured the relevant dimensions of the 
controversy.  
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The major themes that seemed apparent from the debate were (1) the role of science in the 
development of the regulations; (2) the extent of reliance on global scientific evidence in 
developing regulations; (3) the role of trade-offs between conservation of indigenous fishes 
and economic utilisation of trout, an alien species; (4) administrative due process and 
participatory regulatory development; and (5) reasons hindering consensus. The 
questionnaire had 47 items. The researcher grouped questionnaire items into clusters: 
understanding the NEM:BA (4 items); controversies in the process of developing AIS 
regulations (17 items); social aspects of trout fly-fishing (6 items); economic aspects of trout 
fly-fishing (15 items); and demographics (4 items). The 47th item was the declaration of 
consent to participate in the survey. The questionnaire is in Appendix 2. 
The questionnaire passed through several phases of development. Its readability and 
comprehensiveness was assessed by the Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 
Research Group in the Economics Department at Rhodes University. Members of this 
research group were given the questionnaire twice during group meetings to evaluate it. 
After each meeting, they gave comments about aspects that were less readable or whose 
wording could be improved. Aquatic scientists, ichthyologists and invasion biologists at 
Rhodes University who were close to the decision making structures in the regulatory 
reform process also evaluated the questionnaire. This was to ensure that the instrument 
correctly captured major issues in the controversy, which would enhance the content 
validity of the instrument (Maree 2013, Williams et al. 2012). The Ethics Committee in the 
Department of Economics approved the questionnaire. The Committee checked the 
instrument for ethical issues as well as the wording and content of the questions. 
The survey link was distributed through the FOSAF website, which represents of the trout 
industry since 1986 and the administrator of the website encouraged fly-fishers to 
participate in the survey (Appendix 1). Only those who had access to the internet and, thus 
the FOSAF website, participated. The researcher launched the online survey on the 13th of 
May 2014 and it was open until 31st of July 2014.  
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4.3.4. Data analysis 
A combination of techniques was used to analyse the data. First, descriptive analysis relying 
mostly on graphs was used to summarise the data. Second, estimation techniques were 
used. 
a. Cronbach’s alpha 
Cronbach (1951) emphasised that measurement-based research must establish the 
correctness and dependability of the survey instrument.  Cronbach’s alpha, therefore, 
assesses the extent to which a researcher was right in “expecting a certain collection of 
items to yield interpretable statements about individual differences” (Cronbach 1951, 
p.297). Thus, the reliability of the instrument using Cronbach’s alpha, which conventionally 
is used to test the internal consistency of a survey instrument, tested for (Cronbach 1951, 
Maree 2013). Maree (2013, p.216) states that items measuring the same latent variable 
must have “a high degree of similarity”. Thus, the higher the Cronbach’s alpha the more 
reliable the instrument. Reliability analysis creates a scale out of the individual items and 
the alpha seeks to evaluate the reliability of the constructed scale (Gliem and Gliem 2003). 
The correlation between the scale and the latent factor is        (Williams et al. 2012). 
Using individual items in econometric analysis usually generates tenuous results owing to 
the prevalence of measurement errors in individual items with the concomitant pathological 
effect of multicollinearity (de Winter et al. 2009, Gorsuch 1997, Williams et al. 2012).  
b. Exploratory factor model 
Exploratory factor analysis was used to reduce the large number of items in the 
questionnaire into fewer variables (DiStefano et al. 2009, Maree 2013, Williams et al. 2012). 
Since the researcher had no a priori theoretical expectations about which items would 
measure the same construct, exploratory factor analysis was used to reveal the underlying 
factorial patterns (Gorsuch 1997). As Williams et al. (2012, p.3) argue, exploratory factor 
analysis “allows the researcher to explore the main dimensions to generate a theory, or 
model from a relatively large set of latent constructs often represented by a set of items.” 
They also state that exploratory factor analysis “is considered the method of choice for 
interpreting self-reporting questionnaires” (Williams et al. 2012, p.2).  
Generally, it is argued that exploratory factor analysis can be used to reduce the number of 
variables; explore structural relationships of variables; assess the dimensionality of a 
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theoretical construct; assess the validity of a data collection instrument; enhance 
parsimony/Ocam’s razor in estimation; control the effects of multicollinearity as well as 
develop theoretical concepts or test existing theoretical concepts (de Winter et al. 2009, 
DiStefano et al. 2009, Gorsuch 1997, Maree 2013, Sass 2011, Williams et al. 2012). There is 
no agreement in literature as to the minimum number of observations or the ratio of the 
number of observations to variables that facilitates factor analysis (de Winter et al. 2009, 
Williams et al. 2012). The lowest rule of thumb ratio is 3:1, but it can be as high as 10:1 
(Williams et al. 2012).  
To reduce the data into a few variables, factor analysis identifies “the fewest possible 
constructs needed to produce the original data” (Gorsuch 1997, p.533) by estimating for 
each item a relationship as represented by Equation 4-1. In the system of equations 
(Equation 4-1),    is the first questionnaire item and A, B, C… are factor scores; the     (for K 
= 1, 2, ... k and j = A, B, C,… Z) are the “weights used to best reproduce the original 
standardised item [  ] responses.” K is the total number of items in the questionnaire. 
Gorsuch (1997, p.533) argues that replication of the original data is possible because “all 
equations for factoring data … are directly linked to the original data.” The      are the 
residual terms because the relationships in Equation 4-1 are non-deterministic, hence they 
have error components. 
                  
                  
                  
              
              
                  
Equation 4-1 
The assumption underlying Equation 4-1 is that each item relates to only a single factor 
(theoretical construct). However, DiStefano et al. (2009) argue that in the presence of 
correlated factors, factor scoring has to be based on Bartlett’s method so as to eliminate 
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bias, while producing highly valid scores. The argument follows from the fact that “Bartlett 
scores are produced by using maximum likelihood estimates … which produces estimates 
that are the most likely to represent the “true” factor scores” (DiStefano et al. 2009, p.4-5). 
The regression scoring method, as an alternative to Bartlett scoring, does not account for 
bias despite producing maximally valid scores (DiStefano et al. 2009, Gorsuch 1997). 
 Maree (2013) argues that the exploratory factor analysis technique allows the researcher to 
identify, through item analysis, items that may not be suitable for further use in the analysis. 
Exploratory factor analysis is, thus, the conventional approach by which a researcher is able 
“to determine which items “belong together” in the sense that they are answered similarly 
and therefore measure the same dimension or factor” (Maree 2013, p.219). The factor 
loading matrix was then used to determine the items which belonged to a factor. The 
factors were then assigned names based on the nature of items clustered in them. Using the 
reduced number of variables, a logistic regression model was estimated. Two logistic 
regressions were estimated – one for the perception of the invasiveness of trout and the 
other for the perception of the reasonableness of the draft AIS regulations. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was used to evaluate the 
appropriateness of carrying out factor analysis. It determines the proportion of variance 
amongst the items that represents the common variance. Dziuban and Shirkey (1974, p.359) 
emphasise that the “index yields an assessment of whether the variables belong together 
psychometrically” in which case the resultant correlation matrix will establish the 
reasonableness of carrying factor analysis. The rules of thumb are that a KMO of 0 – 0.49 is 
unacceptable; 0.50 – 0.59 is miserable; 0.60 – 0.69 is mediocre; 0.70 – 0.79 is middling; 0.80 
– 0.89 is meritorious and 0.90 – 1.0 is marvellous (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974).  
c. Factorial logit model 
Assuming a latent variable           , a structural equation can be expressed as 
                                  Equation 4-2  
   
  is a continuously distributed random variable independent of C and X, with a symmetrical 
distribution around zero and 1[.] is an indicator function.   is a vector of categories of 
qualitative predictors such as strongly disagree, disagree, …, strongly agree for each item; 
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and   is a vector of quantitative predictors. The dependent variable assumes a value of 1 as 
long as the latent variable is positive, otherwise it assumes zero. In the present case, the 
perception that trout is invasive assumes a value of 1 if the respondent’s opinion falls on the 
threshold of the continuum of   , where     . The categories   are binary variables 
assuming two values, that is, 0 if the category is not realised and 1 when the category is 
realised. In the case of a five-point Likert scale qualitative predictor, four categories are 
included in Equation 4-2 and the fifth category becomes a base category, otherwise the 
equation would be inestimable because of perfect multicollinearity (Agresti 2002, Long and 
Freese 2006). Any one of the categories can be excluded as the base category. The 
probability of perceiving trout to be invasive, therefore, can be represented as: 
                                Equation 4-3 
Thus,                                  Equation 
4-4   
                                    Equation 
4-5  
                               Equation 4-6  
                           Equation 4-7 
   
Equation 4-5 reveals that the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive depends on the 
distribution of the error term. Since Equation 4-7 is non-linear in the parameters, it has to 
be estimated by the maximum likelihood approach. In the present analysis, a logistic 
distribution was chosen because of the possibility of interpreting odds in addition to 
marginal effects (Greene 2003, Long and Freese 2006). The variance of the error term in a 
logistic distribution is given by 
        
 
           Equation 4-8  
The binary logit can be expressed as  
            
      
        
         Equation 4-9 
     
Since    is unknown, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients has little value because 
the objective is not to estimate the effect of each    and    on  
 . Thus, it is the sign of the 
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estimated coefficients that matters. The marginal effect of a change in    (which is a 
continuous variable) on            can be estimated by the partial derivative of Equation 
4-7: 
            
   
                         Equation 
4-10        
Since the cumulative density function for   in Equation 4-7 is strictly increasing, it follows 
that        . Thus, the effect of    on            depends on the sign of   . However, 
Equation 4-10 measures an instantaneous change in probability, which is likely to be a poor 
interpretation strategy if there are non-linearities in the relationships of the       and the 
probability of perceiving trout to be invasive. In the presence of non-linearities, the 
alternative is to interpret the effect of discrete changes in both       and      on the 
probability of perceiving trout to be invasive. Equation 4-11 illustrates the effect of a change 
from    to      on the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive. In this case,      are 
dummies, but the same approach works for continuous variables as well. 
                                                    
                           Equation 4-11 
    
The special case of Equation 4-11 treats categorical predictors as quantitative predictors and 
that reduces Equation 4-7 to Equation 4-12 since the C’s are now quantitative just as the X’s 
are. 
                       Equation 4-12 
A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the special case (Equation 4-12) is nested in 
Equation 4-7 determines whether one can interpret categorical predictors quantitatively or 
not (Agresti 2002). The test statistic tests the claim that the special case holds given that the 
factorial logit model is adequate. Thus, if the test for the null hypothesis that the special 
case is nested in the complex model is not rejected, one can proceed with the special case in 
further analysis. 
Since the study aimed at evaluating the reasonableness of the regulatory reform process, a 
logistic regression of the perceptions about the reasonableness of the 2014 draft AIS 
regulations was estimated. The questionnaire had an item, which stated: “In my opinion, 
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the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Alien and Invasive Species 
Regulations, in their current state, are….” Respondents could choose amongst four ordered 
responses, namely “1= completely not reasonable”; “2=not reasonable”; “3= reasonable”; 
and “4=very reasonable”. Since the dependent variable was ordered, an ordered logistic 
regression was used. Following Wooldridge (2010), if a response variable,  , has   response 
categories the latent variable approach can be used to derive an ordered logistic model.  
The latent variable,   , is given by the relationship: 
                             
  
 
      Equation 4-13 
In Equation 4-13,   is Kx1 vector of parameters and X contains no constant. With   response 
categories, cut off points can be denoted as                 such that 
             
             
          
             
          Equation 4-14 
In the present study,      Thus, for four ordered response categories, there are three cut 
off points. The conditional probabilities for the ordered logistic regression can be expressed 
as: 
                                             
                 
                                        
                                    
                                 
          Equation 4-15 
By maximum likelihood, estimates for   and   can be obtained. The likelihood function for 
each ith observation can be expressed as: 
                                                                
                              Equation 4-16 
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The marginal effects are obtained by taking the partial derivatives of Equation 4-16. For 
example 
           
   
            ; 
           
   
                                  ; and 
           
   
            
          Equation 4-17 
4.3.5. Conclusion 
The chapter presented the methodology and various methods of analysis that the study 
employed to answer its research question. As was apparent, there was no “one way of 
knowing” that was preferred to others. Each component of the study had a different 
method of analysis. Owing to the complexity of the policy issue under study, a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative methods was used within a concurrent nested mixed 
methods design. The goal was to analyse a process and provide a processual explanation. 
The epistemological programme that tied all the methods of analysis together was volitional 
pragmatism, which is particularly developed for institutional analysis. 
Subsequent chapters present the analyses of the policy process, each applying a relevant 
component of the methods of analysis just reviewed. Chapter 5 provides an interpretation 
of the NEM:BA using institutional economic theory. Chapter 6 provides the legal history of 
the NEM:BA. Chapter 7 provides econometric results. Chapter 8 gives a semiotic analysis of 
the entire NEM:BA AIS regulatory reform process from 2003-2014. Chapter 9 provides 
discussion and conclusions. 
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Chapter 5  
An economic interpretation of the NEMBA 
 
“That  the economist  takes  statutes  to  be  complete  when  enacted  is  striking to  a  
lawyer,  who  realizes  that  the  meaning  of  a  statute  is  not  fixed until  the  courts  have  
interpreted  the  statute,”  (Posner 1982, p.264). 
 
5.0. Introduction 
In light of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998 and the 
Constitution of South Africa 1996, Chapter 5 uses institutional economic theory to interpret 
the controversial fifth chapter of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 
(NEM:BA) of 2004. The incentive and value systems embedded in these three institutions 
are evaluated. The chapter also evaluates the scientific ideology that provided foundational 
concepts to the NEM:BA.  
As the South African Legislature was adopting the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Bill in 2003, the Member of Parliament, Chalmers (2003), remarked: 
“[W]e are not being unrealistic when we say that this is one of the most important 
pieces of legislation to be passed since 1994, and certainly the most important piece 
of biodiversity legislation for decades. If coupled with sound enabling regulations, 
and if sufficient resources are devoted to ensure adequate implementation, this Bill, 
providing as it does an effective legal framework, has the ability to transform 
biodiversity management in South Africa for the good of all of its people,” (emphasis 
added).  
The promulgation of biodiversity policy and law in South Africa was considered to be an 
important milestone in the post-apartheid dispensation. This might suggest that 
policymakers, scientists and the general polity, in broad terms, shared a “remarkable 
consensus on the issues needing to be addressed by this policy” (White Paper on 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of South Africa’s Biological Diversity, hereafter 
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Biodiversity Policy, 1997, p.18). Despite the celebration over the enactment of the NEM:BA, 
the implementation phase (realm of rules) of the NEM:BA has been a heavily contested 
terrain in the history of environmental policy in South Africa (Kepe et al. 2005). Since the 
NEM:BA became law in 2004, it took the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) nearly 
a decade to develop substantive Alien and Invasive Species (AIS) Regulations, and eight 
years to develop a national list of invasive species. One wonders whether it was the failure 
of the DEA to promulgate sound enabling regulations or whether it was the NEM:BA that 
was so ‘disenabling’ that it was difficult to develop sound enabling regulations.  
Claims and counter-claims characterize the debate about regulation of economically useful 
alien and invasive species. On the one hand, sectors that utilise alien species that were 
listed as invasive claimed that the DEA was misinterpreting and misapplying the NEM:BA 
(FOSAF 2013, FOSAF and Trout SA 2014a; 2014b). On the other hand, the DEA claimed that 
these sectors were sensationalising matters and spreading propaganda as well as 
misinterpreting the NEM:BA (DEA 2014b). It was a battle of interpretations, which it typical 
of laws that are developed within a limited access policymaking order, while 
implementation is left to democratic processes (Table 3-1). 
Another set of claims and counter-claims also characterised the two decades (1980-2003) 
that preceded the enactment of the NEM:BA. Discursive wars were fought over the 
management of alien species in both the media and peer-reviewed publications. The pro-
aliens lobby argued that invasion biologists and the DEA were purists and “eco-nationalists” 
with distaste for anything called alien (Brown 2013, p.57). The anti-aliens lobby argued that 
at the core of alien species introductions lay utilitarianism, “environmental greed” (Skelton 
2000, p.41) and financial greed (Cambray 2003a). They also argued that species 
introductions and the spreading of already naturalised species was “eco-terrorism” 
comparable, in degree of evilness, to “political terrorism” (Cambray 1997, p.27).  
There was also a voice in the middle that maintained that alien invasive species that were of 
socio-economic significance could be utilised in a sustainable manner by striking a balance 
between utilisation of invasive alien species and conservation of indigenous species (De 
Moor and Bruton 1988, Ellender and Weyl 2014, Ferrar and Kruger 1983, Skelton and Davies 
1986). For example, De Moor and Bruton (1988, p.86) argued that economically useful 
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invasive species had “a permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa”, but 
had to be sustainably managed. They acknowledged fungibility of species and co-existence 
to the extent that it was possible (Maier 2012). 
Having sketched the background, Chapter 5 then offers an explanation of the incentive 
structure enshrined in the NEM:BA. Such an explanation helps to determine why protracted 
controversies exist at the regulatory phase if legislators and the DEA did their homework 
well at the legislative phase. Could it be that the NEM:BA had some questionable provisions 
insofar as management of alien and invasive species were concerned? What were the likely 
economic implications of the NEM:BA’s provisions for the management and utilisation of 
alien and invasive species? Section 5.1 presents the method of analysis. Section 5.2 presents 
results of the comparative analysis. Section 5.3 extends the analysis to sustainable use, 
conservation and financing of biodiversity management. Section 5.4 examines the judicial 
interpretation of what makes regulations reasonable and section 5.5 concludes Chapter 5.  
5.1. Analytical framework 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 5 was largely comparative and evaluative. The 
comparison focused on the statutory content of the relevant provisions of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1996, the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 
107 of 1998 and the NEM:BA of 2004. The NEM:BA is subsidiary to the NEMA. The idea was 
to locate the perceivable sources of the controversy from the statutory content of the 
NEM:BA relative to the foundational environmental governance legislation (the NEMA) and 
founding constitutional provisions for environmental governance as outlined in section 24 of 
the Constitution.  
The OIE theory of valuation, with a bias towards John R Commons’ reasonable valuation, 
was used. This framework of analysis lends itself well to the task because the controversies 
in biodiversity governance in South Africa are nothing if not controversies over values, 
valuation and interpretation. As already reviewed, there is considerable literature on OIE 
theory of valuation (Bush 1987; 2009, Hayden 2006, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2002, Ramstad 
1989; 2001, Tool 1977). A society is a “set of institutional systems” and an institutional 
system is “a set of institutions” (Bush 1987, p.1076). Bush (1987, p.1076) goes on to define 
an institution as “a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behavior”. The emphasis 
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is on both socio-structural relations and values that prescribe/proscribe behaviour. Bush 
(2009, p.293) advances the idea that the process of institutional change necessarily entails 
an accompanying reconfiguration of the value structure of society. The reconfiguration of 
the value structure is inevitable because values correlate human behavior within the nexus 
of opportunity sets created by the different institutions. Bush (1987, p.1076) also argues 
that the “value system of society [determines] the character of the institutional structure.”  
Values are “[standards] of judgment” and valuation is the “application of a “value” as a 
standard of judgment” in arriving at a value-consistent public policy decision (Bush 2009, 
p.296). Since in any society multiple and, sometimes, irreconcilable values exist by reason of 
existence of multiple social groups, a choice of the relevant values has to be made from the 
broader set of values. Bush (2009, p.296) calls that choice a “value judgment”.  
5.1.1. Reasonable valuation 
Hayden (2006) argues that reasonable/instrumental valuation theory is consistent with 
democracy. At the core of the reasonable valuation framework is the idea of purpose. A 
process of “giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom 1995, p.898), which entails purposeful 
deliberative valuation, is a distinguishing feature of these valuation frameworks (Hayden 
2006). Commons (2009, p.697) asserts that “[t]he Constitution [and any statute or 
regulation] is not what it says it is – it is what the Court says it is.” Thus, according to 
Commons (2009, p.690) reasonable valuation is the legislative, administrative and judicial 
“process of weighing practices, customs, precedents, statutes, and constitutions in light of 
changing conditions and conflicting habitual assumptions.”  
In a constitutional democracy, a minimum core set of values exists that coordinates and 
correlates various norms and standards specific to various institutions (pieces of legislation). 
The constitution and judicial precedent supply the core values (Hayden 2006). State 
(authoritative) agents determine what is reasonable to do to enhance institutional 
coherence and favourable socio-economic and environmental outcomes (Bromley 2008a). 
Codified values become the predominant value system that provides valuation criteria for 
new institutions as well as guiding formation of new institutions (Hayden 2006). 
A change in any one of the pieces of legislation entails a change in norms and standards, 
which are still required to conform to the foundational constitutional values. It follows that 
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a new institution that is poorly aligned to the constitutional value structure causes 
institutional misfit, renders dysfunctional the value framework, and leads to adverse 
institutional outcomes and conflicting opportunity sets (Bromley 1985, Bush 1987; 1989). 
Put differently, the new institutional complex might be regressive, even though the original 
intention was desirable.  
5.1.2. Environmental policy as economic policy 
Goddard (1972) prescribes that economists ought to interpret environmental policy as 
economic policy. His argument is that the same questions central to economics concerning 
what to produce; how much to produce it; for whom to produce it; where to produce it and 
at what cost (including costs imposed by externalities) are likewise addressed by 
environmental policy. Typically, environmental policy determines production and 
consumption patterns by determining what to conserve, how to conserve it, where to 
conserve it, what activities to proscribe in the interest of the environment as well as what 
activities to permit under either stringent or accommodative regulatory conditions (Hayden 
2006).  
Environmental policy, thus, has important implications for transaction costs, economic 
incentives and relative economic viability of activities that directly or indirectly rely on 
utilisation of environmental resources (Mettepenningen et al. 2009). Goddard (1972) 
proposes a positive model of economic analysis as a guide to the choice of an efficient 
environmental policy. However, in a social context where multiple value systems and beliefs 
coexist, policy is likely to be less deterministic and more discursive (Balint et al. 2011, Gray 
and Gill 2009, Rittel and Webber 1973). Once it turns out to be discursive, 
reasonableness/instrumentality, as opposed to efficiency, becomes the guiding principle in 
choosing alternative environmental policy (Waller Jr and Robertson 1991). Bromley (2008d, 
p.11) supports this argument stating that realms of reasons and rules have “less faith in 
rational choice models, and in related efficiency-based policy prescriptions, than do those 
economists who insist that such approaches are necessary and sufficient for rational public 
policy.” 
In the realm of social and economic policymaking (including environmental policymaking), 
the problems that policymakers seek to address are wicked in nature (Gray and Gill 2009, 
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Rittel and Webber 1973). Wicked problems defy determinism because of the absence of an 
inclusive instituted social imaginary (King 1993). In a pluralist society, there are as many 
divergent social beliefs and value systems as there are social groups, each wanting to 
dominate the policy space. As such, notions of efficient legislation or policies might not 
necessarily deliver widely acceptable outcomes. Instead of being guided by efficiency 
criteria, policymakers are guided by “sufficient reason(s) to alter specific institutional 
arrangements in the interest of – for the purpose of – modifying particular economic 
outcomes in the future” (Bromley 2008d, p.11). The principle of sufficient reason is the basis 
of reasonable legislation.  
5.1.3. Human-centeredness versus environment-centeredness 
 Conservation interests and socio-economic interests have been battling to control the 
policy space in South Africa. Nelson (2010) asserts that controversies surrounding 
environmental or biodiversity governance go beyond science. He demonstrates that behind 
these controversies lies a host of undeclared “theological assumptions” (Nelson 2010, p.30), 
which are the real sources of discursive power. Theological assumptions qualify for ideology 
in the Ayresian explanation since they are transcendental. Equipped with undeclared 
theological assumptions, the environmental creationist/conservationist, at least for non-
Darwinists, ideally attempts to re-create the grand pattern that the creator of the earth 
originally laid out, which humankind disrupted afterwards (Maier 2012, Mooney and Drake 
1989).  
In Nelson’s (2010) view, environmental creationism is the most recent messiah seeking to 
save Nature, which has been/is being lost due to disruptive human activities. On the other 
hand, he sees another old time dominant paradigm of salvation – economic progress. The 
goal of economic progress (the economic messiah), through domination of nature, is to save 
the world from the evils of scarcity, poverty and inequality among many other evils. 
Fundamentally, both so-called religions seek to save the world, but through quite disparate 
approaches. The former saves the world (nature) by protecting it from people. The latter 
saves the world (people/society) by exploiting nature through technological progress.  
Nelson’s (2010) argument suggests that there are multiple social views of the world. 
Simberloff et al. (2013) distinguish amongst four environmental views, namely ecocentrism, 
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anthropocentrism, zoocentrism and biocentrism. Ecocentrists have a bias towards ecological 
systems and emphasise that it might be reasonable to eradicate alien and invasive species 
to protect biodiversity. On the other hand, anthropocentrists are people-centred and they 
“do  not  worry  about  ecological impacts  of  invasions  unless  these  also  drive  economic  
or social  damages” (Simberloff et al. 2013, p.63).  Zoocentrists grant equal moral rights to 
both human and non-human sentient beings and they “oppose  sacrificing  the interests  of  
individual  animals  for  the  sake  of  human interests  or  biodiversity  per  se  and  have  
often  opposed eradication  plans” (Simberloff et al. 2013, p.63-64).  Lastly, biocentrists 
consider all biological entities to be intrinsically valuable regardless of whether they are 
sentient or non-sentient. 
5.1.4. Method of analysis 
To interpret the NEM:BA from an institutional perspective, a textual analysis strategy was 
used (Maree 2013). The approach used here was a comparative analysis of the relevant 
provisions in each statutory instrument. In particular, the fifth Chapter of the NEM:BA was 
the focus of the analysis because it is the one that governs the utilisation and management 
of alien and invasive species. The data used in this Chapter consisted of the NEMA of 1998, 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 and the NEM:BA of 2004.  
5.2. Results 
Table 5-1 depicts broad generalizations of the comparative results. Discussion of results 
gives finer details about each broad thematic aspect. Some of the themes cut across several 
themes. As such, they are not discussed separately. 
5.2.1. People at the forefront of environmental management concerns 
Findings suggested that a fundamental point of difference between the Constitution/NEMA 
and the NEM:BA was the relative consideration of people and the environment (Table 5-1). 
The NEMA and Constitution are anthropocentric (people-centred) whereas the NEM:BA is 
biocentric/ecocentric. Section 24 of the Constitution specifies the founding provisions for 
environmental governance. Section 24 provides that  
“Everyone has the right— (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or 
wellbeing; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that - (i) 
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prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) 
secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development” (emphasis added). 
Table 5-1: Summary major findings of the comparative analysis 
Aspect Constitution Act 108 of 
1996 
NEMA 107 of 1998 NEM:BA 10 of 20042 
Environment 
protected for 
people 
Yes  Yes  No, but for its own 
sake 
Value framework Consequentialist  Consequentialist Deontologal 
Implied definition 
of natural 
resource 
Both alien and 
indigenous 
Both alien and 
indigenous 
Only indigenous  
Sustainable use Yes, all resources Yes, all resources Yes, indigenous 
resources only 
Fate of alien and 
invasive species 
Sustainably utilise them 
to manage harmful 
effects 
Sustainably utilise 
them to manage 
harmful effects 
Eradicate or combat 
with view to gradual 
eradication 
Justifiable social 
and economic 
development 
Unconditional yes Unconditional yes Yes, if based on 
indigenous resources 
Economic thrust Facilitative of all 
activities as long as 
they are justifiable 
social and economic 
developmental 
activities 
Facilitative of all 
activities as long as 
they are justifiable 
social and economic 
developmental 
activities 
Prohibitive and 
inhibitive for activities 
based on listed 
invasive species no 
matter how justifiable 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The constitutional environmental governance framework is human-centred. The 
environment needs protection, but not for its own sake. It is to be protected for the benefit 
of people. It is not to be protected from people. By providing that “everyone has the right”, 
the Constitution is not assigning to people property rights over the environment. Rather, 
                                                          
2
 This is the NEM:BA before the National Environmental Management Laws Amendment Act (NEMLAA) of 
2013, which now provides for regulation of alien and invasive species by demarcated areas, by activity, by 
species management programme – aspects that the NEMBA 10 of 2004 failed to provide for and which made it 
inhibitive. 
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right here seems to refer to liberty. Commons (1942) distinguished two related 
constitutional meanings of economic (and, perhaps, social and political) power: liberty and 
property. Property is the “power of scarcity” (Commons 1942, p.370), which is the power of 
an owner to withhold something from those who need it, but do not own it. Liberty, on the 
other hand, is “bargaining power” (Commons 1942, p.370). In the preamble, the NEMA 
sheds light on the concept of right stating that “the State must respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the social, economic and environmental rights of everyone.” Social, economic and 
environmental rights encompass both property and liberty.  
The NEMA, which operationalises section 24 of the Constitution, goes a step further to 
elaborate what it means to have the environment protected for the people. In section 2, the 
NEMA lays down a peremptory normative, guiding and evaluative framework that binds all 
organs of state and all other subsidiary pieces of legislation. Among other principles, it 
provides that “Environmental management must place people and their needs at the 
forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, developmental, cultural and 
social interests equitably,” (NEMA, s.2 (2), emphasis added). Notice, this is a peremptory 
provision. It is a statutory command and government administrators have to obey it both in 
letter and in spirit. Thus, the NEMA provides for rights to a livelihood (physical and 
psychological needs), developmental rights, cultural rights and social rights (Christiansen 
2006). Environmental management must serve (facilitate) progressive realisation of these 
rights or strengthen them where they already exist as long as they do not promote and 
perpetuate unfair socio-economic discrimination. 
Ordinarily, one would expect environmental management’s primary “concerns” to be the 
conservation, restoration, preservation and protection of the environment. Paradoxically, 
the primary “concern” in the NEMA is the people (Table 5-1). One wonders why the NEMA 
goes to such lengths to make this provision. Steyn (1999, p.15) points out that the dominant 
belief in the 1980s was that “people (especially black people) were the enemies of 
conservation.” To be sure, it was an “environmental policy to “‘save’ Africa from Africans”” 
(Nelson 2010, p.260). The Biodiversity Policy (1997, p.16) advances the same argument and 
is worth quoting here: 
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“After Union, and indeed up until recent times, influential lobbies continued to 
secure additional areas and stronger legislation for protected areas … Moreover, the 
establishment of protected areas was often accompanied by forced removals and 
resource dispossession among black people. The dominant approach prevailing 
during this period was that protected areas ought to be “pristine”, fenced-off areas,” 
(emphasis added). 
The quote reveals the depth of disenfranchisement of the black (and other disadvantaged) 
peoples from access to, and utilisation of, environmental resources. At the core of the 
disenfranchisement was environmental creationism, which required protection and 
restoration of the environment to its pristine or near-pristine condition (Phillips 2003). The 
institution of property defined the racially entrenched power structures insofar as utilisation 
of environmental resources was concerned. Thus, it was used in a ceremonially warranted 
way (Tool 1994). 
In peremptorily providing for a framework that places people at the forefront of the 
concerns of environmental management, the NEMA, thus, is invoking remedial legal-
economic interventions (Commons 2009). The purpose of remedial interventions is to 
restore and promote equity and economic liberty (Mashaw 1980; 1981). To persist with the 
pre-democracy model of environmental management that created “Noah’s Ark” (Nelson 
2010, p.12) and islands of purity would have entrenched the green apartheid system in a 
post-apartheid political dispensation.  
5.2.2. Consequentialism versus Deontology 
In providing for the protection of the environment “for” the people, the Constitution places 
ultimate value in the people rather than the environment (Table 5-1). By providing that 
environmental management must place people at the “forefront” of its concern, the NEMA, 
like the constitution, assigns ultimate value to the people. These are value rankings. 
However, the NEM:BA is founded on a fundamental principle that underpins the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) of 1993. In its preamble, the CBD declares that “Contracting 
parties [are] [c]onscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity”. The first principle that 
the Biodiversity Policy (1997, p.20) specifies is that “All life forms and ecological systems 
have intrinsic value,” (emphasis added). The NEM:BA, thus, expanded the CBD principle to 
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include all life forms (humans and alien non-humans included) and ecological processes and 
interactions. This is biocentrism (Simberloff et al. 2013). The NEM:BA does not assign 
ultimate value to humans, but it assigns it to all life forms, ecological processes and 
ecological interactions. 
From an environmental philosophy point of view, the claim to intrinsic value is the bedrock 
for egalitarianism of life forms (Maier 2012, Sarkar 2005). Intrinsic value means that every 
life form has value in and of itself regardless of any utilitarian value it has to other life forms 
(Maier 2012). Instrumental value means that a life form has value only insofar as it yields 
utility to other life forms, especially humans (Norton 2003, Sarkar 2005). To the extent that 
attributing intrinsic value to non-human life forms grants them moral rights, they are moral 
equals with humans. Similarly, every ecological process and system, as per the NEM:BA, has 
moral claims equal to those of humans. There is a fundamental point of difference. The 
NEM:BA ascribes to egalitarianism of all life forms including humans as well as alien and 
invasive species (biocentrism). The NEMA and the Constitution place ultimate value in the 
people as well as recognizing the instrumental value of the environment and its 
components. They subordinate the environment to humankind, subject to a conservation 
ethic or duty of care (Glavovic 1984). 
The NEMA and the Constitution are built on a consequentialist value framework insofar as 
they make humans ultimate holders of value, whereas the NEM:BA’s value framework is 
deontological because humans are not assigned the role of valuing agent (Maier 2012). 
Consequentialism focuses on environmental consequences and outcomes only as they 
relate to human welfare (Maier 2012, Norton 2003, Sarkar 2005). On the contrary, 
deontology eliminates humans as valuing agents and propounds that all life forms have 
equal moral rights (Maier 2012). 
In Nelson’s (2010, p.3) view, consequentialism is prevalent because societies often advocate 
“that economic religion should not be abandoned, but rather revised and reworked to 
reflect new environmental concerns and ecological understandings.” Nelson’s argument is 
that consequentialism does not abandon the pursuit of economic progress. It only calls for 
factoring in of environmental issues in the dominant discourse. The environment is to 
supply material inputs to the production process and be used as a waste sink (Hanley et al. 
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2013, Tietenberg and Lewis 2010). The environment is to be a means to the advancement of 
human ends, although it warrants earnest protection, preservation, conservation and care. 
The ultimate purpose of all this is to serve the physical, psychological, developmental, 
cultural and social needs and interests of people. Therefore, the founding environmental 
governance framework is anthropocentric and consequentialist, whilst the NEM:BA is 
biocentric and deontological.  
5.2.3. Implied statutory definitions of natural resources 
The comparative analysis revealed that the NEM:BA has a different implied conception of 
what a natural resource is relative to what is implied by the NEMA/Constitution (Table 5-1). 
The term natural resources is not defined in the NEMA and the NEM:BA. Section 24 of the 
Constitution and the preamble to the NEMA provide for “ecologically sustainable … use of 
natural resources” (emphasis added). However, the preamble to the NEM:BA provides for 
“the sustainable use of indigenous biological resources” (emphasis added). Whilst it is 
logical that the Constitution and the NEMA have broader implied definitions of natural 
resources than the NEM:BA because they are including biological and non-biological 
resources, it is not apparent whether their implied definitions of the biological component 
are restricted to indigenous resources.  
The term “natural resources” does not seem to place any identity restrictions, such as 
indigenousness or alienness, onto the resources. To the NEM:BA, natural resource means 
indigenous resource, but this, probably, is a narrow and restrictive conception insofar as 
indigeneity cannot be fully characterised in terms of biological and geographical factors 
alone (Chew and Hamilton 2011). Temporal and cultural factors also play a critical role in 
defining what an indigenous resource is (Chew and Hamilton 2011, Wylie 2008). 
The only piece of South African legislation that defines a natural resource is the 
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (CARA) of 1983. The CARA, section 1, states that 
“‘natural agricultural resources’ means the soil, the water sources and the vegetation, 
excluding weeds and invader plants.” In this case, the CARA defines a natural resource as 
one that has potential or actual economic value in agriculture. The CARA definition is 
utilitarian. However, a less obvious aspect of this definition is that the CARA regards alien 
species that are non-invasive and are agriculturally valuable as natural resources. It only 
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excludes invasive plants from the definition. Even here, there is an ambiguity because an 
invasive plant/animal that is also agriculturally beneficial does not so easily fit into that 
definition. 
The foregoing discussion reveals that the concept of naturalness is a social construction 
(Bromley 2012, Hirokawa 2014, Max-Neef 2005). Nature is what people commonly perceive 
its effects on them to be (Bromley 2012, Peirce 1878). In a pluralistic society, multitudes of 
competing and conflicting definitions of a natural resource exist. The degree of convergence 
of “mental objectification” of investigators, policymakers and the general polity about 
nature becomes the natural (Bromley 2012, p.19). The claim here is that leaving the concept 
of natural resources undefined in legislation necessarily created conditions necessary for 
institutional isolation (marginalisation) of some sectors to the extent that a dominant 
epistemic group will utilise its instituted social imaginary to exclude from its conception of 
natural resources what other groups would identify as natural resources. As the literature 
review suggested and as illustrated in Table 3-1, loose legal provisions create necessary 
conditions for epistemic injustice or monopoly over the sanction of ignorance by epistemic 
communities that manage to appropriate sovereign power in policy processes (Ayres 1996, 
Code 2008, Commons 2009, Dotson 2011, Dugger 1996b, North 1990, North et al. 2007; 
2012). Interpretive battles are likely to characterise implementation processes. 
5.2.4. NEM:BA requires eradication of alien species and invasive species 
This sub-section devotes itself to the analysis of relevant concepts that the NEM:BA employs 
because, not only have controversies arisen over the interpretation of the concepts, but also 
the legislative intent can be inferred from them.  
a. Alien species 
An alien species is defined in the NEM:BA as  
“(a) a species that is not indigenous; or (b) an indigenous species translocated or 
intended to be translocated to a place outside its natural distribution range in 
nature, but not an indigenous species that has extended its natural distribution 
range by natural means of migration or dispersal without human intervention,” 
(NEM:BA, section 1(1)). 
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An indigenous species that extends its natural distribution range by “natural” means is non-
alien. However, invasion is invasion. Insofar as a species extends its natural range by natural 
means, but its invasive effects are the same as those of a species that spreads by human 
assistance, Chew and Hamilton (2011), Davis et al. (2011), Shackelford et al. (2013) and 
Warren (2007) question the wisdom of focusing on the mode of range extension rather than 
the degree of damage caused by a species.  Central to this definition, to be sure, is the 
presumption that humans are exogenous to nature (Nelson 2010). Thus, human 
interventions such as translocation of species are interpreted as exogenous disturbances to 
nature.  
b. Invasive species 
The entire controversy about the proposed regulatory regime for alien and invasive species 
centred on the definition of an invasive species because it was upon this basis that a species 
was subjected to stringent controls or prohibited. The NEM:BA defines an invasive species 
as  
“any species whose establishment and spread outside of its natural distribution 
range (a) threaten ecosystems, habitats or other species or have a demonstrable 
potential to threaten ecosystems, habitats or other species; and (b) may result in 
economic or environmental harm or harm to human health,” (NEM:BA section 1(1), 
emphasis added) 
The definition has a biological invasiveness component, a socio-economic and an 
environmental invasiveness component. The Federation of Southern African Flyfishers 
(FOSAF) (2013) argued that this definition created a conjunctive test of invasiveness. It 
further argued that the obvious implication was that a species could only be invasive if it 
satisfied both conditions. To be invasive, conclusive scientific evidence about the negative 
ecological and socio-economic impact of a species must have been gathered. Thus, impact 
has to be of such a magnitude that it threatens long-term survival of another species, 
perhaps, leading to extinction. However, in some cases, the evidence is only circumstantial 
in which case the potential impact must be demonstrable.  
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Table 5-2: Potential conflictual and consensual decision scenarios regarding the 
identification of invasive species 
 
 
A Species is 
invasive if… 
May be causing 
harm to human 
health 
May be causing 
economic harm 
May be causing 
environmental 
harm 
May not be 
causing economic, 
environmental or 
human health 
harm 
Establishment 
and subsequent 
spread by natural 
means threatens 
indigenous 
species 
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that utilise 
alien and invasive 
species disagree 
Establishment 
and subsequent 
spread by natural 
means threatens 
habitats  
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that utilise 
alien and invasive 
species disagree 
Establishment 
and subsequent 
spread by natural 
means threaten  
ecosystems 
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree  
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA, invasion 
biologists, sectors 
that utilise alien 
and invasive 
species all agree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that utilise 
alien and invasive 
species disagree 
Establishment 
and subsequent 
spread by  
human assistance 
threaten 
indigenous 
species 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that utilise 
alien and invasive 
species disagree 
Establishment 
and subsequent 
spread by  
human assistance 
threaten habitats 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that utilise 
alien and invasive 
species disagree 
Establishment 
and subsequent 
spread by  
human assistance 
threaten 
ecosystems 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that 
utilise alien and 
invasive species 
disagree 
DEA and invasion 
biologists agree; 
sectors that utilise 
alien and invasive 
species disagree 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The definition imbeds in itself the criteria for classifying a species as invasive. The 
fundamental (and sufficient) criterion according to the NEM:BA is that the species causes 
ecological harm. The second, expressed as a mere possibility by the use of “may result”, is a 
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necessary condition. That a species does not cause socio-economic harm does not prevent it 
from being listed as invasive for as long as ecological harm has been established. Viewed 
from this perspective, the provision indicates that the NEM:BA provides a conjunctive test, 
but the test criteria are ranked in such a way that one is a sufficient condition and the other 
is only a necessary condition. Interest groups such as the FOSAF were interpreting the 
definition in a broader sense than the restrictive sense that the NEM:BA definition 
stipulates.  
Table 5-2 dimensionalises the definition of an invasive species in order to determine 
potential conflictual and consensual scenarios in the regulatory reform processes that 
followed the promulgation of the NEM:BA. It combines socio-economic criteria and 
ecological criteria in order to decode the underlying cause of the non-convergence of the 
dynamic interpretants of the players in the regulatory reform process. The first scenario 
(shaded) is the convergence of mental objectification between economic sectors that utilise 
invasive species, and the DEA and invasion biologists for species that satisfy both ecological 
and socio-economic criteria of invasiveness.  
In the second scenario, the sectors utilising alien and invasive species disagree with the DEA 
and invasion biologists on the invasive status of species that might not be causing economic 
harm, environmental harm or harm to human health although they might be threatening 
species, habitats or ecosystems (Table 5-2). To the economic sectors, such species are non-
invasive by virtue of them failing to satisfy the socio-economic/environmental harm test of 
the conjunctive test of invasiveness. The problem with the interpretation of socio-economic 
sectors that utilise invasive species is that it assigns equal weight to ecological and socio-
economic criteria when, in effect, the NEM:BA makes the ecological criterion a sufficient 
condition and the socio-economic/environmental criterion a necessary condition. 
It is difficult to find a species that threatens species, habitats or ecosystems that does not 
harm human health, the economy or the environment in the long-term (Norgaard 2007). 
Short-termism guided by the Veblenian pecuniary culture shapes the argument of economic 
sectors in this scenario. However, the constitutional/NEMA environmental framework builds 
on “tempered anthropocentrism”, which Sarkar (2005, p.75) considered to balance short-
term and long-term interests. ‘Short-term’ anthropocentrists “do not worry about ecological 
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impacts of invasions unless these also drive economic or social damages” (Simberloff et al. 
2013, p.63).  The discount rate for the economic sectors might be higher than the underlying 
social discount rate implied by the long-term anthropocentrism in the constitutional/NEMA 
framework. Thus, the argument of the economic sectors was ceremonially warranted in this 
scenario and failed to pass the environmental continuity test and, in effect, was an 
argument for the maintenance of the status quo (Tool 1994).  
The third scenario concerns species that harm human health, the economy or environment, 
but can potentially threaten species, habitats or ecosystems if and only if human beings 
subsequently spread them (Table 5-2). The DEA/invasion biologists declare such species 
invasive, but the economic sectors disagree. Differentiating between natural and human-
assisted subsequent range extension, however, can clarify matters because it helps the 
policymaker to focus on fundamental rather than consequential problems. The case of 
natural range extension after the first instance of introduction is fundamental because it 
means that the species has a potentially colonisable suitable habitat available (Macdonald 
and Jarman 1985, Richardson and Van Wilgen 2004). The case of human-assisted range 
extension is consequential because it implies that the species can only invade if it is 
propagated in new areas. In this case, the species is not the problem, but human/economic 
motives and behaviour are the fundamental problem. The policymaker has to think in terms 
of economic incentives and sanctions that could be instituted to modify economic behaviour 
to minimise further volitional spread of the species.  
To the extent that invasion biologists and the DEA do not differentiate species by mode of 
subsequent range extension, it leads to a logical failure in their argument in the sense that a 
species that can only subsequently spread by human assistance is not an established 
species. If not established, then the subsequent spread ceases to be by natural means. A 
species that is established, but cannot expand its range because suitable habitats are 
discrete and separated by impassable non-suitable habitat, cannot be a spatially dynamic 
threat to indigenous species. It is a threat to those species within the invaded area. 
The NEM:BA’s definition of an invasive species, however, underplays the grand purpose of 
environmental governance as enunciated in the Constitution section 24. The central thrust 
of environmental governance is to guarantee an environment not harmful to people’s 
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health and wellbeing. The real issue lies in what “wellbeing” might mean. An environment 
that threatens the socio-psychological and economic/livelihood assets of people harms their 
wellbeing insofar as it can generate economic and social ruin. Viewed from this perspective, 
it implies that a species can only be invasive if the ecological threat it poses is such that it 
inflicts harm on the environment that, in turn, harms human health and wellbeing.  
The definition of invasiveness in the NEM:BA seems too narrow to fit the broader 
constitutional vision because it only concentrates on biological invasiveness. In a 
consequentialist value framework, such as the one the Constitution and the NEMA provide 
for, it is not enough to say a species threatens “ecosystems or habitats or other species”. 
The threat has to be such that it jeopardises human wellbeing since humans are the 
ultimate object of environmental governance (Maier 2012, Simberloff et al. 2013). The 
issues that legislation has to deal with, as outlined in section 24 of the Constitution, directly 
affect human health and wellbeing through compromising the production of ecosystem 
goods and services, economic viability of environmental resource-based activities, as well as 
causing diseases to humans and their livestock.  
c. Controlling alien and invasive species 
A closer inspection of the definition of “control” reveals that the NEM:BA prescribes 
eradication of alien or invasive species regardless of their socio-economic worth. Nor does 
the eradication depend on damage criteria (Chew and Hamilton 2011; Davis et al. 2011; 
Warren 2007). Rather, being alien or invasive provides sufficient ground for eradication. The 
NEM:BA section 1(1) states, 
““Control”, in relation to an alien or invasive species, means – (a) to combat or 
eradicate an alien or invasive species; or (b) where such eradication is impossible, to 
prevent, as far as may be practicable, the recurrence, re-establishment, re-growth, 
multiplication, propagation, regeneration or spreading of an alien or invasive 
species,” (emphasis added). 
Alien species and invasive species alike are to be combated or eradicated. If immediate 
eradication is impossible, gradual elimination of alien species and invasive species is the 
ultimate goal. Although the NEM:BA claims that all life forms have intrinsic value, it might be 
internally inconsistent to the extent that it provides for eradication of alien species. If all life 
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forms have intrinsic value, it is difficult to conceive the bases upon which their eradication is 
premised. The argument the NEM:BA gives is that they “may” harm ecosystems (discussion 
of this point follows later). Note that “all life forms” is a universal set that does not attach 
identity to the various life forms in question. Since alien species must be eradicated, human 
activities based on those aliens face the risk of being proscribed unless some exemption 
framework is invoked.  
To be sure, the provisions of the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA are founded on Article 8(h) of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1993. Article 8(h) provides that “Each 
Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate [p]revent the introduction of, 
control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species.” 
Apparent from this article is the focus on eradication of invasive alien species.  The 
assumption is that the threatening processes would have been scientifically identified. 
Whether eradication is to be prioritised based on the degree of damage, is not evident in 
the CBD provision.  
The Conference of Parties to the CBD did not develop guiding principles for implementing 
Article 8(h) until 2002 in its Decision VI-23. Decision VI-23 sets the international regulatory 
regime for alien and invasive species and emphasises that invasive aliens must be 
eradicated and, if that is not possible, contained and controlled in the sense of reducing 
their number. Since the CBD is a contractual institution, in terms of its framing, it is binding 
to all signatory member states. The peremptory injunction that invasive aliens must be 
eradicated is to be obeyed by signatory member states. However, the NEM:BA went further 
to also state that alien species regardless of whether they are invasive or not have to be 
eradicated as its definition reveals. In a sense, this appears to point towards purism or eco-
nationalism as the pro-aliens lobby has argued (Brown 2013). Eco-nationalism is “Strict 
biological nativism” (Peretti 1998, p.188). 
d. Regulation of Alien and Invasive Species 
The fifth chapter of the NEM:BA provides for the management framework for alien and 
invasive species. The purpose of the chapter is (a) to prevent unauthorized entrance of new 
alien species into South Africa, and, more importantly,  
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“(b) to manage and control alien species and invasive species to prevent or minimise 
harm to the environment and biodiversity in particular [and] (c) to eradicate alien 
species and invasive species from ecosystems and habitats where they may harm 
ecosystems or habitats” (NEM:BA, s.64 (b, c), emphasis added). 
The NEM:BA does not define the term “manage”, but it defines “control”. A closer 
examination of the purposes of the chapter reveals that a species is to be eradicated 
whether it is alien or invasive. It is to be eradicated not because it has caused harm, but 
because it “may” cause harm. It is a question of possible harm, but not actual harm caused 
since the precautionary principle is a guiding dictate of global environmental management 
(Balint et al. 2011). Such a broader purpose, however indispensable, in the estimation of the 
present study amounts to a blanket approach to alien and invasive species management. 
There seems also to be a loose usage of the terms control and eradicate in this chapter of 
the NEM:BA. Whilst to control is to eradicate and combat as the Act defines it, the fifth 
chapter of the Act seems to use the term control to imply any intervention other than 
eradication. 
In terms of economic use of the species, there seems to be no enabling provision. It follows 
that investing in an activity that involves an alien species or an invasive species is such a 
risky economic activity that the risk amounts to uncertainty. The problem is that, whatever 
species invasion biologists suspect to have the potential to harm ecosystems, habitats or 
other species becomes eradicable. While the definition of an invasive species requires a 
species to be presently causing evident damage or to have demonstrable potential to do so, 
the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter creates a different criterion, namely, that suspicion that a 
species may cause harm is sufficient ground for eradication. A much more surprising point is 
that alien species are also liable to eradication despite the fact that they are not listed as 
invasive species. The construction, “alien species and invasive species” (NEM:BA, section 
64(c)), makes explicit that whether invasive or not, an alien species is to be eradicated. This 
outcome seems to substantiate the claim that a spirit of eco-nationalism pervades the 
NEM:BA (Brown 2013).  
146 | P a g e  
 
e. Fate of activities based on alien species  
An economic activity that utilises an alien species is permissible only to the extent that a 
“prescribed risk assessment” has been carried out (NEM:BA section 65(2)). The transaction 
costs of obtaining a permit, therefore, involve the application for the permit and costs of 
hiring a consultant to do the risk assessment. The NEM:BA prescribes a permission and 
exemption framework for regulation of alien species. Unlike a property right, a permit 
creates a system of revocable privileges (Bromley 2009, Macinko and Bromley 2003).  
The NEM:BA, section 66, however, provides that the Minister “may” exempt some alien 
species or categories of such species as well as persons or categories of persons utilising the 
alien species. To economic sectors that utilise alien species, the possibility of an exemption 
is their hope. The problem, however, is that leaving exemptions as a matter of ministerial 
discretion, does not sufficiently guarantee that the Minister will indeed exempt the species 
that matter to these sectors. The Minister has a right of refusal to exempt a species. Having 
already indicated that an alien species is eradicable if scientists suspect that it causes or may 
cause harm, complete uncertainty as to whether the Minister would in any case exempt 
economically useful alien species prevails.  
f. Fate of activities based on invasive species 
As an obligatory matter, the Minister must “publish a national list of invasive species in 
respect of which this chapter must be applied nationally” (NEM:BA s.70(1)(a)). A window of 
hope for economic sectors that utilise invasive species is implicit in this provision. The fact 
that a list must be published implies a process of prioritisation such that only species that 
inflict the most significant damage on ecosystems, habitats, species, the environment and 
human wellbeing are listed and those causing the least damage are not be listed. The 
problem, though, is that if the criteria for listing the species are equivocal, there is little 
guarantee that invasive species serving important socio-economic purposes will not be 
listed. However, the Act seems ambiguous in that the stated purpose is the eradication of 
“alien species” and “invasive species” where they “may” cause ecological harm (NEM:BA, 
s.64 (c)). The fact that species belonging to both categories – alien and invasive – are subject 
to eradication, demonstrates the ambiguity. 
Even though listed as invasive, a species can be economically utilised, but only under a 
permitting arrangement. The permit requires a prescribed risk assessment to be carried out 
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to the satisfaction of the DEA or a competent authority (NEM:BA section 71(2)). The 
difference in treatment between an alien and a listed invasive species is that a listed 
invasive species cannot be “exempted” from permitting conditions whereas some alien 
species may be exempted at the discretion of the Minister. This also implies that non-listed 
invasive species can be utilised with/without a permit applicable to them. By default, they 
would be treated as alien species. Economic sectors that utilise invasive species would find 
it more attractive to have the species of interest left unlisted so that they are treated as 
alien species and, thus, eligible for exemption. The advantage of that arrangement is that 
transaction costs of maintaining the species are lower than for listed invasive species.  
5.3. Permission, sustainable use and conservation finance 
Whilst the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA provides for a permitting system to facilitate 
utilisation of alien or invasive species, it creates quite substantial uncertainty about the 
regulatory regime that would be employed. Section 91 specifies additional requirements 
regarding alien or invasive species.  
“An issuing authority may issue a permit for a restricted activity involving a specimen 
of an alien species or an invasive species only if … (b) the relevant specimen has been 
found to have negligible or no invasive potential; (c) the benefits of allowing the 
activity are significantly greater than the costs associated with preventing or 
remedying any resultant damage to the environment or biodiversity…” (emphasis 
added). 
Again, alien species, a category that seems to have been created for those species that 
cause no/negligible harm to ecosystems, habitats and other species, are included in the 
restrictions. Thus, an investor whose business is going to utilise an alien species or a listed 
invasive species can obtain a permit if and only if the concerned species has negligible or no 
invasive potential. In most cases, the net benefits of allowing the alien species-based activity 
might be ambiguous (De Moor and Bruton 1988) because of inaccuracies in valuation 
techniques.  
The paradox is that most economically useful alien species have been identified in policy 
and scientific circles as highly invasive (Biodiversity Policy 1997, Ellender and Weyl 2014, 
Moran et al. 2013, Richardson 2011, Richardson and Van Wilgen 2004, Skelton 2000, Van 
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Wilgen et al. 2001). For example, “Up to 60% of the threatened endemic freshwater fish of 
South Africa may be threatened by introduced fish species such as trout, carp and bass,” 
(Biodiversity Policy 1997, p.37). It follows, therefore, that a permit would be impossible to 
obtain in such a situation since a species must have negligible or no invasive potential for a 
competent authority to grant a permit. The unperceived effect of this provision is that it 
amounts to prohibition or shutting down of economic activities that utilise alien and 
invasive species for which scientists claim evidence of non-negligible invasiveness.  
In Christopher Lance Mercer v State 2003, a governmental agency turned down a permit 
application because “the caracals [which Christopher Lance Mercer kept in the Kalahari 
Raptor Centre] were earmarked as potential problem animals to farmers” (emphasis added), 
that is, they were declared economically invasive. Evidently, the listing of a species as 
invasive or potentially so has drastic implications for the possibility of obtaining a permit, 
and understandably so, with potentially ruinous social and economic consequences. This 
case suggests that the test of invasiveness has to consist of biological and socio-economic 
criteria jointly. 
The concept of sustainable utilisation as envisaged in the NEM:BA seems to be narrow 
because it only focuses on indigenous resources. Sustainable funding for biodiversity 
conservation could be secured through sustainable utilisation of alien and/or invasive 
species. Figure 5-1 illustrates the argument. Conservationists (C) and economic sectors that 
utilise alien and invasive species (E) have irreconcilable interests. The bundle of 
environmental services for environmentalists includes goods (indigenous species) and bads 
(alien/invasive species). Thus, their welfare increases as indigenous species diversity 
increases and the propagule pressure as well as the spread of alien and invasive species 
decreases.  
Economic sectors that utilise both alien species and invasive species, on the other hand, 
have a bundle of environmental services that has two goods (indigenous and economically 
useful alien/invasive species). Their welfare increases as both goods increase. There exist 
two alternative institutional arrangements NAIS (no-AIS, that is eradicate or manage with a 
view to gradually eliminating alien and invasive species) and AIS (allow use of alien and 
invasive species). The former is what the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA envisages and the 
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latter is the pre-NEM:BA scenario. The indifference curves for economic sectors are labelled 
(E1 and E2) and those for conservationists including the DEA are labelled (C1 and C2). The 
contract curve is the line NAIS-AIS. 
 
Figure 5-1: Sustainable use of species and financing of biodiversity conservation 
Source: Author’s analysis 
Figure 5-1 can be interpreted as an arrangement for payment for ecosystem goods and 
services. Since the NEM:BA came into effect when it was legitimate to utilise alien/invasive 
species in South Africa, the starting position is AIS on the contract curve. Thus, a 
“grandfathering or first possession” approach is assumed (Libecap 2009, p.133), whereby 
AIS-based sectors are protected by a property rule by virtue of having prior-use over the 
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resources before the NEM:BA came into force (Bromley 1978b). The task is to reform 
institutions in such a way that the final institutional arrangement is one at NAIS where AIS at 
worst are to be eradicated and at best utilised within a payment for ecosystem goods and 
services framework. At NAIS, conservationists can be protected by a liability rule. While a 
property rule ensures that conservationists will not eradicate alien and invasive species 
without the consent of economic sectors, protecting conservationists with a liability rule 
imposes duty on economic sectors to utilise invasive species for as long as they compensate 
the conservationists for the biodiversity losses induced by the species they utilise (Bromley 
1978b). Thus, at NAIS, a redistributive policy that imposes liability on economic sectors is 
envisaged. At NAIS, there is efficiency in exchange since the marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) is equal for conservationists and economic sectors. 
                   
                     
  
          
               
   Equation 5-1 
In this setting, conservationists will have to extort payment from AIS-based economic 
sectors because they are the ones now protected by a liability rule at NAIS. Daly and Giertz 
(1975, p.998) define extortion as  
“the  act of  obtaining  payments from  some entity  in return  for  not  imposing  
upon  that entity  some harmful  effect,  where  the  generator  of  the  external  
effect  receives  no direct net  internal  benefit  from  the act.”  
The harmful effect in the present analysis is the eradication of the alien and invasive species 
upon which some sectors’ economic activities rely. Extortion is a process of economic 
coercion, conditioned on the relative degree of bargaining power (or liberty, as Commons 
(1942) would say), to obtain payment from another party that is not protected by a property 
or liability rule (Bromley 1978a; 1978b). It is possible to interpret extortion, from a 
monetary perspective, as a strategy for enjoining parties to internalise negative externalities 
caused by their activities. However, Samuels (1972b) argues that monetary prices are 
surrogates of the structure of rights and the distribution of power in society and, as such, 
extortion is essentially assenting to the reality that the party whose economic activities are 
imposing a social burden is the one whose rights count in public policy. Even after extortion, 
the real cost, which is the material flow in the form of an externality still occurs, thus it is an 
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issue of interdependence rather than externality (Samuels 1972b). That one’s right is 
permitted to be a cost factor in others’ decision processes is the real cost (Samuels 1972a; 
1972b). 
Since the conservationists have to extort payment from AIS-based sectors, they bear 
positive transaction costs in the process. They would demand a payment that although off 
the contract curve, will leave them just as well off as they would be on the contract curve. 
This means that they will demand HJ as payment. Notice, the price offer curve J is tangential 
to C2 at V. Being at V or at NAIS makes no difference to conservationists because they are 
equally well off at either position. However, AIS-based sectors are prepared to pay HK 
where the price offer curve K is tangential to their indifference curve at W.  
The final equilibrium can be one in a range of potential outcomes, one of which is NAIS and 
many of which are off the contract and bounded by the price offer curves J and K. Since HK > 
HJ, it follows that a bargainable surplus exists equivalent to HK less HJ. Negotiation, 
therefore, centres on the control of the bargainable surplus. The magnitude of transaction 
costs determines the distribution of this surplus. The magnitude of transaction costs is a 
function of economic power (property and liberty) as well as tastes and preferences of the 
parties involved (Bromley 1978a, Commons 1942). At the limit, the transaction costs can 
only be as large as the bargainable surplus in which case extorting payment becomes 
unattractive. The smaller the transaction costs of extorting payment, the greater is the 
incentive to negotiate for as much of a share of the bargainable surplus as possible. This 
way, financing resources for biodiversity conservation are raised through sustainable 
utilisation of alien and invasive species. This leaves aggregate welfare higher because 
everyone is better off – the conservationists and the AIS-based sectors as well as society in 
general.  
In effect, this conclusion resembles the conservation levies that Provincial Nature 
Conservation Authorities in South Africa collect from the hunting industry. In SA Predator 
Breeders Association and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2009, 
Justice Van Der Merwe stated the “the financial benefits of the hunting industry comprised 
direct financial benefits such as … revenue for provincial conservation authorities and 
conservation levies,” (emphasis added). 
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The conservation levies could then be used to finance conservation programmes, such as 
Working for Water and Working for Indigenous Biodiversity, among others. It must be 
remarked at this stage that the financing implications emanating from this analysis do not 
pass the neoclassical efficiency test. Petrick and Pies (2007, p.256) describe such an 
outcome as “the establishment of an (attainable) institutional arrangement that allows the 
realisation of mutual gains” to the extent that “policy is no longer guided by the desire to 
attain the ideal of a perfect market” (italics in original). The extorted amount is not the 
optimal one consistent with NAIS, which lies on the contract curve. Rather, it is a reasonable 
amount arrived at through deliberative valuation. It is here that the role of economic power 
comes into play. Conservationists have the environmental right (liberty) enshrined in the 
Constitution, section 24, and, therefore, could bargain with AIS-based sectors. AIS-based 
sectors have property rights and privileges to portions of the environment where they 
engage in their economic activities. They also have the environmental right (liberty). They 
can withhold their property interest from conservationists.  
Because both parties have liberty, they enter into bargaining using the negotiational 
psychology of economic coercion or persuasion to arrive at a reasonable extortion (Albert 
and Ramstad 1998, Commons 1931, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012). This is the concept of 
reasonable value/ just price (Dugger 1996a; 1996b). “Reasonable Value itself is nothing  
other  than  a coherent  and  pragmatic,  albeit  secularized,  solution  to  the  problem  of  
just  price,” (Ramstad 2001, p.254). Ramstad further characterises reasonable value “as a 
desideratum of public policy..., an imperfect compromise to be reached through an 
administrative process” (Ramstad 2001, p.272, emphasis added). He argues that it  is  “not  a  
metaphysical  entity discoverable  through  abstract  logic,  as is  the case with the “optimal”  
or “efficient” outcomes  serving  as  desiderata  in  mainstream  practice” (Ramstad 2001, 
p.272).  
The point to note here is that the conclusion reached in the analysis above resulted in a 
non-efficient compromise solution that, nevertheless, was a “workable consensus” 
(Commons 2009, p.743), which left all parties concerned satisfied. Reasonable value/just 
price is a product of discursive valuation rather than deductive reasoning that, in the 
neoclassical sense, underpins Pareto optimality analysis (Norgaard 2007, Waller Jr and 
Robertson 1991). It is a pragmatist’s approach to fair compensation. Dugger (1996b, p.429) 
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described the reasonable valuation outcomes that “all lay somewhere within the gap 
between what the conflicting interests in transactions actually wanted.” Similarly, 
conflicting interests in biodiversity conservation fall within the confines of reasonable 
valuation.  
The Coasean approach, where the party without the property right has to bribe the party 
vested with the right in property to reduce the scale of a harmful activity or stop it 
completely (Coase 1960), would produce a stalemate. Bribe is the obverse of extortion. 
Conservationists pay the sectors utilising alien and invasive species to reduce their scale of 
operation. No institutional change would take place. Notice, in the Coasean approach, 
conservationists would offer to pay economic sectors a compensating variation (HJ) for 
them to reduce the utilisation scale of alien and invasive species. HJ is consistent with the 
conservationists’ welfare at V in order to move from the status quo institutional 
arrangement (AIS) to the desired institutional arrangement (NAIS) on the contract curve. 
However, economic sectors would consider their own welfare to determine whether to 
accept or reject the offer. In this case, they would be willing to accept HK, which 
conservationists are not willing to pay. Hence, to accept the offer (HJ) would generate a 
negative net compensating variation (HJ – HK < 0).  
The real issue that the reciprocity argument in the Coasean approach underplays is that 
optimality is a function of who first has the entitlement and, therefore, a function of the 
power structure and wealth distribution of society (Samuels 1972a; 1972b). The optimality 
just strengthens the status quo, which is to say no institutional change takes place, while the 
environmental problem still awaits redress. 
5.4. Reasonable legislation  
This section utilises the judicial decision in the first NEM:BA implementation case to discuss 
governance challenges that have undermined emergence of consensual regulations. The 
case is not about alien and invasive species, but provides important insights into the limited 
access policymaking order in the realm of rules in the NEM:BA processes. In SA Predator 
Breeders Association and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2010, 
South African courts had to decide the rationality/reasonableness of regulations made 
under the NEM:BA to regulate the hunting of captive bred lions. In particular, the 
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regulations made provisions to the effect that captive bred lions were not to be hunted until 
they had become self-sustaining after being released into the wild. The regulations 
stipulated a minimum period of twenty-four months as sufficient for these animals to 
become self-sustaining. Self-sustenance, by implication, meant that the lions would have 
become independent of the humans such that they would be food self-sufficient. However, 
the hunting industry argued that captive-bred lions lacked the capacity to become self-
sustaining.  
It also argued that adjusting the hunting freeze period from the conventional (3 days to 4 
months) to 24 months before the lions are legitimately huntable, would cause irreparable 
economic ruin to the sector. Beyond the direct financial ruin, social provisioning would be 
curtailed and many livelihood opportunities and jobs would be lost. This ultimately meant 
the closure of this sector of the hunting industry. Thus, before the court was the question of 
whether the regulatory provisions being challenged would pass the rationality/ 
reasonableness test. 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Justice Heher remarked that 
rationality/reasonableness was an indispensable element of administrative conduct so as 
“to avoid capricious or arbitrary action by ensuring that there is a rational relationship 
between the scheme which is adopted and the achievement of a legitimate government 
purpose”. It was also indispensable because it ensured that the administrative “decision is 
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given”. Lastly, rationality ensured 
that “the action of the functionary bears a rational connection to the facts and information 
available to him and on which he purports to base such action.”  
The Court’s interpretation of reasonable administrative action and legislation suggests two 
broad evaluative criteria. The intervention, firstly, must be capable of reasonably achieving 
the stated purpose. If an intervention is connected to some government purpose, but is not 
the most reasonable approach to achieving that purpose, it would fail the rationality test. 
For example, prohibiting an existing activity versus managing it to minimise negative 
impacts, while allowing sustainable use are two alternative approaches to governing an 
activity to achieve the same purpose, but have disparate implications. However, prohibition 
might not be the most reasonable approach even if it has a direct connection to the stated 
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government purpose. In most cases, finding acceptable win-win solutions is much more 
reasonable than prohibition (Dugger 1996b, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2002, Ramstad 2001).  
Secondly, to be reasonable, the intervention must be science-based or evidence-based. This 
criterion safeguards against arbitrariness. On cross-examination, the Minister’s, and his 
panel of scientists’, justification of the 24 month-freeze on hunting failed to withstand 
judicial scrutiny. The hallmark of rationality is reasonableness. The court ruling suggests that 
rational official intervention is capable of being justified through “a particular game of giving 
and asking for reasons” (Price 2013, p.31). It must be demonstrable that the action is a 
justified and reasonable approach to the achievement of the state’s ends-in-view and is 
informed by all available scientific facts.  
Justice Heher further noted that  
“The Minister’s intention as expressed in that sub-regulation was to allow hunting of 
captive-bred lions to be pursued under the specified circumstances and not to make 
such hunting impossible or even impracticable. But if there can be no real prospect 
that such lions will be able to look after themselves then there will be as little 
prospect of hunting being permitted and the purported upliftment of the ban in 
[regulation] 24(1)(a) will be meaningless and [regulation] 24(2), in its present form, 
irrational” (emphasis added). 
The Court’s intuition was that since captive-bred lions were not to be hunted until the 
lapsing of at least 24 months at which point, purportedly, they would have become self-
sustaining, yet scientifically they would never be so, the unperceived effect of the 
regulations was to shut down this sector of the hunting industry. The permitting 
arrangement became a phantom. It would amount to a property taking without fair 
compensation. Thus, the court ruled in favour of the appellants. The verdict was that the 
regulations were unreasonable/ irrational. 
The foregoing judicial analysis corroborates the conclusion reached concerning Chapter 5 of 
the NEMB:A. It was shown that section 91 of the NEM:BA stipulates that a competent 
authority can issue a permit for utilisation of alien species only if the specimen has been 
proven to have no or negligible invasive potential. It was also shown that the majority of 
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alien species that are economically useful are mostly perceived and proven to be invasive 
species and, sometimes, highly invasive. From that perspective, section 91 of NEM:BA has 
the same effect as the regulatory requirement that captive-bred lions be hunted after they 
become self-sustaining which, scientifically, they would never be, thus effectively implying a 
shutting down of the concerned sector. The permitting provisions become both immaterial 
and irrational. Thus, the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA seems to be  an unreasonable piece of 
legislation.  
Responding to a query by Kloof Conservancy about delayed promulgation of AIS regulations, 
the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs’ (2012, p.1) argument corroborates the 
conclusion just stated. She wrote: 
“Notwithstanding the invasive nature of some alien species, due consideration had 
to be given to the contribution of certain species to the national economy …. 
Therefore provision was made to regulate those invasive species to be listed in terms 
of section 70 of NEM:BA, in different categories, namely invasive species to be 
subject to compulsory control, to be managed in terms of species management 
programmes, or to be regulated by (demarcated) area or activity. However, 
insufficient enabling provisions in NEM:BA have posed a challenge as far as it relates 
to the implementation of regulations of such a comprehensive nature” (emphasis 
added). 
The Minister’s response states plainly that the NEM:BA, in its original intentions, never 
made provision for the sustainable use of alien and invasive species. Rather, guided by an 
eco-nationalistic ideology it focused on eradication and gradual elimination of alien and 
invasive species over time. Thus, the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA seems unreasonable from 
an economic point of view. 
5.5. Conclusions 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the following conclusions seemed reasonable and 
inescapable. The NEM:BA’s fifth chapter seemed to be internally inconsistent in terms of its 
value system, conceptual underpinnings, incentive structure and, to some extent, intent. 
The NEM:BA’s fifth chapter seemed to be externally (comparatively) inconsistent with the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and the National Environmental 
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Management Act (NEMA) 1998. The NEM:BA is deontological/ biocentric, but the NEMA and 
Constitution are consequentialist/ anthropocentric. The conspectus of the two dimensions 
of inconsistency leads to a dissonant institutional system that creates conflicting 
opportunity sets.  
To the extent that the permitting provision accommodates alien species with negligible or 
no invasive potential, and many economically useful alien species have been scientifically 
proven to be invasive or suspected to be invasive, it follows that sectors relying on such 
species face an implied prohibition. The legislature failed to strike reasonable balance 
between conservation of indigenous species and sustainable use of alien and invasive 
species in the drafting of the Act in 2003. The definition of an invasive species underplays 
anthropocentric factors (social and economic considerations), but it concentrates on 
biocentric/ecocentric matters. Consequently, the restrictive stance of the Act foreclosed 
options for sustainable utilisation of species as well as sustainable financing of biodiversity 
conservation. The NEM:BA’s fifth chapter seems to reflect an ideology of eco-nationalism 
(indigenous is good, alien is bad), notwithstanding the anthropocentric environmental 
governance dispensation upon which it claims to build. The conspectus of the scientific and 
lawmaking-political processes, through the discernible spirit of eco-nationalism, leads to the 
institutional isolation (marginalisation) of sectors that utilise alien and invasive species.  
The concept of sustainable use, as defined in the NEM:BA, seems to be conceptually weak, 
restrictive of economic development and eco-nationalistic because it focuses exclusively on 
indigenous species. This leads the thesis to argue that the NEM:BA, insofar as governance of 
alien and invasive species is concerned, might be a less reasonable piece of legislation that 
has created uncertainty and risk, and has constricted investment. The ultimate conclusion of 
the thesis is that the NEM:BA might be such a disenabling piece of legislation that the DEA 
cannot develop enabling regulations that are socio-economically progressive without first 
amending it.  
With these conclusions, it is demonstrable that the NEM:BA, at the time of promulgation, 
might have potentially foreshadowed institutional isolation of sectors reliant on alien and 
invasive species even though at that time few interested and affected parties might not 
have perceived it. Read as an economic document, the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA is a 
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policy that dissuades the sustainable investment in, and use, of all biological resources 
insofar as alien species are excluded from the biological resource stock. Its economic 
rationale seems to be ambiguous. By restricting itself to sustainable use of indigenous 
biological resources, and declaring war on eco-terrorism as anti-alien lobbyists would say, 
the NEM:BA forecloses opportunities for sustainable financing of biodiversity conservation.  
The study recommends that the implementers of the NEM:BA identify reasonable win-win 
solutions. A balancing mechanism is required. A reconstruction of the biodiversity concept 
in the NEM:BA is envisaged. As it stands, it seems too narrow to be facilitative of South 
Africa’s economic reconstruction. In concluding, the study argues that, rather than it being 
the DEA failing to promulgate “sound enabling regulations” to make NEM:BA effective, it 
might be the NEM:BA that is so disenabling that the DEA finds it difficult to promulgate 
sound enabling regulations. Under such circumstances, any attempt to promulgate sound 
enabling regulations is declared contrary to the Act. The regulations that rather are sound 
and enabling for the NEM:BA would be the type that requires blanket eradication of alien 
species and invasive species, which the DEA might be finding to be politically inexpedient to 
implement because they would be draconian. 
With reference to the theoretical framework, reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, one can 
conclude that the statutory content of the NEM:BA suggests a failure of 
reasonable/instrumental valuation during the enactment process. The strong biological 
nativism of the Act suggests that a unidisciplinary knowledge system, rather than a 
transdisciplinary knowledge system, informed the content. A defensible inference that the 
process of designing the NEM:BA was a limited access policymaking order seems 
reasonable, hence the disenabling content. A dominant social imaginary was used to 
marginalise any other epistemological systems that could have contributed to better 
institutional design. The role of ideology (ceremonial knowledge) in shaping institutional 
change is evident in the statutory content of this Act. 
Chapter 6 abductively investigates why the NEM:BA became a disenabling piece of 
legislation as is now apparent in Chapter 5’s findings. It takes an archaeological approach to 
the problem and reconstructs the legislative history of the NEM:BA.  
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Chapter 6  
Negotiating the deal - NEM:BA interest configuration 
 
“Nevertheless, whoever leaves economic pressures out of history or out of the discussion of 
public questions is in mortal peril of substituting mythology for reality and confusing issues 
instead of clarifying them,” (Beard [1935] 2012, not paged). 
 
6.0. Introduction 
Until now, the study has identified a pattern of institutional dissonance in the legal 
foundations of environmental governance. It has also identified in the NEM:BA a 
phenomenon of institutional isolation of sectors that utilize alien species and invasive 
species. It derived seven contextually validated conclusions. In summary, the conclusions 
covered aspects such as internal inconsistency of the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter and the 
external inconsistency of the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter relative to the NEMA and the 
constitutional environmental governance framework. It also concluded that eco-nationalism 
pervaded the fifth chapter of the biodiversity legislation. Finally yet importantly, the thesis 
observed the absence of enabling provisions for utilisation of alien species and invasive 
species that historically played, and continue to play, a socio-economically important role.  
The objective of Chapter 6 is to reconstruct the interests (influences on public policy) that 
might have shaped the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter into the controversial piece of legislation that 
it has become. The result is an identification of “social groups, ideologies, and discourses” 
that dominated biodiversity legislative processes (Weaver-Hightower 2014, p.116). Could 
the sources of the incoherence be rooted in history? Could it be a recent paradigm shift in 
conservation thinking? The chapter demonstrates that the NEM:BA was predominantly 
shaped by the administrative preferences of the directorate that presided over the drafting 
of the Act. Chapter 6 is organised as follows. Section 6.1 presents method of analysis. 
Section 6.2 presents emerging views in conservation thought in the 1980s. Section 6.3 
reviews the NEM:BA enactment process. Section 6.4 synthesises the findings and section 6.5 
concludes the chapter. 
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6.1. Data and Method of analysis 
To deconstruct policy influence, Chapter 6 utilised South African National Scientific 
Programmes (SANSP) reports (number 61 of 1982, number 72 of 1983, number 118 of 1985 
and number 144 of 1988) that focused on alien and invasive species. The study also utilised 
public hearings that the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and the Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism Portfolio Committee conducted in 2003 during the drafting and 
enactment of the NEM:BA. An internal document that the DEA produced which tabulated its 
responses to submissions by interested and affected parties was also used. It was accessed 
from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group Website. Lastly, three of the study’s key 
informants occasionally alluded to one historical aspect or another of the evolution of 
biodiversity conservation thinking and legislation in South Africa and, so, the chapter 
occasionally used interview data. One of the interviewees was a senior official in the DEA 
and two of them were academic authorities in aquatic and fisheries sciences.  
Two major epochs are discernible from the NEM:BA processes – the two decades (1980-
2003) of the evolution of scientific/policy thought on how to regulate alien and invasive 
species prior to the NEM:BA and the NEM:BA drafting/enactment process (2003-2004). The 
analysis first synthesized scientific/policy thought characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s 
prior to the NEM:BA. The NEM:BA enactment process was subsequently analysed. 
The researcher coded the arguments raised in the data sources using Weaver-Hightower’s 
(2014) definition of an argument, which was discussed in Chapter 4. From the coded 
arguments, an agreement score was computed. It was computed as 
                                 
                                        
                           
                 
Equation 6-1 
 
6.2. Emerging biodiversity conservation thought  
Fifty-eight overlapping codes emerged from coding the SANSP reports. Related codes were 
merged, leading to 12 ultimate codes. The codes were grouped into definitional issues, 
institutionalisation of biological invasion research, value framework, and envisaged 
regulatory framework (Table 6-1).  
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Table 6-1: Summary comparison of pre-NEM:BA and NEM:BA enactment process 
Aspect Task Group for Invasive 
Biota (TGIB) 1980s 
NEM:BA 2004 NEM:BA Enactment 
process 
Alien species Standard definition plus 
political origin 
Standard definition Standard definition; 
groups claimed it was 
wide and unscientific 
Invasive 
species 
Standard definition and 
equal emphasis on 
ecological and economic 
impacts 
Standard definition 
but underplays 
economic impact 
and overplays 
ecological impacts 
Standard definition but 
groups advocated for 
linking it to scale of 
invasion and propagule 
pressure 
Focus of 
research 
Politically alien species Indigenous species Groups lobbied for 
research on invasives to 
inform policy measures 
Environmental 
creationism 
Yes, with propaganda 
campaigns by botanical 
societies and conservation 
authorities against 
invasive alien species 
Yes, strong anti-
alien stance 
Yes, strong anti-alien 
stance led by botanical 
societies 
Value 
framework 
Partly consequentialist; 
partly deontological; 
partly virtue ethics 
Deontological  Deontological ; some 
traces of 
consequentialism 
Science driven 
policy 
Yes, explicit focus Implied Majority lobbied for a 
science-based approach 
Trade-offs Strategic intention No Groups lobbied for 
trade-offs 
Zonal system Major institutional 
mechanism 
Intended but 
delegitimized by 
anti-alien stance in 
NEMBA 
Groups warned that Act 
will fail without zonal 
system 
Determination 
of 
invasiveness 
Explicit scientific criteria Implied but too 
vague 
Groups recommended 
focus on scale of impact 
and propagule pressure 
Cost benefit 
analysis 
Indispensable Provided for in the 
NEMA 
Yes, case by case 
assessment of aliens  
Sustainable 
utilisation  
All species- alien and 
indigenous 
Only indigenous All species- alien and 
indigenous 
Financial 
incentives/ 
disincentives  
Subsidies for landowners 
to eradicate invasive 
species 
Financial penalty 
for actual invasions 
Subsidies; financial 
guarantees for 
introducing aliens 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the South African National Scientific Programmes 
Reports (1982, 1983, 1985, 1986); the NEM:BA of 2004; NEM:BA Bill 2003 and public 
hearings. 
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Summarily, the agreement score between the approach of the Task Group for Invasive Biota 
(TGIB) and submissions by interested and affected parties during the NEM:BA enactment 
process was approximately 75% (Table 6-1). There was agreement on definition of an 
invasive species; the use of science-based approaches; balancing mechanisms; need for 
zonal system; determination of invasiveness, need for cost-benefit analysis; sustainable use 
of all species and financial incentives for managing invasives. While there was agreement on 
determination of invasiveness, the submissions during the enactment process only 
considered two of the five parameters that the TGIB discussed in the 1980s (Macdonald and 
Jarman 1985), which are discussed below. Similarly, on financial incentives, the submissions 
had more novel ideas than the subsidies that the TGIB proposed to incentivise landowners 
to control invasive species on their land because subsidies were likely going to fail because 
of moral hazard.  
The agreement score between the promulgated NEM:BA provisions and the TGIB’s views 
was 33.3% (Table 6-1). There was agreement on political dimension of alienness; traces of 
environmental creationism; deontological value framework and the need for cost-benefit 
analysis in biodiversity policy decisions. On the other hand, the agreement score between 
the submissions by interested and affected parties and the content of the NEM:BA of 2004 
was 25% (Table 6-1). There was agreement on traces of environmental creationism, 
deontological value framework and the need for cost-benefit analysis. Detailed examination 
of these patterns follows. 
6.2.1. Definitional issues 
In keeping with the global shift in conservation thinking, it was a consensual observation 
that the spread of alien and invasive species was becoming a globally significant problem 
(De Moor and Bruton 1988, Ferrar 1983, Ferrar and Kruger 1983, Moran and Moran 1982, 
Siegfried and Davies 1982). The formative definitions of alien species and invasive species 
were quite similar to the definitions in the NEM:BA. An invasive species was defined as one 
that had the “ability to establish self-sustaining populations in natural communities, with 
tendency to dominate the host community” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.5). The emphasis 
was on self-perpetuation and the ecological impact of a species. This definition excluded 
aspects of socio-economic invasion, but entirely focused on ecological aspects. 
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An alien species was defined as “a species remote from its centre of origin, usually from a 
different continent or subcontinent” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.5, emphasis added). De 
Moor and Bruton (1988, p.2) defined an alien species as “an introduced species from 
outside the boundaries of Southern Africa.” The definitions gave weight to the political 
origin of a species in addition to the ecological origin. Recent thinking in the NEM:BA 
process has developed new terminology that seems to concur with this definition. An 
indigenous species translocated within South Africa now is called an extralimital species 
rather than an alien species (Ellender and Weyl 2014). By defining a translocated indigenous 
species as extralimital, conservation authorities have latitude to ignore such species even if 
they are invasive and focus on politically alien species that are invasive.  Some references in 
the SANSP reports reveal the focus of the TGIB on political origin of species.   
“Although the Working Group for Invasive Biota is mainly concerned with alien 
invasive species, information on translocated indigenous species has also been 
included as they are also foreign to their new environment and may cause severe 
environmental problems there,” (De Moor and Bruton 1988, p.2, emphasis added).  
Bruton and Merron (1985) also expressly state the same scientific orientation in the TGIB. 
To the TGIB, translocated indigenous species really were not alien species, hence not 
deserving urgent scientific attention. This seems to indicate that less weight was assigned to 
research on invasion processes associated with translocated indigenous species. The recent 
concept of extralimital species seems to build on this historic conceptual strategy by which 
the TGIB problematised alien and invasive species politically. This concept seems to 
corroborate the claim that an ideology of eco-nationalism drives the NEM:BA alien and 
invasive species regulatory reform processes (Brown 2013).  
To the extent that effects of invasion are indistinguishable along lines of translocated 
indigenous species and politically alien species, as they pose the same threat, it begs the 
question of why the species are differentiated if the focus is on the damage caused rather 
than the origin of species (Davis et al. 2011, Warren 2007). Ferrar and Kruger (1983, p.5) 
provide some clues revealing that “Propaganda campaigns organised by botanical societies 
and the [provincial] conservation authorities … resulted in a strong “anti-invasive alien 
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plant” groundswell.” Thus, a mobilization process accentuated a well build-up opinion in a 
large section of the activist, policy and scientific community against invasive alien species.  
The epistemic community that managed to partner with governmental agencies not only 
shaped the ideological climate and climate of ideas, but also physically participated in the 
decision making process. The holders of scientific knowledge and the issuers of the sanction 
of ignorance determined the nature and extent of institutional adjustment. The role of 
knowledge, ideology and propaganda in driving institutional change is self-evident in this 
account (Ayres 1996, Denzau and North 1994, Galiani and Sened 2014, North 1990). It was 
around the mid-1980s that campaigns against alien fishes such as trout also began (Crass 
1986b, Skelton and Davies 1986). The propaganda, which started in terrestrial ecosystems, 
soon spread to aquatic ecosystems.  
6.2.2. Value framework 
Since the formative times of the invasion biology research programme in South Africa, a 
mixture of value frameworks is observable. One group was “concerned with the survival of 
species of plants and animals for their own sake” (Siegfried and Davies 1982, p.4). Here non-
human species were assigned ultimate intrinsic value, hence a deontological framework. 
This is the position botanists maintained since the 1980s, which the NEM:BA ultimately 
assumed. Yet, another group maintained a consequentialist view, namely that 
“[c]onservation is for people and about people. If there were no people, there would be no 
need for conservation. People are conservation’s beneficiaries,” (Siegfried and Davies 1982, 
p.4). The point here is that adverse consequences on human welfare were to be avoided. 
Thus, the environment was managed in the interest of generating desirable consequences 
for humans.  
“Transformations of larger parts of the earth’s surface and significant modification of 
much of the remainder are therefore inevitable. The challenge for management is to 
ensure that such transformations and modifications do not create biological 
deserts…,” (Siegfried and Davies 1982, p.5).  
This view indicates that it was impossible to maintain an unaltered ecological system, 
because humanity had become too technologically advanced not to modify the ecological 
systems (Swanson 1994). An anthropocentric inclination defined this view, focusing on how 
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people derive “[i]nspiration, art, poetry and song, dance, religion and ritual, recreation and 
refreshment” from animals and plants (Siegfried and Davies 1982, p.6). This group’s views 
foreshadowed the NEMA’s provision for environmental governance that requires the 
placement of people at the forefront of its concerns so that it addresses their cultural, 
developmental, physical, psychological and social needs and interests equitably.  
6.2.3. Institutionalisation of biological invasion research 
With the establishment of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment 
(SCOPE), South African conservation and invasion biologists assumed an instrumentally 
leading role (Peretti 1998; 2010). The need to institutionalise invasion biology research in 
South Africa subsequently emerged (Ferrar and Kruger 1983). The TGIB was established in 
1980 and its mandate was to generate and systematise knowledge on invasions and 
engender a science-based biodiversity governance framework (Ferrar and Kruger 1983). 
a. Dimensions of the TGIB’s biological invasion research programme 
The research programme was multidimensional in that it focused on the “biogeography of 
invasions”, “autecology of invasive species”, “characteristics of invaded ecosystems”, 
“impacts of invasions on natural and semi-natural ecosystems” and “systems for 
management and prevention” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.9-11). Thus, the programme 
focused on ecology of biological invasions, socio-economics of invasive species and a 
possible regulatory framework that would strike a balance between conservation of 
indigenous biota and socio-economic utilisation of alien and invasive species (De Moor and 
Bruton 1988, Ferrar and Kruger 1983, Macdonald and Jarman 1985).  
The programme was to establish characteristics of resilient and vulnerable ecosystems, 
reasons why they were resilient or vulnerable and “the factors [that affected] the rate and 
extent of recovery of an invaded ecosystem during and after eradication or control of the 
invading species” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.10). The TGIB endeavoured to develop 
“ecologically sound management strategies for tackling the problems of invasion” (Ferrar 
and Kruger 1983, p.2). Since the maintained view was that invasive alien species with socio-
economic significance were to be utilised within a zonal system, the starting point was to 
identify the invasive attributes of species in order to inform control measures (Ferrar and 
Kruger 1983).  
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b. Invasive species listing criteria 
The TGIB was not under any illusion about the difficulties of controlling and eradicating 
invasive aliens and, therefore, scientifically sought to establish “threat criteria or impacts of 
invasions [that could] be used to rank invasive species” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.11) as a 
basis for prioritising eradication/control interventions. Macdonald and Jarman (1985) 
discussed a typical prioritisation framework that was used to determine the degree of 
invasiveness of a species and, thus the decision to declare it invasive or not. The listing 
criteria for invasive species focused on aliens that had “established self-sustaining 
populations in areas of indigenous vegetation and which are considered to be having 
significant environmental or economic impacts” (Macdonald and Jarman 1985, p.3, 
emphasis added). The framework was a two stage process, the first of which was a less 
rigorous a priori sorting of species into three categories: “very bad, medium or not so bad” 
(Macdonald and Jarman 1985, p.27). The second stage then applied criteria that were more 
rigorous and Macdonald and Jarman (1985, p.20) defined the parameters of the listing 
criteria as follows: 
A = current degree of species infestation (propagule pressure) 
B = degree of difficulty in controlling the species given the current state of 
technology 
C = Extent of potential habitat for the species  
D = the potential rate of spread [range extension] of the species  
E = the degree of impact of the species in the invaded area  
The novelty of this invasive species-listing framework was that the TGIB weighted the five 
parameters.  The TGIB assigned a weight of half-unity to A and B, a double weight to C and a 
weight of unity to D and E. Thus, the TGIB defined the importance value (I) of a species as  
                                       Equation 6-2  
The framework had both spatial and temporal dimensions. To the TGIB, it mattered most 
that a species had abundant potentially colonisable habitats since it is inherent in the 
invasion process that a species must be expanding its distribution range (the spatial 
dimension). The historic and innate rate of extension of the distribution range (the temporal 
dimension) (D) as well as the degree of damage caused by the species (E) mattered as the 
second weightiest parameters. The higher the importance value of a species the greater the 
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priority the TGIB placed on its listing for control and eradication. Thus, the criteria focused 
on relative degree of damage caused and potential damage a species was likely to cause. 
Only species with large importance values qualified for listing. This guaranteed a shorter and 
more economical list of controllable invasive species than what blanket listing prescribed. 
The criteria, however, focused on ecological parameters only. The framework excluded 
socio-economic criteria although the focus was on species with “significant environmental 
or economic impacts” (Macdonald and Jarman 1985, p.3). Therefore, it is unclear what 
parameters determined the degree of economic impact and whether economic impact was 
ever considered beyond mere acknowledgement. The TGIB was aware that the “[n]ature of 
a threat, as well as its recognition, often involves complex interacting ecological and social 
factors,” hence policymakers had to consider the interactions in “developing policy and 
programmes for conservation” (Siegfried and Davies 1982, p.12).  
De Moor and Bruton (1988) considered the case of aquatic species that had socio-economic 
value of some sort either to the local, regional or national economy. They proposed an 
ecological-economic listing framework. The four categories comprised pest species, 
nuisance species, equivocal species and beneficial species. A pest species was one with a 
“major negative impact on the environment and does not have any [socio-economically] 
desirable attributes” (De Moor and Bruton 1988, p.2). A nuisance species, on the other 
hand, was one for which “its negative [environmental] impact generally outweighs any 
positive [socio-economic] attributes which the species may have” (De Moor and Bruton 
1988, p.2).  
They found in existence equivocal species, which they defined as “species which are known 
to be extremely harmful, but may be of some value to certain interest groups” (De Moor 
and Bruton 1988, p.3). Such species were “detrimental under some circumstances or in 
some localities and beneficial in others,” (De Moor and Bruton 1988, p.3). Finally, Bruton 
(1986, p.2) defined beneficial invasive species as a “classical environmental dilemma, and 
one which needs to be viewed from different angles in order to achieve a balanced 
perspective” because it simultaneously has a major economic contribution and major 
negative environmental impacts in the same locality. Policymakers still needed to manage 
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the concomitant environmental impacts. Management of such species was a wicked policy 
problem (Balint et al. 2011, King 1993, Rittel and Webber 1973). 
To list a species under any of the four categories, deliberative scientific consensus 
determined “whether the impact of the species, be it detrimental or beneficial, has been 
major, minor or unknown, or whether it is considered that it will have a potential major 
impact should it extend its range” (De Moor and Bruton 1988, p.3, emphasis added). The 
four categories (pest, nuisance, equivocal and beneficial) approximately fitted into 
Macdonald and Jarman’s (1985) second stage, since they defined the degree of damage 
caused by a species. 
Macdonald and Jarman’s (1985) framework, however, was more applicable to terrestrial 
systems than it was to aquatic ecosystems, which are continuums. As Ferrar and Kruger 
(1983, p.7) emphasise, “Invasive species other than vascular plants have received very little 
attention and research to date is therefore inadequate in this respect.” The Federation of 
Southern African Flyfishers (FOSAF) 2013) argued that the NEM:BA was terrestrially biased, 
thus making it difficult to implement in aquatic ecosystems. It seems that the terrestrial bias 
of the NEM:BA has historical roots in how invasion biologists mostly focused research 
efforts on terrestrial floral ecosystems. Some aquatic invasion biologists, for instance 
Ellender and Weyl (2014), have also acknowledged the infancy of aquatic invasion research 
in South Africa. 
c. Benefits of eradication and control measures 
The TGIB emphasised how indispensable it was to conduct cost-benefit analysis in 
evaluating eradication or control of “major invaders, including the environmental impacts of 
the control measures themselves” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.11, emphasis added). The 
TGIB understood that every intervention had established and hidden costs and benefits. The 
benefits of such intervention programmes would be in the realm of provision of public 
goods and conservation-related jobs (Macdonald and Jarman 1985). Other beneficial 
considerations in the view of the TGIB included the economic use of biomass of invasive 
biota in economic activities such as furniture production. Direct costs of such interventions 
would include financial costs of running the eradication and control programmes (Moran et 
al. 2013). However, another set of costs that often escaped consideration was the socio-
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fiscal implications of the interventions on the tax base and employment if they targeted an 
economically beneficial invasive species.  
d. Socio-economic regulatory framework of invasive alien species  
From the inception of the TGIB, balancing mechanisms were considered in every discussion 
on management of invasive alien species. The TGIB recognized that “[s]everal of these 
[invasive] species are of considerable economic importance in agriculture, forestry, fisheries 
and other forms of rural activities” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.1). Similarly, Siegfried and 
Davies (1982, p.11) emphasised that the “ultimate problem … is almost always related to 
development policy and the long-range use of natural resources and, although such ultimate 
problems require most attention, they are the most neglected” (emphasis added). Thus to 
ensure that such ultimate problems are not neglected, the TGIB sought balancing 
mechanisms that simultaneously promoted both conservation of indigenous biota and 
utilisation of invasive alien species. To that effect, two major questions occupied the TGIB in 
its research programme. 
“What options are available for control when the invasive species is simultaneously a 
useful crop or otherwise valuable asset in the same region? How can control systems 
be developed when invasive species are useful and desirable in one area but 
undesirable elsewhere?” (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, p.11, emphasis added).  
The kind of questions that guided the search for a consensual biodiversity governance 
framework focused on identifying win-win solutions. The first question dealt with what 
Bruton (1986) called classical environmental dilemmas (wicked problems) because the 
species was economically beneficial, but at the same time invasive in the same geographical 
area. The second question was the basis of zonal systems whereby environmental 
authorities granted permission for economic utilisation of an invasive alien species in one 
region, while they proscribed it in another region.  
The formative institutionalisation phase of invasion biological research in South Africa 
sought to attain conservation objectives, while promoting ecologically sustainable and 
justifiable socio-economic development that relied on alien and invasive species. The TGIB 
framed the sustainable utilisation of species within the context of coordinated land uses 
that would facilitate minimisation of the impact of invasive species. The concept of 
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sustainable utilisation was much broader than the one in the NEM:BA, which focuses on 
indigenous species only. Land use coordination, to the TGIB, meant creation of zonal 
systems (spatial property and use rights systems) that would facilitated differential 
treatment of species so that economic agents could sustainably utilise invasive alien species 
without sacrificing the objective of conserving indigenous biota. Zonation would facilitate 
“the differential investment of control effort in different portions of an alien [species’] 
distribution range” (Macdonald and Jarman 1985, p.57).  
The envisaged regulatory framework would create zones in some of which the first priority 
was “total eradication”; the second priority was “eventual elimination”; and third priority 
was elimination from protected areas only (Macdonald and Jarman 1985, p.58). As 
Macdonald and Jarman (1985, p.76) discussed, “zonation would also allow for permissible 
use of a species within an area where infestation is already severe, in cases where invader 
species are valued by one sector of society.” Therefore, the TGIB considered demarcation of 
zones to “improve the practicality of legislative control [of invasive species]” (Macdonald 
and Jarman 1985, p.76).  
Since in some cases such demarcated zones already existed, but were serving non-
conservational purposes, the TGIB maintained that a rational approach was to de-proclaim 
some invasive alien species by removing legal protection as well as restricting the number of 
demarcated areas where aliens are protected/permitted (Macdonald and Jarman 1985). De-
proclamation of trout waters in the mid-1980s was a typical application of this wisdom. 
However, it generated media and academic ‘trout wars’ amongst fly-fishers, conservation 
authorities and some scientists (Crass 1986b). The problem was that colonial pecuniary 
institutions had allocated environmental entitlements and privileges that guaranteed 
protection of alien species of interest to some beneficiary groups, but at the expense of 
indigenous species. De-proclamation would result in redistribution of socio-economic 
advantages from the formerly privileged by revoking some of the colonially entrenched 
environmental entitlements. Demarcation of sensitive and non-sensitive waters eventually 
resolved the wars (Brown 2013, Skelton and Davies 1986). 
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6.3. NEM:BA’s enactment process 
While coding the public hearings and the DEA’s internal document, an unusual observation 
was that there was little discussion on chapter 5 of the NEM:BA in 2003 except a few 
references to definitional issues and exemptions. Ten organizations (some of which were 
joint advocacy efforts of several organizations) submitted their positions to the 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism Portfolio Committee. The majority of the submissions 
focused on bioprospecting of genetic resources and genetically modified organisms. The 
submissions, much less, focused on economic issues related to invasive species.  
Only twelve codes emerged from the analysis and were categorized into definitional issues, 
NEM:BA-NEMA conflict, value framework, differential treatment of invasive species and 
socio-economics of regulating alien species and invasive species and financing of 
biodiversity conservation. Of these twelve codes, the DEA agreed with interested and 
affected parties on three of them (a disagreement score of 75%, Table 6-1). Considering that 
on the three agreed submissions only one was already implicit in the Bill and two were 
never subsequently implemented, it follows that the effective disagreement score was 
91.7% (Table 6-1). 
6.3.1. Value framework 
Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) made submissions to the effect 
that the Biodiversity Bill explicitly ought to have included the intrinsic value principle. The 
Animal Welfare Community, a consortium of ten ENGOs, submitted an all-encompassing 
position on intrinsic valuableness of all life forms. The Animal Welfare Community (2003, 
not paged) considered the Biodiversity Bill to represent “a utilitarian and purist view of 
biodiversity” because it excluded the intrinsic value principle, which is a deontological 
framework. Thus, the group believed that “without this principle, the Bill as currently 
formulated is completely utilitarian in the sense that it focuses merely on conserving 
biological diversity because of its use or value to humans,” (emphasis added).3 The ENGOs 
had two key paradoxical views, namely, that the biodiversity bill was consequentialist and 
had a semblance of strict biological nativism (purism). Concerning consequentialism, Justice 
for Animals (2003, not paged) argued that the Bill made animals “the property of humans”, 
                                                          
3
 The Biodiversity Bill and the Protected Areas Bill were jointly debated and interested and affected parties 
submitted comments or represented their interests at public hearings in respect of both Bills. 
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yet “animals  are  sentient   beings with  inherent   value  in themselves,  whose  lives  are  
not   reducible  to whatever  value  humans might   place  on  them” (emphasis added). 
By arguing that the lives of animals were irreducible to utilitarian value, ENGOs pushed for a 
deontological framework in which animals had the same inviolable moral rights as humans 
do. They placed equal ultimate intrinsic value in animals as in people. Since the Bill sought to 
eradicate alien species, the ENGOs, presumably zoocentrists as their policy views suggest, 
argued that it was purist (Simberloff et al. 2013). They maintained that not all alien species 
were necessarily bad. The Bill, ENGOs argued, empowered governmental agencies to “make 
arbitrary  decisions  regarding  the management of…  non-indigenous wild  animals  who  are 
free-roaming  and  living  in  areas  of   South  Africa…  and  non-indigenous wild  animals…  
bred  for  commercial  purpose,” (Justice for Animals 2003, not paged, emphasis added). 
To these submissions, the DEA (2003, not paged) responded by emphasising that it was 
“[n]ot recommended as principles are dealt with in NEMA.” Implicit in this statement was an 
agreement with the ENGOs that animals had intrinsic value just as the humans do. The 
difference was in the express content of the Bill. The DEA did not respond to the argument 
that the Bill was purist. The DEA (2003, not paged) argued that the “purpose of the 
legislation is to regulate for the conservation of South Africa’s biodiversity and this is the 
paramount objective. Exotic species should be conserved in their range states” (emphasis 
added). Since there existed no ecological space for conservation of alien species even those 
that were regarded as livestock, chances that eradication would be justified against any 
alien species were relatively high. The DEA’s response confirms the claim that a spirit of eco-
nationalism guides the NEM:BA and this is captured by the possessive expression “South 
Africa’s biodiversity”, which evidently refers to indigenous biological resources. 
6.3.2. NEM:BA overrides NEMA 
The thesis has so far concluded that the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter is externally inconsistent 
with the NEMA and the Constitution. The Animal Welfare Community (2003, not paged) also 
argued that the Biodiversity Bill created “a significant and potentially fundamental 
exception which undermines NEMA’s principles” insofar as it stated that     
 “In the event of any conflict between a section of this Act and (a) any other national 
legislation in force immediately prior to the date of commencement of this Act, the 
173 | P a g e  
 
section of this Act prevails if the conflict specifically concerns the management of 
biodiversity or indigenous biological resources” (NEM:BA, section 8(1), emphasis 
added).  
It is obvious that the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998 qualifies 
into the category “any other” and the category “in force immediately prior”. Thus, where 
the NEMA is anthropocentric and the NEM:BA is biocentric/ecocentric, the Bill proposed 
that the section (such as its fifth chapter) would always prevail. The DEA (2003, not paged) 
dismissed the argument by the Animal Welfare Community because “the issue [had] been 
approved by the State Law Advisers who did not see any conflict”. However, a decade after 
the NEM:BA became law in 2004, the inconsistency between the NEMA and the NEM:BA 
continued to haunt implementation of chapter five.  
6.3.3. Definitional issues 
Convergence of mental objectification of participants in a policy process depends on 
agreement on a minimum set of definitional issues that help focus attention. The Friends of 
the Tahr queried the definitions of alien and invasive species in the Bill because the 
definitions of alien and invasive species were “wide and unscientific” and assumed that “any 
alien species is invasive or potentially invasive per se, i.e. by definition of its ancestral ethnic 
origin” (DEA 2003, not paged, emphasis added). The Friends of the Tahr also argued that 
there was “no burden or criteria on the management authority to scientifically establish the 
invasive threat or the extent of the threat” (DEA 2003, not paged, emphasis added). The 
argument was that there was “no requirement that invasiveness be linked to “scale” of the 
invasion” (DEA 2003, not paged, emphasis added). The argument was that “regardless of the 
“density” of the species the management authorities have the capacity to declare a species 
as invasive” (DEA 2003, not paged, emphasis added). The DEA (2003, not paged), however, 
maintained that “the definition[s] adequately address the issues relating to the purpose of 
the bill.” 
6.3.4. Differential treatment of invasive species 
One of the most comprehensive submissions related to a differential approach to 
invasiveness. The major view was that the Biodiversity Bill failed to differentiate degrees of 
invasiveness (DEA 2003). A graded approach to invasiveness would facilitate prioritisation of 
species to eradicate, to prohibit and to permit if they had socio-economic significance. As 
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the Bill stood, whether a species had socio-economic significance or not mattered little. 
What mattered was its invasiveness and, much less, the degree of invasiveness. An 
organisation called Integrated Biodiversity Solutions submitted that the major weakness of 
the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA was  
“the lack of differential treatment of invasives and/or activities relating to invasives, 
to allow for geographical uniqueness… Without this management direction, effective 
management of invasive species will remain an ever elusive and extremely costly 
mirage and the bill will fail in this sector as spectacularly as did similar provisions of 
CARA, of which current provisions of the bill is a rehash” (DEA 2003, not paged, 
emphasis added). 
Perhaps, Integrated Biodiversity Solutions’ view was the most accurate prediction of all 
considering that it is precisely the failure to differentiate degrees of invasion that 
subsequently made it difficult to implement the fifth chapter of the NEM:BA for nearly a 
decade since the NEM:BA became law in 2004 (Bashoff 2013a; 2013b, Minister of Water 
and Environmental Affairs 2012). Implementation failed right where Integrated Biodiversity 
Solutions perceived the fault line was. While precedent of such a framework having failed 
under the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (CARA) of 1983 was known to the DEA, 
it still chose to promulgate the same system.  
The default position of the NEM:BA was to eradicate every species listed as invasive. If a 
systematic and scientific framework for listing species were available, then relative invasive 
impact would determine eradication and listing priorities. Only those species with major 
invasive impact would deserve listing, whilst the rest would be managed as mere aliens 
under a strictly enforced permitting system that required risk assessments (environmental 
impact assessments) to be conducted. Integrated Biodiversity Solutions’ submission 
suggested a zonal system that accounted for regional ecological and climatic differences 
and, thus regionally differential invasive capacities of species. The DEA acknowledged the 
recommendation, but never subsequently acted upon it.  
It was not until 2013 that the DEA amended the NEM:BA in line with Integrated Biodiversity 
Solutions’ submission to allow for a zonal system. There seemed to have been some 
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powerful forces that had rigidly predetermined the content of the Act insofar as alien and 
invasive species were concerned. In the interviews, the senior official of the DEA stated: 
“We are now empowered to differentially treat invasive species by the changes to 
NEM:BA. So, the problem was that we had an Act that was not well drafted... [and] 
the science behind it was very fundamentalist. But we are trying to take a pragmatic 
approach to how we regulate against invasive species… So, there was some very 
theoretical, impractical thinking in those who drafted this [NEM:BA] Act and it’s been 
a problem for us” (Expert 1 2014, pers comm, emphasis added). 
The NEM:BA itself as already established was a badly drafted piece of legislation insofar as 
there were internal inconsistencies in the Act. The Act had theoretical novelty that 
nonetheless was impractical. The NEM:BA, much more so, was built on a fundamentalist 
scientific ideology. Fundamentalism defies reason. Bromley (2012, p.14) argues that “reason 
liberated us from the tyranny of imposed ideas” Bromley (2007, p.680), which an instance of 
an exclusive epistemological system. Degnbol et al. (2006, p.534) describe fundamentalism 
as “painting the floor with a hammer”, “technical fixes” and “tunnel vision”. Ostrom and Cox 
(2010, p.451) define fundamentalism as a “panacea problem” by which they mean scientists 
approach complex socio-ecological problems in a deterministic fashion and recommend 
linear solutions to policymakers and legislators.  
The fundamentalist position of the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter required a blanket eradication of 
alien and invasive species alike, unless exempted at the discretion of the Minister. The 
Friends of the Tahr recommended that the “blanket eradication of alien species, other than 
those exempted… should be avoided and that species be evaluated on a case-by-case basis” 
(DEA 2003, not paged). While the DEA acknowledged the recommendation, it never 
subsequently amended the provision. A case-by-case approach would have promoted a 
more evidence-based, balanced and scientific approach to biodiversity governance. 
The senior official’s point about the substantive content of the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter is 
concerned with a fundamentalist ideology that shaped the text. It seems such 
fundamentalism is a recent phenomenon because the discussion of the scientific and policy 
thought of the 1980s revealed a determined search for win-win and practical approaches to 
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management of biological invasions without unnecessarily constraining economic 
utilisation. 
6.3.5. Socio-economics of invasive species and exemptions 
The Biodiversity Bill made a permit a compulsory requirement for anyone to utilise alien 
species. The Bill partly relaxed the provision providing that it did “not apply to an alien 
species which immediately before that section took effect was lawfully utilised in the 
Republic for the production of agricultural products.” However, some interested and 
affected parties perceived some ambiguity in the provisions when evaluated in the entire 
scheme of the Biodiversity Bill.  
Forestry South Africa (2003, not paged) submitted that the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter failed to 
provide “an exemption for commercially grown tree species that have received permission 
to be planted in terms of other legislation” (emphasis added). Important to Forestry South 
Africa was the need for an explicit exemption of invasive species that served commercial 
purposes. Forestry South Africa, like other commercial players, grappled with species that 
were declared invasive despite their economic worth. Since these commercial agricultural 
species were regulated as economically useful invasive species under the Conservation of 
Agricultural Resources Act (CARA) of 1983, Forestry South Africa (2003, not paged) 
considered the Biodiversity Bill to add to the regulatory burden, which would increase 
transaction costs of compliance and render economic activities based on such species less 
viable. The South African Nursery Association (SANA) viewed the entire issue as a 
diminution of existing economic rights (DEA 2003). The SANA took note of the fact that 
much of what is cultivated or reared is non-indigenous, but the NEM:BA had an anti-alien 
stance.  
The Botanical Society of South Africa, however, submitted that the “provisions of the Bill 
relating to alien and invasive species need to be significantly strengthened to fill the gap left 
by the dilution of the provisions of CARA” (DEA 2003, not paged, emphasis added). While 
economic players viewed the Bill as unduly burdensome and ambiguous insofar as economic 
utilisation of alien and invasive species was concerned, conservation interests considered 
the Bill to be porous. Provision for economic utilisation was equated to dilution. To the 
recommendations of economic interests, the DEA (2003, not paged), however, counter-
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argued that they were not acceptable because no “blanket exemption for any alien species 
… [and] … no blanket exemption for any organisation is considered.” 
6.3.6. Balancing mechanisms and financing of biodiversity conservation 
While the DEA had a fundamentalist stance against alien species, the Working for Water 
Programme of the Department of Water Affairs recommended locating win-win solutions 
and permit utilisation of alien and invasive species in a user-pays framework. The Working 
for Water Programme was established in 1995 to eradicate alien and invasive plants that 
were threatening the water security of the country. Having the experience, the Programme 
chair made presentations with quite innovative economic measures that would facilitate 
sustainable utilisation of alien species and invasives.  
“It is important to balance the concern for invasions with the significant benefits that 
we derive from alien species… What is necessary… is a sufficient measure of control 
over the potential risks of the importation, and an enforceable “or user-pays” 
approach to accountability for any actual invasions” (Working for Water Programme 
2003, not paged, emphasis added).   
The essence of proposal was to locate win-win solutions and provide for in-build 
mechanisms that would facilitate payment for ecosystem goods and services or external 
costs of the permitted activities and species. This is the framework that was represented in 
Figure 5-1. The problem was how to ensure that those who used alien and invasive species 
were accountable for subsequent actual invasions. Similarly, since birds, wind, water and 
animals can easily disperse seeds of most floral species, it would be difficult for the DEA to 
enforce accountability for actual subsequent invasion. The Working for Water Programme 
(2003, not paged, emphasis added) also submitted that “the person or group proposing an 
introduction to bear the risk, and for this to be underwritten by accredited insurance”.  
Having experience in managing invasive plants, the Working for Water Programme 
contended that the net benefits of most introduced species were low, if not negative. The 
“vast bulk of introduced species are brought in for marginal profit, and yet society (including 
the environment) has to bear the risks and costs” (Working for Water Programme 2003, not 
paged, emphasis added). By introducing a host of financial measures to ensure that 
beneficiaries bore the risk rather than shift the burden to the taxpayer, such activities would 
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evidently become unviable. The point was that players in such activities, understandably, 
would have to reallocate their resources to other species since that would be the most 
rational thing there was to do. 
The Working for Water Programme had some reservations about taking an anti-alien stance 
as it would be self-defeating because in the future, as climate change trends worsen, threats 
imposed by food insecurity might necessitate importation of more productive alien species. 
Therefore, it was unreasonable to foreclose such opportunities. The novelty of the Working 
for Water Programme’s recommendation was that should “we find some alien “wonder 
crop” that can make a massive difference to the well-being of society, the Government can 
underwrite the introduction of these species” (Working for Water Programme 2003, not 
paged, emphasis added).  
The historical precedent created by a pecuniary system of colonial privileges allowed people 
to introduce species for private gain without paying for external costs imposed on society 
and the environment. Thus, the Working for Water Programme’s submission urged 
legislators to clarify two things – who benefited from the species introduction and who bore 
the risk and cost of managing impacts of subsequent invasions. So far, private persons 
benefited, but the taxpayer bore the risk and cost of invasions. The taxpayer subsidised 
private economic agents. Thus, the Working for Water Programme (2003, not paged) 
further recommended addition of provisions “to ensure that the costs of preventing, 
controlling or eradicating invasive alien species are borne by those who have been 
responsible for their introduction or who have derived a direct financial or other benefit 
from them.”  
The DEA (2003, not paged), however, was of the opinion that the views of the Working for 
Water Programme were “[n]ot recommended, due to the impracticality of 
implementation.”  The Deputy Director General: Biodiversity and Conservation of the DEA 
argued that “Working for Water’s suggestion that introducers of alien species should supply 
financial guarantees had merit, but it was unclear how the cost of the introduction of alien 
species would be estimated” (DEA 2003, not paged). While a Bio-security unit within the 
DEA had the role of creating a database of invasive species in the country and could easily 
verify the invasive capacity of a new alien species from its country of origin through global 
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collaborative efforts, the DEA did not consider it. Using the results of a risk assessment 
coupled with knowledge of extra-territorial invasive capacity available to the Bio-security 
unit, the DEA could easily provide a provisional estimate of the financial guarantee.  
6.4. Synthesis 
Since the agreement score between TGIB’s views and views expressed in the submissions to 
the Environmental Affairs and Tourism Committee was high (75%), as shown in Table 6-1, 
what forces might have shaped the NEM:BA? One could infer traces of failure in democratic 
policymaking or as Bromley (2012, p.18) characterises it: it was “environmental governance 
[that] resembles the neo-colonial practice of ruling down on others”. Such a non-democratic 
policymaking culture amounted to ceremonial encapsulation of all ideas that could have 
shaped the NEM:BA to be a progressive biodiversity law at the time of enactment/drafting. 
If ceremonial encapsulation defines the paradox, whose ceremonial interests resisted 
instrumental/reasonable legislation? One answer is fundamentalism in governance (Expert 
1, pers comm). The analysis suggested that much of the content that went into the NEM:BA 
was shaped by the conservation ideology of the then directorate of the Department of 
Environmental Affairs. Environmental creationism lay at the core of all the views of the then 
directorate of the DEA that presided over the drafting processes.  
There always exists the possibility that ceremonial interests – especially buttressed by a 
pecuniary culture – would curtail any proposed institutional change that would bolster 
intergenerational stewardship (Bolduc 2009, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2014, Mora and 
Valentinov 2012, Tool 1994, Veblen [1899] 2005, Wisman 2011). The dominant social 
imaginary can also promote ideological interests that undermine progressive biodiversity 
governance. Since reason seems to have been undermined by fundamentalism and 
impractical theoretical considerations in the NEM:BA process, the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter 
could be classified as an “imbecile institution” (Veblen 1914, p.25). Findings suggested the 
possibility that ceremonial interests – especially driven by scientific ideologies through the 
medium of epistemic violence – played an equally important influence that resulted in path 
independent change, which theoretically led to regressive institutional change (Ayres 1996, 
Bush 1987; 1989, North 1990). This is what Veblen (1914, p.25) calls “the triumph of 
imbecile institutions over life and culture”.  
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According to Veblen (1914, p.49), “disserviceable institutions easily arise and continue to 
hold their place in spite of the disapproval of native common sense”. The fact that he argues 
that imbecile institutions “easily arise” means that there exists a futuristic component to 
their evolution, but once established, they become past-binding and “continue to hold their 
place”. The extent to which institutions (laws, regulations, policies, culture, custom, 
traditions, beliefs and taboos) are unreasonable or discordant to the socio-political and 
scientific context determines the degree of imbecility of those institutions. Nelson (2010, 
p.169) asserts that environmental creationism often leads “to ill-conceived and unjust 
environmental policies, as when many black Africans were evicted from their native lands in 
the twentieth century to protect “the creation””. This argument corroborates the concepts 
of imbecility, epistemic violence and Lysenkoism. Bromley (1985, p.790) similarly discusses 
environmental creationism as the “myth of management” by which governments in a 
“number of countries passed laws that prohibited” utilisation of environmental resources.  
While conservation is inevitable and most desirable, it takes place in a socio-cultural context 
in which the natural/environmental resource has multiple meanings to various social beings 
and groups depending on their situatedness in that environment. The problem is one of 
institutional change that not only endangers people’s livelihoods because it is non-
anthropocentric, but also threatens the continuity of culture. Scientific hegemony also is an 
inevitable culprit in this analysis and, through a fundamentalist ideology (an instituted social 
imaginary), it strengthened epistemic violence. Jentoft (2006, p.672) urges that the 
“hegemony of the natural sciences should be replaced by a multi- or, ideally, inter-
disciplinary approach”. He argues that such a multi-disciplinary approach would examine 
the “social and economic issues… as thoroughly and systematically as those of the natural 
systems” (Jentoft 2006, p.672). Fundamentalism is a uni-disciplinary approach to knowing 
and policymaking.  
Valentinov (2015, p.148) describes uni-disciplinary knowledge as “partial rationalities of 
individual functional systems”. Policy problems as already established are at best messes 
and at worst wicked, thus defying uni-disciplinary solutions (Balint et al. 2011, Hartmann 
2012, Ritchey 2011, Rittel and Webber 1973). Bromley (2008a, p.237) emphasises that 
“public policy cannot legitimately be held hostage to the prescriptive truth claims imposed 
on it … (…from any other discipline).” Arguing that wicked global policy problems cannot be 
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resolved by uni-disciplinary epistemic claims, Max-Neef (2005, p.15) emphasised that 
“disciplinary investigations concern only one level of reality.” 
Emerging from the findings is the possible conclusion that the NEM:BA legislative process 
was a limited access policymaking order or the transitional phase with high risk of relapse 
into a limited access policymaking order characterised by a high incidence of epistemic 
violence (Table 3-1) as the analysis revealed the DEA was doing. Entrenched insiders 
effected their sovereign will through the mechanism of epistemic oppression or the sanction 
of ignorance as argued in Chapter 3 and illustrated in Figure 3-2 and Table 3-1. The major 
conclusion is that not all knowledge is instrumental and there is an ever present problem in 
policymaking that epistemic communities might assume hegemonic influence over the 
policy space. The immediate consequence is that warranted assertions graduate into new 
institutions before the gestation period for them to become valuable assertions is over. 
As Bromley (1985, p.790) describes it, governance by ruling down “insults the citizenry” and 
“creates perverse incentives” in the sense that “it suddenly becomes an act of honor to defy 
stupid institutional arrangements, and a necessity for survival as well.” As already 
established in chapters 2 and 3, the problem with this approach to governance is that it fails 
to promote equity on four dimensions: “institutional equity”, “endowment equity”, 
“political equity” and “economic equity” (Béné and Neiland 2006, p.45). This results in the 
imbecility of new institutions. 
Peretti (1998; 2010) advanced a hypothesis that the South African policy and scientific 
processes of the 1980s, beginning with the establishment of the Task Group for Invasive 
Biota (TGIB) in 1980, were a reflection of the spirit of eco-nationalism/green apartheid. He 
likened the TGIB’s research programme to “[s]trict biological nativism,” by which 
“[i]deologically, politically, and ecologically, the Nazis sought to prevent mixing” and “to 
purify nation and nature, by eliminating people and biota that were supposedly not native” 
(Peretti 1998, p.188). He observed four circumstantial conditions that correlated positively 
with strict biological nativism in South Africa.  
First, South African biological scientists were “instrumental in preparing the project 
proposal” (Peretti 1998, p.188) for the SCOPE research programme on biological invasions. 
Second, the SCOPE had become an authoritative voice in biological invasion science and 
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South African scientists had had, and still have, a hegemonic influence over the SCOPE 
project. Thirdly, South African scientists have been disproportionately participating in SCOPE 
international forums and publishing volumes of work on biological invasions. He then asks, 
“Why are scientists from South Africa especially concerned with biological invasion (Peretti 
1998, p.188)?”  To answer this question, he draws on a fourth correlation – the similarity of 
the predispositions of Nazism and Apartheid. He therefore concludes that “Like Nazism, 
apartheid thinking is concerned with separating the pure from the impure... It is not 
surprising that SCOPE’S hard-line biological nativism has roots in South Africa,” (Peretti 
1998, p.188-189; 2010, p.33, emphasis added).  
Between the TGIB’s research programme and the NEM:BA enactment process, which one 
does the green apartheid hypothesis characterise more accurately? In light of TGIB’s 
evidently long-term anthropocentric framework with a relative proclivity towards 
consequentialism as already reviewed, Peretti’s (1998; 2010) hypothesis seems to be a 
mischaracterisation of the 1980’s. The provision for sustainable utilisation of invasive aliens 
through creation of spatial property and use rights systems (zonal/demarcated areas) can 
hardly pass for strict biological nativism and eco-Nazism. His characterisation seems to fit 
the NEM:BA enactment process rather than the formative years of, and at most a decade 
and half after the establishment of, the TGIB in the 1980s. It seems he mistook correlation 
for causation.  
The greater participation of invasion biologists from South Africa, who happen to research 
mostly terrestrial ecosystems, is because the Fynbos Biome of South Africa (a unique floral 
kingdom with high endemicity) is under threat and major transformations have been 
underway for some centuries (Kruger et al. 1989, Macdonald and Jarman 1985, Richardson 
2011, Van Wilgen et al. 2001). Such a unique ecosystem attracts the attention of large 
numbers of conservation/invasion biologists and, therefore, their research output tends to 
be higher. However, the volume of the research output hardly has anything to do with 
apartheid habitual ways of thought.  
There is, however, a measure of truth in Peretti’s (1998; 2010) hypothesis. Ferrar and Kruger 
(1983, p.5) discuss how botanical societies began to depopulate gardens of any alien species 
and re-populate them with indigenous plant species. The strong anti-invasive alien plant 
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groundswell did not differentiate between economically useful and non-economically useful 
species. In this case, the green apartheid hypothesis partly holds. Similarly, Peretti’s (1998) 
hypothesis is a relevant explanation given the TGIB’s focus on politically alien species in its 
research programme (Bruton and Merron 1985, De Moor and Bruton 1988). Further, the 
triumph of propaganda campaigns against invasive aliens that led to conservation ‘wars’ in 
the media and academic forums in the 1980’s (Brown 2013, Crass 1986b, Ferrar and Kruger 
1983, Skelton and Davies 1986) suggests that environmental creationism managed to 
deflect the sustainable path that the TGIB had advocated. Botanical societies, in the 1980s, 
were at the forefront of propaganda campaigns against alien species and continued to be so 
in the NEM:BA enactment processes, to the extent of considering the NEM:BA to be porous 
even with its anti-alien stance that required eradication of harmless alien species and 
harmful alien species alike. 
6.5. Conclusion 
Chapter 6 sought to reconstruct the ideologies and discourses that shaped the NEM:BA to 
be the controversial piece of legislation that it subsequently became. A number of 
conclusions followed. First, an ideology of eco-nationalism whose seeds dated back to the 
1980s strengthened over the decades leading up to the NEM:BA enactment process. In that 
respect, the hypothesis of a green apartheid system seemed a reasonable characterisation 
of the policy processes of the NEM:BA era.  
Secondly, elements of fundamentalism in conservation ideology were shown to be at the 
core of the strict biological nativism that became characteristic of the NEM:BA. To the 
extent that the pre-enactment views on utilisation of invasive species correlated with 
submissions of interested and affected parties during the enactment process, the 
explanation for strict biological nativism in the NEM:BA inferably has to be administrative in 
nature. It seems reasonable to hypothesise that administrative preferences of the then 
directorate of the DEA shaped the content of the NEM:BA. This conclusion is a new insight 
into the emergence of new institutions which suggests that much of the national legislation 
is not made by legislatures, but by the directorates of governmental agencies. The 
legislature discusses and sanctifies the will of these authoritative administrative agents.  
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Thirdly, ceremonial interests of invasion biologists in the employ of the DEA at that time and 
botanical societies seem to have shaped the content of the NEM:BA. They encapsulated any 
emerging or existing knowledge fund that would have facilitated a progressive biodiversity 
governance framework. Insofar as a dominant epistemological system marginalised 
alternative interpretations of environmental realities, the role of epistemic violence in 
engendering ceremonial encapsulation of the knowledge fund is an inescapable explanation. 
Although participation of interested and affected parties was promoted, the existence of a 
dominant epistemological system effectively reduced the realm of reasons to a limited 
access policymaking order, which undermined the emergence of reasonable legislation. The 
fifth chapter of the NEM:BA, thus qualifies as an imbecile institution. 
The legislative historical analysis established that the NEM:BA foreshadowed the problem of 
institutional isolation since the drafting process began and that the ceremonial adequacy 
standard of administrative preferences shaped the Act. Chapters 7 and 8 provide in-depth 
analyses of institutional isolation during the regulatory/implementation phase using the 
case study of trout. Chapter 7 presents econometric estimates obtained from online survey 
data. Chapter 8 presents semiotic analysis of the NEM:BA process, which provides a 
dynamic qualitative explanation of how institutions become. 
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Chapter 7  
Perceptions about the reasonableness of the 2014 draft AIS regulations 
 
“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to 
adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man,”  
– Shaw (1946, p.343).   
7.0. Introduction 
The extent to which institutional adjustment succeeds depends on the perceptions and 
reactions of the polity that bears the burden of the adjustment. Institutional adjustment 
reconfigures the legal foundations of an economy and concomitantly, the legal entitlements 
of social agents resulting in redistribution of economic advantages. Consequently, recipients 
of a policy instrument react to it differently.  
The draft AIS regulations published in February 2014 for public comment had three 
distinguishing features. Firstly, brown trout (Salmo Trutta) and rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus 
mykiss) were classified as invasive species in special conservation areas, which meant that 
they were to be utilised under a permitting arrangement (DEA 2014b). However, outside 
these areas, trout were not listed as invasive (DEA 2014b). Secondly, nearly all of what were 
formerly mapped as trout waters were now fish sanctuaries, hence trout were to declared 
invasive there. Thirdly, aquaculture facilities were restricted activities, which meant that one 
required a DEA permit in addition to permits from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (DAFF) as well as the Department of Water Affairs to operate an aquaculture 
farm or a hatchery (DEA 2014b). Thus, there was, in a sense, a problem of overregulation. 
Although the trout industry did not participate in any traceable way in the public hearings 
during the formulation of the NEM:BA in 2003, Chapter 6 established that the economic 
interests of represented sectors that utilise alien and invasive species were sidelined in the 
NEM:BA public hearing, drafting and enactment processes. Administrative and regulatory 
preferences of the DEA as well as the interests of anti-alien scientists and activists shaped 
the Act so that little or no provision was made for economic utilisation of traditionally 
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economically useful invasive alien species. This was a manifestation of sovereign power 
through the sanction of ignorance (epistemic violence).  
7.1. Research method and objectives 
The quantitative component of the thesis was embedded in a larger qualitative analysis. The 
online survey instrument was distributed through the FOSAF website (Appendix 1). The 
objective was to evaluate the trout industry’s perceptions about the reasonableness of the 
draft AIS regulations as published for public comment in February 2014. The other objective 
was to establish major factors that made the policy process controversial. The intensity of 
the perceptions was critical in guiding further qualitative integrative analysis of the reasons 
why the trout industry was insistent on some aspects of the controversy, thus leading to a 
potential explanation of the existence or non-existence of the perceived institutional 
isolation of sectors that utilise invasive alien species.  
The method of analysis was explained in Chapter 4. A combination of techniques was used 
to analyse the data. First, descriptive analysis, relying mostly on graphs, was used to 
summarise the data. Reliability analysis using Cronbach’s Alpha was carried out to assess the 
degree of internal consistency of the survey instrument (Tavakol and Dennick 2011, Maree 
2013). The results from this quantitative component were crystallised with the results from 
the qualitative research (Maree 2013, Weaver-Hightower 2014). Maree (2013, p.40) defines 
crystallisation as “the practice of “validating” results by using multiple methods of data 
collection and analysis.” 
Exploratory factor analysis was used to reduce the large number of items to fewer variables 
(Boermans and Kattenberg 2011, DiStefano et al. 2009, Maree 2013, Williams et al. 2012). 
Since there were no a priori theoretical expectations about which items would measure the 
same construct, exploratory factor analysis was necessary (Gorsuch 1997). Maree (2013) 
argues that this technique allows the researcher to identify, through item analysis, items 
that may not be suitable for further use in the analysis. Exploratory factor analysis is the 
conventional approach by which a researcher is able “to determine which items “belong 
together” in the sense that they are answered similarly and therefore, measure the same 
dimension or factor” (Maree 2013, p.219). The factor loading matrix was then used to 
determine the items which belonged to a factor. The factors were assigned names based on 
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the nature of items comprising them. On the basis of the reduced number of variables, a 
binary response logistic model was estimated (following Equation 4-12). The algebraic 
representation of the factor analytic model is given by Equation 4-1. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 provides descriptive results and section 7.3 
explores factors that undermined emergence of a consensual solution. Section 7.4 and 7.5 
present and analyse econometric results of the trout sector’s perceptions about the 
reasonableness of the AIS draft regulations and perceptions about the invasiveness of trout. 
Section 7.6 concludes the chapter. 
7.2. Descriptive results 
This section presents descriptive results of the online survey. It discusses demographics first 
and economic spending profiles. Second, it discusses the core aspect of the online survey, 
which was the NEM:BA regulatory reform controversy. It finally draws some inferences for 
crystallisation with qualitative findings. 
7.2.1. Demographics 
Table 7-1: Summary demographic statistics 
Item mean Std. 
dev 
median min max Response 
rate 
n 
Are you a flyfisher? (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.91 0.28 1 0 1 100% 114 
Are you a clubmember? (yes =1, 
no=0) 
0.73 0.44 1 0 1 92.1% 105 
Sex (female =1, male =0) 0.06 0.25 0 0 1 92.1% 105 
Race (white = 1, other 0) 0.99 0.10 1 0 1 91.2% 104 
Level of education (below matric = 
1, postgraduate = 6) 
4.78 1.44 5 1 6 91.2% 104 
Percentage of friendships acquired 
through fly-fishing (Figure 7-3) 
3.89 2.48 3 0 10 93% 106 
Number of fly-fishing years 23.18 13.57 20 2 60 88.6% 101 
Do you own a second home at your 
favourite fly-fishing destination? 
0.14 0.34 0 0 1 90.4% 103 
Salary (less than R10000/month=1, 
greater than R50000/month=6) 
4.07 1.63 4 1 6 89.5% 102 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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a. Sex, race and second homeownership, education and income 
Response rates to questionnaire items varied between 89% and 100% (Table 7-1).  Ninety-
three percent of the respondents were males (Table 7-1). Approximately, 99% of the 
respondents were white. Based on the survey data, it seems that fly-fishing is 
predominantly a white male recreational activity. Both the average and median fly-fisher 
had spent over 2 decades in piscatorial pursuits (Table 7-1). This shows that respondents 
had long-term commitment to fly-fishing. In studies on the economic impact of trout in the 
Eastern Cape, Nicholson and Snowball (2014) reported 96% male white respondents in a 
sample of 52. Du Preez and Hosking (2011), Du Preez and Lee (2010a; 2010b) and Gatogang 
(2009) reported 98% white respondents and 93% male white respondents in a sample of 96. 
The closeness of the demographic statistics for the online survey to other studies suggests 
that the sample approximated the population reasonably well. 
Nearly 14% of the respondents owned second homes in fly-fishing destinations. 
Hoogendoorn and Visser (2010) found that out of a population of 3,500 permanent 
residents of Dullstroom in Mpumalanga province, 4% owned second homes and were 
predominantly fly-fishing syndicates. In Rhodes Village, Hoogendoorn and Visser (2010) 
found that 16% of a population of 450 permanent residents were second home owners.  
Approximately 91.2% of the respondents were fly-fishers (Table 7-1). Just over 73% of the 
respondents were members of fly-fishing clubs. Nearly 58% of the respondents reported 
that their fly-fishing clubs held leasehold rights to trout waters. Almost 42% of the 
respondents reported that their clubs owned trout waters. Since the survey link was 
distributed through the FOSAF website, it naturally follows that most respondents were club 
members. The level of private ownership and leaseholding of fly-fishing waters suggests that 
the sector might have some vested interests to protect against institutional change 
processes that seek to substantially reconfigure use and property rights structures. 
b. Education, income and occupation 
Figure 7-1 shows that 48% of the respondents held a postgraduate qualification. In 
aggregate terms, 63% were degreed. Nicholson and Snowball (2014) reported 67.3% 
degreed respondents. Du Preez and Hosking (2011), Du Preez and Lee (2010a; 2010b) and 
Gatogang (2009) found that 41% held a postgraduate qualification and 24% held an 
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undergraduate qualification, which means 65% were degreed. The present distribution 
conforms to patterns revealed by previous studies. Thus, the policy clientele was relatively 
highly educated. 
 
Figure 7-1:  Education and income profiles of the respondents 
Source: Author’s analysis4 
Reflective of the high education levels in the sample, the income profile also indicates that 
over 63% of the 102 respondents earned a monthly after-tax income in excess of USD 2,860. 
The modal income category was >USD 4,613, which was 29.4% of the respondents. The 
mean and median categories were USD 2, 860 – USD 3,690, which was 21.6% of the 
respondents (Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1). Du Preez and Hosking (2011), Du Preez and Lee 
(2010a; 2010b), Gatogang (2009), Nicholson and Snowball (2014) also found comparable 
patterns in their samples.  
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Figure 7-2: Occupations of the respondents 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
c. Friendships and fly-fishing destinations 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Friendships and fly-fishing destinations 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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Figure 7-2 shows that the largest number of respondents that disclosed their occupation 
was employed in the construction and engineering industry (16%), followed by 13% that 
were service providers in the trout industry and 13% that were from the education/research 
sector.  
Trout fly-fishing was an important way of making friends for a cumulative 73% of 
respondents in the 1%-10% category to 41%-50% category (Figure 7-3). The modal category 
of friendships made from fly-fishing was 11%-20%. Theoretically, one would expect the 
importance of fly-fishing in the building of social capital to have a large influence on group 
attitudes and tastes for certain species as well as regulatory regimes (Veblen [1899] 2005). 
The more important an activity is in the building of social networks the greater the social 
power of the beneficiaries due to high solidarity levels. 
Just over 48% of the sample preferred Mpumalanga province as a fly-fishing destination, 
which was greater than a combined 38% of the respondents who preferred KwaZulu-Natal 
and the Eastern Cape (Figure 7-3). Hoogendoorn and Visser (2010) reported fly-fishing as 
the most popular outdoor recreation activity among second homeowners in Mpumalanga in 
towns such as Dullstroom that are located in the Trout Triangle. In the first most 
comprehensive nationwide mapping of fly-fishing opportunities, Hoogendoorn (2014) also 
found a similar pattern although KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga were about the same in 
terms of popularity for trout fly-fishing opportunities. However, Du Preez and Lee (2010b) 
and Gatogang (2009) found that Mpumalanga trout fly-fishing destinations were ranked 
fourth after Rhodes Village of the Eastern Cape (ranked first), Natal Midlands in KwaZulu-
Natal (ranked second) and Cape streams (ranked third). The result obtained in the thesis 
suggests that the majority of online survey respondents were from Mpumalanga. 
7.2.2. Economic spending profile for fly-fishers in 2013 
Table 7-2 shows information about fly-fishing trips in 2013. At least 95% of the respondents 
had a fly-fishing trip in 2013 and the average fly-fisher had eight fly-fishing trips in 2013, 
while the median fly-fisher had six trips in 2013. Nicholson and Snowball (2014) reported an 
average of nearly five trips per annum, but Du Preez and Hosking (2011), Du Preez and Lee 
(2010a; 2010b) and Gatogang (2009) reported a much lower average of nearly 2 trips per 
annum. 
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Table 7-2: Fly-fishing trips in 2013 
Item mean Std. dev median Response  
rate 
n 
Did you take a fly-fishing trip in the last 
12 months? 
.95 .21 1 92.1% 105 
How many trips did you take in the last 
12 months? 
7.75 7.1 6 89.5% 102 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
Figure 7-4: Mean and median spending profile per person in 2013 prices 
Source: Author’s analysis5 
Figure 7-4 depicts spending profiles for the sample. The three most influential spending 
categories were accommodation (a mean of USD 2,400 per person per annum); transport (a 
mean of USD 1,900 per person per annum) and food and drinks (a mean of USD 1,100 per 
person per annum) (Figure 7-4). The aggregate spending for the 99 respondents was USD 
0.71 million (an average of USD 7,200 per person per annum) in 2013 including transport 
expenditure in 2013 prices. The aggregate spending, excluding transport expenditure, for 
the 99 respondents was USD 0.52 million (an average of USD 5,300 per person per annum) 
in 2013 prices.  
Leibold and van Zyl (2008) reported a total spending of USD 496.8 million in 2007 prices and 
an average of USD 11,000 per person per annum for 45,000 fly-fishers.6 Du Preez and Lee 
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(2010b) estimated that the trout fly-fishing industry generated USD 0.77 million (or an 
average of USD 8,100 per person) per annum in the economy of Rhodes Village in the 
Eastern Cape of South Africa. Using negative binomial modelling, Du Preez and Hosking 
(2011) found that the economic contribution of trout fly-fishing to the economy of Rhodes 
Village in Eastern Cape South Africa was just over USD 2.48 million ( or a mean of USD 26, 
000 per person) per annum. Using the travel cost method, Gatogang (2009) found that the 
economic contribution of trout in Rhodes Village was nearly USD 1.65 million (or an average 
of USD 17,000 per person) per annum.  Nicholson and Snowball (2014) found that the 
economic impact of trout fly-fishing was between USD 0.4 million (or an average of USD 660 
per visit) per annum and USD 0.48 million (or USD 790 per visit) per annum in the Eastern 
Cape.  
The findings of the present study are within close range to findings of contemporary studies 
on the economic contribution of trout in various localities of South Africa except Du Preez 
and Hosking (2011) and Gatogang (2009). The magnitudes of the differences are sensitive to 
the estimation assumptions and methods used. In all these studies, accommodation and 
transport were the greatest spending categories just as the thesis also found. The spending 
profile, thus, reasonably approximated the population profile. This gave assurance of the 
reliability of the self-reported values in the survey. 
7.2.3. NEM:BA AIS regulatory reform controversies 
As a way of understanding the intensity of the perceptions of the trout industry about the 
draft AIS regulations that were published for public comment in February 2014 and finally 
promulgated as law in August 2014, respondents were asked a wide range of questions 
about the reform process. 
a. Self-reported legal comprehension 
The extent to which a policy clientele participates actively in a policy process depends on its 
intellectual capabilities on the policy issue in question. Nearly 93% of the respondents had 
heard about the NEM:BA and 95% of the respondents had heard about the 2014 AIS 
regulations previously (Table 7-3). 
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 The annual average exchange rate was ZAR 7.05 to USD 1.00 
194 | P a g e  
 
Table 7-3: Heard about the NEM:BA process 
Item Yes n 
Have you ever heard about the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act (NEM:BA)? 
93% 112 
Have you ever heard about the Alien and Invasive species regulations of 
the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act? 
95% 112 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
Figure 7-5: Legal comprehension of the NEM:BA and the 2014 AIS regulations 
Source: Author’s analysis 
As Figure 7-5 depicts, the respondents self-reported a fair level of comprehension of the 
legislation governing the utilisation and conservation of biodiversity. Approximately 57% of 
the respondents reported a basic understanding of the NEM:BA, which was by far the 
largest category. Overall, almost 91% of the respondents had some degree of understanding 
of the NEM:BA. Similarly, 50% of the sample reported a basic understanding of the 2014 
draft AIS regulations (Figure 7-5). In total, nearly 94% of the sample considered themselves 
to possess some level of understanding of the 2014 draft AIS regulations. Most fly-fishing 
websites and magazines had regular instalments from environmental lawyers interpreting 
the NEM:BA and the various iterations of the draft AIS regulations. Such high self-reported 
levels of legal comprehension were anticipated as a result. Therefore, high self-reported 
levels of legal comprehension add to the validity and reliability of subsequent responses 
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about the legislative process, which require respondents to possess some knowledge of the 
legislation. 
b. Science-driven AIS regulatory reform process 
Table 7-4A and Table 7-4B show the distribution of the perceptions of the trout sector. 
Almost 31% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the view that the DEA had followed 
a South African scientific research-driven implementation process (Table 7-4A). Overall, 47% 
of the respondents disagreed relative to 30% who agreed with the statement that the DEA 
was following a South African scientific research-driven process in implementing the 
NEM:BA. 
Table 7-4A: AIS Regulatory reform process controversies 
 % of respondents  
Questionnaire Item SD D N A SA n 
In my opinion, a South African research-driven 
implementation of the NEM:BA has been at the 
forefront of the DEA's alien and invasive species 
management concerns 
31 16 23 17 13 110 
In my opinion, the DEA conclusively relied on 
international research evidence in order to decide the 
invasiveness of trout in South Africa 
6 9 10 26 49 114 
In my opinion, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
adequately researched on the nature of the threat 
posed by trout on indigenous species, habitats and 
ecosystems before listing them as invasive 
68 19 2 4 8 113 
I believe that the regulations strike a balance between 
biodiversity conservation and socio-economic utilisation 
of the trout   
55 21 6 6 12 111 
In my opinion, scientists in, or advising, the Department 
of Environmental Affairs developed the Alien and 
Invasive species regulations  in consultation with 
interested and affected parties such as fly-fishers 
54 21 9 5 11 114 
In my opinion, the flyfishing public (and the Federation 
of Southern African Flyfishers (FOSAF) lack the 
specialised knowledge necessary to contribute towards 
alien and invasive species regulations 
55 17 12 10 6 113 
My trust in the Department of Environmental Affairs 
increased as a result of the  National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act decision process 
58 22 10 7 4 114 
The Department of Environmental Affairs justified to 
interested and affected parties the rationale for the 
listing of trout as invasive  
74 14 4 5 3 114 
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Table 7-4B: AIS Regulatory reform process controversies 
 % of respondents  
Questionnaire item SD D N A SA n 
I think the Department of Environmental Affairs equally 
took responsibility of researching into the 
socioeconomic benefits of trout species as it also 
researched into the ecological cost of trout 
71 17 4 2 6 114 
In my opinion, trout should be listed as invasive IF it can 
be demonstrated that in a given catchment the net 
benefits of conserving indigenous is positive 
18 13 14 26 29 114 
I consider trout to be important cultural symbols in 
South African fly-fishing circles 
0 2 4 25 69 106 
Trout are still important social status symbols in South 
African fly-fishing circles 
3 5 23 24 46 106 
Trout fly-fishing is a way of getting intimate with nature 0 2 3 14 81 105 
In my opinion, all species regardless of whether they are 
indigenous or alien, have a permanent place in the 
ecology and economy of South Africa 
18 19 24 19 20 113 
The alien and invasive species regulations adequately 
provide for my spiritual, cultural, social, physical, 
economic and development needs 
58 19 14 2 7 106 
Even if the regulations facilitate the conservation of 
indigenous fishes, their livelihood impact should not be 
neglected 
11 20 17 27 24 103 
Source: Online survey 
Over 49% of the respondents strongly agreed with the view that the DEA had conclusively 
relied on international evidence to decide the invasiveness of trout. In summative terms, 
nearly 75% of the respondents agreed with the view that the DEA had relied on 
international evidence to decide the invasiveness of trout in South Africa (Table 7-4A). The 
policy clientele perceived the DEA to be relying on non-contextual evidence in arriving at its 
decisions. Since invasiveness of a species varies with climatic-biospheric conditions (Ellender 
and Weyl 2014, Van Rensburg et al. 2011), using evidence from a different climatic-
biospheric setting led to contestable decisions.  
The questionnaire had a set of statements that focused on trout specific research. As Table 
7-4A shows, just over 68% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the view that the DEA 
had adequately researched the nature of the ecological threat posed by trout. In summative 
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terms, 87% disagreed with the view that the DEA had adequately researched the nature of 
the ecological threat posed by trout.  
Table 7-5: Sufficient condition for listing a species as invasive 
In my opinion the sufficient condition for listing species as invasive is that: percentage of 
respondents 
[1] They must be alien and established outside their natural distribution 
range 
9% 
[2] They must be alien and established outside their natural distribution 
range, and  threaten or can potentially threaten ecosystems, habitats and 
species 
16% 
[3] They must simultaneously be alien and established outside their natural 
distribution range; threaten or can potentially threaten ecosystems, 
habitats and species; and do cause economic, human health and 
environmental harm 
75% 
 Yes No 
Based on the sufficient condition for listing species as invasive, can trout 
possibly be classified as invasive? 
27% 73% 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The study also intended to establish the criteria respondents believed the DEA should use to 
decide the listing of species as invasive. Approximately 75% of the 105 respondents believed 
criterion three was the sufficient condition for listing species as invasive (Table 7-5). Since 
criterion three was the most popular, it followed that a science-driven process that failed to 
engage in socio-economic aspects about trout (or any alien species) might encounter 
opposition. Table 7-5 also reveals that 27% perceived trout to be invasive based on their 
view of what the sufficient condition for listing species as invasive ought to be. 
c. Participatory policymaking 
The post-apartheid democratic constitutional dispensation has a distinct imperative for 
participatory natural resource governance. The survey, thus, solicited perceptions about the 
adequacy of the regulatory process from a participatory standpoint (Table 7-4A). Table 7-4A 
shows that nearly 54% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the view that scientists in 
the DEA charged with making the regulations consulted with interested and affected 
parties. In general, nearly 75% of the sample felt that their sector was being marginalised in 
the reform process. Nicholson and Snowball (2014) found that 69% of the fly-fishers in their 
sample felt that they were being excluded from the NEM:BA regulatory reform processes. 
198 | P a g e  
 
The phenomenon of institutional isolation buoyed by the sanction of ignorance (epistemic 
violence) seems to have been active in the policy process. 
If consultation did not occur according to expectations, was it because the DEA regarded the 
FOSAF as not knowledgeable enough to contribute to the process? Approximately 55% of 
the respondents strongly disagreed with the view that the FOSAF lacked the necessary 
knowledge to be consulted (Table 7-4A). In summative terms, 72% of the sample disagreed 
with the view that the FOSAF was not knowledgeable enough not to be consulted. During 
interviews data collection, the researcher came across ichthyologists and conservation 
biologists who have been practising conservationists for the past six decades and are serving 
in the FOSAF’s Environmental Committee. The FOSAF had knowledgeable members within 
its decision-making ranks.  
Management of alien and invasive species, like any other policy issue, is a wicked problem 
and trust is central to the resolution of such problems (Balint et al. 2011, Rittel and Webber 
1973).  Table 7-4A shows that 58% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the 
statement that their level of trust in the DEA had increased as a result of the decision-
making processes of the NEM:BA. The protracted controversy over the regulation of trout 
suggests that the DEA did not attend to trust building in the process. Nearly 80% of the 
sample seemed to be suspicious of the DEA’s decisions.  
The trout sector’s lack of trust seemed to be confirmed by the strong perception that the 
DEA had not justified its decision criteria for listing trout as invasive (Table 7-4A). Nearly 
74% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that the DEA had justified 
the criteria it used to decide the listing of species as invasive. Thus, a combined 88% of the 
sample disagreed with the statement. As Brandom (1995, p.904) asserted, policymaking is 
“the game of giving and asking for reasons”. It seemed that resource users asked questions, 
but reasons were not given.  
d. Socio-economic aspects of the controversy 
As already established in Chapters 5 and 6, the overarching environmental management 
framework of South Africa is anthropocentric and consequentialist. The research also sought 
to establish the role of the socio-economic aspects of alien and invasive species in the 
controversies. Table 7-4B shows that 71% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the 
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view that the DEA had systematically researched the socio-economic aspects of trout as it 
had consistently and systematically invested in researching the ecological cost of trout. 
Thus, in aggregate terms, 88% of the sample disagreed with the view that the DEA had 
concerned itself with the socio-economic issues of the trout as much as it had been 
concerned with the ecological cost. Jentoft (2006, p.672) argued that the tendency in 
natural resource governance was to focus on natural science research, but he emphasised 
the need for an interdisciplinary framework in which “social and economic issues are 
examined as thoroughly and systematically as those of the natural systems.” Other scholars 
who similarly emphasised complex socio-ecological analysis in informing institutional design 
are Degnbol et al. (2006), Ostrom and Cox (2010) and Salmi (2012). 
The questionnaire included some statements that focused on the balancing conservation of 
indigenous fishes and economic utilisation of trout as well as cost-benefit analysis, which 
the law demands the DEA carry out in order to inform its decisions (Table 7-4B). Table 7-4B 
shows that 29% of the respondents strongly agreed with the view that trout can be listed as 
invasive species if the net benefit of conserving indigenous fishes in the same locality was 
demonstrated to be positive. Overall, 55% of the sample agreed with the view that trout 
should be listed as invasive if the net benefits of conserving indigenous fishes can be 
demonstrated to exceed the economic contribution of trout. The result suggested that the 
trout industry supported conservation of indigenous fish species, but it expected cost-
benefit analyses to inform the decisions rather than ecological cost analyses only. As such, a 
decision that missed the economic component, but had the ecological cost component right 
would be regarded as an incomplete cost benefit analysis. 
On the issue of balancing conservation of indigenous fishes and utilisation of trout, nearly 
55% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that the draft AIS regulations 
had managed to strike balance between biodiversity conservation interests and trout 
utilisation interests (Table 7-4A). In summative terms, nearly 76% disagreed with the view 
that the DEA had managed to strike balance between conservation of indigenous fishes and 
economic utilisation of trout. The descriptive results suggest that the search for balance 
remains a key issue that needs to be addressed for resources users to buy-in into the DEA’s 
proposals. 
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e. Socio-cultural aspects of the process 
Some species, such as trout, have a cultural history associated with them so much that they 
have a different meaning to those groups that hold them dear (Bennion 1920, Curtis 2005, 
Hoy 1913, Snyder 2007). The questionnaire had statements on the spiritual, cultural and 
status roles of trout. Table 7-4B shows that 69% of the respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement that trout was an important cultural symbol in South African fly-fishing circles. 
Overall, 94% of the sample regarded trout as a cultural symbol. Consistent with the 
postulation of the Veblenian Dichotomy that some species play an honorific role and 
ceremonial interests deepen the conviction and taste for such species (Veblen [1899] 2005), 
46% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that trout was an important 
status symbol in South African fly-fishing circles (Table 7-4B). In summative terms, 70% of 
the sample agreed with the statement that trout was a status symbol in South African fly-
fishing circles. These observations suggest the existence of an emotional, cultural and 
spiritual attachment to trout. Table 7-4B also reveals that 81% of the respondents strongly 
agreed with the statement that trout fly-fishing was a way of getting intimate with nature. 
In aggregate terms, 95% of the sample regarded trout fly-fishing as a way of getting intimate 
with nature.  
Since trout played spiritual, cultural and status roles, it was likely that South Africans 
interested in trout fly-fishing would view trout as a permanent component of the South 
African biota. Bruton (1986) and De Moor and Bruton (1988) argued that trout had a 
permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa. However, there was a mixed 
response to the statement that all species regardless of whether they are indigenous or 
alien have a permanent place in the ecology and economy of South Africa. In aggregate 
terms, 39% of the respondents agreed with the statement, while 37% disagreed with it 
(Table 7-4B). Of all the items on the controversies, this item had the most evenly spread 
responses. It shows that within the trout sector, there were some who would not grant 
permanent ecological citizenship to species just because they served pecuniary interests.  
Section 2(2) of the NEMA summaries the anthropocentrism of the South African 
environmental governance framework which provides that “[e]nvironmental management 
must place people and their needs at the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, 
psychological, developmental, cultural and social interests equitably.” The questionnaire 
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solicited opinions to assess if the trout industry perceived the AIS regulatory reform process 
to be addressing the NEMA Section 2(2) provision. Just over 58% of the respondents 
strongly disagreed with the statement that the AIS regulations addressed the NEMA Section 
2(2) provision (Table 7-4B). In summative terms, 77% of the sample disagreed with 
statement that the DEA had adequately addressed the NEMA Section 2(2) needs through 
the draft regulations. 
Table 7-4B also shows that, in aggregate terms, 51% of the respondents agreed with the 
view that the livelihood impact of regulations should not be neglected even if they 
facilitated conservation of indigenous fishes. The perceptions about this item seemed to 
reflect the high income and occupation profiles reviewed in the demographics implying that 
many respondents’ livelihoods did not directly depend on trout. Still, the intuition is 
relatively firm and agrees with Siegfried and Davies’ (1982, p.11) conclusion that the 
“ultimate problem… is almost always related to development policy and the long-range use 
of natural resources and, although such ultimate problems require most attention, they are 
the most neglected.” The essence of their argument was that conservation is all about 
people and for the benefit of people. Thus, conservation initiatives and policies that 
achieved their conservation goals, but failed to address other developmental needs could be 
regarded as unreasonable policies by their recipients. 
7.3. Hindrances to consensual solutions 
The general pattern emerging from Figure 7-6 is that the majority of the factors with the 
highest percentage of respondents electing them as fundamental problems that were 
hindering consensus mostly had to do with participatory policymaking and institutional 
power. The most overwhelming view (78% of the respondents) was that the consultative 
process followed by the DEA had been ineffective. The present result does not seem to 
object to the fact that there were consultative meetings, but it queries the quality 
(effectiveness) of the consultative meetings. Probably, they were power over (ruling down) 
rather than power with (co-management/co-governance) processes (Degnbol et al. 2006, 
Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011). Béné and Neiland (2006, p.45) argue that democratic 
policymaking facilitates “economic equity” (“equity in rent redistribution”), “institutional 
equity” (fair burden of transaction costs imposed by the regulatory framework), “political 
equity” (“equity of participation in decision-making process”) and “endowment equity” 
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(“equity of access” to environmental resources). These factors largely relate to 
administrative due process in the processes of institutional change. 
 
Figure 7-6: Factors hindering consensus in the AIS regulatory reform process 
Source: Author’s analysis 
In spite of the perceived inconclusiveness of the scientific evidence regarding the 
invasiveness of trout, 76% of respondents felt that the DEA had proceeded with 
absoluteness of conviction to list trout as invasive. For example, during interviews the senior 
official of the DEA stated: 
“[B]ut then we said with that specific one [that is, trout] we have absolutely no doubt 
that our position is the correct one and we will go ahead and we would regulate on 
the basis of that and people could take us to court..., but it’s simply that we are 
actually convinced that we are correct and that if something is invasive then we are 
obliged to list it” (Expert 1 2014, pers comm, emphasis added). 
The statement reveals that the DEA felt that it had sufficient evidence, hence the claim that 
its position on the invasiveness of trout was absolutely correct. The conviction that the DEA 
78% 
76% 
71% 
56% 
55% 
54% 
52% 
46% 
44% 
14% 
Ineffective consultative process 
Inconclusive evidence about the current invasive 
capacity of trout 
Too much discretionary power given to the 
Minister in the AIS regulations 
Environmental activism that seeks to purify South 
Africa’s environment from aliens 
Absence of an aquatic biodiversity policy 
framework which leads to uncertainty 
DEA withholds strategic information from 
stakeholders 
Domination of ecological invasion science over 
legal/economic implementation of the NEM:BA 
Lack of provision for economically productive use 
of trout 
Reliance by DEA on scientific definition of invasive 
species rather than definition in the NEM:BA 
Environmental greed on the part of the trout 
industry 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Percent of respondents who agreed 
203 | P a g e  
 
was correct was revealed in the suggestion that “people could take us to court”, but the 
DEA would not compromise on its decision. However, some leading aquatic scientists 
acknowledged that the AIS reform process was constrained by data-poverty on alien fish 
invasions (Ellender and Weyl 2014, Van Rensburg et al. 2011) because alien fish invasion 
research was in its “infancy” in South Africa (Ellender and Weyl 2014, p.125).  
Respondents also felt that the regulatory text gave the Minister too much discretionary 
power (71% of the respondents), which in a sense undermined certainty because no one 
knew with any degree of certainty what the Minister’s probable course of action would be 
(Figure 7-6). In addition, users of alien and invasive species might have felt uncomfortable 
with a text that granted the Minister too much discretionary power because it opened 
opportunities for other interest groups (such as environmental activists) to lobby the 
Minister to list a species or remove it from one favourable category to a more stringent one. 
A more stringent regulatory regime would raise the transaction costs of compliance since 
the regulatory burden might be large and asymmetrical, which would undermine 
institutional equity. 
 
Figure 7-7: Reasonableness of the NEM:BA AIS regulations as in February 2014 
Source: Author’s analysis 
Given the foregoing descriptive analysis, were the 2014 draft AIS regulations reasonable? As 
Figure 7-7 depicts, 85% of the respondents perceived the draft AIS regulations not to be 
reasonable, in aggregate terms. In conclusion, the descriptive results suggested that the 
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controversies in the regulatory process were driven by governance-related failures. The DEA 
seemed to have failed to give sufficient reasons when the trout sector asked for some. As a 
result, the DEA lost the trust of the trout industry. This had potentially important 
implications because wicked problems demand robust trust relationships to be able to 
resolve them. There were indications that the regulatory reform process was a limited 
access policymaking order at the regulatory phase. 
7.4. Probability of perceiving AIS regulations as reasonable 
The section presents and interprets the quantitative results. The descriptive analysis 
revealed that the trout industry largely perceived the regulations to be unreasonable. 
Further, inferential analysis into the factors that might have been the most important 
drivers of the controversy, as well as those that deserved the attention of sovereign agents 
in their decision-making processes, was carried out.  
7.4.1. Cronbach’s Alpha 
Table 7-6 presents the results of the reliability analysis. Since the items were measured on 
different scales, the estimation standardised the scale (Gliem and Gliem 2003). A Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.73 was obtained. Eight items (italicised and emboldened in Table 7-6) had to be 
excluded from the quantitative analysis since the Cronbach’s alpha increased when they 
were left out.  
After excluding the eight items the Cronbach’s alpha increased from 0.73 to 0.80 (Table 7-7). 
According to Gliem and Gliem (2003, p.87), “an alpha of .8 is probably a reasonable goal”, 
but an alpha exceeding 0.6 is also acceptable (Gliem and Gliem 2003, Maree 2013, Tavakol 
and Dennick 2011). The Cronbach’s alpha presumes unidimensionality of the latent variable, 
which the case may not be (Boermans and Kattenberg 2011, Gorsuch 1997). The correlation 
between the revised scale and the underlying factor was               which was 
reasonably high. The amount of measurement error in the instrument is given by 
                        . Thus, the measurement error was 35.2%. The error 
was high suggesting that adding more items that measured the same latent factor to the 
questionnaire would have reduced the level of the measurement error (Tavakol and Dennick 
2011). 
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Table 7-6: Reliability test – Cronbach’s alpha 
Item n Sign item-test 
correlation 
item-rest 
correlation 
interitem 
covariance 
alpha 
Is trout invasive 113 + 0.4485 0.3428 0.1120 0.7162 
Heard AIS regulations 112 - 0.2131 0.0909 0.1211 0.7338 
Understand NEM:BA 111 - 0.2545 0.1347 0.1189 0.7296 
Understand AIS regulations 110 - 0.2425 0.1213 0.1192 0.7302 
Net conservation benefits >0 
list trout as invasive 
114 - 0.1525 0.0301 0.1242 0.7393 
DEA followed science driven 
process in AIS regulations 
110 + 0.5442 0.4502 0.1071 0.7059 
DEA relied on international 
evidence to list trout 
114 - 0.3431 0.2274 0.1168 0.7256 
DEA researched nature of 
threat posed by trout to 
indigenous fish 
113 + 0.5203 0.4198 0.1090 0.7099 
DEA researched 
socioeconomics of trout 
114 + 0.5343 0.4363 0.1080 0.7078 
DEA consulted when drafting 
AIS regulations 
114 + 0.5837 0.4929 0.1051 0.7015 
FOSAF lack specialised 
knowledge  
113 + 0.6019 0.5146 0.1046 0.7002 
Trust in DEA increased 114 + 0.6811 0.6044 0.1015 0.6932 
DEA justified rationale for 
listing trout as invasive 
114 + 0.7001 0.6255 0.1007 0.6913 
AIS regulations strike balance 
between conservation and 
economic utilisation 
111 + 0.5613 0.4691 0.1072 0.7060 
AIS regulations meet 
NEMA2.2 
106 + 0.4231 0.3092 0.1129 0.7179 
Even if regulations promote 
conservation of indigenous 
fish, their livelihood impact 
should not be neglected 
103 + 0.4143 0.3008 0.1135 0.7191 
All species have permanent 
place in South Africa 
113 + 0.1408 0.0189 0.1248 0.7403 
Sufficient condition for listing 
species as invasive 
105 - 0.3907 0.2791 0.1138 0.7197 
Trout flyfishing way of 
intimacy with nature 
105 - 0.2222 0.0981 0.1209 0.7335 
Trout is a cultural symbol 106 - 0.2393 0.1139 0.1207 0.7330 
Trout is a status symbol 106 + 0.0736 -0.0536 0.1275 0.7451 
Test scale  0.1138 0.7295 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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Table 7-7: Cronbach’s alpha after excluding irrelevant items 
Item n Sign item-test 
correlation 
item-rest 
correlation 
interitem 
covariance 
alpha 
Is trout invasive 113 + 0.4984 0.3819 0.2468 0.7972 
DEA followed science driven 
process in AIS regulations 
110 + 0.5392 0.4284 0.2409 0.7920 
DEA relied on international 
evidence to list trout 
114 - 0.3640 0.2312 0.2624 0.8102 
DEA researched nature of 
threat posed by trout to 
indigenous fish 
113 + 0.5873 0.4828 0.2372 0.7887 
DEA researched 
socioeconomics of trout 
114 + 0.6088 0.5066 0.2342 0.7859 
DEA consulted when drafting 
AIS regulations 
114 + 0.5987 0.4955 0.2344 0.7861 
FOSAF lack specialised 
knowledge  
113 + 0.5855 0.4812 0.2360 0.7876 
Trust in DEA increased 114 + 0.7084 0.6247 0.2233 0.7752 
DEA justified rationale for 
listing trout as invasive 
114 + 0.7309 0.6525 0.2212 0.7731 
AIS regulations strike balance 
between conservation and 
economic utilisation 
111 + 0.5751 0.4702 0.2387 0.7900 
AIS regulations meet 
NEMA2.2 
106 + 0.4794 0.3422 0.2513 0.8011 
Even if regulations promote 
conservation of indigenous 
fish, their livelihood should 
not be neglected  
103 + 0.4475 0.3092 0.2545 0.8038 
Sufficient condition for listing 
species as invasive 
105 - 0.4437 0.3210 0.2510 0.8008 
Test scale  0.2410 0.8049 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
Some items entered the scale negatively (reversed), while others entered positively, hence 
the column labelled sign (+/-) (Table 7-7). The item-test column gives the correlation 
between the item and the standardised overall scale variable that controls for the varying 
scales on which items were measured. The higher the item-test correlation, the more 
relevant an item is to the measurement of reliability. For example, the most relevant items 
were: “Trust in DEA increased” (a correlation to the all-items scale of 0.708) and “DEA 
justified rationale for listing trout as invasive” (correlation to the all-items scale of 0.731).  
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The item-rest column (Table 7-7) measures the correlation between an item and the scale 
formed by the rest of the items (Gliem and Gliem 2003) and is less misleading than item-test 
correlation (Gorsuch 1997). The higher the item-rest correlation, the more important an 
item is in the reliability scale. For example, the correlation between the item “Is trout 
invasive?” and the sum of the rest of the items was 0.382 (Table 7-7).  
The column interitem covariance (Table 7-7) measures the effect of excluding an item on 
the average interitem correlation, thus items that do not correlate well with others have 
higher interitem covariances associated with them. For example, excluding “DEA relied on 
international evidence to list trout” increased the interitem covariance from an average of 
0.241 to 0.262 (Table 7-7). Similarly, excluding “Regulations meet NEMA 2.2 needs” 
increased the interitem covariance from 0.241 to 0.251. On the other hand, excluding, for 
example, “DEA researched the nature of threat posed by trout on indigenous fish” reduced 
the interitem covariance from 0.241 to 0.237 (Table 7-7).  
The most important column in Table 7-7 is the column labelled alpha because it reveals the 
effect on the Cronbach’s alpha of excluding an item. Items for which the alpha was lower 
than the test scale (alpha = 0.805) were relevant because excluding them lowered the 
reliability. For example, excluding the item “Are trout invasive?” reduced the alpha from 
0.805 to 0.797, but excluding the item “DEA relied on international evidence to list trout” 
marginally increased the alpha from 0.805 to 0.81. For theoretical interest in this item 
however, it was retained.  
7.4.2. Correlation analysis 
Table 7-8A and Table 7-8B present correlation coefficients for items that were retained after 
reliability analysis, which were significant at the 10% level of significance. Blanks imply 
insignificance at the 10% level of significance. The strongest reported positive correlations 
were between “Trust in DEA increased” and the scale variable (0.7) and between “DEA 
justified rationale for listing trout” and the scale variable (0.7). There was a moderate 
negative correlation between the item “DEA relied on international evidence to list trout” 
and the scale variable (-0.4). Other correlations were small despite being statistically 
significant. 
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Table 7-8A: Correlation analysis 
 Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Scale variable 1       
2 Is trout invasive .5*** 1      
3 DEA followed science driven 
process in AIS regulations 
.5*** 
 
 1     
4 DEA relied on international 
evidence to list trout 
-.4*** 
 
-.2** 
 
 1    
5 DEA researched nature of 
threat posed by trout to 
indigenous fish 
.6*** 
 
.2** 
 
.2* -.2** 1   
6 DEA researched 
socioeconomics of trout 
.6*** 
 
.3** 
 
.2*  .4*** 1  
7 DEA consulted when drafting 
AIS regulations 
.6*** 
 
 .4***  .1* .3*** 1 
8 FOSAF lack specialised 
knowledge  
.6*** 
 
.2*** 
 
.2**  .3*** .3*** .3*** 
9 Trust in DEA increased .7*** .2** .3***  .4*** .4*** .5*** 
10 DEA justified rationale for 
listing trout as invasive 
.7*** 
 
.3** 
 
.3*** -.2** .4*** .4*** .4*** 
11 AIS regulations strike balance 
of conservation-economic 
activities 
.6*** 
 
.3*** 
 
.2**  .3*** .4*** .4*** 
12 AIS regulations meet 
NEMA2.2 
.5*** 
 
 .2**  .3***  .3*** 
13 Even if regulations promote 
conservation of indigenous 
fish, their livelihood impact 
should not be neglected 
.4*** 
 
 .3***  .2* .2*  
14 Sufficient condition for listing 
species as invasive 
-.4*** 
 
-.3*** 
 
-.2**  -.2* -.2** -.2** 
*** means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%; blanks mean 
insignificant correlations. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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Table 7-8B: Correlation analysis 
 Item 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
8 FOSAF lack specialised 
knowledge  
1       
9 Trust in DEA increased .5*** 1      
10 DEA justified rationale for 
listing trout as invasive 
.4*** .6*** 1     
11 AIS regulations strike balance 
of conservation-economic 
activities 
.3*** .5*** .5*** 1    
12 AIS regulations meet 
NEMA2.2 
.2** .2** .2**  1   
13 Even if regulations promote 
conservation of indigenous 
fish, their livelihood impact 
should not be neglected 
 .2*   .3*** 1  
14 Sufficient condition for listing 
species as invasive 
  -.3***   -.2** 1 
*** means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%; blanks mean 
insignificant correlations. 
Source: Author’s analysis 
Some very significant positive correlations were those between “Trust in DEA increased” 
and “DEA justified rationale for listing trout” (0.6); “Regulations strike balance between 
conservation of indigenous species and economic utilisation of trout” and “DEA justified 
rationale for listing trout as invasive” (0.5) (Table 7-8B). Other unexpectedly low positive 
correlations occurred between “AIS regulations meet NEMA2.2 needs” and “Trust increased 
in DEA” (0.2) (Table 7-8B). The most outstanding pattern was the clustering of items that 
related to democratic policymaking such as consultation, trust, justification of decisions and 
balancing of competing interests (Table 7-8A and Table 7-8B). This suggested that these 
clusters of items might have been measuring the same latent variable, hence justifying 
exploratory factor analysis (Gliem and Gliem 2003). 
7.4.3. Sample adequacy 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was used (Table 7-9). The 
KMO is a measure of appropriateness of factor analysis for a given set of items. It 
determines the proportion of variance amongst the items that represents the common 
variance. The rules of thumb are that a KMO of 0 – 0.49 is unacceptable; 0.50 – 0.59 is 
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miserable; 0.60 – 0.69 is mediocre; 0.70 – 0.79 is middling; 0.80 – 0.89 is meritorious and 
0.90 – 1.0 is marvellous (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974). 
Table 7-9: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable KMO 
DEA researched socioeconomics of trout 0.7729 
DEA consulted in developing AIS regulations 0.7427 
Fosaf lack specialised knowledge to contribute to AIS regulations 0.7414 
Trust in DEA increased due to AIS regulations process 0.7854 
DEA justified rationale for listing trout as invasive 0.8261 
AIS regulations strike balance between conservation of indigenous fishes and 
economic utilisation of trout 
0.6758 
Is trout invasive? 0.6190 
DEA relied on international evidence to list trout 0.6468 
What is sufficient criterion for listing a species as invasive? 0.5683 
DEA researched the nature of ecological threat posed by trout 0.8090 
AIS regulations NEMA 2.2 needs 0.6873 
Even if regulations promote conservation of indigenous fish, their livelihood should 
not be neglected 
0.5325 
DEA followed a science driven process in AIS regulations 0.7192 
Overall 0.7304 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
While the rest of the items had a KMO measure of sample adequacy in the middling to 
meritorious categories (Table 7-9), four items had a KMO in the mediocre category and two 
items had a KMO in the miserable category. The poor sample adequacy for some items 
illustrated the limitations of relying on items rather than scaled factors in further analysis 
(Gliem and Gliem 2003, Maree 2013). Nevertheless, the all-items KMO of 0.73 suggested 
that the sample was adequate (Table 7-9). 
7.4.4. Exploratory factor analysis 
After testing the reliability of the instrument, exploratory factor analysis was used to reduce 
the data to a few theoretical constructs. Following Maree (2013, p.219), “the “bad” items” 
identified during reliability analysis were removed, thus the researcher excluded the eight 
items identified in Table 7-6. Oblique rotation was used to assess the underlying pattern for 
the latent variable such that correlated factors were produced (Gorsuch 1997). DiStefano et 
al. (2009, p.3) argue that “the cut-off value to use is an arbitrary decision.” A factor loading 
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cut-off value of 0.4, which was above the minimum recommended cut-off value of 0.3, was 
chosen (DiStefano et al. 2009). 
Table 7-10: Extracted factors by oblique rotation 
Variable 
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DEA researched socioeconomics of 
trout 
0.4374    0.5710 
DEA consulted in developing AIS 
regulations 
0.5440   0.4967 0.3966 
Fosaf lack specialised knowledge 
to contribute to AIS regulations 
0.7602    0.4138 
Trust in DEA increased due 
NEM:BA decision processes 
0.7696    0.2834 
DEA justified rationale for listing 
trout as invasive 
0.7604    0.3349 
AIS regulations strike balance 
between conservation and 
economic utilisation 
0.6440  -0.4443  0.4195 
Is trout invasive?  -0.7665   0.3843 
DEA relied on international 
evidence to list trout 
 0.5456  0.5437 0.4468 
What is sufficient criterion for 
listing a species as invasive? 
 0.7252   0.3696 
DEA researched the nature of 
ecological threat posed by trout 
  0.6577  0.4313 
AIS regulations NEMA 2.2 needs   0.7204  0.3978 
Even if regulations promote 
conservation of indigenous fish, 
their livelihood impact should not 
be neglected  
   0.4421 0.4705 
DEA followed a science driven 
process in AIS regulations 
   0.7222 0.3768 
Note: Factors with loadings <0.4 excluded 
Source: Author’s analysis 
All factors with Eigen values that were at least unity were considered so as to retain a 
broader set of factors of theoretical interest that had emerged from descriptive and earlier 
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qualitative analysis (Boermans and Kattenberg 2011, Williams et al. 2012). The principal 
component factoring results are in Appendix 7. Williams et al. (2012, p.9) emphasise that 
the “labelling of factors is a subjective, theoretical, and inductive process.” Backed with the 
pattern that emerged during descriptive analysis, labels that aligned with the study’s 
“theoretical and conceptual intent” were chosen (Williams et al. 2012, p.9).  
Four groups of items comprised the four extracted factors (Table 7-10). The factor loading 
coefficients in Table 7-10 are Bartlett coefficients used to estimate the individual scores (per 
case/row). The column labelled “Uniqueness” measures the variance that is peculiar to a 
variable because it is not shared with other variables in the factor model. Variables with 
large uniqueness values were less relevant in the factor model because they had less in 
common with other variables. For example, 57% of the variance in “DEA researched 
socioeconomics of trout” was not shared with other variables in the factor model. Thus, 
“The DEA researched socioeconomics of trout” was not quite relevant in the factor model. 
The first factor, labelled Participatory, comprised six democratic policymaking related items 
such as “The DEA consulted when developing the AIS regulations”; “The DEA justified the 
rationale for listing trout as invasive”; and “Trust in DEA increased as a result of the decision 
processes of the NEM:BA” (Table 7-10). The weightiest items in this factor were trust in the 
DEA increased (factor loading of 0.770), justification of administrative decisions (a factor 
loading of 0.760), and “The FOSAF lacks expertise to contribute to the AIS regulatory reform 
process” (factor loading of 0.760). The importance of administrative due process and 
consensual policymaking was the central thrust of this factor. It is important to note that the 
four factors entailed participatory activities – trust building is an interactive process, 
justification is an interactive process of giving and asking for reasons, balancing/win-win 
solutions imply solving the puzzle consensually as is characteristic of wicked problems and 
messes and researching socioeconomics of trout calls for active interaction between the 
DEA and the sector. 
Three items comprised the second factor, labelled “evidence for listing”: “Is trout invasive?”; 
“The DEA conclusively relied on international evidence to list trout as invasive” and the 
“Sufficient condition for listing species as invasive” (Table 7-10). The most important item of 
these three was “Is trout invasive?” (factor loading of -0.767). “Is trout invasive” entered the 
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factor negatively suggesting that as the DEA accumulated evidence of the ecological impact 
of trout, trout came to be regarded as invasive. Being regarded as invasive was associated 
with a negative connotation of being a public bad in some sense. Hence the increase in 
evidence for listing trout as invasive made it a less desirable species, especially in an 
ecological sense, hence the negative sign. “The sufficient condition for listing trout as 
invasive” (factor loading of 0.725) entered the factor positively because the sufficient 
condition if considered in its broadest sense required the gathering of evidence of ecological 
impact, human health impact, economic impact and environmental impact. A firm and 
broad evidence base positively related to the sufficient condition for listing a species as 
invasive.  
The third factor, labelled “anthropocentric”, consisted of three items: “The DEA researched 
the nature of ecological threat posed by trout” (factor loading of 0.658); the “AIS regulations 
address the spiritual, cultural, economic, developmental, psychological and social needs of 
the policy clientele, that is, NEMA 2(2) needs” (a factor loading of 0.720); and finally, “The 
AIS regulations strike balance between conservation of indigenous fishes and economic 
utilisation of trout” (factor loading of -0.444) (Table 7-10). The negative influence of the 
variable “AIS regulations strike balance between conservation of indigenous fishes and 
economic utilisation of trout” suggested that a greater bias towards human welfare in the 
current generation lost the essence of long term anthropocentrism because it imposed costs 
on future generations. On the other hand, a greater bias towards conservation lost the 
essence of short term anthropocentrism in that it imposed costs on the present generation. 
The factor focused on the people-centeredness of environmental governance in South 
Africa. Addressing cultural, spiritual, developmental, social, economic and psychological 
needs was anthropocentrism at the core. 
Lastly, the fourth factor, labelled “contextualising”, contained the items: “DEA followed a 
South African scientific research-driven process in implementing the NEM:BA” (a factor 
loading of 0.722); “DEA relied on international evidence to list trout as invasive” (a factor 
loading of 0.544); “DEA consulted with interested and affected parties in developing AIS 
regulations” (a factor loading of 0.497) and  “even if the regulations facilitate conservation 
of indigenous species, their livelihood impact should not be neglected” (factor loading of 
0.442) (Table 7-10). The most important variable in this factor was “DEA followed a South 
214 | P a g e  
 
African scientific research-driven process in implementing the NEM:BA” suggesting that 
local research was non-substitutable. It played an important role in shaping policy 
development and provided the framework for contextualising global evidence (Ellender and 
Weyl 2014, Van Rensburg et al. 2011).  Thus, the factor emphasised the need to 
contextualise evidence when making regulatory decisions, because reality was socially and 
contextually constructed through participatory processes (Bromley 2012, Dawson 1994, 
Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011, Ostrom and Cox 2010). Applying evidence without 
contextualising it would, probably, be the genesis of wickedness of a policy problem. 
Livelihood interests indispensably defined the limits and rate of institutional adjustment. 
7.4.5. Logistic regression  
The four factors in Table 7-10 became the new regressors together with some demographic 
variables. An ordered logit model was estimated first since the dependent variable 
“Reasonableness of the 2014 draft AIS regulations” was ordered with four choices: 
completely not reasonable, not reasonable, reasonable and very reasonable. The 
proportionality of odds assumption was violated (Appendix 10), suggesting that an ordered 
logit regression could not be estimated (Long and Freese 2006). Thus, the researcher 
decided to merge categories of the reasonableness variable. Completely not reasonable and 
not reasonable were re-coded as “not reasonable = 0” and reasonable and very reasonable 
were re-coded as “reasonable = 1”. Since the variable became binary, a binary logistic model 
was estimated (Equation 4-12). All demographic variables perfectly predicted the outcome 
variable except education (Appendix 11), which was included in the final model. Table 7-11 
presents the results of the final model. 
The effective estimation sample was 86 (Table 7-11). The model was significant at less than 
the 1% level of significance with a Chi-squared statistic of 37.64. Thus, the null hypothesis 
that all estimated coefficients except the intercept were jointly zero was rejected. Judging 
by the pseudo R2, the model was a good fit because with only five variables it explained over 
57% of the total variation in the probability of perceiving the 2014 proposed AIS regulations 
to be reasonable. The estimated model made theoretical sense. Exact levels of significance 
were used to interpret statistical significance of estimates since they are non-arbitrarily 
determined (Gujarati 2004).  
215 | P a g e  
 
Table 7-11: Estimation results for logistic regression of Reasonableness of AIS regulations 
 Reasonableness of 2014 draft AIS  regulations (0,1) 
Participatory 
Standard error 
P-value  
1.618*** 
.614 
0.008 
Evidence for listing  
Standard error 
P-value 
2.837** 
1.175 
0.016 
Anthropocentric  
Standard error 
P-value 
1.934*** 
.723 
0.007 
Contextualising 
Standard error 
P-value 
1.652** 
.695 
0.017 
Education 
Standard error 
P-value 
.277 
.520 
0.594 
Constant 
Standard error 
P-value 
-5.766 
3.187 
0.070 
Number of obs           86 
Log likelihood  -14.066 
LR chi2 (5)                  37.64 
Prob > chi2               0.000 
Pseudo R2                0.572 
Note: *** means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5% 
Source: Author’s analysis 
Effective participation (“participatory”) had a positive effect on the probability of perceiving 
the 2014 draft AIS regulations to be reasonable. The effect was significant at an exact 
significance level of 0.8% (Table 7-11). Béné and Neiland (2006) emphasised that effective 
participation theoretically entailed four dimensions of equity: institutional equity, 
endowment equity, economic equity and political equity in the policy space. Similarly, the 
ability to address “anthropocentric” issues facilitated affirmative perceptions about the 
reasonableness of the regulations. The effect was significant at an exact significance level of 
0.7% (Table 7-11).  
An evidence-based (“evidence for listing” species) regulatory reform process increased the 
probability that the respondent would perceive the draft AIS regulations to be reasonable. 
This positive effect was significant at an exact significance level of 1.6% (Table 7-11). The 
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founding constitutional provision for environmental governance requires reasonable 
legislative and other measures to be implemented to facilitate progressive realisation of 
environmental rights (Republic of South Africa Constitution 1996, section 24). It was 
established in Chapter Five that the judiciary interpreted reasonable legislation/regulations 
to be that for which there is a rational and defensible causal link between the 
legislative/regulatory intent, public purpose and the scientific/other evidence available to 
the policymaker. Lastly, the ability to “contextualise” scientific or other evidence had a 
positive influence on the probability of the respondent perceiving the draft AIS regulations 
to be reasonable. The effect was significant at an exact significance level of 1.7% (Table 7-
11). 
Table 7-12: Goodness of fit test for estimated logistic regression model 
 True  
Classified Regulations are reasonable =1 Regulations are not reasonable =0 Total 
+ 6 3 9 
- 5 72 77 
Total 11 75 86 
Percent correctly classified = 90.7 % 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The model correctly predicted 90.7% of the perceptions about the reasonableness of the 
2014 draft AIS regulations (Table 7-12). The estimated model was a good fit. Table 7-13 
presents transformed results derived from Table 7-11 for ease of interpretation. Only 
significant variables were reported.  
Table 7-13: Odds of perceiving the AIS draft regulations to be reasonable 
Reasonableness of 
2014 draft AIS 
regulations (0,1) 
Coeff z P>|z| % change in 
odds for a unit 
increase in X 
% change in 
odds for SD 
increase in X 
Standard 
deviation 
of X 
Participatory 1.618 2.633 0.008 404.3 410.4 1.0075 
Evidence for listing  2.837 2.415 0.016 1606.4 1644.5 1.0078 
Anthropocentric  1.934 2.675 0.007 592.0 600.0 1.0059 
Contextualising 1.652 2.377 0.017 421.6 414.6 0.9918 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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a. Participation and reasonableness of emergent institutions 
For a unity increase in “participatory”, the odds of perceiving the regulations to be 
reasonable increased by over 404%, holding other factors fixed at their means (Table 7-13). 
Similarly, for a one standard deviation increase in “participatory”, the odds of perceiving the 
regulations to be reasonable increased by just over 410%, all variables centred on their 
means (Table 7-13). This result suggests that satisfying democratic environmental 
policymaking requirements has a strong positive influence on the polity’s perceptions of the 
reasonableness of the proposed institutional arrangement.  
The lack of effective participatory governance was a major weakness of the NEM:BA 
process. Strategic informants highlighted the problem of epistemic violence. For example, 
Expert 6 (2014, pers comm) remarked that “the DEA are not doing it correctly. Why are they 
not listening to scientists? If they are, then they are not listening to the right ones”. (Expert 
6 2014, pers comm) added that although “the DEA claimed that the whole process was 
scientifically based, it is flawed… Yet, there are teams and teams of experts, scientists and 
lawyers, employed by government”. Expert 3 (2014, pers comm) also reiterated that the 
DEA leadership were “biased towards the input from scientists who are mainly their own. 
They don’t like listening to independent scientific opinions”. The most important point 
raised by Expert 3 and Expert 6 was that the DEA had its own elite group of scientists and 
lawyers whose epistemic claims really mattered in the design of institutions. The absence of 
inclusive discourse in the regulatory reform process implied that participation was 
ineffective. 
b. Evidence for listing species and reasonableness of emergent institutions 
A one unit increase in the factor “Evidence for listing” species increased the odds of 
perceiving the regulations to be reasonable by over 1606%, holding other factors fixed at 
their means (Table 7-13). The odds of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable increased 
by nearly 1645% for a one standard deviation increase in the variable “Evidence for listing” 
species, centring all variables on their means. Thus, the factor “Evidence for listing” species 
was the most critical in shaping the perceptions of the reasonableness of the regulations 
because its effect on the magnitude of the change in the odds of perceiving the regulations 
to be reasonable was at least 2.5 times the effects of changes in the other factors.  
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The implication is that a regulatory reform process that is perceived to be evidence-driven, 
subject to the inclusiveness of the evidence-generating process, qualified for a reasonable 
process of institutional change. The theory of institutional change reviewed in Chapter Two 
postulated that a progressive process of change was characterised by the instrumental 
application of knowledge and instrumental growth of relevant knowledge to resolve societal 
problems (Atkinson and Reed 1990, Bush 1987, Hayden 2006, Tool 1994). One informant 
queried the credibility of the evidence used. 
“When I write to them and I say please give me the Minister’s reasons for listing 
trout as invasive… they sent me a list of articles, which they said they relied upon in 
coming to the decision. That’s not good enough to me… You must say to me what 
aspects of those articles have you considered... And what weight have you given it in 
relation to what other considerations. And what is the reasoning, therefore, that 
allows you to make this conclusion” (Expert 5 2014, pers comm). 
Commons (2009, p.690) asserted that reasonable valuation is the “process of weighing” 
contending claims in “light of changing conditions and conflicting habitual assumptions.” 
Thus, reasonable value ultimately is “the consensual idealism” of those concerned with the 
issue at hand (Commons 2009, p.743). Expert 5 rightly demanded the “weight” assigned to 
aspects of the peer reviewed articles in light of other contextual facts. Expert 3 (2014, pers 
comm) also remarked that “so many species are listed as invasive for administrative 
convenience.” The failure of the bureaucracy to justify its reliance on certain peer reviewed 
articles and what aspects thereof it relied upon undermined the credibility of the evidence.  
The present findings suggest that there are increasing returns to investment in aquatic alien 
fish invasion research because the resultant evidence has the potential to create positive 
perceptions about the reasonableness of regulatory change proposals, which in turn would 
minimise transaction costs of environmental policy (Coggan et al. 2010, Marshall 2013, 
McCann 2013, McCann et al. 2005, Mettepenningen et al. 2011). Usually, transaction costs 
of environmental policy are magnified by controversy-driven vicious planning cycles (the 
planning curse) that fail to resolve the problem, which, often, are contestations over 
evidence used to make decisions. Repeated planning cycles involve resources such as time, 
personnel, funds and hiring of consultants, among others. Evidence is crucial for consensus 
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building, which is a sure way of addressing wicked problems (Balint et al. 2011, Rittel and 
Webber 1973). Similarly, evidence-based institutional change enables policymakers to give 
reasons and justify actions satisfactorily to private agents (Brandom 1995, Bromley 2006, 
Davidson 1963). 
Reviewing the state of South African knowledge about freshwater alien fish invasions, 
Ellender and Weyl (2014, p.125) drew attention to the fact that alien fish invasion research 
was “in its infancy” and that implementation of the DEA’s AIS regulatory framework 
required a “strong information base” (Ellender and Weyl 2014, p.128) that was regionally 
sensitive. However, they found that “South Africa is data-poor with regard to understanding 
non-native fish invasions” (Ellender and Weyl 2014, p.128, emphasis added).  
“Part of the criticism against our decision has also been how invasive trout is. Is trout 
invasive in all areas? So, it’s a valid question…  So, it’s true we haven’t done enough 
research on the invasiveness of trout or other species, but where we have done 
research there is no question that trout are invasive,” (Expert 1 2014, pers comm). 
“Policy decisions are being made in a policy vacuum. Policy decisions are being made 
in the absence of credible information. Policy decisions are being made in the 
absence of credible scientific knowledge” (Expert 5 2014, pers comm). 
Expert 1’s response confirmed the infancy of research into alien fish invasions and that not 
enough research had yet been carried out. However, with reference to Karssing (2010), 
Karssing et al. (2012), Rivers-Moore et al. (2013), Shelton (2013), Shelton et al. (2014), the 
senior official was confident that enough knowledge had been gathered to inform policy 
despite the focus of these studies on one dimension of the invasion process. A common 
feature of these studies is that they focus on the impact of trout in the invaded area, but 
they do not examine other dimensions of invasion such as availability of potentially 
colonisable habitat and the species’ historic and innate rate of range extension, which 
scholars such as Macdonald and Jarman (1985) and Richardson and Van Wilgen (2004) 
consider to be the most important. Ellender and Weyl (2014, p.128) also emphasise this 
knowledge gap stating that “relatively little research has been done on their … spread” 
(emphasis added). Expert 5’s view demonstrates how perceptions that undermine 
220 | P a g e  
 
reasonableness of new institutions easily emerge when regulated sectors have doubts about 
the credibility of the evidence used in public decision making process. 
c. Anthropocentrism and reasonableness of emergent institutions 
Attending to the needs and interests of people equitably and putting them at the forefront 
of policy processes for managing the environment defines the core of the anthropocentric 
South African constitutionalism. A unit increase in the factor “anthropocentric” increased 
the odds of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable by 592%, holding other factors fixed 
at their means (Table 7-13). For a one standard deviation increase in the factor 
“anthropocentric”, the odds of perceiving the AIS regulations to be reasonable increased by 
600%, all variables centred on their means (Table 7-13). This result was interesting in the 
sense that the definition of an invasive species in the NEM:BA had an ecological threat 
component as well as harm to human health, economic harm and environmental harm 
components. Thus, to list trout as invasive without demonstrating its threat to the human 
condition or liveability of the environment necessarily generated objections.  
In Chapter 5, the study established that the constitutional/NEMA environmental governance 
frameworks were consequentialist, which logically was human-centeredness. Thus, the 
positive effect of “anthropocentric” on the probability of perceiving the regulations to be 
reasonable corroborated the findings in Chapter 5 that in a consequentialist environmental 
governance framework, it was not enough to say that a species had an ecological impact; 
the impact had to be of such a magnitude that it jeopardised human wellbeing (Maier 2012, 
Simberloff et al. 2013). 
d. Contextualising evidence and reasonableness of emergent institutions 
The results revealed that the odds of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable increased 
by nearly 422% for a unit increase in the variable “contextualising”, holding other variables 
fixed at their means (Table 7-13). A one standard deviation increase in “contextualising” also 
increased the odds of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable by nearly 415%, all 
variables centred on their means. This was an enormous influence, which was dominated by 
the item “the DEA followed a South African scientific research-driven process in 
implementing the NEM:BA” (factor loading of 0.72), and suggested that scientific evidence 
was a necessary condition for a new institution to be perceived to be reasonable.  
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The extent to which regulations were perceived to be reasonable depended on the extent to 
which the DEA contextualised to South Africa bio-climatic conditions the scientific evidence 
used to decide the listing of species. The foregoing conclusion follows given the presence in 
“contextualising” of factors such as international evidence, consulting interested and 
affected parties in developing regulations and livelihood impact of regulations. All these 
items not only defined and shaped the context within which scientific claims are 
transformed into new institutions, but also determine the extent and speed of institutional 
adjustment. Informants were divided over the source of the evidence that should be used. 
Some invasion biologists maintained that international evidence was sufficient, while the 
trout sector argued for local research evidence. 
“Published  GLOBAL  scientific  literature has  been  through  a  scientific  peer  review  
whereas  the opinions  of  many  trout  anglers  have  been  through  a ‘pub  review’  
system  which  seems  to  reinforce what  they  say  because  they  have  heard  it  so 
many  times  BUT  no  actual   facts.!,” (Expert 7 2014, email comm, capitalization in 
original, italics added). 
“I fish for trout in the Bushman’s river, about 100km from here. I catch yellowfish, 
and I catch brown trout. They co-exist. They are both present in the system. I know 
of no other environmental harm that happens there. So, what is the imperative for 
conservation in that context? You see, it’s easy to use assumptions!” (Expert 5 2014, 
pers comm). 
“In my hometown … we also have indigenous minnows living with trout…. I keep on 
telling the officials to come and look… I have got records that I have kept to prove it” 
(Expert 6 2014, pers comm). 
“Coexistence is not a sufficient condition to deny that trout are invasive.” (Expert 2 
2014, pers comm). 
 The four quotations suggest that invasion biologists and resource users disagree sharply 
over the invasiveness of trout. To Expert 5 and Expert 6, prolonged coexistence of trout and 
indigenous species implied no environmental harm existed, but Expert 1 (2014, pers comm) 
pointed out that the trout industry only looked at the “impact of trout on indigenous fish 
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and [not] impacts across the taxa.” Anecdotal evidence of co-existence of trout contradicted 
generalisation of the invasiveness of trout in the entire country. Expert 2 (2014, pers comm) 
maintained that “Science is a natural thing same with economics. You build a case around a 
pattern. And you extend what you know into certain areas.” His argument implied 
generalisation from specific cases. What seemed surprising, however, was that an inductive 
framework used to generalise invasion from a specific case to the rest of the country was 
ruled out for generalising from specific cases the coexistence of trout and indigenous 
species to the rest of the country.  
Expert 7, however, regarded global evidence as truth and observational claims as non-truth 
and non-factual because they had not been scientifically reviewed. They lacked the truth 
content because they were outcomes of a “pub review system”, which, in his view, was 
incapable of producing facts. Hayek (1945, p.521), however, argues that today “it is almost 
heresy to suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge”, yet  “beyond 
question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be 
called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules” exists. Scholars in fisheries 
governance, however, discuss the disappearance of anecdotal knowledge, which they 
believe fills in the knowledge gaps in scientific models that often suffer from the shifting 
baselines syndrome (Jackson and Alexander 2011, Pauly 1995, Sheppard 1995, Sumaila and 
Pauly 2011).  
The anecdotes facilitate a process of “stochastic belief updating” (Bromley 2008d, p.6). The 
South African environmental governance framework enjoins governmental agencies to 
“take into account the interests, needs and values of all interested and affected parties, and 
this includes recognizing all forms of knowledge, including traditional and ordinary 
knowledge (NEMA, section 4(g), emphasis added). Thus, the dismissal of observational 
evidence under the label “pub reviewed” demonstrates that a hegemonic epistemological 
system engendered epistemic violence and undermines emergence of reasonable 
institutions.  
7.4.6. Assessing discrete changes in probability 
The probability of perceiving the regulations to be “not reasonable” was 98.8%, all factors 
held at their means (Table 7-14). Table 7-14 reveals that as “participatory” increased from 
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its minimum to its maximum, the probability of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable 
increased by 0.9032 (or 
      
      
            ), holding other variables at their means.7 
Conversely, this result implied that as participatory changed from its maximum to its 
minimum, the probability of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable declined by 99.9%. 
Thus, the probability of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable was very sensitive to the 
state of participation of resource users in environmental governance as the level of 
participation increased from its minimum (limited access policymaking order) to its 
maximum (open access policymaking order). 
Table 7-14: Discrete changes in probabilities of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable 
 from to diff from to diff mfx 
 X=min X=max Min->Max x-0.5sd X+05sd -+0.5sd  
Participatory 0.0011 0.9043 0.9032 0.0055 0.0276 0.0220 0.0198 
Evidence for 
listing  
0.0000 0.2658 0.2658 0.0030 0.0498 0.0468 0.0347 
Anthropocentric  0.0001 0.8914 0.8913 0.0047 0.0321 0.0274 0.0237 
Contextualising 0.0004 0.6101 0.6098 0.0055 0.0277 0.0222 0.0202 
 
Probability that February 2014 AIS regulations were not reasonable  
Probability that February 2014 AIS regulations were reasonable  
0.988 
0.012 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The probability of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable was also very sensitive to the 
manner in which anthropocentric issues were addressed because it increased by 0.8913 (or 
891,300%) as “anthropocentric” switched from its minimum to its maximum, holding other 
factors at their means (Table 7-14). Similarly, the probability of perceiving the regulations to 
be reasonable was sensitive to the increase in “contextualising” from its minimum to its 
maximum (increasing by 0.6 or 152,450%), holding other variables at their means. As 
“Evidence for listing” species increased from its minimum to its maximum, the probability of 
perceiving the regulations to be reasonable increased by 0.3 (or nearly infinite percent) 
holding other variables at their means, which was a very large influence.  
The marginal effect of a small increase in “participatory” on the probability of perceiving the 
regulations to be reasonable was 2% (Table 7-14). The marginal effect of a small increase in 
                                                          
7
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“evidence for listing” species on the probability of perceiving the regulations to be 
reasonable was 3.5% (Table 7-14). The marginal effect of a small increase in 
“anthropocentric” on the probability of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable was 
2.4% (Table 7-14). The marginal effect of a small increase in “contextualising” on the 
probability of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable was 2% (Table 7-14). Overall, all 
the factors had huge influences on the changes in the probability of perceiving the 
regulations to be reasonable and even the marginal effects were substantially large. 
7.5. Perceptions about invasiveness of trout 
Since the controversy was driven by disagreements over the invasiveness of trout, the study 
carried out an analysis of the probability of perceiving trout to be an invasive species. Likert-
scale variables with categories (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree and strongly 
agree) were used as already reviewed under descriptive analysis. The challenge in utilising 
such data was how to best deal with Likert-scale predictors. One view is that they are 
qualitative variables and as such, the distance between the categories is non-equal (Agresti 
2002). It would be spurious to ignore that fact and proceed to estimate the model using the 
categories as quantitative data. The second view is that the categories are quantitative 
(Agresti 2002, Long and Freese 2006, Maree 2013).  
A factorial logistic model that treated the categories as qualitative predictors was estimated 
(Equation 4-11). The estimated factorial logistic model is reported in Appendix 12; its 
goodness of fit is reported in Appendix 13; and its odds ratios are presented in Appendix 14. 
Secondly, a simple logistic model that treated the categories as quantitative predictors was 
estimated based on Equation 4-12. The alternative formulation increased degrees of 
freedom by interpreting the categorical predictors  as quantitative (Table 7-15). In order to 
assess the suitability of treating the categorical predictors quantitatively rather than 
qualitatively, the contrast between the factorial logistic model and the simple logistic model 
was tested (Appendix 15). The null hypothesis was that the simple logit model was nested in 
the factorial logit model. The likelihood ratio test returned a chi-squared statistic of 16.22 
which was statistically insignificant, with a p-value of 18% (Table 7-15). Since the null 
hypothesis that the simple logistic model was nested in the factorial logistic model could not 
be rejected, the study proceeded to utilise the simple logistic framework.  
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The simple logistic model was estimated including two items (“trout is a cultural symbol” 
and “trout fly-fishing is a way of getting intimate with nature”) that were excluded from the 
factorial logistic model because of collinearity and perfect prediction of the outcome 
variable. The results are reported in Table 7-15. Using the likelihood ratio test, the model 
was statistically significant, with a chi-squared statistic of 26.94, which was significant at an 
exact significance level of 0.5%. The model correctly classified 79.8 % of the outcomes of the 
response variable, which is a good fit (Table 7-16). 
The signs of the estimated coefficients in Table 7-15 conformed to those of the factorial 
logit model (Appendix 12). The variables, “trout is a cultural symbol” and “trout fly-fishing is 
a way of getting intimate with nature,” had theoretically consistent signs although they 
were statistically insignificant. Table 7-17 presents results for statistically significant 
variables transformed from Table 7-15.  
7.5.1. Probability of perceiving trout as invasive  
Table 7-15: Simple logit model including socio-cultural factors 
Logistic regression     Number of observations  = 79 
       LR chi2 (11)    = 26.94 
       Prob > chi2   = 0.0047 
Log likelihood = -30.1130    Pseudo R2    = 0.3090 
Is trout invasive? Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive -1.675*** 0.6060 -2.76 0.006 
Level of understanding of AIS regulations -0.886 0.5390 -1.64 0.100 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive in a given locality 
0.578*** 0.2840 2.03 0.0042 
All species regardless of origin have a permanent 
place in the ecology and economy of South Africa 
-0.870** 0.3408 -2.55 0.011 
Even if AIS regulations facilitate conservation of 
indigenous fishes, their livelihood impact should 
not be neglected  
-0.042 0.2597 -0.16 0.871 
Trout fly-fishing is a way of getting intimate with 
nature 
-0.636 0.4811 -1.32 0.186 
Trout is a cultural symbol in South Africa -0.261 0.4833 -0.54 0.589 
Percentage of friendships gained from trout 
flyfishing 
0.132 0.1646 0.80 0.424 
Level of education -0.534* 0.2806 -1.90 0.057 
Salary -0.088 0.2433 -0.36 0.719 
Log of years of fly-fishing -1.287* 0.6838 -1.88 0.060 
Constant 16.1304 5.4988 2.93 0.003 
Note: *** means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10% 
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Table 7-16: Goodness of fit test for simple logistic model 
 True  
Classified Trout is invasive =1 Trout is not invasive =0 Total 
+ 9 6 15 
- 10 54 64 
Total 19 60 79 
Percent correctly classified = 79.75% 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
Table 7-17: Transformation of simple logit results for significant variables only 
Is trout invasive? (0,1) b z P>|z| % change in 
odds for a 
unit increase 
in X 
% change in 
odds for SD 
increase in X 
SDofX 
Sufficient condition for 
listing trout as invasive 
-1.675 -2.76 0.006 -81.3 -63.0 0.5929 
List trout as invasive if 
net benefits of 
conserving indigenous 
species are positive in a 
given locality 
0.578 2.03 0.042 78.2 130.9 1.4488 
All species regardless of 
origin have a permanent 
place in the ecology and 
economy of South Africa 
-0.870 -2.55 0.011 -58.1 -69.8 1.3774 
Level of education -0534 -1.90 0.057 -41.4 -49.8 1.2910 
Log of years of fly-fishing -1.287 -1.88 0.060 -72.4 -55.3 0.6262 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
a. Sufficient condition for listing species as invasive 
To assess the trout sector’s understanding of the criteria for evaluating invasiveness, the 
questionnaire included the statement: “In my opinion the sufficient condition for listing 
trout as invasive is that [1] they must be alien and established outside their natural 
distribution range [2] they must be alien and established outside their natural distribution 
range, and threaten or can potentially threaten ecosystems, habitats and species [3] they 
must simultaneously be alien and established outside their natural distribution range; 
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threaten or can potentially threaten ecosystems, habitats and species; and do cause 
economic harm, human health harm and environmental harm”.  
For a unit increase in this item, the odds of perceiving trout to be invasive decreased by 
81.3%, holding other variables fixed at their means (Table 7-17). Alternatively, a one 
standard deviation increase in the sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive, centring 
other variables at their means, reduced the odds of perceiving trout to be invasive by 63% 
(Table 7-17). The result, which was significant at an exact significance level of 0.6%, 
suggested that the sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive was a critical policy 
variable that might explain the presence of controversy in the NEM:BA regulatory reform 
process. Focusing on alienness only as a criterion for listing species was the strictest test of 
invasiveness because it implied that every non-indigenous species was invasive. 
The definition of an invasive species has been a sticky policy issue since 2007 and strategic 
informants were divided amongst themselves on how invasiveness should be determined. 
“[The] definition can be seen in three parts: (i) A factual/scientific enquiry as 
whether the species in question is established or spread outside its natural 
distribution range; (ii) The factual/scientific enquiry into threats whether they be real 
or potential, to species, ecosystems or habitats; AND (iii) A human rights based 
enquiry into the impact of those threats (harm) on human health and wellbeing and 
the economy” (FOSAF and Trout SA 2014a, p.41, capitalisation in original). 
“So, to think that you have got a Biodiversity Act and you are going to make sure that 
you cannot protect biodiversity by saying a species is only invasive if it also has 
negative economic impact and negative human health impact and they both have to 
be satisfied, then it’s absurd” (Expert 1 2014, pers comm, emphasis added). 
“[W]hy the definition includes such things [economic harm and human health 
harm]... is because many invasive organisms including fungi and the like species 
directly harm human health... It does not say and does not intend to say, even if it is 
in that clause, that every alien invasive organism is directly impacting human health 
per se… The scientific perspective on invasiveness of trout is unequivocal!” (Expert 2 
2014, pers comm, emphasis in audio). 
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“They are not looking at the developmental side. They are not looking at the 
economic side of this policy... The debate is centred on invasiveness where they 
haven’t actually talked about the economics” (Expert 4 2014, pers comm) 
“[I]n the areas where they have self-sustaining populations, they have established. 
They can’t be invasive; they have invaded. It’s past. They are naturalised now” 
(Expert 3 2014, pers comm) 
The FOSAF and Trout SA (2014a, p.43) maintained that “[a]ll three elements of the test must 
be satisfied in order for a species to be classified as invasive.” The DEA, however, 
maintained that “the trout species are invasive in an ecological sense” (DEA 2014c, not 
paged). Thus, the assertion that invasiveness must be defined ecologically only, it seems, 
served DEA’s own administrative interests, thus satisfying the possession of power test and 
the sanction of ignorance (epistemic violence). Although fungi were to be controlled rigidly 
because of the socio-economic harm that they cause, they were all listed as category 1b 
species in the 2014 AIS regulations, List 11, which means the DEA had no immediate 
intention to eradicate them. If Expert 2’s argument follows, then the DEA’s invasive species 
lists misclassified fungi or mis-prioritised eradication interventions. Expert 3’s basic 
argument was that policymakers and scientists have to conceptualise invasion temporally to 
determine if a species had “invaded”, “is invading”, or “may invade”. By applying the time 
dimension to the invasion process, he argued, a sufficient framework for deciding 
invasiveness could be designed.  
As Figure 7-6 illustrated, more than half (56%) of the respondents perceived environmental 
activism that sought to purify South Africa of anything alien as one of the hindrances to the 
attainment of a consensual regulatory framework. The alien test was a blanket approach to 
listing species because it did not consider invasiveness, but only focused on the origin of a 
species. It was established in Chapter 6 that during the NEM:BA enactment process some 
economic interests, and surprisingly, zoocentrists such as Friends of the Tahr and Animal 
Welfare Community, criticised the Biodiversity Bill as purist and driven by a strict biological 
nativism ideology. Some scholars of biological invasions and biogeography of invasions have 
also recently argued that judging species by their invasive impact, rather than their origin, 
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was the most appropriate course of action to take (Chew and Hamilton 2011, Davis et al. 
2011, Sagoff 2009, Warren 2007). 
b. Cost-benefit analysis 
The odds of perceiving trout to be invasive increased by 78.2% for a unit increase in the 
perception that trout could be listed as invasive if the net benefit of conserving indigenous 
species was positive in a given locality, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, for a one standard 
deviation increase in the perception that trout could be listed as invasive if the net benefit 
of conserving indigenous species was positive, the odds of perceiving trout as invasive 
increased by 130.9%, centring other variables at their means (Table 7-17). The magnitude of 
the effect was statistically significant at an exact significance level of 4.2%. The intuition 
behind this finding was that respondents, 91% of whom were trout fly-fishers, supported 
conservation of indigenous fishes on condition that the DEA demonstrated that the 
regulatory intervention of conserving indigenous species by controlling trout created a 
socio-environmental surplus in a given locality. This result, despite differences in the 
magnitudes of the estimated odds, tells the same story as does the large odds ratios in 
Appendix 14 for the factorial logistic model estimates.  
Gatogang (2009) attempted a proxy cost benefit analysis using the contingent valuation 
method by determining the willingness to pay for rehabilitation of trout streams (habitat) 
and willingness to pay for eradication of trout in Rhodes Village in the Eastern Cape. He 
found that trout fly-fishers were willing to pay nearly R200,000 per annum for rehabilitation 
of trout habitats, while they were willing to pay R29,000 per annum for eradication of trout. 
Du Preez and Lee (2010a) also found that trout fly-fishers were willing to pay nearly 
R172,000 per annum for rehabilitation of trout streams. Alternatively, Gatogang’s (2009) 
results suggested that fly-fishers in their sample were 6.9 times (590%) more willing to 
invest in the quality of trout habitats than in the conservation of indigenous species.8 
c. Permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa 
Table 7-17 also reveals that a unit increase in the perception that all species have a 
permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa regardless of their origin 
reduced the odds of perceiving trout to be invasive by 58%, ceteris paribus. A one standard 
                                                          
8
  Calculated as   
       
     
              . 
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deviation increase in the perception that all species have a permanent place in the economy 
and ecology of South Africa reduced the odds of perceiving trout to be invasive by 69.8%, 
centring other variables on their means. The effect was statistically significant at an exact 
significance level of 1.1%. The logical conclusion from this result was that socio-
economically useful species were likely to be perceived as having a permanent place in a 
society especially if they fulfilled cultural purposes in addition to commercial purposes (De 
Moor and Bruton 1988).  
The results suggested that with growing usage of a species, habituation tended to indigenise 
the species so much so that people tended to accept the species as having a permanent 
place in the ecology and economy of the country (Bruton 1986, Chew and Hamilton 2011, 
De Moor and Bruton 1988, Wylie 2008). Thus, the power of habit to valorise species seemed 
a reasonable conclusion from the results (Snyder 2007, Taylor 2007). By deduction, it was 
evident that managing such species for which people have strong spiritual/socio-cultural 
attachments demanded a balancing act between scientific opinion and democratic/social 
valuation. Failing to balance out these factors seemed to have transformed the 
management of trout in South Africa into a wicked problem. 
d. Effect of education and years of fly-fishing  
A unit (one level) increase in the level of education reduced the odds of perceiving trout to 
be invasive by 41.4%, other variables fixed at their means (Table 7-17). A one standard 
deviation increase in the level of education reduced the odds of perceiving trout to be 
invasive by 49.8%, centring other variables on their means (Table 7-17). The effect was large 
and significant at an exact significance level of 5.7%.  
Lastly, an additional year of fly-fishing, fixing other variables at their means, reduced the 
odds of perceiving trout to be invasive by 72.4%. A one standard deviation increase in years 
of fly-fishing reduced the odds of perceiving trout as invasive by 55.3 %. The effect was 
statistically significant at an exact significance level of 6%. The more time one spent in fly-
fishing pursuits the less likely they were to perceive trout to be invasive. 
7.5.2. Discrete changes in the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive 
The standard approach to evaluating the effects of changes in a variable on the probability 
of observing an outcome is to compute marginal effects. However, given non-linearities 
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associated with models of binary response variables, discrete changes in the predicted 
probabilities for a given change in an independent variable make more intuitive analysis 
possible (Long and Freese 2006). Table 7-18 shows discrete changes in the probability of 
perceiving trout to be invasive assessed from three different angles, namely when a 
predictor changed from its minimum to its maximum; when a predictor changed by one 
standard deviation (+/- 0.5sd) and the marginal effects. The probability of perceiving trout 
to be invasive was predicted to be 14.3%, holding all other variables fixed at their means 
(Table 7-18). Variables that caused large discrete changes in the probability of perceiving 
trout to be invasive are likely to be the most important policy variables that have to be 
addressed to contain the wickedness of the policy problem. 
Table 7-18: Discrete changes in probability of perceiving trout as invasive 
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Sufficient condition for listing trout 
as invasive 
.753 .097 -.657 .216 .092 -.123 -.206 
List trout as invasive if net benefits 
of conserving indigenous species are 
positive in a given locality 
.038 .287 .249 .099 .203 .104 .071 
All species regardless of origin have 
a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa 
.464 .026 -.438 .234 .084 -.149 -.107 
Level of education .586 .089 -.497 .191 .106 -.085 -.066 
Log of years of fly-fishing .654 .038 -.615 .200 .101 -.100 -.158 
 
Probability of perceiving trout to be non-invasive  
Probability of perceiving trout to be invasive 
.857   
.143 
Source: Author’s analysis 
a. Level of education and years of fly-fishing 
A change in the log of years of fly-fishing from its minimum to its maximum reduced the 
probability of perceiving trout to be invasive by 0.62 (or 94%) (Table 7-18). The marginal 
effects of a very small increase in the log of years of fly-fishing on the probability of 
perceiving trout to be invasive was -16%. The result suggested that the length of the lifetime 
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spent in pursuit of trout fly-fishing created a habitual/cultural attachment to the species, 
which made it less likely that long established fly-fishers would perceive trout to be invasive. 
As the “level of education” increased from below matric/high school (minimum) to 
postgraduate (maximum), the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive decreased by 
0.50 (or 85%), other variables held at their means (Table 7-18).9 A one standard deviation 
increase in the level of education reduced the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive 
by 45%. The marginal effects of a very small increase in the level of education on the 
probability of perceiving trout to be invasive was -7%. The overall observation was that as 
the level of education increased, the tendency was to perceive trout to be non-invasive. 
Theoretically, as education increases, ecological knowledge is expected to increase and 
understanding of invasions is expected to increase (Richardson 2011). Thus, the result is 
unexpected. 
There are two possibilities that can explain the surprising outcome. The first possibility is 
that the more educated fly-fishers might have been able to engage critically with the 
literature on alien fish invasions in their evaluation of the decisions of the DEA and might 
have found the decisions scientifically unsound. However, this possibility fails to pass 
scrutiny since all the literature reviewed so far concluded that trout was invasive, at least in 
an ecological sense (Barnard 1938, Cambray 1997; 2000, 2003a; 2003b, Cambray and Bianco 
1998, Ellender and Weyl 2014, Karssing et al. 2012, Kleynhans 1996; 1999, Rivers-Moore et 
al. 2013, Shelton 2013, Shelton et al. 2014, Skelton 2000).  
There is only one scholar, who was a fly-fisher himself, who claimed that unsustainable land 
uses rather than trout were responsible for the loss of indigenous fishes in the Natal 
province (Crass 1969; 1986a; 1986b). There is only one non-peer reviewed official manual of 
the Department of Water Affairs used for studying river quality that attributed 8% of 
instream habitat destruction to exotic aquatic faunal species (trout included). The weight of 
major land uses such as water abstraction was 14%; bed modification was 13%; flow 
modification was 13%; and channel modification was 13% (Kemper 1999).   
                                                          
9
 The percentage change is given by  
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Cambray (2003a, p.64), however, provided evidence to the effect that “in the Dullstroom 
area there are now 1 500 trout dams, these having a major impact on the proper 
functioning of the Crocodile river” Thus, if Kemper’s (1999) framework is used, trout is 
implicated twice – firstly, directly through trophic cascades and secondly, indirectly through 
damming of rivers to create exclusive trout fisheries – making the overall weight 61% (water 
abstraction (14%) + flow modification (13%) + bed modification (13%) + channel 
modification (13%) + direct exotic aquatic faunal impact (8%)). Cambray (2003a, p.64) 
further stated that as a result of damming “the underwater world in this area [was now] an 
‘aquatic desert’ due to the impact of trout on aquatic biodiversity.” Even pro-trout scholars 
noted the ecological impact of trout (De Moor and Bruton 1988, Hey 1926a; 1926b; 2006).  
The second possibility is that it might have been a manifestation of the Veblenian pecuniary 
culture (Veblen [1899] 2005). The Veblenian pecuniary culture hypothesis has explanatory 
power given that places such as the Dullstroom in the Trout Triangle are popular second 
home investment destinations usually for rich urbanites who establish fly-fishing syndicates 
both for attractive financial gains and exclusive leisure (Hoogendoorn 2014, Hoogendoorn 
and Visser 2010). The supposition is that as education increases, so does the income level. 
For interest in the surprise that an increase in the level of education reduced the probability 
of perceiving trout to be invasive, and the supposition that it might be a manifestation of 
the Veblenian pecuniary culture, a “quick” estimation of the salary-education relationship 
was carried out (Table 7-19).10 The ordered logit model estimated is expressed by Equation 4-
16. 
The estimated model in Table 7-19 was significant at an exact level of significance of 0.4%, 
with a chi-squared statistic of 8.19. Worth noting from Table 7-19 is that education level 
positively influenced salary level (a coefficient of 0.352). The probability of observing a 
respondent that earned less than USD923 was 6.3%, evaluated at the mean education level. 
The probability of observing a respondent that earned greater than USD4,613 was 27.9% 
evaluated at the mean education level, and >USD4,613 was the modal income category in 
the sample. 
 
                                                          
10
 It was a “quick” estimation in that it was non-rigorous but merely sought to establish the causal relationship.  
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Table 7-19: Salary-education relationship 
Ordered logistic regression                          Number of obs   =       101 
                                                       LR chi2 (1)          =       8.19 
                                                       Prob > chi2         =       0.004 
Log likelihood = -168.104                          Pseudo R2           =       0.024 
Salary Coefficient Std. Error z p>|z| 
Education  .352 .125 2.83 0.005 
/cut1 -1.01 .675  
/cut2 .304 .623 
/cut3 1.127 .625 
/cut4 2.049 .641 
/cut5 2.648 .659 
 
Predicted probabilities and marginal effects of education on salary, (mean education level 
= 4.8 = undergraduate) 
Salary category Marginal 
effects 
Predicted 
Probability  
 
< USD 923 -.021** 0.063 
USD1015-USD1845 -.035** 0.136 
USD1937-USD2768 -.025** 0.162 
USD2860-USD3690 -.004 0.226 
USD3782-USD4613 .015* 0.134 
>USD4613 .071*** 0.279 
Note: *** means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10% 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The marginal effects were all significant except for the USD2860-USD3690 category. The 
marginal effects of small increases in the level of education on the probabilities of earning 
salaries below USD2,768 were negative. For example, the marginal effect of a small increase 
in the level of education on the probability of earning less than USD923 was -2.1% and -3.5% 
for earning USD1,015-USD1,845 implying that major improvements in education constituted 
an exit strategy from low income brackets. However, as the level of education continued to 
increase, the marginal effects on the probability of earning >USD4,613 were 7.1%. Thus, the 
inference that the highly educated were the high income classes was substantiated and the 
Veblenian pecuniary culture hypothesis became a reasonable explanation of the surprise 
result that higher education levels were associated with lower probabilities of perceiving 
trout to be invasive. All studies reviewed in the descriptive analysis concluded that the fly-
fishing fraternity was generally a high income and highly educated one (du Preez and 
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Hosking 2011, Du Preez and Lee 2010a; 2010b, Gatogang 2009, Nicholson and Snowball 
2014).  
  
 
 
Figure 7-8: Joint effect of the log of years of fly-fishing and education on the probability of 
perceiving trout as invasive 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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Figure 7-8 illustrates the joint effect of the level of education and the number of years of fly-
fishing on the probability that a respondent who was average on all other attributes 
perceived trout to be invasive. The probability curves revealed non-linearities in the 
relationships. Similarly, the effect of the log of flyfishing years on the probability of 
perceiving trout to be invasive declined with the level of education. The differences in the 
height of the curves depict the differences in the effect of the various levels of education on 
the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive. 
b. Sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive 
 
 
Figure 7-9: Joint influence of the sufficient condition of listing trout as invasive and log of 
years of flyfishing on probability of perceiving trout as invasive 
Source: Author’s analysis 
As the sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive species changed from its minimum 
(=1=alienness only) to its maximum (=3= inclusive and broad criteria), the probability of 
perceiving trout to be invasive decreased by 0.66 (or 87%), holding other variables at their 
means (Table 7-18). The effect was large. This suggested that as the criteria of listing species 
as invasive became more inclusive (of origin, biological criteria and socio-economic criteria), 
P
r(
 i
n
v
a
s
iv
e
)
logflyyears
 Alien test   alien & biological test
 bio-alien-socioeconomic test
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
0
.25
.5
.75
1
237 | P a g e  
 
the likelihood of respondents perceiving trout to be invasive decreased sharply. The 
marginal effect of a very small increase in the sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive 
on the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive was -21%, which was very large. The 
magnitude of these marginal effects illustrated that the criteria used to decide invasiveness 
was a critical public policy variable that if handled properly might have helped in resolving 
some of the controversies. 
Figure 7-9 depicts the joint influence of both the sufficient condition of listing trout as 
invasive and the log of years of fly-fishing on the probability that a respondent, who was 
average on all other attributes, perceived trout to be invasive. The probability of perceiving 
trout to be invasive was non-linear for the three categories over the range of the log of 
years of fly-fishing. Figure 7-9 reveals that the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive 
disproportionately increased as the sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive changed 
from the inclusive criterion (conjunctive test) to the strictest criterion (alienness test) over 
the entire range of the log of years of fly-fishing, holding all other variables at their means. 
While in all the three cases the probability fell over the entire range of the log of years of 
fly-fishing, it initially fell most slowly in the case of the restrictive criterion (alienness only) 
for respondents who had fewer years of fly-fishing. 
Figure 7-9 reveals that the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive fell sharply 
especially in the case of the inclusive criteria when the log of years of fly-fishing was at most 
2.25 (that is, 9.5 years of fly-fishing). Committed fly-fishers were less likely to perceive trout 
to be invasive regardless of the length of time they had spent in piscatorial pursuits. For 
respondents who believed that trout had to be listed as invasive just because it was alien, 
the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive fell steeply once the log of years of fly-
fishing exceeded 2.25. However, the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive remained 
high (at least 0.4) for the strictest criterion even when years of fly-fishing were as high as 60. 
Those who held on to the strictest criterion were likely to insist that trout were invasive 
regardless of any other considerations, such as environmental damage or socio-economic 
factors (Figure 7-9).  
It was established in Chapter 6 that the Task Group for Invasive Biota for South Africa 
developed a model for assessing invasiveness that considered dimensions such as rate of 
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range extension, propagule pressure, impact in invaded area and costliness of control as 
well as availability of potentially colonisable habitat (De Moor and Bruton 1988, Macdonald 
and Jarman 1985, Richardson and Van Wilgen 2004). Thus, the focus went beyond mere 
alienness. Recent debates in invasion ecology have also emphasised that a focus on 
alienness (origin) has led to a misjudgement of species and economically wasteful 
eradication programmes (Chew and Hamilton 2011, Davis et al. 2011, Larson 2007, Sagoff 
2005; 2009, Warren 2007). 
c. List trout if net benefits of conservation are positive 
 
 
Figure 7-10: Joint effect of the log of years of fly-fishing and the perception of that trout 
could be listed as invasive if net benefits of conserving indigenous fishes are positive on the 
probability of perceiving trout as invasive 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The probability of perceiving trout to be invasive increased by 0.25 (or 655%) as the 
perception that trout could be listed as invasive if the net benefit of conserving indigenous 
fishes in the same locality increased from its minimum (or strongly disagree=1) to its 
maximum (strongly agree=5), holding other factors at their means (Table 7-18). The 
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marginal effects of a small increase in the variable, “list trout as invasive if net benefits of 
conserving indigenous species are positive in a given locality”, on the probability of 
perceiving trout to be invasive was 7%. Thus, the probability of perceiving trout as invasive 
was quite sensitive to the provision of cost benefit analysis evidence. 
Figure 7-10 illustrates the joint effect of the perception that  trout could be listed as invasive 
so long as the net benefits of conserving indigenous fishes in the same locality was positive 
and the log of years of fly-fishing on the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive for an 
individual who was average on all other factors.  Overall, the result suggested that providing 
results of credible cost benefit analyses was a potential solution to the controversies to the 
extent that the trout sector was willing to trade-off utilisation of trout for conservation of 
indigenous fishes and/or to pay conservation levies (compensation) to conservation 
agencies. 
d. All species have a permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa 
 
 
Figure 7-11: The joint effect of the log of years of fly-fishing and the perception that all 
species have a permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa on the 
probability of perceiving trout as invasive 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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The probability of perceiving trout to be invasive fell by 0.44 (or 94%) as the variable “all 
species have a permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa” increased 
from its minimum (or strongly disagree=1) to its maximum (or strongly agree=5), other 
factors fixed at their mean values (Table 7-18). The marginal effects of a small increase in 
the variable, “all species have a permanent place in the economy and ecology of South 
Africa”, on the probability of perceiving trout to be invasive was -11%. The magnitude of 
these effects is large suggesting that invasiveness cannot be determined by biological 
factors only, socio-cultural factors also count (Chew and Hamilton 2011). 
Figure 7-11 illustrates the joint effect of the perception that “all species have a permanent 
place in the economy and ecology of South Africa” and the number of years of fly-fishing on 
the probability that a respondent who was average in all other variables perceived trout to 
be invasive.11 The effect of the log of flyfishing years on the probability of perceiving trout as 
invasive declined as a respondent’s response to the statement on the permanency of 
economic and ecological place for all species swung from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree.  
To the extent that habitual use of a species in leisure or livelihoods grants it socially created 
“rights of occupancy” (Chew and Hamilton 2011, p.41), the results suggested that the 
prioritisation of species to list for eradication has to take into account socio-economic 
criteria in addition to ecological criteria in order to satisfy due process of law. Habit has the 
power to valorise species (Veblen [1899] 2005). Veblen ([1899] 2005, p.85) argues that 
there is a paradox in that it “frequently happens that an article which serves the honorific 
purpose of conspicuous waste is at the same time a beautiful object.” Waste does not carry 
the ordinary derogatory meaning in Veblen’s theory of the leisure class. Rather, conspicuous 
waste, to Veblen, means expenditure which is not based on the instinct of workmanship and 
the canon of instrumental efficiency since these two canons help advance the broader 
societal human life process.  
The argument is that the leisure class, by the ceremonial code of decorum, highly regards 
certain game species because they might be ferocious/predatory, beautiful and challenging 
to hunt and, by habituation, monopolises and valorises the species as exclusive and 
                                                          
11
 The probability space can only display four curves at once, thus, the category neutral was excluded but 
technically the curve lies between the disagree and agree curves. 
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permanent articles of leisure. Veblen ([1899] 2005, p.93) discusses the manifestation of the 
“canon of taste” by which “pecuniary repute is traceable in the prevalent standards of 
beauty in animals.” Veblen ([1899] 2005, p.87-94) characterises such species as follows: 
“these objects are beautiful and have a utility as such; they are valuable on this 
account if they can be appropriated or monopolized; they are, therefore, coveted as 
valuable possessions, and their exclusive enjoyment gratifies the possessor’s sense 
of pecuniary superiority at the same time that their contemplation gratifies his sense 
of beauty…This class of animals are conventionally admired by the body of the upper 
classes … [by] drawing a hard and fast line of pecuniary demarcation between the 
beautiful and the ugly.” 
Conspicuous waste is invidious expenditure that results in social differentiation (Wisman 
2011). In effect, the law of conspicuous waste is a Darwinian selection mechanism that 
explains “the persistence of such forms [of institutions and articles of leisure] as are fit to 
survive under its dominance. It acts to conserve the fit, not to originate the acceptable” 
(Veblen [1899] 2005, p.111). Thus, the persistence of certain institutions of leisure and the 
species that serve honorific roles implies that they survived the Darwinian selection criterion 
of ceremonial adequacy evident in the law of conspicuous waste. 
7.6. Conclusions 
The results, firstly, suggested that for the NEM:BA draft AIS regulations to pass democratic 
muster, the DEA has to attend to making right participatory environmental governance. The 
roles of trust-building, reason-giving to questions asked by the policy clientele and striking 
win-win solutions as well as taking into account socio-economics of trout were relevant 
dimensions. Addressing these matters would satisfy administrative due process, which 
would result in reasonable value and social utility.  
Secondly, implementing the regulations within the confines of anthropocentrism would 
grant the regulations the licence of reasonableness. Thirdly, contextualising scientific 
evidence, which entails taking into account livelihood impact and the impact of a species on 
the liveability of the environment, created conditions for affirmative perceptions to the 
regulatory intent. Lastly, the decision to list trout as invasive demanded an explicit 
framework that clearly singled out the criteria for doing so. The results suggest that the 
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sufficient condition for listing trout (as any other alien and invasive species) needed to be 
defined more rigorously beyond reference to predatory impacts of a species and it had to be 
inclusive of ecological and socio-economic criteria.  
Taken together, these four conclusions suggested a practical framework within which 
democratic imperatives, human wellbeing as well as the social and cultural context define 
the limits and speed of institutional adjustment in biodiversity management. While 
scientists might prefer a shock therapy approach that is ecocentric or biocentric, dialectic 
forces would be unleashed by anthropocentric forces that almost always ceremonially 
encapsulate any scientific claims for which the political community does not find sufficient 
reasons to act upon. These conclusions corroborate the major finding in Chapter 6, which 
established and contextually validated the green apartheid hypothesis. It was shown that 
fundamentalism in scientific thought shaped the NEM:BA to be the controversial legislation 
that it came to be insofar as management of alien and invasive species was concerned. 
Economic sectors were isolated during the formative years of the NEM:BA, while a strong 
biological nativism defined the configuration of the new institution (the NEM:BA) and pre-
ordained its implementation (regulatory phase) as such.  
The findings, however, have also revealed the role of the Veblenian pecuniary culture in 
shaping the controversies. Even if the DEA had failed on a number of democratic 
policymaking fronts, the trout sector also had a ceremonial system of interests. Firstly, as 
the education level increased, contrary to theoretical expectations, trout fly-fishers were 
more likely to perceive trout to be non-invasive. It was also shown that there was a general 
perception that trout had a permanent place in the economy and ecology of South Africa 
and that this perception could be explained in terms of culture, social status and most of all 
the Veblenian pecuniary culture. The trout sector, nonetheless, supported the conservation 
of indigenous fishes so long as the DEA demonstrated that the net benefit of conserving 
such species in traditional trout habitats generated a net socio-environmental surplus. 
Chapter 8 presents an evolutionary analysis of the AIS regulatory reforms from a semiotic 
perspective. It provides a grand overview. Since the quantitative analysis carried out in 
Chapter 7 is based on self-reported data, an independent type of data is required to 
triangulate the quantitative findings.  
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Chapter 8  
  Implementation of the NEM:BA deal – evolutionary analysis 
 
“Perhaps, when the new Bible of Science is written, one may read of man as the prodigal son 
of Mother Nature, flouting for a time her admonition and her wisdom, spending his  heritage 
in riotous living; but at last reduced to the husks upon a barren waste of his own making, he 
crawls back to his Old Mother's fire-side and listens obediently to the story of a certain wise 
man whose name was Ecology,” (Wissler 1924, p.317) 
 
“If you are a man of authority, 
Be patient when you are listening to the words of a petitioner; 
Do not dismiss him until he has completely unburdened himself 
Of what he had planned/to say to you 
A man who has been wronged desires to express his frustrations 
Even more than the accomplishment of the (justice) for which he came, 
But concerning him who dismisses petitions 
Men say, ‘Why ever did he reject it?’ 
Not everything about which he has petitioned will be done, 
But a sympathetic hearing is a means of calming the heart.” 
 
The Maxims of Ptahhotep, not dated 
 
8.0. Introduction 
The process of creating new legislation is a process of negotiating economic deals at its core 
(Beard [1935] 2012, Bromley 1997; 2008a). It is a flow of rationing transactions. The goal of 
the negotiation is to address problems that motivated the need for the new legislation. The 
regulatory phase is a process of implementing the negotiated deals by devising rules that 
clarify and operationalise the legislation (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2011). However, there 
could be institutional failure whenever the process of developing regulations becomes more 
prolonged and contested than the process of creating the primary legislation. Some 
plausible hypotheses might explain the failure when it exists.  
Chapters 5 and 6, firstly, confirmed that the deal negotiation process might have been 
prematurely closed before a real deal was struck. Secondly, Chapters 5 and 6 confirmed that 
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the negotiation of the deal has been exclusive (limited access policymaking order) such that 
the once marginalised groups, for the first time, have been negotiating institutional spaces 
to have the deal modified at the regulatory phase. Chapter 8, thirdly, confirms the 
hypothesis that the executors of the deal (implementing governmental agencies) might have 
been failing to comprehend the essence of the deal properly. This miscomprehension 
opened the deal implementation process to the sanction of ignorance (epistemic violence), 
which ultimately led the governmental agency to redefine administratively the legal 
entitlements that the legislature has already redefined. The administrative redefinition of 
the opportunity sets became the origin of the phenomenon of institutional isolation. The 
plausibility of the third hypothesis as an explanation of the contested institutional 
adjustment process for biodiversity governance and its implications for institutional 
isolation using the trout industry as a case study was evaluated. 
Contrary to the Department of Environmental Affairs’ (DEA’s) claim that before amendment 
the NEM:BA was so disenabling that comprehensive AIS regulations could not be developed 
and implemented (Bashoff 2013a; 2013b, Minister of Environmental Affairs 2012), the 
chapter demonstrates that the administrative process of developing regulations actually 
disenabled the NEM:BA to a large extent. Section 8.1 briefly outlines the method of semiosis 
and the data sources that were used. Section 8.2 provides a historical analysis of the 
evolution of the pecuniary system in trout fisheries. Section 8.3 discusses the historical 
determination of environmental entitlements that partly underpin the problem for 
biodiversity governance today. Section 8.4 extends Bush’s (1987) model on institutional 
spaces and ceremonial encapsulation. Section 8.5 to 8.9 present analysis of the 2004-2014 
NEM:BA regulatory reform process. Section 8.10 concludes the chapter. 
8.1. Method of analysis – semiosis 
The trichotomy – emotional, energetic and logical interpretants – as discussed in Chapter 4 
was utilised. It was within this analytical method that components of the working integrated 
institutionalist paradigm (Figure 3-2) were applied to the South African case study. The 
negotiational psychology, of which epistemic violence is a special case, is a semiotic process 
in that the commands, the coercions and argumentations are flows of signs capable of being 
interpreted by intelligible agents. Semiotics is a sociocognitive analysis of how institutions 
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evolve and it illuminates the open access and limited access policymaking orders, which 
provide an ontological framework for Commons’ negotiational psychology.  
Major events, processes, the main actors, and the non-linearities that the process assumed 
over the decade (2004-2014) were identified. Every major event or process and the 
responses it attracted from the policy clientele or policymaker was classified into the 
Peircean trichotomy of interpretants. The objective was to identify the sources, forms and 
extent of institutional isolation as the process evolved over time. 
For data, the study utilised the trout industry’s submissions to the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA) since 2005 and the DEA’s responses. The major actors since 
that time were the Federation of South African Flyfishers (FOSAF), the Trout Interest Group 
(TIG) as well as a coalition of the FOSAF and Trout South Africa (Trout SA). Court papers for 
the Kloof Conservancy v. Republic of South Africa, 2014 case were obtained, and access to 
information that would usually be difficult to obtain, even through interviews was gained. 
The data from these court papers provided a means for triangulating the views expressed by 
the senior government official in the interview. The papers were in the public domain, thus 
posing no ethical issues. 
8.2. Evolution of a pecuniary system in trout fisheries  
To undertake a brief reconstruction of the pecuniary system that underpins the historic 
development of trout fisheries in South Africa, section 8.2 briefly reviews and applies 
Veblen’s ([1899] 2005) Theory of the Leisure Class. Veblen (1898a, p.393) asserts that 
economics has to be a science of the “process of cultural growth”. In the Theory of the 
Leisure Class, Veblen ([1899] 2005) argues that as the process of cultural growth takes place 
complex institutions of leisure consistent with the stage of economic development also 
evolve. The leisure class theory characterises the evolution of a culture of economic and 
environmental greed entrenched in inequality and regressive institutional development 
(Veblen ([1899] 2005, Wisman 2011).  
In the emergence of the leisure class, there is an associated development of a ceremonial 
code of decorum (Veblen [1899] 2005). Decorum prescribes behaviour that is consistent 
with good taste. The code of decorum, as an example, defines how one differentiates 
between noble and ignoble, ferocious and docile, as well as between beautiful and 
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unappealing fly-fishing species. Some species are non-ferocious and ignoble, hence their 
replacement in the ecosystem with suitable species that pass the ceremonial adequacy test, 
as demanded by the code of decorum, becomes a ‘justified’ action of the leisure class. The 
suitable species have to be imported and acclimatised.  
The ceremonial code of decorum is a status preservative inasmuch as it guides the 
ceremonial differentiation of articles of leisure. Veblen ([1899] 2005) argues that species 
that serve honorific ends are monopolised by the leisure class. The leisure class lobbies for 
the design of pecuniary institutions to safeguard its “social standing,” “social claims,” and 
“social assets” (Polanyi [1957] 2001, p.48), and these can be laws and policies that secure 
such pecuniary motives. Monopolisation, in turn, finds expression in the institution of 
private property. Protective laws might be enacted and enforced, and exclusive usage of the 
species for honorific ends legally certified. The leisure class becomes the most powerful 
class that determines why, how, and to what extent institutional adjustment can take place 
insofar as the adjustment interferes with the class’ interests.  
8.3. Conceptual model for characterising institutional adjustment for trout fisheries 
Bush’s (1987) concept of institutional spaces, which was reviewed in Chapter 2, represents 
various mechanisms of ceremonial encapsulation and institutional change dynamics. Section 
8.3 extends it. As it stands, it views society in a dichotomous way, whereby one social group 
has ceremonial interests and another has instrumental interests. However, it can be argued 
that each participant/group has both ceremonial and instrumental interests. The interests 
only differ in terms of relative dominance in that particular individual/group. In any given 
policymaking context, there necessarily are pro- and anti-policy groups. Each group has four 
(rather than two) possible behavioural strategies. A policy change proposal can be 
ceremonially feasible, instrumentally feasible, ceremonially non-feasible, and instrumentally 
non-feasible. With this reorganisation of the Bushian institutional space concept, as 
depicted in Table 8-1, the story of trout in South Africa can be re-interpreted dynamically. 
Table 8-1 summarises the entire history of the introduction of trout and the associated 
institutional (re)adjustment processes to the present day.  
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Table 8-1: Augmented conceptual model of institutional spaces 
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Lysenkoan I –
Convergence of 
ideological egos and 
interests all satisfied; 
Trout introduction in 
1867-1985; law 
promulgated in 1867 to 
support introduction and 
protection of trout as 
livestock ; trout 
protective legislation; 
government subsidies 
Ceremonial 
encapsulation II –  
2014 AIS draft 
regulations -  
institutional 
hegemony through 
the sanction of 
ignorance  
 
 
Lysenkoan V –wicked 
problem; non-
convergent values 
and beliefs;  
DEA says trout are 
invasive by ecological 
definition (2005-
2014), trout industry 
objects; Trout SA 
formed; propaganda 
begins 
 
Lysenkoan VI – 
Wicked problem;  
2007 AIS 
regulations; July 
2013 interim 
regulations; 
trout 
deliberately 
misclassified 
without credible 
justification 
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Ceremonial 
encapsulation I –Leisure 
and pecuniary interests 
largely prevail as fly-
fishers dominated the 
policy space (1986 
compromise to the trout 
wars) 
 
 
Instrumental 
Consensus 
Democratic 
constitutional 
imperative = open 
access order in all 
dimensions (Trout 
regulation 2014, 
compromise 
solution); 2009 draft 
AIS regulations nearly 
reached this solution 
Instrumental 
embodiment II – 
Anti-trout interests 
prevail since wider 
society supports 
conservation– 1986 
trout wars  (initial 
position); 2005/6 AIS 
regulations position; 
FOSAF accede to 
listing of trout 2009 
Lysenkoan VII – 
wicked problem; 
Need 
negotiation or 
no action;  
Both sides have 
instrumental 
solutions, but it’s 
about whose 
knowledge 
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Lysenkoan II – Wicked 
problem; non-
convergent values and 
beliefs; conservation 
authorities mid 80s 
started propaganda 
campaigns; 
FOSAF says trout not 
invasive (2005-2014)  
but DEA disagrees by 
ecological definition;  
Instrumental 
embodiment I –
Leisure and  
pecuniary interests 
prevail because 
wider society prefers 
trout to other species 
(National 
development plan; 
National aquaculture 
policy) 2014 forward 
Status quo  by 
default – Let nature 
take its course 
Status quo by 
default – Let 
nature take its 
course 
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Lysenkoan III – wicked 
problems; leisure and 
pecuniary interests 
prevail; demand in 1986 
by trout sector for trout 
to remain protected as 
livestock.  
Lysenkoan IV – 
Wicked problems; No 
action major action 
besides stopping 
funding subsidising 
trout fishing; trout 
sector continues to 
expand (1986-2003) 
Status quo by default 
– Let nature take its 
course 
Status quo by 
default -Let 
nature take its 
course 
 
Source: Author’s extension of Bush’s (1987, p.1092) institutional spaces 
Table 8-1 illustrates that only two stable institutional equilibria could resolve the wickedness 
of the trout regulation problem: the convergence of ceremonial interests and the 
convergence of instrumental interests. Tables 8-2A – 8.2C, which are discussed in section 
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8.5, semiotically analyse some of the negotiational processes that shaped the institutional 
adjustment processes of the regulatory reform process depicted in Table 8-1. Sociocognitive 
processes and social imaginaries that influenced the ideas that shaped the processes are 
captured by the semiotic codes in Table 8-2A – 8.2C. 
8.4. Environmental entitlements and propagation of trout in South Africa 
The first stable institutional equilibrium, by default, was non-controversial because it was an 
era of convergence of ceremonial interests in having trout propagated and acclimatised in 
South African waters (Table 8-1). Policymakers, politicians, scientists and fly-fishers argued 
for trout introduction. News of successful introduction of trout species in Australia, 
Tasmania, and New Zealand in 1864 motivated individuals with piscatorial interests to start 
importing trout from Europe and North America since 1875, but the acclimatisation success 
rate was mixed (Crass 1986b).  
The dominant argument was that there was no suitable indigenous species for fly-fishing 
(Hey 1926a; 1926b; 1928). Nicolls and Eglington (1892, p.134) argued that there was “little 
opportunity for displaying his skill with rod or line, as the varieties inhabiting the [South] 
African rivers are few in number and afford little interest to the sportsman or naturalist” 
(emphasis added). Bennion (1920, p.viii) also claimed that “all that was needed to make that 
spacious land [of South Africa] perfect was some trout fishing”. Jackson (1986, p.7) also 
stated that “the argument that no indigenous fish species served the same purpose as well 
as the introduced alien [fishes] still holds good.” The ceremonial code of decorum seemed 
to dictate the taste for non-indigenous species, especially ferocious game fish.  
The Cape Colony legislature passed the Fish Introduction Act of 1867. The Act had one 
purpose: “For Encouraging the Introduction in the Waters of this Colony of Fishes not native 
to such Waters…,” (Fish Introduction Act 1867, p.1061, emphasis added). The Act created an 
incentive system to encourage private initiative to introduce alien fishes. Different private 
agents that were willing to introduce alien fish had the legal aid of the State, which 
“provided by law means for the protecting of the same fish, spawn and fry,” (Fish 
Introduction Act 1867, p.1061, emphasis added).  
The Act was so generous that an individual only needed to “apply in writing to the 
Governor” for permission, and specify in the application the type of fish to be introduced, 
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and the number of rivers/catchments into which the fish would be introduced and to “state 
in such application what degree and nature of protection… the applicant requires for such 
fish” (Fish Introduction Act 1867, p.1061). The protection was for “securing the propagation, 
or fair chance of propagation, of the fish” (Fish Introduction Act 1867, p.1061, emphasis 
added). Subsequently the Governor promulgated a proclamation “having the force and 
effect of law” to protect the stocked waters (Fish Introduction Act 1867, p.1062).  
The process of allocating environmental entitlements and privatisation of the aquatic 
commons began with the Act. The incentive system was of the land enclosure-type 
movement, such as “the enclosure movement in South Africa,” (Bromley 1994, p.358), 
although the 1867 Fish Introduction Act created an aquatic enclosure movement. The Act, 
therefore, encouraged indiscriminate introduction of fishes and Cambray (2003a, p.65) 
states that the “majority  of  the  problems  created  by  the  indiscriminate distribution  of  
alien fishes  many years ago remain  with us  today.” 
Celebrating the successful introduction of trout, Hoy (1913, p.5) commented that “the South 
African angler [had] now reached the highest pinnacle of bliss” because of “careful game 
laws and stocking.” Crass (1986b, p.125) also emphasised that “Ever since trout were first 
introduced to South Africa an interminable succession of legislative provisions has been 
brought into effect to protect the [trout] fish...” Expressing the same view, Curtis (2005, 
p.19) indicated that “[t]rout were … strictly under the protection of the Crown”. A strong 
pecuniary system was slowly developing. Provincial Nature Conservation Authorities, too, 
were charged with propagating, stocking, and conserving trout at the expense of indigenous 
fishes (Skelton 2000, Skelton and Davies 1986). In effect, leisure-augmentation influenced 
the design of various pieces of legislation that were all targeted at preserving the honorific 
status of trout and other alien fish. Thus, trout became institutionalised both in law and 
culture in the South African context.  
Discussions on ceremonially warranted behaviours assume away the possibility of future-
bound ceremonial systems. “In all its manifestations the ceremonial system is past-binding,” 
Ayres (1996, not paged, emphasis added) argued, but it can also be future-bound if an 
envisaged institutional adjustment adequately serves ceremonial interests of the leisure 
class irrespective of its instrumental non-feasibility (a typical case of a Lysenkoan 
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institutional adjustment (Table 2-1). This argument seems plausible considering that the 
impetus for the introduction of trout was the news about successful introduction of trout in 
other countries (Crass 1986b). Aquaculture development was only considered three 
decades after recreational fisheries were successfully established (Hey 1926a; 1926b). 
Ceremonial interest, therefore, made efforts to introduce trout into South African waters — 
that is, to realise a future they had been imagining (Bromley 2004b, Dawson 1994).  
Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2 show that the distribution of trout species in the period before, 
and up to, the 1980s is the same as the present-day distribution of trout. Figure 8-1 
demonstrates that trout fisheries mostly were developed in upper catchments 
(watersheds), where environmental conditions were more suitable for trout to breed. 
However, aquatic scientists argue that such upper catchments are refuges for endangered 
indigenous fish species. Cambray (2003b, p.221) also emphasised: “Private syndicates are 
developed that purchase mountain catchment areas to create exclusive waters for alien 
trout angling.” Cambray and Bianco (1998, p.349), for example, also argue that “Rainbow 
trout are usually introduced into those very upper catchment areas where we should have 
the best chance of conserving sections of aquatic ecosystems.”  
By creating an autopoietic (self-referential) pecuniary system (Valentinov 2015), the 
environmental entitlements created by the 1867 Act have become the source of 
institutional path dependence (Table 8-1). Such a system evaluates every proposed 
institutional change only in terms of its ceremonial adequacy standard. Trying to reclaim 
trout waters for indigenous fishes redistributes economic advantages. The trout sector is 
likely to resist change because the system of environmental entitlements created by the 
1867 Act and subsequent legal instruments favoured the sector. Thus, the autopoietic 
pecuniary system determines the extent and rate of institutional adjustment. 
The result of convergence of ceremonial interests was a Lysenkoan I institutional 
adjustment that did not carefully weigh all the aquatic evidence in the Inland Fisheries 
Surveys of 1925-1928, but justified nationwide and large scale species introduction. A 
nascent body of knowledge of the invasiveness of trout was existent, and was 
acknowledged in the fisheries survey reports of the 1920s (Barnard 1938, Hey 1926a; 1926b, 
Skelton 2000). A number of institutional outcomes can be identified: privatisation of the 
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commons through the aquatic enclosure movement with a systematic catchment approach 
(Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2), and leisure augmentation by controlling as much environmental 
resources as possible. 
 
Figure 8-1: Historic distribution of rainbow trout 
Source: De Moor and Bruton (1988, p.79): Atlas of alien and translocated indigenous species 
aquatic animals in Southern Africa. 
 
Figure 8-2: Present distribution of rainbow trout 
Source: Shelton (2013, p.11): Impacts of non-native rainbow trout on stream food webs in 
the Cape Floristic Region, South Africa: integrating evidence from surveys and experiments. 
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The Commonsian theory of institutional change gives an interesting account of the 
introduction of trout. First, the news of successful acclimatisation of trout in Australia, 
Tasmania and New Zealand came as a surprise, which set in motion an inquiry process 
(Dawson 1994). Second, the emerging expression was that South African rivers were 
species-poor (principle of scarcity). The ceremonial code of decorum created the perceived 
scarcity. The imagining was that well-stocked trout waters were also possible in South Africa 
(principle of futurity). To realise that future, a series of strategic transactions were set in 
motion starting with the design of the 1867 Fish Introduction Act and other supportive 
policy instruments (principle of working rules) designed by the Cape Colony government 
(principle of sovereignty).  
By 1985, Provincial Nature Conservation Departments, which for the past 80 years had been 
conserving alien fish, changed their conservation ideology and attitudes (Ferrar and Kruger 
1983, Skelton 2000). As established in Chapter 6, in 1980, invasion biology research was 
institutionalised in South Africa, and South African biological invasion scientists began to 
lead global invasion research processes (De Moor and Bruton 1988, Ferrar and Kruger 1983, 
Peretti 1998). In the early 1980s, botanists and Provincial Nature Conservation Authorities 
started anti-alien species propaganda campaigns (Ferrar and Kruger 1983). Conservation 
authorities proposed removal of protection from trout and advocated for conservation of 
indigenous species. To the government, this was instrumentally feasible, but to the leisure 
class, this was an assault on their social standing and social assets. Thus, trout wars began. 
In the instrumental embodiment II configuration (Table 8-1), conservation interests were 
determined to reverse the institutional perversity that nearly a century of policymaking and 
legislation since the late 1860s had created (Crass 1986b). 
Trout fly-fishers, however, demanded that the protection of trout be maintained and that 
the government had to continue to fiscally support the sport (Skelton and Davies 1986). This 
position was Lysenkoan III (Table 8-1). The provincial authorities could not agree with fly-
fishers because their argument was that trout was imposing an unnecessary fiscal burden 
on society and driving indigenous species to extinction (Skelton and Davies 1986). It can be 
seen that the authorities’ initial position of instrumental embodiment II and the trout fly-
fishing sector’s initial position of Lysenkoan III were quite disparate. Consequently, 
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protracted negotiational processes and media wars eventually led to a compromise, as 
depicted by ceremonial encapsulation I (Table 8-1).  
Trout fly-fishers demanded a compromise solution in which “trout responsibility, valuable 
infrastructure, laws, and law enforcement systems, [were to be] transferred where 
necessary into private management in as orderly and least harmful a manner as possible,” 
(Jackson 1986, p.8, emphasis added). Fly-fishers were interested in the continuation of that 
pecuniary system even if it meant privatisation of trout fisheries management and 
legislative enforcement powers. The Cape Department of Nature and Environmental 
Conservation, however, explained its institutional adjustment proposal, which was to 
demarcate “sensitive waters” and “non-sensitive waters” so that “the status quo regarding 
trout fishing will for practical purposes remain as it is,” (Hamman 1986, p.10, emphasis 
added). 
The status quo did not change because major catchments that were prime trout waters 
remained in the control of trout fly-fishers (Figure 8-1). Conservation policy was 
ceremonially encapsulated. Thus, the configuration labelled ‘ceremonial encapsulation I’ 
managed to preserve the status quo nearly intact. Sections 8.5 to 8.9 discuss the 
contemporary institutional adjustment problem under the NEM:BA. 
8.5. Limited access policymaking order: 2004-2007 
The semiotic analysis of the regulatory reforms in the governance of alien and invasive 
species (AIS) had its genesis in the statutory injunction that the Minister was constitutionally 
bound to publish AIS regulations and a national list of invasive species within two years after 
the NEM:BA, on 1 September 2004, became law (NEM:BA section 70(1)(a)). In compliance, 
the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism set up a task team to draft the 
regulations and to develop the list of invasive species. The task team comprised top-level 
taxonomists in the country (Henderson 2013), who had to work on both the listing of 
invasive species (a scientific domain) and drafting of regulations (a socio-economic domain). 
Macleod (2006, p.13, emphasis added) interviewed leaders of the task team who 
emphasised that “just about every scientist in this field here agreed the draft regulations we 
drew up were a good thing.”  
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The task team that dealt with aquatic alien species comprised invasion biologists, some of 
whom had led anti-trout campaigns in various peer-reviewed and non-peer reviewed 
publications since 1997 (Table 8-2A). The appointment of such scientists onto the task team 
served as a sign of possible marginalisation of the interests of the trout industry in the entire 
regulatory process. Table 8-2A indicates that “the underlying dilemma structure of 
interaction [kept] on living below the surface of the existing institution and remain[ed] 
latently present” after the 1986 institutional solution (Petrick and Pies 2007, p.258, 
emphasis in original). The end of trout wars in 1986 appeared to have resolved the 
ecocentric-anthropocentric dilemma, but it had not. The conflict was latent, and was 
resurrected by “academic scribblers” as Ayres (1996, not paged) would call them. 
For example, one leading anti-trout researcher, and a member of the task team, 
recommended to “South African environmental policy-makers [that]... [w]e have just passed 
through a period of political terrorism: let us now move away from eco-terrorism, even if it 
means the end of trout,” (Cambray 1997, p.27, emphasis added). Calling trout fisheries 
expansion eco-terrorism and likening it to political terrorism, generated outrage among fly-
fishers in the media (Brown 2013).  The recommendation to end trout seemed to threaten 
an entire industry. Cambray (2003b, p.225) extended his argument to what signified 
potential marginalisation of economic activities utilising alien species emphasising that 
“Policy makers opt for a rationalist response of sustainable development”, which 
perpetuates domination of nature by humankind. He, thus, recommended that there 
“should be total eradication of the aliens in rivers and lakes” (Cambray 2003b, p.226). 
In his argument, Cambray demonstrates his belief that the search for win-win solutions had 
failed to resolve ecological problems. To him, sustainable development was part of the 
problem. Since past policies had advanced anthropocentricism, now it was time for policies 
to advance biocentrism and/or ecocentricism as a solution to the problem of alien and 
invasive species. He, thus, advocated for a win-lose framework. Since trout fisheries 
comprised feral and domesticated stocks, the recommendation for total eradication was a 
sufficient sign that appointment of scientists sharing Cambray’s ideology to decide the fate 
of industries relying on alien and invasive species was a survival and viability threat to them 
(Table 8-2A). 
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Table 8-2A: Semiotic codes for the NEM:BA regulatory reform process  
Period Sign Object Interpretant 
1986-
2003 
Anti-trout scientists 
recommend complete 
eradication of trout from 
inland waters and label trout 
fisheries development eco-
terrorism 
Survival 
and 
viability 
threat to 
the trout 
industry 
 Fly-fishers outraged (emotional);  
 Fly-fishers respond through media 
campaigns (energetic) 
2005-
2006 
Minister appoints some 
members of the anti-trout 
lobby to the task team 
charged with listing invasive 
species and drafting AIS 
regulations 
Survival 
and 
viability 
threat to 
the trout 
industry 
 Fear that trout sector would be 
marginalised (emotional); 
 FOSAF (2005) responds with a trout 
position paper offering institutional 
innovations (energetic);  
 Trout sector mobilises to lobby 
national decision makers (energetic) 
2005-
2006 
Task team classifies trout as 
species to be regulated 
through a zonal approach 
(logical); Trout sector 
proposal in the position 
paper adopted (logical) 
Industry is 
now 
secure 
 Trout sector consulted (energetic);  
 Trout sector supports the regulations 
and list of invasive species (logical, 
that is symbol recognition) 
2005-
2006 
DEA rejects the 2005/2006 
species lists and regulations; 
Task team dismissed 
Survival 
and 
viability 
threat to 
the trout 
industry 
 Trout sector outraged (emotional); 
 Original task team frustrated 
(emotional); 
  Experts criticise the DEA (energetic) 
2006-
2007 
DEA hastily publishes draft 
AIS regulations and invasive 
species lists 
Survival 
and 
viability 
threat to 
the trout 
industry 
 Original task team criticises the 
species lists because of many 
inadequacies (energetic);  
 Trout sector outraged (emotional);  
 Trout sector responds with a 
censuring letter (energetic);  
 Trout sector makes critical comments 
and proposes policy innovations 
(energetic) 
2008-
2010 
DEA makes major revisions 
to the 2007 draft regulations 
and publishes the 2009 draft 
that reverted to the 
2005/2006 regulatory system 
Industry is 
now 
secure 
 Trout sector welcomes the 2009 draft 
(emotional) 
 Trout sector provides more 
constructive comments (energetic) 
 Trout sector accedes to the listing of 
trout as invasive (logical, symbol 
recognition) 
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Table 8-2B: Semiotic codes for the NEM:BA regulatory reform process 
Period Sign Object Interpretant 
2008-
2010 
DEA commissions the SANBI 
to consult with the trout 
sector to discuss the principles 
and methodology for mapping 
trout waters and SANBI holds 
workshop and collaboration 
with the trout sector begins 
Willingness to 
consult 
 Trout sector disappointed with 
the DEA’s disengagement in the 
process (emotional) 
 FOSAF’s mapping principles and 
mapping methodology adopted 
fully (logical, symbol 
recognition) 
2008-
2010 
SANBI contracts the SAIAB to 
map trout waters and SAIAB in 
collaboration with the trout 
sector maps trout waters 
Willingness to 
consult 
 Disagreements with SAIAB over 
the mapping (emotional) 
 Disengagement (energetic) 
 Re-engagement (energetic) 
2008-
2010 
Chief State Law Advisor shows 
that the 2009 draft 
regulations could not pass 
legal muster because the 
NEMBA disallowed the DEA’s 
regulatory intensions 
Regulations 
failed 
constitutionality 
and legality test 
 DEA revises the 2009 regulations 
(energetic) 
 DEA begins to amend the 
NEM:BA (energetic) 
2008-
2010 
DEA rejects trout maps and 
SAIAB consultant resigns 
because of the NEM:BA 
process 
Survival and 
viability threat to 
the trout 
industry 
 Trout sector frustrated 
(emotional) 
2011-
2013 
DEA promulgates 2013 
interim regulations with two 
categories of invasive species, 
with trout species requiring 
compulsory control, but the 
DEA failed to give reasons for, 
and to justify, the listing 
Regulatory 
process comes 
short of 
administrative 
due process 
requirements 
 FOSAF demands justification for 
the listing of trout in 2013 
(energetic) 
 FOSAF mobilises for litigation 
(energetic) 
 FOSAF demands the DEA’s 
audience (energetic) 
2011-
2013 
DEA responds with a letter of 
assurance to the FOSAF 
emphasising that trout would 
not be eradicated, and the 
DEA persists with its 
regulatory reform proposal 
Survival and 
viability threat to 
the trout 
industry 
 Trout sector forms a lobby 
group called Trout South Africa 
(energetic) 
 Trout South Africa pledges to 
fight for the delisting of trout 
under the DAFF and to oppose 
every decision about trout that 
the DEA makes (emotional) 
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Table 8-2C: Semiotic codes for the NEM:BA regulatory reform process 
Period Sign Object Interpretant 
2013-
2014 
DEA promulgates the NEM:BA 
amendment (NEMLA) in 2013, 
revisits the 2009 draft 
regulations and republishes 
them as 2014 draft AIS 
regulations. DEA unilaterally 
declares fish sanctuaries. 
Survival and 
viability threat 
to the trout 
industry 
 Trout sector outraged by the fish 
sanctuaries (emotional) 
 Trout South Africa mounts road 
shows, media campaigns, 
propaganda campaigns and 
mobilises for litigation (energetic) 
2013-
2014 
DEA responds with media 
releases and televised 
addresses correcting 
misrepresentations of the 
trout sector 
Survival and 
viability threat 
to the trout 
industry 
 Trout South Africa continues to 
mount road shows, media 
campaigns and mobilisation for 
litigation (energetic) 
 Kloof conservancy litigates against 
the DEA for failure to implement 
Chapter 5 of the NEMBA 
(energetic);  
 Court ruling in Kloof Conservancy 
v. Government of South Africa is 
in favour of Kloof Conservancy, 
and encourages trout sector to 
pursue litigation (logical) 
2013-
2014 
Negotiation between trout 
sector and the DEA 
Willingness Memorandum of understanding on 
how to regulate trout (energetic) 
2013-
2014 
The presidency declares 
aquaculture development a 
major strategy of the Ocean 
Economy vision; Aquaculture 
Labs summons the DEA and 
orders it to reach consensus 
with trout sector and to design 
regulations that facilitate 
aquaculture growth 
Industry is now 
secure  In compliance to the order, and in 
collaboration with the trout 
sector and Provincial Nature 
Conservation Authorities, the DEA 
developed trout-specific 
regulations (logical) 
 DEA announces that promulgated 
AIS regulations and species lists of 
2014, will be amended to 
incorporate trout specific 
regulations (logical) 
 Long-term integrated permits 
now offered (logical) 
 Plan to map aquaculture 
development zones (energetic) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
8.5.1. Institutional entrepreneur proposes institutional innovations 
In response to the views of the anti-trout lobby, Bainbridge and Lax (2005, p.1, emphasis 
added), on behalf of the FOSAF, argued that in the design of “sound conservation 
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management policies…, many social, economic and environmental factors must also be 
taken into account, not only the interactions between the indigenous and alien biota” (Table 
8-2A). Bainbridge and Lax’s (2005) view agreed with Bromley’s (2012, p.19) view that “it is 
not just the physical characteristics of an ecosystem”, but it is also “the social construction 
of that ecosystem that will be decisive in terms of institutional arrangements” for resolving 
environmental problems (emphasis added). Effective institutional arrangements for 
environmental governance take into account both human dimensions and natural systems 
(Hirokawa 2014, Max-Neef 2005).  
The FOSAF began to mobilise and raise awareness among fly-fishers so that “the views of all 
anglers are articulated to decision makers, [since] the decisions that are taken may not be in 
our favour” (Bainbridge and Lax 2005, p.4). The FOSAF published a position paper in 2005 
proposing a regulatory framework for trout with the hope of influencing the content and 
thrust of the invasive species lists and the AIS regulations (Table 8-2A). Four governance 
principles underpinned the FOSAF’s proposition: “sustainable development”, “sustainable 
fisheries resource management”, integrated environmental management and “Integrated 
Catchment Management” (Bainbridge et al. 2005, p.11).  
The position paper raised three major issues that would operationalise the four-pillar 
governance framework if implemented. Firstly, Bainbridge et al. (2005, p.i) proposed that 
the regulatory framework had to provide for the “maintenance of both indigenous as well as 
alien species” (emphasis added). Secondly, Bainbridge et al. (2005, p.i) strongly proposed 
“the establishment of a zoning system.” The central thrust of this proposition was to create 
a system of spatial property and use rights systems (zonal systems) that would protect the 
industry and maintain the status quo, while conserving biodiversity. Thirdly, Bainbridge et 
al. (2005, p.i) advocated the “development of a policy framework and management 
guidelines for control, conservation and management of aquatic biodiversity resources.” 
Thus, the role of an institutional entrepreneur was unfolding, which had already begun in 
1986 during the trout wars (Brown 2013, Crass 1986b). 
8.5.2. The DEA rejects the 2005/2006 draft regulations 
While scientists and various sectors were pleased that they had consensually developed 
regulations that would facilitate conservation of biodiversity without “restricting economic 
259 | P a g e  
 
development unnecessarily, and ensuring that such development is sustainable” 
(Biodiversity Policy 1997, p.23), the DEA rejected the regulations (Table 8-2A). The 
“regulations were rejected  by  the  Department  of  Environmental  Affairs  and  the  task  
team  was dismissed.  No reasons for the rejection or dismissal were communicated” 
(Henderson 2013, paragraph 5, emphasis added). Macleod (2006, p.13) reported the 
incident stating that “[l]eading scientists who spent years developing a national system to 
prevent invasions by alien species are dismayed that [the regulatory system] had been 
dismissed by the department of environmental affairs and tourism.” An important point 
here was that the DEA failed on reason giving as “no further formal communication … [as] to 
why the department had dismissed their proposed regulations…” was given (Macleod 2006, 
p.13).  
The DEA only hinted that the regulations were “work in progress” and “opinions and 
perspectives” were bound to differ (Macleod 2006, p.13). Insofar as the DEA had delegated 
authority to the task team to develop the regulations consultatively, it remained unclear 
whose opinion it was that differed when the generality of sectors and scientists had 
established reasonable value. Macleod (2006, p.13) reported that the development of the 
regulatory system “involved broad consultation, including workshops with diverse sectors 
such as aquaculture [trout industry included], game farmers, nurseries and pet traders” 
(Table 8-2A). The administrative preferences of the DEA, but not the nature of the problem 
as consensually determined through consultative processes, defined the institutional 
adjustment path. Expert 1 (2014, pers comm) commented on the rejection of the 
regulations by the DEA: 
“Part of it was that [the process] was taking a very multi-departmental approach to 
it. I think they were uncomfortable with that… We had state law advisors and other 
[legal] opinions on everything we did. And the opinions at the time were that what 
we were doing … was possible” (emphasis added). 
Ironically, the NEMA demanded inter-departmental harmonisation of policies, but here 
disharmony between economic-oriented departments and the DEA seemed to play a major 
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role in defining the institutional adjustment path.12  The rejection of the regulations on 
grounds that they were taking a multi-departmental approach suggested that the NEM:BA 
AIS regulatory process was a limited access policymaking order in which the DEA was the 
only sovereign agent deciding what had to be done. This inevitably implied that the 
rationing transactions in this period failed to pass the reasonableness/instrumentality test 
since democratic valuation at the inter-departmental level was undermined. Thus, the 
conclusion was that a phenomenon of administrative coercion and epistemic violence 
through the negotiational psychology of coercion as well as command and obedience was 
slowly evolving in the regulatory reform process. In a limited access policymaking order, the 
negotiational psychology of persuasion is ruled out and ceremonially warranted assertions, 
which are the instituted social imaginary, prevail. 
8.5.3. Design of imbecile regulatory instruments: 2006-2007 
The original task team, government departments with economic mandates as well as other 
interested and affected parties regarded the 2007 draft AIS regulations as disappointing 
(Henderson 2013) (Table 8-2A). The 2007 draft regulations and species lists “were heavily 
criticised by members of the 2004 to 2006 task team. The invasive species list… was 
inadequate and contained several material omissions of species that are known to be 
invasive” (Henderson 2013, not paged, emphasis added).  
The species list also clashed with economic interests because it concentrated on 
economically useful species and delisted invasive species that were of no economic use. 
Bashoff (2013b, p.12-13), a Director of Policy Development in the DEA, also reported that 
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry indicated that “they did not support the revised draft AIS 
Regulations that was different from what had been developed by the original task team”. 
Looking at the three departments that objected to the regulations, one can conclude that 
economic interests were institutionally isolated in the 2007 draft AIS regulations. The three 
departments have economic mandates to promote industrial development, agricultural and 
forestry development, food security, employment creation and poverty alleviation, among 
                                                          
12
 To provide for co-operative, environmental governance by establishing principles for decision-making on 
matters affecting the environment, institutions that will promote co-operative governance and procedures for  
co-ordinating  environmental functions exercised  by organs of  state (NEMA 1998, Preamble) and “There must 
be intergovernmental co-ordination and harmonisation of policies, legislation and actions relating to the 
environment (NEMA 1998, section 2(4) (l)). 
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others. The 2005/2006 species listing scheme recognised economically useful invasive 
species and prescribed a zonation system to facilitate economic utilisation without 
necessarily harming biodiversity.  
Species that least qualified for listing as invasive were also listed in the 2007 list. In an 
interdepartmental review meeting, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) 
commented that given the strictness of the NEM:BA on invasiveness, the DEA would do well 
by listing “ONLY those [species] that need to be controlled and eradicated... The better 
option is to regulate species that could be invasive but that should not necessarily be 
eradicated under the alien provisions,” (DEA 2008, not paged, capitalisation in original). This 
statement reveals that the DEA, up to that time, but excluding the 2005/2006 iteration, had 
followed a blanket listing approach that was not guided by criteria such as the relative 
degree of threat posed by a species, hence the emphasis “list ONLY” those that need to be 
eradicated. The recommendation to regulate economically useful invasive species as non-
listed species under strictly enforced permit conditions agreed with the position of the trout 
industry (Bainbridge et al. 2005, FOSAF 2007; 2009a; 2009b; 2013, FOSAF and Trout SA 
2014a; 2014b, Trout Interest Group (TIG) 2008).  
The FOSAF (2007, not paged) reacted to the 2007 draft AIS regulations with a letter 
addressed to the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism “to express … extreme 
disappointment at the many inadequacies, errors and incongruities that were brought to 
light in our review of the document.” The Minister had assured stakeholders that the DEA 
would prepare “regulations that were credible, practical, widely supported, and which 
would not be expensive or onerous to implement” (FOSAF 2007, not paged), but the draft 
regulations achieved the contrary. In terms of Table 8-1, this process is the Lysenkoan VI 
transitional phase. The views that the anti-trout lobby had expressed earlier were finding 
their way into the regulations (Table 8-2A). The phenomenon of institutional isolation 
engendered by hegemonic epistemologies was slowly becoming apparent in public policy. 
The economic incentive structure was not credible to the trout sector and the regulations 
implied a large transaction cost burden on the regulated players. The absence of provisions 
to facilitate, rather than inhibit, economic utilisation of alien species that traditionally 
served socio-economic purposes was not only an unacceptable threat to economic and 
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social rights, but also constitutional rights to a livelihood (Table 8-2A). The FOSAF (2007, not 
paged) warned that the regulatory framework “risks bringing you and your Department into 
significant disrepute and into contest with a major sector of our agricultural and tourism 
industry” because players in the trout sector were “very vocal in their outrage at the lack of 
provision in the regulations of alien fish with significant economic and social value.” Thus, 
the sector threatened “to open this debate in television and in the popular media as well as 
in Parliament” (FOSAF 2007, not paged). The emotional interpretant of outrage was to 
engender energetic interpretants such as media campaigns and lobbying the legislature. 
The FOSAF (2007, not paged) felt that the “draft regulations lack[ed] cohesion and logic 
precisely because of the absence of … a policy framework with regard to aquatic biodiversity 
and ecosystems.” The essence of having the aquatic biodiversity policy framework was to 
provide “the basis, criteria and parameters to distinguish between relative threats and 
advantages and thus would have provided for different mechanisms, strategies and 
treatment of the various species,” (FOSAF 2007, not paged). The FOSAF (2007, not paged) 
felt that the DEA listed species “in a general and theoretical sense based on scientific 
information from abroad or taken out of context”, but if policy criteria were in place the 
DEA would have listed species “on a practical case by case, locality basis that takes account 
of local conditions, species and consequences” (FOSAF 2007, not paged). The FOSAF’s 
argument confirms the large estimated odds in Chapter 7 which showed that a one standard 
deviation increase in the use of contextually relevant evidence increased the odds of 
perceiving the regulations to be reasonable by 415% (Table 7-13). 
8.6. Transitional phase in policymaking orders: 2008-2010 
The energetic interpretants that the 2007 draft AIS regulations and species lists attracted 
forced the DEA to make major revisions to the regulations (Bashoff 2013a). The 2009 draft 
AIS regulations incorporated some of the proposals that the FOSAF had made previously 
(Table 8-2A). In an affirmative energetic interpretant, the FOSAF (2009b, p.3) acknowledged 
that “there appear to be many positive aspects to the draft regulations”.  
Two institutional innovations were introduced into the draft regulations. Firstly, the DEA 
proposed an integrated permitting system, which implied that an economic agent only 
needed a single risk assessment and application to obtain a water use licence, a trout 
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stocking licence and a licence to transport live specimens of an alien species, among other 
permissible activities. A trout farmer, without an integrated permitting arrangement, 
needed no less than nine permits to complete a single trout operation (Swartz, not dated). 
Transaction costs were large. Expert 1 (2014, pers comm) also remarked that “We had some 
things that were, probably, too fundamentalist themselves around permitting.” Thus, 
private transaction costs were bound to decline significantly with the institutional 
innovation. The FOSAF (2009a, not paged) welcomed “the principle of integration of permits 
as a positive step hopefully aimed at avoiding unnecessary duplication of administration of 
permits and costs.” This innovation was in line with the FOSAF’s proposal for an integrated 
environmental management and integrated catchment management framework (Table 8-
2A).  
Secondly, section 21(2) of the 2009 draft AIS regulations provided that a “species may be 
listed in different categories in different parts of the country.” The 2009 draft regulations 
created four categories of species: namely, species to be compulsorily eradicated; species to 
be controlled by an invasive species management programme; species to be regulated by 
area and species to be regulated by activity. The 2009 regulations re-introduced the first 
four categories of the 2005/2006 draft regulations. While this move was welcomed by the 
FOSAF, the FOSAF (2009a) still argued that the DEA had not carefully considered its 
recommendation since 2005. As an example, the FOSAF (2009b, p.1) maintained that “the 
categories in the draft regulations were prepared unilaterally by DEAT and its advisors” and 
no “explanation has been provided to stakeholders on the underlying rationale to the 
recently published classification system” (emphasis added).  
Failing to give reasons and justifications was the biggest failure of the DEA since the process 
began in 2004. This theme of publicising the criteria used to determine the invasiveness of 
species recurred in every submission and letter that the FOSAF, and later its collaborators, 
submitted to the DEA (FOSAF 2007; 2009b; 2012; 2013; FOSAF and Trout SA 2014a; 2014b; 
Trout Interest Group (TIG) 2008). Two conclusions are possible. Firstly, governance failure, 
in the form of lack of administrative due process and regulatory unresponsiveness, 
characterised the reform process. Secondly, the DEA, it seems, had criteria that it perceived 
might not have passed democratic and scientific scrutiny. Expert 3 (2014, pers comm) 
remarked that “so many invasive species are listed as invasive for administrative 
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convenience.” Administrative convenience was a ceremonial adequacy standard upon which 
public policy was being decided. 
 In a spirit of compromise, the FOSAF (2009b, p.2) stated that it was of “the opinion that 
DEAT had little alternative but to list trout to be an invasive species.” The reason for the 
compromise (Table 8-2B) was that South Africa was a signatory to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and that trout were listed in the top one hundred invasive species in the 
world. The FOSAF (2009b, p.2) made another major concession stating that “the pragmatic 
approach would be to concede the “invasive” potential of trout, as is defined by the Act, 
and thus to accept the listing.” The 2009 draft regulations had managed to bring a 
convergence of mental objectification about how to regulate trout because the FOSAF’s 
proposals about a zonal system had been taken on board (Table 8-2B). The dynamic process 
leading to this compromise was a phenomenon of instrumental embodiment II, which 
occurred when instrumental interests (sustainable biodiversity conservation) overpowered 
ceremonial interests (pecuniary interests, status quo and power) of the trout sector and the 
ceremonial interests of anti-alien species lobbyists (Table 8-1). 
To strengthen participatory governance of natural resources, the DEA commissioned the 
South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) to deliberate with the trout industry on 
the mapping of trout waters (SANBI 2009) (Table 8-2B). The SANBI-trout industry workshop 
deliberated on the mapping methodology (SANBI 2009) and the essence of the process was 
to gain “buy-in from anglers/angling bodies” (Swartz not dated, p.1). The most important 
point was that the FOSAF’s mapping methodology and principles were wholly adopted. It 
had devised this methodology and empirically tested it successfully in the mapping of trout 
waters in the KwaZulu-Natal province (Bainbridge et al. 2005). Thus, an institutional 
innovation that the FOSAF designed had become officially recognised, which semiotically 
implied symbol recognition (Table 8-2B). The institutional innovation passed the fitness test. 
The FOSAF had all the marks of an institutional entrepreneur who invested in knowledge 
and used it in strategic transactions to overcome limiting factors by influencing institutional 
change (Commons 2009, Dawson 1994, North 1990).  
Two signs turned the trajectory of the nascent progressive institutional adjustment into a 
contested process again. The first was the Chief State Law Advisor’s comment that 
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questioned the legality of the proposed regulatory approach in the 2009 draft AIS 
regulations (Table 8-2B). The second sign was the rejection of the maps by the DEA without 
supplying reasons for the decision (Table 8-2B). The problem that had just been tamed 
became wicked again.  
8.6.1. Administrative redefinition of legal entitlements  
The questioning of the legality of the regulatory framework by the Chief State Law Advisor 
(CSLA) relates to the question of whether the NEM:BA was so disenabling that the DEA 
could not develop a comprehensive set of enabling regulations or the DEA had disenabled 
the NEM:BA to fit its regulatory preferences (administrative convenience). After reviewing 
the regulations and the species lists, the CSLA advised the DEA “that a number of provisions 
were ultra vires… due to inadequate, or in some cases, a total lack of enabling provisions in 
NEMBA” (Bashoff 2013a, p.8, italics in original).  
The NEM:BA did not provide for the designation of species categories with different degrees 
of invasiveness for the purpose of management and control  priorities. To the NEM:BA, a 
species was either listed as invasive or not listed. If a species were listed as invasive, the 
NEM:BA required its complete eradication and prevention of the re-emergence of the 
species in any form or shape. The intuition in the NEM:BA was that species were to be listed 
in terms of the degree of ecological damage which they posed (Davis et al. 2011). This 
entailed a ranking of species to prioritise which ones to eradicate and which ones not to 
(Macdonald and Jarman 1985). The former qualified for listing and the latter did not qualify. 
Thus, the administrative failure to supply criteria for determining the relative invasiveness of 
species on which basis to prioritise the listing, as the FOSAF had always insisted, had come 
back to occupy the DEA. It was a Lysenkoan II process (Table 8-1).  
 The CSLA clarified that “[c]ompulsory control and eradication are only requirements if the 
species are listed as invasive species” (Bashoff 2013a, p.9). The rationale in this view was 
that the default management strategy for non-listed invasive species was the same as that 
for alien species whose invasiveness had not yet been established or was negligible. 
Economically useful invasive species were the only species that provided a typical case of 
species that would have to be regulated as non-listed invasive species rather than listed 
invasive species. Similarly, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) 
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recommended three options: “list ONLY those [species] that needs to be controlled and 
eradicated” or “amend the provisions to allow for control without eradication” or “regulate 
species that could be invasive but that should not necessarily be eradicated under the alien 
provisions,” (DEA 2008, not paged, capitalisation and emboldening in original). The DEA 
chose the second option, which was to amend the NEM:BA in order to “allow for control of 
invasive species without eradication” (Table 8-2B). 
The administrative choice redefined the opportunity sets, which implied that the transaction 
cost burden of using species that now were listed as invasive was going to increase. The 
administrative choice effectively changed the rationale of the NEM:BA since control no 
longer meant eradication/combating, but could now also mean management. The Minister 
of Water and Environmental Affairs (2012, p.1) stated that the administrative regime for 
economically useful invasive species was  
“to regulate those invasive species to be listed… in different categories… However, 
insufficient enabling provisions in NEMBA have posed a challenge as far as it related 
to the implementation of regulations of such a comprehensive nature.”  
Because of the perceived statutory shortcomings of the NEM:BA “the DEA… initiated a 
process of proposing urgent amendments to NEMBA” (Minister of Water and Environmental 
Affairs 2012, p.1). Expert 1 (2014, pers comm) corroborated the ministerial view stating that 
“there was some very theoretical, impractical thinking in those who drafted this [NEM:BA] 
Act and it’s been a problem for us… So, the problem was that we had an Act that was not 
well drafted.”  Expert 1 (2014, pers comm) drew attention to the fact that it was not only 
the drafting of the Act that was bad, but also “the science behind it was very 
fundamentalist, but we are trying to take a pragmatic approach to how we regulate against 
invasive species.” Fundamentalism in the scientific ideology that underpinned the NEM:BA 
was an instituted social imaginary, which Peretti (1998; 2010) hypothesised as a discernible 
residue of apartheid ideology in the anti-alien thinking in the South African invasion 
biological research.  
8.6.2. Administrative discontinuities 
Frequent changes in the leadership of the DEA and the parent ministry were blamed for 
policy reneging that was characteristic of the 2004-2014 period. The problem of 
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fundamentalism, which is characteristic of instituted social imaginaries, became a 
strategically limiting factor.  
“[With] departmental individual change, you go from the fundamentalist that was 
Crispian Oliver and Pam Yako who were involved in the drafting of the Act to the 
more pragmatic thinking in the DEA leadership now. I think people have to 
appreciate that succession of DG’s and Ministers is a succession of paradigms of 
thinking which make things difficult to harmonise” (Expert 1 2014, pers comm, 
emphasis added). 
The point Expert 1 raised had several implications. It implied that each directorate and the 
accompanying minister worked within a policy ecology in which institutional spaces, in a 
network of policy clienteles, had to be negotiated. A change in this leadership entailed a 
reconfiguration of institutional spaces and types of scientific ideas and ideologies relied 
upon. Above all, each director/minister was a member of an epistemic community of some 
sort and, as such, carried with him/her the intellectual and spiritual climate of his/her 
epistemic community as well as the ideologies of that community. Thus, the drafting of a 
policy instrument that spanned several generations of directorate/ministerial leadership 
was likely to experience the planning curse due to conflicting ideologies between the 
predecessors and their successors. To this complex misfit, conflicts with recipients of the 
policy transformed the policy ecology into layers of wickedness. 
Contrary to the DEA’s claims that the NEM:BA was disenabling, the Kloof Conservancy 
(2013, p.7) argued that the DEA misconstrued its duty under the NEM:BA, which was to 
publish “regulations that fit NEMBA, not to remain supine while the [DEA] endeavoured to 
make NEMBA fit the [DEA’s] proposed regulatory regime.” Similarly, in Kloof Conservancy v. 
Republic of South Africa, 2014, Justice Vahed, in an obiter dictum, argued that “the 
perceived inadequacies of NEMBA were without foundation” (2014, p.39; emphasis added). 
In light of this obiter dictum, and the views of the FOSAF since 2005, the CSLA and the 
DWAF, it was concluded that the DEA disenabled the NEM:BA. It sought to satisfy its own 
preferred regulatory regime that had more to do with an extensive listing of species that 
were known to have some invasive tendencies than with addressing the public question of 
listing species with the most damaging impact on species, ecosystems, habitats, human 
268 | P a g e  
 
health, the economy or the environment. Further, in disenabling the NEM:BA, the DEA 
effectively redefined the opportunity sets that the legislature had already redefined, thus 
initiating the phenomenon of deep-structure institutional isolation. 
Table 8-3: Leadership changes in the Ministry and Department of Environmental Affairs  
Minister Period Policy ecology / policymaking order Director 
General 
Period 
Mohamed Moosa 
(African National 
Congress – ANC) 
1999-
2004 
Transitional phase; legislative process 
was a transitional phase with high risk 
of relapse to limited access 
policymaking order 
Oliver 
Crispian 
1999-
2005 
Marthinus van 
Schalkwyk (New 
National Party (1997-
2005), a new look of 
the old party that 
ruled during 
apartheid. After 2005, 
he became a member 
of the ANC) 
2004-
2009 
Transitional phase; policy ecology 
actually eventually relapsed to a 
limited access policymaking order 
Oliver 
Crispian 
Pam 
Yako 
1999-
2005 
2005-
2008 
Buyelwa Sonjica 
(African National 
Congress - ANC) 
2009-
2010 
Transitional phase; policy ecology 
oscillated between transitional phase 
and limited access policymaking order 
Nosipho 
Ngcaba 
2008-
2015 
Edna Molewa (African 
National Congress - 
ANC) 
2010-
2015 
Transitional phase, although the 
policy ecology oscillated between the 
transitional phase and the limited 
access policymaking order. After the 
Trout SA propaganda  campaigns in 
2014 and litigation by Kloof 
Conservancy, it  transitioned to an 
open access policymaking order  
Nosipho 
Ngcaba 
2008-
2015 
 
Source: Personally compiled from various parliamentary and departmental records 
Table 8-3 summarises the changes in ministers and director generals in the Ministry and 
Department of Environmental Affairs. The political parties to which each minister belonged 
are indicated in brackets. Political party ideology seemed to have had a correlation with the 
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types of signs that flowed throughout the NEM:BA process. Chapter 6 established that the 
NEM:BA enactment process was in the transitional phase with a very high risk of relapsing 
to a limited access policymaking order during which the administrative preferences of the 
DEA shaped the content of the Act. The Minister at that time was an African National 
Congress (ANC) minister. It was the directorate in this period 1999-2005 that Expert 1 
blamed for fundamentalism in its administrative practices and the accompanying scientific 
ideology. 
The period 2004-2009 was the one in which implementation of the NEM:BA began. 
Outstanding semiotic processes in the 2004-2009 period were dismissal of the original task 
team without providing reasons and justification; the rejection of the 2005/2006 draft AIS 
regulations without providing reasons and justification; the publication of outrageous draft 
AIS regulations in 2007 as the FOSAF (2007) described them; and the rejection of the trout 
maps without providing reasons and justification. Epistemic violence was highest in this 
administrative generation. In a historical reflection into the ideology that shaped the 
NEM:BA drafting process, Expert 3 (2014, pers comm) remarked that “environmental 
legislation was based on the old apartheid style of managing and doing things.” By the 
apartheid style of managing things, Expert 3 meant a governance style of ruling down/ top-
down logic. The transitional phase in the 1999-2004 period effectively relapsed into a 
limited access policymaking order in 2004-2009. All progressive scientists who had tried to 
follow the balanced approach of the Task Group for Invasive Biota (TGIB) of the 1980s, were 
summarily dismissed and a new team appointed. 
8.6.3. DEA rejects trout maps  
The general perception from those close to the mapping processes was that the DEA 
rejected the maps in a similar way, and for similarly undeclared reasons, that it had rejected 
the draft AIS regulations of 2005/2006. For example, Expert 6 (2014, pers comm) remarked 
that “they threw out the maps because they realised there was such an overlap of 
yellowfish, black bass, carp, and barbel and they realised that what they were trying to 
implement was non-implementable.” Similarly, Expert 3 (2014, pers comm) pointed out that 
“the mapping process was thrown out and Ernst resigned… The mapping process was not a 
species management approach, but it was a catchment approach to environmental 
management,” which the DEA did not want. The SANBI (2009, p.6) report also recorded that 
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the trout industry proposed a “catchment approach”, the rationale being to minimise 
transaction costs of administration and compliance. The FOSAF (2012, p.2) argued that the 
DEA had based the mapping process on the “framework  of  the  regulations… which  
entailed  very  little  potential  change  to  the  current  status quo.” Since the status quo was 
to be maintained, but suddenly the DEA decided to reject the mapping process, agitation in 
the industry was inevitable (Table 8-2B). 
A senior SANBI official (2014, email comm) disclosed that the mapping process was “a very 
inflammatory project” and “very  controversial” because  “the  DEA  had  [not]  paid…  
attention  to  the  social  engagement  process  with  trout  fishermen”. The SANBI (2009, 
p.12) consultative workshop report similarly stated that the trout industry had “[c]oncern 
that DEAT is not really engaged in the process and have not listened to past comments on 
legal and administrative system concerns raised by the sector.”13 The DEA failed on 
participatory governance (“social engagement process”) (Table 8-2B), hence the element of 
distrust from the trout sector. Thus, much of the controversy indicated the absence of 
political/participatory equity (Béné and Neiland 2006). These findings agree with the 
estimated odds which showed that a one standard deviation decrease in the variable 
“participatory” decreased the odds of perceiving the regulations to be reasonable by 410% 
(Table 7-13). 
8.7. Interim regulations and escalation of controversy: 2011-2013 
With the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the 2009 draft AIS regulations set aside, the 
DEA published shortened AIS regulations that included species that deserved compulsory 
eradication and those that required regulation through a compulsory invasive species 
management programme in 2013 (Table 8-2B). The original task team defined the two 
categories of species in 2005/2006 as species whose harmful effects outweighed their 
economic benefits (Henderson 2013). The DEA decided to transfer trout to the category 
requiring a compulsory species management programme from a category that required 
regulation by zonal approach in the 2005/2006 and the 2009 drafts (Bashoff 2013a). If trout 
were not as harmful as to make their economic benefits less than their harmful effects, the 
sector queried the criteria that were used to list trout in the stricter category (FOSAF 2013).  
                                                          
13
 The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) was formerly called the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). 
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The listing of trout under a compulsory species management category was a sign that 
angered and threatened the economic viability of the trout industry (Table 8-2B). The DEA 
lost the trust of the trout sector from this moment onwards. The anger of the trout sector 
subsequently led to a series of energetic interpretants one of which was the formation of a 
coalition/institutional entrepreneur named Trout South Africa (Table 8-2C). The coalition 
represented the interests of fly-fishers and the rest of the trout industry. A Lysenkoan V 
institutional adjustment process had begun (Table 8-1). Reacting to the regulatory 
unresponsiveness of the DEA, Cox (2013, p.5) argued that the “FOSAF has been suggesting … 
alternatives for years but have been ignored”, hence “we are going to have to oppose this 
law. We need to do so in the courts and in public” (emphasis added). The trout industry 
promised a series of energetic interpretants such as media campaigns, road shows and 
litigation (Table 8-2C). The DEA assured the industry emphasising that the “view of the 
Department is that management (rather than requiring the eradication) of listed invasive 
species is consistent with NEMBA” and that the DEA was “mindful of the fact that trout 
poses a lower risk to biodiversity in certain places” (Ngcaba 2013, p.2), hence not targeted 
for eradication. Yet, trout was classified under a category for which ecological harm 
exceeded socio-economic benefits. 
Despite the assurance from the DEA, the trout industry adopted an offensive strategy. Trout 
SA’s objectives in the offensive strategy were “to get trout delisted as an invasive species 
under the NEM:BA” in the short term; “to represent trout interests under the auspices of 
the DAFF” in the long term; and to “attack the DEA’s decision on all fronts” insofar as the 
listing of trout was concerned. The trout industry now wanted to have trout regulated under 
the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (CARA) of 1983 administered by the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) (Table 8-2C). The DAFF has an 
economic mandate, which makes it more sensitive to developmental and economic matters 
(anthropocentrism) whereas the DEA was concerned with biodiversity conservation 
(ecocentrism and/or biocentrism). The contestation was now shifting to the level of 
propaganda because whatever could be used to frustrate the decisions of the DEA had to be 
used (Table 8-2C).  
Governance failure as evident in deficiencies in administrative due process led to the 
turning point of the regulatory problem from a manageable problem to a wicked problem. 
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One of the factors contributing to the emotional interpretant of outrage was that the DEA 
did not want to disclose the interim regulations to affected parties. The FOSAF, after a 
prolonged struggle, was permitted to comment on the regulations “on an agreed 
confidential basis” (FOSAF 2013, p.1). The 2010-2014 period was under ANC ministerial 
leadership (Table 8-3). The culture of ruling down had not changed. The regulatory process 
was a limited access policymaking order that led to institutional isolation of sectors 
dependent on alien and invasive species.  
8.8. Fifth iteration of AIS regulations and species lists 2013-2014 
The amendments to the NEM:BA, through the National Environmental Management Laws 
Amendment Act (NEMLAA) of 2013, became the logical interpretant that resolved the 
emerging series of energetic interpretants from the CSLA, the trout industry and the 
litigation by Kloof Conservancy. The NEMLAA finally enabled the DEA to re-publish the 2009 
draft AIS regulations as the 2014 final AIS regulations with some modifications to the list of 
invasive species. Inasmuch as the DEA had lost the trust of the trout industry in 2013, which 
by now had resolved to oppose the DEA for any decision it made until trout was regulated 
under the CARA of 1983, a fierce contest followed the publication of the February 2014 
draft AIS regulations for public comment.  
8.8.1. Fish sanctuaries coincide with mapped trout waters 
The unilateral declaration of fish sanctuaries by the DEA resulted in an emotional 
interpretant of outrage again. The trout industry questioned the credibility of the scientific 
evidence that informed the determination of fish sanctuaries. Fish sanctuaries, as a new 
institutional innovation, were designed to facilitate conservation of endangered indigenous 
fish species (Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4). A mapping process informed the demarcation of the 
fish sanctuaries. However, the fish sanctuaries followed the same pattern that the rejected 
trout maps followed so much so that almost all formerly mapped trout waters became fish 
sanctuaries. Two scientific processes – the mapping of trout waters and the mapping of fish 
sanctuaries – gave diametrically contrary results. Just as the DEA had, in the past, failed to 
supply and justify the criteria used to list species as invasive, it also failed to supply and 
justify the criteria used to determine the fish sanctuaries (FOSAF and Trout SA 2014a; 
2014b). Moreover, the DEA had not consulted interested and affected parties concerning 
the fish sanctuaries (FOSAF and Trout SA 2014a; 2014b). 
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Figure 8-3: Rhodes, Barkley and Lady Grey fish sanctuary map  
Source: Generated by the author on the South African National Biodiversity Institute 
interactive web tool. 
 
 
Figure 8-4: Eastern Cape Province trout zonation map  
Source: South African Institute of Aquatic Biodiversity. 
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Some strategic informants commented on the institutional fitness of the fish sanctuaries. 
“It is affecting research, teaching and service provision capacity of the university 
facility. It is affecting the industry at large. Most trout farms are in fish sanctuaries... 
Who decided this!? Where is the consultation!? And by what criteria did they decide 
it!?” (Expert 3 2014, pers comm, italicisation reflects emphasis in audio). 
“We will have to acknowledge that because of the debate, provinces were coming 
around and saying, “Actually, we don’t have to list fish sanctuaries.” So, that was the 
benefit of the criticism of our approach. Not that we hadn’t within our group said this 
doesn’t make sense to have fish sanctuaries, but we had to give everyone to agree” 
(Expert 1 2014, pers comm, emphasis added). 
Expert 3’s argument raised a number of issues. By disrupting research, teaching and service 
provision, fish sanctuaries could be categorised as “imbecile institutions” (Veblen 1914, 
p.25) or “zombie institutions” (Ayres 1996, not paged). At the level of principles of 
institutional adjustment, they failed to satisfy the principle of instrumental efficiency to the 
extent that they failed to promote the growth of the human life process. They failed to 
satisfy the principle of recognised interdependencies to the extent that they disrupted 
socially embedded interdependences in the research and teaching service provision, and 
economic production of trout (Foster 1981c). Fish sanctuaries also failed to satisfy the 
principle of technological determination because fish sanctuaries were not determined by 
the nature of the problem the DEA sought to address. They failed to satisfy the principle of 
minimal dislocation because they were planned to be implemented as “‘shock therapy’” 
(Tool 1994, p.406). As the theory of reasonable value predicted, consensus is a product of 
the negotiational psychology of argumentation and pleading as well as coercion and 
persuasion. Expert 1 acknowledged that the debate and criticisms resulted in the 
disbandment of the imbecile institution. 
At the level of the test of progressivity, the fish sanctuary institutional innovation failed the 
democratic test to the extent that it was a product of scientific hegemony. It failed the 
growth of knowledge test because it foreclosed scientific enquiry into a consensual 
institutional arrangement. It foreclosed the Deweyan process of generating 
reasonable/instrumental value (Foster 1981a). The dominant social imaginary of the 
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entrenched epistemic community was law. It failed the minimal needs test to the extent 
that livelihoods were endangered. While attempting to create islands of purity, it satisfied 
the environmental continuity test in an undemocratic way (Nelson 2010). The fish sanctuary 
institutional innovation satisfied the possession of power test to the extent that the DEA 
and its advisors found reason-giving and justification of the innovation unnecessary.   
The DEA seemed to be learning after the fact since 2003, which demonstrated that it did not 
effectively consult in the first place. The tendency to learn after the fact qualifies for what 
Tuchmann (1984, p.7) described as “wooden-headedness” or what Code (2008, p.32) 
describes as “intransigent politics of unknowing” to the extent that it characterises the 
refusal to be deflected by evidence to the contrary. The fact that the DEA, was informed by 
provincial nature conservation authorities – which had been managing trout since the mid-
20th century – that fish sanctuaries were unnecessary after a costly contest, suggests 
ineffective consultation. Similarly, Chapter 6 established that during public hearings a 
recommendation was made for including in the Act express provisions for addressing 
invasiveness differentially, but the DEA neglected it. These instances suggest that an 
instituted social imaginary in policymaking was marginalising, through the sanction of 
ignorance, views from alternative epistemological systems under the pretext that the 
outsider groups were not qualified to make those recommendations. Yet, the process of 
amending the NEM:BA in 2013, a decade later, went back to the same recommendations. 
Institutional isolation, as a phenomenon, has its roots in epistemological systems that shape 
the ideological and ideational climate of a policymaking community and processes. Strategic 
informants highlighted the problem of epistemic violence. For example, Expert 6 (2014, pers 
comm, emphasis added) remarked that “the DEA are not doing it correctly. Why are they 
not listening to scientists? If they are, then they are not listening to the right ones”. The 
justification Expert 6 offered for his comment was that although “the DEA claimed that the 
whole process was scientifically based, it is flawed… Yet, there are teams and teams of 
experts, scientists and lawyers, employed by government” (Expert 6 2014, pers comm, 
emphasis added). Expert 3 (2014, pers comm, emphasis added) also reiterated that the DEA 
leadership were “biased towards the input from scientists who are mainly their own. They 
don’t like listening to independent scientific opinions”. The most important point raised by 
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Expert 3 and Expert 6 was that the DEA had its own elite group of scientists and lawyers 
whose epistemic claims really mattered in the design of institutions.  
8.8.2. Trout species excluded from invasive species lists 
In the 2014 draft regulations, the DEA initially listed trout species within a zonal framework 
so as to take into account the regional differential of the species’ invasive impact. The 
regulatory framework demarcated sensitive and non-sensitive waters. Trout was considered 
invasive in national parks, provincial reserves, mountain catchment areas, forestry reserves 
and fish sanctuaries (DEA 2014a, List 6). However, trout was not “listed for other parts of 
the country, and may only [be] introduced into dams within fresh-water systems in which it 
has been formally documented to occur” (DEA 2014a, List 6). The implication was that trout 
was utilisable in the special conservation areas only under a permit and rigorous risk 
assessment.  
The problematic special conservation areas, which were so extensive that they rendered 
most traditional prime waters sensitive, were fish sanctuaries (Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4).  
Anti-trout scholars such as Cambray (1997; 2000; 2003a; 2003b), Cambray and Bianco 
(1998) and to some extent Skelton (1977; 1987; 2000) had argued previously that mountain 
catchment areas where self-sustaining trout fisheries were viable were the same waters 
where conservation initiatives must be carried out because some indigenous fish species 
lived in those waters. It was from these recommendations that fish sanctuaries were 
demarcated, but they focused exclusively on ecological criteria.  
The problem for the trout sector was that the transaction cost burden of having trout 
categorised as invasive in waters that traditionally, and in the solution to the 1986 trout 
wars, were designated non-sensitive waters was high (Brown 2013, Crass 1986b, Skelton 
and Davies 1986). Following energetic interpretants in the form of road shows and media 
campaigns that the FOSAF and Trout SA launched since the publication of the February 2014 
draft AIS regulations for public comment (Coan 2014a; 2014b, Cox 2014a; 2014b; 2014c, 
among others) (Figure 1-2), the DEA decided to delist trout in the final invasive species list 
that it promulgated in August 2014. The DEA (2014g) reiterated that the best way “to 
regulate the rainbow trout and brown trout is still being discussed with the aquaculture and 
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fly-fishing industries, and they have not been listed at present.” Thus, in the meantime, 
“Provincial controls over the two trout species will be continued” (DEA 2014g). 
The series of energetic interpretants from the trout industry invoked energetic interpretants 
from the DEA, first, by delisting trout; secondly, by initiating negotiations; thirdly, by a 
media release to pacify the sector; and finally, a logical interpretant that the status quo 
regulatory arrangement would continue (Table 8-2C). The role of individual agency in 
shaping institutional change, through influencing administrative transactions highlights the 
significance of institutional entrepreneurship in weakening hegemonic epistemologies. 
Trout SA nearly achieved its objective to have trout delisted in the short term by damaging 
the DEA’s public image.  
8.8.3. External sovereign agent intervenes 
A plausible hypothesis that emerges from this case is that as the planning curse generates a 
high transaction cost burden on the administrative agency of persisting with a disputed 
regulatory proposal, political pressure from, or negative public image in the eyes of, the 
agency’s superiors increases. The probability of the regulated interest group winning the 
contest also approaches unity as the planning curse attracts public interest, thus leading to 
instrumental embodiment of administrative ceremonial interests. Expert 4 (2014, pers 
comm, emphasis added) corroborated this hypothesis: 
“The context that created the shift is that aquaculture has been prioritised by the 
Presidency as part of its Ocean Labs planning process to develop the Ocean 
Economy. I am part of the Aquaculture Labs which has the power to summon any 
government department to discuss how to facilitate aquaculture development. As 
the AIS [regulatory process] was identified  as a constraint ,  … [the Deputy Director 
General] was  basically  ordered  to  come  to  the  labs  and  reach  a  consensus that 
would accommodate biodiversity objectives and aquaculture  sector  development  
goals. As he has to report back to the Minister on what was agreed, he was forced to 
reach an agreement.”14 
The most important point in this quote was that a limited access policymaking order was 
broken by an authority superior to the administrative agency. The superior had the “power 
                                                          
14
 The name of the Deputy Director General was removed for confidentiality 
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to summon” the administrative agency. In this case, the public image of the DEA had been 
damaged by the campaigns of the trout sector, and its principals “ordered” or “forced” the 
DEA to strike a “compromise” (Table 8-2C). The DEA’s regulatory proposal was perceived to 
be a “constraint” to the national anthropocentric vision for aquaculture development since 
it raised transaction costs of utilising the invasive species of which trout is a prime 
aquaculture species (Britz et al. 2009, De Moor and Bruton 1988, Safriel and Bruton 1984).  
While the anti-trout scientists were part of the policy elite in the DEA’s team of scientists, a 
pro-trout scientist was a member of a higher decision making body, the membership to 
which influenced the negotiational psychology of command and obedience through the 
“summoning”, “ordering” and “forcing” of the DEA to reach a consensus. The ability to 
switch epistemic identities and to draw from multiple epistemic networks enhanced the 
individual agency of Expert 4 in influencing the weakening of a dominant social imaginary in 
the DEA, leading to the disbandment of a limited access policymaking order (Table 8-2C).  
The emerging hypothesis adds a new dimension to North et al.’s (2007; 2012) postulation 
that the dominant coalition in the limited access order would find the political transaction 
costs of maintaining a limited access order too high to bear and would begin to grant civil, 
economic and political liberties to the once excluded groups. North et al.’s (2007; 2012) 
account endogenises the force for change from the limited access order to the transitional 
phase and, finally, the open access order, which assumes that a high level of trust would 
have been established to allow impersonal exchange. The trust then results in a change of 
will of the dominant coalition. The emerging hypothesis in the present analysis is that an 
external sovereign agent has to break the limited access policymaking order by raising the 
transaction costs for the dominant coalition of persisting with its interests (Table 8-2C). The 
extent to which the external sovereign agent intervenes depends on the non-coalition 
groups’ transaction costs of lobbying that external sovereign.  
8.8.4. Instrumental consensus – working compromise  
The only other stable equilibrium in Table 8-1 was the state of convergence of instrumental 
interests. The interest in promoting the welfare of society socio-economically presently and 
the interest in promoting the long-term welfare of society through biodiversity conservation 
converged. A logical interpretant that followed the series of road shows and media 
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campaigns (Coan 2014b) was the promulgation of a specific set of regulations for the trout 
species that would amend the AIS regulations that were promulgated in August 2014. Thus, 
a habit change emerged as a new set of institutions (Table 8-2C). The trout specific-
regulations of 2014 brought the institutional adjustment process to a state of equilibrium, 
which is the Instrumental consensus (Table 8-1, Table 8-2C). The ceremonial-ceremonial 
configuration was a typical example of a limited access policymaking order (regressive 
institutional adjustment process), but the instrumental-instrumental configuration was an 
example of an open access policymaking order (progressive institutional adjustment 
process).  
In effect, as Expert 4 (2014, pers comm) emphasised during interviews that “We need a 
harmonised policy. A policy on trout”, the compromise solution reached that envisaged 
outcome. Negotiations between the DEA and the trout sector led to a series of energetic 
and logical interpretants (Table 8-2C). First, a memorandum of understanding was drawn up, 
which first acknowledged a “place for trout” in South Africa as Bruton (1986) and De Moor 
and Bruton (1988) three decades earlier had argued. The memorandum of understanding 
emphasised that the government had “prioritised aquaculture under the National 
Development Plan. The growth of Trout Aquaculture lies within the parameters of the 
strategies that have been formulated as a result of that plan,” (DEA, FOSAF and Trout SA 
2014a, p.1). Given the national policy to expand aquaculture to promote local economic 
development and alleviate poverty, the parties agreed that the national anthropocentric 
economic vision had to guide the regulatory regime for trout.  
The compromise solution that emerged from the negotiations provided for green and 
orange zones. In green zones, Trout Regulation 2 provided that “Trout will not be listed as 
invasive species in catchments, or portions of catchments, that can be legally demarcated by 
the Department as “green zones”.” The DEA would manage trout “as alien species” (DEA, 
FOSAF and Trout SA 2014b) in the green zones. Within green zones, Trout regulation 3.3 
provided that “Long-term (up to 20 years), multiple-release Permits may be issued for trout 
to registered Permit holders.” It quadrupled the permit duration from what it was in the 
February 2014 draft AIS regulations. The implication of embedding this incentive structure 
in this institution (long-term permits) guaranteed durability of tenurial rights, economic 
viability and substantially lowered transaction costs.  
280 | P a g e  
 
In orange zones, permission to farm trout would be granted if there was evidence of the 
existence of trout populations already. In these zones, the DEA would list trout as invasive 
species to be utilised under a permitting arrangement. Trout regulations 6.1, 6.2 and 6.5 
provide that “[o]ne risk assessment is required for a potential specified Aquaculture 
Development Zone which will allow the granting of numerous permits to multiple applicants 
within the defined zone.” The regulations also provided that, through continuous 
assessment, orange zones could transition to green zones. Instead of every applicant 
carrying out a risk assessment, potential applicants would jointly fund a single risk 
assessment and have an orange zone defined for trout farming. The difference between 
individual and collective risk assessments in terms of transaction costs would potentially be 
large.  
The instrumental consensus just discussed, had been recommended by the FOSAF since 
2005 and later the Trout Interest Group in 2008 (Table 8-1). Self-regulation was part of the 
constructive agreements between the DEA and the FOSAF in 2009, which was the 
contemplation of self-administration provision in the 2014 Trout specific regulations. Thus, 
it was evident that the FOSAF and its subsequent collaborators in the trout advocacy 
process became successful institutional entrepreneurs. They became the agents of 
institutional change that proposed institutional innovations.  
Chapter 6 established that at the inception of the Task Group for Invasive Biota (TGIB) in the 
1980, two of the questions that occupied it were: (1) what management arrangements 
could be used for a species that was simultaneously beneficial and invasive in the same 
locality and (2) what could be done to a species that was invasive in one area and beneficial 
in another area. These two questions were the substance of the instrumental consensus 
expressed in trout-specific regulations designed in 2014. Some of the decision makers in the 
DEA and some scientists who were informing the process or involved as decision makers in 
the NEM:BA process since 2005/2006 were part of the TGIB in the 1980s. There was 
evidence of ceremonial encapsulation in the NEM:BA process whereby the entrenched 
biological invasion research community had attained hegemony in biodiversity policy 
process and had managed to prevent the use of the existing fund of knowledge to resolve 
the problem in a consensual manner (Bush 1983; 1987). 
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Table 8-4: Transaction cost burden of the proposed trout regulatory regime 
Restricted Activities for Trout outside of Protected 
Areas, that is in areas where trout traditionally 
have always been propagated, grown, stocked, 
farmed, fished and sold  
Before 
instrumental 
consensus 
(effect on 
transaction 
costs shown as 
+/-) 
After 
instrumental 
consensus 
2014 
(effect on 
transaction 
costs shown as 
+/-) 
 Importing into the Republic, including introducing 
from the sea, any specimen of a listed invasive 
species 
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Exempted, 
if Permit 
from DAFF 
 
- 
 Having in possession or exercising physical control 
over any specimen of a listed invasive species. 
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Exempted  
- 
 Growing, breeding or in any other way propagating 
any specimen of a listed invasive species, or causing 
it to multiply. 
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Exempted  
- 
 Conveying, moving or otherwise translocating any 
specimen of a listed invasive species. 
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Permit 
Required 
 
+ 
 Selling or otherwise trading in, buying, receiving, 
giving, donating or accepting as a gift, or in any way 
acquiring or disposing of any specimen of a listed 
invasive species. 
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Permit 
Required 
 
+ 
 Releasing any specimen of a listed invasive species Permit 
required 
+ Permit 
Required 
+ 
 The transfer or release of a specimen of a listed 
invasive fresh-water species from one discrete 
catchment system in which it occurs, to another 
discrete catchment system in which it does not 
occur; or, from within a part of a discrete catchment 
system where it does occur to another part where it 
does not occur as a result of a natural or artificial 
barrier. 
Permit 
required 
 
 
 
+ 
Permit 
Required 
 
 
 
+ 
 Discharging of or disposing into any waterway or the 
ocean, water from an aquarium, tank or other 
receptacle that has been used to keep a specimen of 
an alien or a listed invasive species.   
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Permit 
Required 
 
- 
 Catch and release of a specimen of a listed invasive 
freshwater fish or listed invasive fresh-water 
invertebrate species   
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Exempted  
- 
 The release of a specimen of a listed invasive fresh-
water fish species, or of a listed invasive fresh-water 
invertebrate species, into a discrete catchment 
system in which it already occurs.   
Permit 
required 
 
+ 
Permit 
Required 
 
+ 
Source: Author’s analysis of the Trout Regulations 2014 (not yet gazetted) and pre-
amendment NEM:BA   
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The implications of the instrumental consensus are illustrated in terms of reductions in the 
transaction cost burden borne by the trout sector (Table 8-4). At the core of the contentions 
was the burdensome nature of the regulatory regime that the DEA had been proposing 
since 2007, which implied overregulation of the trout sector (Bashoff 2013a; 2013b). Thus, 
the instrumental consensus that emerged after the contestation between February 2014 
and August 2014 improved the transaction cost regime for the trout sector. Activities that 
still required permitting were those that constituted potential pathways for new invasions 
by trout. The trout industry now has the most favourable regulatory regime ever, which was 
attained after a costly and vicious institutional adjustment path as depicted in Table 8-1. 
8.9. Conclusions 
Findings so far suggested a number of explanations for the controversial institutional 
adjustment process. Firstly, because the negotiation of the NEM:BA was prematurely closed 
before a real deal was struck, the regulatory phase became a re-negotiation of the NEM:BA. 
Secondly, because the NEM:BA negotiation process was a limited access policymaking order, 
the regulatory phase, which had some transitional phase conditions, found newly admitted 
participants negotiating for provision of their interests in the deal. Institutional spaces were 
renegotiated.  
Findings also suggested a third result that tied the first two together to offer an explanation 
of how institutional isolation evolved. The DEA disenabled the NEM:BA in its quest to satisfy 
its ceremonial adequacy standard of administrative convenience, which informants 
characterised as fundamentalism in administrative processes. The ceremonial adequacy 
standard was about listing as many species as possible. The implication of designing 
institutions based on ceremonial adequacy in turn led the DEA to redefine administratively 
opportunity sets that had already been legislatively redefined. Institutional isolation had its 
genesis in this administrative redefinition of legal entitlements.  
The redefinition of opportunity sets, which fell short of administrative due process, was 
characterised by the sanction of ignorance, which was a mechanism of institutional 
hegemony. The epistemic community (invasion biology) whose instituted social imaginary 
defined the climate of ideas, ideology and the types of knowledge to be used to design 
biodiversity regulatory institutions was the power structure that was driving epistemic 
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violence. The results suggested that while the initial iteration of regulations in 2005/2006 
was framed to facilitate sustainable utilisation of alien and invasive species, the draft 
regulations failed to pass ceremonial adequacy standards of administrative convenience of 
the then directorate of the DEA.  
Since the regulatory regime was influenced by the ceremonial adequacy standard of 
administrative convenience, it failed to satisfy the principle of technological determination 
which required a problem to define its own solution. Similarly, designing a regulatory regime 
to meet administrative convenience implied that the adjustment process passed the 
possession of power test, which made it regressive. Administrative convenience was found 
to have two transmission channels. First, the Department of Environmental Affairs politically 
marginalised economically- and developmentally-oriented departments from the 
biodiversity regulatory process. The epistemic community that constituted the physically 
and ideologically entrenched policy elite epistemically marginalised social science epistemic 
communities from the policy space. The conclusion, thus, is that a phenomenon of political 
coercion synergistically combined with epistemic violence through the negotiational 
psychology of coercion as well as command and obedience to create sufficient conditions 
for an effective limited access policymaking order which always resulted in institutional 
isolation.  
The policy ecology was made complex because the succession of directors and ministers 
implied a succession of scientific and political ideologies as well as governance styles. The 
political ideology of the incumbent minister had a bearing on the institutional adjustment 
path. Because the drafting of the regulations spanned several generations of 
directorate/ministerial leadership it experienced the planning curse due to conflicting 
ideologies between the predecessors and successors. The apartheid style of managing and 
doing things implied that the processes of reason-giving and justification of public decisions 
were neglected. The regulatory process had largely been swinging back and forth between 
the transitional phase and limited access policymaking order. The pattern remained the 
same: regressive institutional adjustment proposals, attempts of one epistemic community 
to impose its warranted assertions as the reality/truth that must inform policy and the 
neglect of democratic policymaking imperatives.  
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The study found that institutional entrepreneurship played a significant role in the 
determination of the degree of persistence of the limited access policymaking order, which 
had underpinned institutional isolation. The hypothesis that emerged from the analysis was 
that institutional entrepreneurship transformed the reform process into a planning curse, 
which, in turn, generated a large transaction cost burden on the administrative agency of 
persisting with a disputed institutional design proposal. The political pressure from the 
agency’s superiors forced the agency to compromise in order to resolve the policy issue. The 
planning curse increased the probability of the instrumental embodiment of administrative 
ceremonial interests. 
An external sovereign agent had to intervene to break the limited access policymaking order 
by raising the transaction costs of the dominant coalition of persisting with its interests. The 
extent to which the external sovereign agent intervened depended on the transaction costs 
of lobbying the external sovereign borne by the lobbyists. The demise of a limited access 
policymaking order in 2014 resulted in a new institution for governing the trout industry 
that was an instrumental consensus. Instrumental interests for both the DEA and the trout 
industry were embodied in the new balanced regulatory path. The incentive structure in the 
trout-specific regulations is characterised by secure tenurial rights, economic viability and 
substantially lowered transaction costs. This 2014 consensual arrangement is exactly what 
the trout sector had advocated for since 2005. Thus, it is evident that FOSAF and its 
subsequent collaborators in the trout advocacy process became successful institutional 
entrepreneurs. They became the agents of institutional change by actively contributing to 
the construction of policy truth in spite of epistemic oppression.  
The instrumental consensual solution was not new because the Task Group on Invasive 
Biota (TGIB) proposed it in the 1980s. Surprisingly, the decision makers in the DEA, some 
provincial conservation authorities, and some scientists who were now informing the 
NEM:BA regulatory reform process or involved as decision makers, were part of the TGIB. 
The only reason that could account for the duration of the controversy when the solution 
was already known to the DEA was that there was ceremonial encapsulation in the NEM:BA 
process, which managed to prevent the use of the existing fund of knowledge to the 
resolution of the problem. Instead of addressing the public question of listing and 
controlling species with the most damaging consequences and managing economically 
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useful invasive species as non-listed alien species, an extensive list was envisaged based on 
undeclared criteria. 
Chapter 9 discusses the findings of the thesis in the context of institutional literature as well 
as general literature on policy sciences. It presents and discusses the thesis’ contributions to 
institutional theory. The chapter also presents suggestions for future research and provides 
policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 9  
Phenomenon of institutional isolation: Discussion and conclusions 
 
“If you are influential, you should establish respect for yourself 
Through knowledge and through courtesy in speech 
Do not be domineering/ except in official matters.” 
 
The Maxims of Ptahhotep, not dated 
 
9.0 Introduction 
The study set out to contribute to the theory of institutional change using the South African 
case of the evolution of biodiversity governance institutions. Since it was such a broad 
research issue, a case study of the trout sector was used to illuminate the origins, 
emergence and persistence of institutional forms and proposals in the evolution of 
governance institutions for alien and invasive species. Judging by its protracted controversy 
with the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), the trout sector was the most visible in 
the evolving process, thus affording the study a detailed case study resource. 
The surprising finding was that there was institutional incoherence between foundational 
environmental governance institutions – section 24 of the South African Constitution of 
1996 and the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998 – and the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (NEM:BA) of 2004. The surprising fact re-
echoed King David’s rhetorical question: “When the foundations are being destroyed, what 
can the righteous do?” (TNIV Bible 2005, p.372). The emphasis is on habitual practices that 
weakened democratic foundations for policy processes.  
In attempting, as it were, to archaeologically exhume the source of the surprise, the 
researcher was sent into multiple epistemic directions. One thing that emerged from the 
research, to be sure, was that policy ecologies were far too complex to be guided by uni-
disciplinary knowledge systems in deciding society’s institutional adjustment path (Hayden 
2006; 2009, Max-Neef 2005, Weaver-Hightower 2014). The search for explanations revealed 
that the same power structure that was responsible for the broken foundations, to an 
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extent, was also responsible for the bitter controversies at the regulatory phase. Knowledge 
and ideology were the power structure, which constituted the instituted social imaginary. 
The legislative and regulatory phases were largely limited access policymaking orders with 
transitional phases that frequently relapsed to limited accessed orders. How did the orders 
emerge? How were the orders sustained? The thesis had some contributions to offer to 
answer to these questions. 
The overall goal of the thesis was to evaluate the perception that sectors that utilised alien 
and invasive species had been institutionally isolated, and to evaluate the potential 
economic implications of the perceived isolation on the sectors in the evolving institutional 
change processes for sustainable biodiversity governance. Why was the process of 
regulating socio-economically useful alien and invasive species controversial? Did 
institutional isolation exist in the first place? Why did it exist? What forms, if it existed, did it 
assume? Who were the key players and what power did they possess in the entire reform 
process? What stories and visions of the future did the rival social groups tell and how did 
those stories and visions shape the institutional adjustment path in the reform processes in 
South Africa? By what criteria did the DEA weigh the competing stories and visions against 
each other in the process of choosing the most reasonable ones that became national 
legislation and regulations? 
Institutional economists have often taken for granted that knowledge producers and 
knowledge consumers in policy processes belonged to different institutional systems and 
were distinct agents. The role of knowledge in institutional evolution fascinated North 
(1990), but it left him with an unresolved puzzle. He theorised that there was bi-directional 
causality between knowledge and institutional change. Knowledge drove institutional 
change through lobbying activities of knowledge holders, which was the power dimension of 
knowledge. Institutions, and especially the incentive structure they defined, determined the 
types of knowledge that epistemic communities generated, acquired and advanced.  
North (1990) and Denzau and North (1994) postulated the corollary that there was also bi-
directional causality between knowledge and ideology, which they characterised as 
fundamentalism, fads, dogmas and propaganda. North (1990) then postulated another 
corollary that ideology, in recorded history, was an important driver of institutional change. 
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Because of the limitations of studying institutional change within the framework of price 
theory, North (1990, p.86) concluded that “we are still at something of a loss to define, in 
very precise terms, the interplay between changes in relative prices, the ideas and 
ideologies that form people's perceptions” and how they influence institutional change. 
Without relying on price theory, Ayres (1996) had much earlier offered what was considered 
in the present study to be a comprehensive hypothesis of how ideology influenced 
institutional change, but the present study did not find a sustained research agenda on 
Clarence Ayres’ postulation. He postulated that ideas (instrumental knowledge) and 
ideology (ceremonial knowledge) were inseparable, which is a typical characterisation of the 
Veblenian Dichotomy – ceremonial and instrumental behaviours/values are inseparable 
although they are different (Bush 1983; 1987, Hayden 1982). The Ayresian hypothesis was 
that ideology, in recorded history, was one of the most predominant forces after technology 
in driving institutional change especially in cases where the epistemic community possessing 
a certain ideology gained ascendancy to the policymaking community. Thus, the ideologues 
became policymakers, which the present study interpreted to mean that the knowledge 
producer and the knowledge user in policy processes coalesced into one social agent. He 
went a step further to suggest that an epistemic community that was entrenched in a 
policymaking community sustained its presence through hegemonic discourses to shut out 
any other potential entrants (Ayres 1996, Peet 2002). 
Building on the Northean puzzle and the Ayresian illumination of the puzzle, the study then 
developed detailed and empirically grounded plausible hypotheses of how the phenomenon 
of institutional isolation in institutional design processes evolved and its economic 
implications for marginalised socio-economic sectors. The mechanisms by which 
institutional isolation was dismantled were also investigated. The integrated institutionalist 
framework developed in Chapter 3 guided the analysis (Figure 3-2) and guides the present 
discussions. The sections that follow present and discuss the theoretical insights that 
emerged from the evaluation of the NEM:BA processes. Policy recommendations and 
suggestions for further research are also presented. 
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9.1. Institutional entrepreneurship and disbandment of the limited access policymaking 
order 
9.1.1. Disbandment  
The thesis broadened the conceptualisation of violence to include epistemic violence, which 
Ayres (1996) and Dotson (2011; 2014) postulated as the forceful triumph of one epistemic 
community over others in institutional arenas and processes. The study took the view that 
epistemic communities also emerge as spontaneous orders with the only goal of advancing 
their own epistemic interests (Langlois and Hodgson 1992, Kuhn 1996). Results illustrated 
that invasion biological research was only institutionalised nationally in 1980, although such 
a paradigm had spontaneously emerged several decades earlier (Ferrar and Kruger 1983). 
The assumption that was central in the study was that epistemic communities had a 
competitive spirit because of the need to maintain autonomy, prestige and power, which 
hindered inter-epistemic community trust and cooperation (Max-Neef 2005, Norgaard 
2007). A limited access policymaking order in an epistemic sense eliminated ideational 
competition, that is, competition of knowledge claims. Lack of ideational competition led to 
weak innovation in institutional design processes. 
In using violence in an epistemic sense and in policy processes, the thesis, contrary to North 
et al.’s (2007; 2012) view that the two social orders were mutually exclusive, demonstrated 
that limited and open access orders could actually coexist in various configurations. The 
difference between the broadened conceptualisation in the thesis and that of North et al. 
(2007; 2012) was that the former was a micro-application and the latter was a macro-
application. In the reconceptualised framework, each configuration had different important 
implications about the severity and absoluteness of epistemic violence as well as the depth 
of institutional isolation (Table 3-1). While North et al. (2007; 2012) endogenised the driving 
force for transition from a limited access order to an open access order at the political level, 
the thesis exogenised the driving force at the policy/regulatory level.  
The prediction that emerged from these qualifying manoeuvres added a new dimension to 
North et al.’s (2007; 2012) prediction that the dominant coalition’s will would change such 
that it will begin to increase access to rents marginally by increasing impersonal exchange 
subject to robustness of trust levels. The dominant coalition would then begin to grant civil, 
economic and political liberties to the once excluded groups. The emerging theoretical 
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insight in the thesis was that an external sovereign agent was required to break the limited 
access policymaking order by raising the transaction costs for the dominant coalition of 
persisting with its ideological interests. The extent to which the external sovereign agent 
intervened depended on the transaction costs of lobbying the external sovereign authority 
borne by the non-coalition members. Such an external sovereign power could be the 
Presidency, the National Planning Commission or the judiciary as was the case in the present 
study. This implied that the limited access policymaking order emerged spontaneously, but 
was disbanded non-spontaneously as exogenous sovereign agents intervened. 
Hara and Raakjær (2009, p.649-650) discuss a similar problem in the evolution of the South 
Africa’s Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998 whereby actors “organised themselves 
into ‘communities of strategic interests’… in order to win specific policy positions.” A limited 
access policymaking order had emerged which consisted of organised labour; conservation-
oriented scientists; and the corporate sector, which had co-opted labour and scientists to its 
side. Scientific arguments were being used to withstand socio-economic transformation of 
the small pelagic sector, while defending exclusive access for, and pecuniary interests of, the 
corporate sector. This is what Hara and Raakjær (2009, p.650) describe as “mobilizing a 
legitimizing discourse – and the associated metaphors, labels and symbols of scientific 
authority” to sanctify policy choices, which is the dominant social imaginary.  
Corporatocracy had won control of the MLRA policy process through the mechanisms of 
institutional hegemony – subreption and mystification – such that all other actors – labour, 
some political powers, governmental agencies and scientists – became means to corporate 
ends (Dugger 1980, Hayden 2003, Hara and Raakjær 2009, Norgaard 2007). Following 
lobbying efforts by marginalised small scale fishers, it took intervention by an external 
sovereign agent, the African National Congress (ANC) political party, to break the limited 
access order that had evolved. This is exactly the prediction that emerged from the thesis’ 
qualifying assumptions added to the Northean social orders.  
In the regulatory domain, the judiciary, subject to the inhibitive influence of transaction 
costs of litigation borne by potential litigants, acted as an exogenous countervailing power 
against regulatory domination since it had the power to review and set aside decisions of 
governmental agencies. The judiciary, in most cases, acts as a countervailing power through 
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“judicial activism” (Cortner 1976, p.330). For example, during the implementation of the 
United States’ National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 some administrative 
agencies were deliberately failing to comply with legislative requirements because they 
were trying to maintain “negotiated accommodations with clientele groups”, but judicial 
activism countered organisational resistance to change (Cortner 1976, p.327). The argument 
is that the survival of an agency depends on the maintenance of agency-clientele 
relationships such that the agency “prefers to reinforce and preserve its negotiated 
environment” (Cortner 1976, p.325). Following litigation by environmentalists, “court orders 
forcing agencies to implement NEPA’s procedural reforms and to give a broader 
construction to many of the Act's provisions” were issued (Wichelman 1976, p.274). 
Interestingly, in the NEPA case, environmentalists were non-coalition members whereas in 
South Africa they are members of the dominant coalition who are ideologically, 
intellectually and physically entrenched in the environmental policymaking community. 
Thus, the pecuniary system (corporatocracy) controlled policy processes in the US and 
environmentalists were isolated because “[a]dministrators [did] not as a general rule seek 
their counsel” (Cortner 1976, p.329). 
9.1.2. Institutional entrepreneurship and institutional isolation 
An important hypothesis that emerged from the application of the limited access order 
hypothesis to policy problems was that it takes some ceremonial power to initiate the 
disbandment of a ceremonial system so as to achieve an instrumental purpose. While the 
thesis hypothesised that some ceremonial power (energetic and emotional interpretants) 
was necessary to initiate the disbandment of the limited access policymaking order so as to 
achieve an instrumental purpose, Ordonomic research posits that only instrumental power 
produces instrumental outcomes (Hielscher et al. 2012). In the 1980s, propaganda 
campaigns were employed to weaken the deeply entrenched pecuniary system of the 
leisure class (Ferrar and Kruger 1983, Skelton 2000). Trout wars of the mid-1980s coincided 
with the institutionalisation of the invasion biological research programme (Ferrar and 
Kruger 1983). The propaganda campaigns achieved the termination of economic subsidies 
to the trout fly-fishing sector and also promoted focus on conservation of indigenous fish 
rather than alien fish (Skelton 2000). In the NEM:BA process, entrenched invasion biologists 
and environmental scientists assumed a fundamentalist ideological position from the 
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commencement of the drafting of the NEM:BA (legislative domain) in 2003 through to the 
drafting of alien and invasive species regulations (administrative domain).  
The trout sector in 2014, however, also employed a propaganda strategy by deliberately 
opposing some of the proposals of the administrative agency no matter how reasonable 
they were. The trout sector’s propaganda strategy was a tit-for-tat strategy with one 
objective in mind: to have trout transferred to a more credible, stable, predictable and 
anthropocentric administrative regime. The conspectus of epistemic violence and 
administrative fundamentalism on the one hand and propaganda on the other, created a 
planning curse which locked the regulatory reform process into a Nash inefficient and 
impoverishing institutional adjustment path. As the planning curse generated a large 
transaction cost burden on the DEA of holding on to a disputed regulatory proposal, 
negative public image in the eyes of the DEA’s superiors increased political pressure to have 
the regulatory controversy resolved. The probability of the trout sector winning the contest 
approached unity, thus leading to instrumental embodiment of administrative and 
epistemic ceremonial interests (Table 8-1). 
Seabrooke’s (2014) discussions on the role of identity switching in creating individual power 
in the international political economy corroborate the implications of the knowledge-power 
nexus as established in the thesis. Multiple identity professionals have multi-epistemic 
dominances, which grant them significant power as governance and policy experts 
(Seabrooke 2014). The shrewd utilisation of different sources of knowledge creates 
opportunities for them to undertake “epistemic arbitrage” (Seabrooke 2014, p.335), which 
is the ability to “mediate between knowledge pools for strategic advantage” (Seabrooke 
2014, p.336). Being successful epistemic arbitrageurs, the professionals become in time 
““epistemic arbiters” of what is appropriate knowledge and meaningful action across a 
range of policy areas” (Seabrooke 2014, p.335). The interaction between epistemic arbitrage 
and identity switching creates a power source for maintaining and hedging the policy space 
by creating a dominant epistemological system (Seabrooke 2014).  
Identity switching played two dialectical roles in South Africa’s NEM:BA AIS regulatory 
reform process. For example, Expert 4 is a practising academic and natural resource 
governance expert who advises some governmental agencies and departments on fisheries 
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and aquaculture policy, and his physical, ideological and intellectual presence in the Ocean 
Labs Planning process cannot be taken lightly as the cause for the summoning and ordering 
of the directorate of the DEA to strike consensus in a way that promoted trout-based 
aquaculture development. On the other hand, Expert 1 was an academic who switched his 
identity to a directorate position in the DEA and was once a chairperson of an international 
epistemic network – the Global Invasive Species Programme. Expert 1’s multiple identities 
granted him indisputable power as a leading authority in invasive species management and 
he became a gateway for the invasion biology epistemic community into biodiversity 
policymaking structures.  
Each identity was associated with a different story, imagining and expression of how policy 
must be created. Seabrooke (2014, p.337) emphasises that successful epistemic arbitrage, 
through multiple identities, makes the agents “epistemic arbiters who enforce what types of 
knowledge and solutions are most relevant.” Discussing the same phenomenon, Rodríguez 
de Francisco and Boelens (2015, p.483) emphasise that “a policy model requires an 
influential institutional and discursive network that produces but also promotes and extends 
the model by means of alliance building.” The alliance necessitates the emergence of a 
dominant epistemological system that can silence non-alliance individuals/groups through 
the sanction of ignorance. 
Using the paradigm of Ordonomics, which investigates the “interdependencies between 
institutions and ideas”, Hielscher et al. (2012, p.780-781) argued that “habits of thought 
implicated in… progressive institutional change have a cooperative, rather than a conflictual, 
nature.” The ordonomic research investigates rule configurations that make possible the 
transition from the “win-lose paradigm” to the “win-win paradigm” “that focuses on joint 
rule-interests”, which makes instrumental/reasonable outcomes possible (Hielscher et al. 
2012, p.781-782). The transition from the win-lose paradigm to the win-win paradigm is the 
same as the transition from a limited access policymaking order to an open access 
policymaking order. The transition, however, has varying degrees of likelihood of success; 
some transitional phases relapse to the win-lose paradigm, while others progress to the 
win-win paradigm.  
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Progress from win-lose to win-win solutions is a transition from imbecile institutions to 
reasonable ones. It was shown through econometric analysis that institutional 
arrangements that were designed through an effective participatory process (open access 
policymaking order) were more likely to be perceived to be reasonable because they were 
consensually designed. Similarly, institutional design processes that took into account socio-
economic (anthropocentric) interests increased the likelihood of a consensual institutional 
arrangement. Hielscher et al. (2012), Petrick and Pies (2007) and Pies and Petrick (2005) 
similarly argue that ceremonial systems can be harnessed into problem resolution through 
participatory policymaking. They presume that the participation of ceremonial interests 
slowly diffuses into the wider pecuniary system some elements of instrumentality such that 
ceremonial interests do not  feel “threatened or directly questioned”, but become actively 
“involved in the instrumental processes of intelligent inquiry that are expected to benefit a 
wide range of stakeholders, including themselves” (Hielscher et al. 2012, p.780).  
The new insight the thesis brings to the ordonomic argument, which so far examines the 
interdependence between institutions and ideas without also examining the 
interdependence between institutions and ideology, is that ceremonialism has instances in 
which it instigates instrumental outcomes. The ordonomic postulation is couched in terms 
of one group having ceremonial interests, while another/others has/have instrumental 
interests. Bush (1987) made a similar assumption in his theory of institutional change. The 
thesis argued that this was unlikely. The most plausible assumption is that every policy 
participant – a group or an individual – has an assortment of ceremonial and instrumental 
interests, which only differ in their relative degree of dominance in the group’s ideational 
processes.  If this inductively derived assumption seems plausible, then it is proper to 
dimensionalise ceremonialism and instrumentalism.  
Conceptualising the institutional adjustment problem in terms of layers of ceremonialism 
and instrumentalism, converges with North’s (1990) hypothesis of bidirectional causality 
between knowledge and ideology and their individual causal relations with institutional 
change. It also converges with Ayres’ (1996) illuminating argument that ideology and ideas 
were inseparable, but different and have different logics in social change. Hence, the thesis’ 
assumption is that every epistemic community simultaneously exhibits ceremonialism and 
instrumentalism. Every administrative agency simultaneously exhibits ceremonialism and 
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instrumentalism and every socio-economic sector, too, exhibit ceremonialism and 
instrumentalism simultaneously.  
Table 8-1 illustrated that with this re-conceptualisation of the Bushian model of institutional 
change, two stable equilibria were possible in the evolution of institutions. The first was a 
ceremonial feasibility-ceremonial feasibility configuration, which ordonomists such as 
Petrick and Pies (2007, p.261) characterise as the only instance illustrating the “social 
undesirability of cooperation” or as illustrating invidious “class cooperation” (Hielscher et al. 
2012, p.782). It is undesirable precisely for the same reasons that cartels are undesirable. It 
stifles competition and impoverishes wider society through a huge deadweight loss, while 
the cartel members accumulate the highest possible pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns 
(Varian 1992; 2010). Such collusive behaviour is consistent with the limited access order in 
an epistemic, political or policymaking sense. 
The second stable institutional equilibrium was instrumental feasibility-instrumental 
feasibility configuration (Table 8-1). This policymaking order is consistent with the open 
access order and is characterised by constructive ideational competition. Consistent with 
Hielscher et al. (2012, p.782), an instrumental feasibility-instrumental feasibility 
configuration is such that “[p]rivileges may be abolished by consent of the privileged classes 
themselves who see, on the basis of the instrumentally warrantable knowledge, that social 
cooperation may become even more advantageous...” The idea here is that there exist 
“[u]nexploited mutual advantage[s]” (Petrick and Pies 2007, p.256) that can only be realised 
through constructive cooperation in the design of rules for making rules as well as in the 
design of rules to live by.  
The core issue here is the idea of valuation. Petrick and Pies (2007, p.256) maintain that “the 
interests of all affected individuals … are the only source of values.” Quite similarly, Original 
Institutionalist theory of institutional change maintains that “those who receive the 
incidence of the policy… [must be] able to find and employ means to change such policy” 
(Tool 1994, p.414). Norgaard (2007, p.375) also argues that deliberative institutional change 
results in “equitable solutions”, which is the ordonomic win-win paradigm. Thus, values 
cannot be externally imposed if successful resolution of world problematiques is to ensue. 
The ordonomic approach, just as the Northean, the Veblenian and the Commonsian 
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institutionalist schools do, emphasises “the role of competition as a key institutional 
arrangement for social cooperation” (Petrick and Pies 2007, p.261). In a limited access 
policymaking order, however, the source of values is not the affected parties, but the 
entrenched (natural/social) scientists whose ideological position becomes the value 
criterion, which then creates a win-lose scenario (Bromley 2012, Hielscher et al. 2012, 
Petrick and Pies 2007, Pies and Petrick 2005).  
While reviewing Original Institutional theory of change, it was argued that since a problem 
was defined as the difference between what ought to be and what is (Foster 1981c), and 
that what ought to be was defined by the knowledge frontier, knowledge producers had 
potentially tremendous power in defining the institutional adjustment path. The power was 
even greater when the knowledge producers became the knowledge users in policy design. 
This theoretical observation from the thesis is a logical extension of the Commonsian theory 
of sovereignty, which so far identifies three manifestations of sovereignty – sanction of 
religious/moral opinion, sanction of poverty, and sanction of physical violence (Commons 
1899a; 1899b; 1899c; 1900; 2009, Dawson 1998, Dugger 1980; 1996b). The thesis added the 
sanction of ignorance or the power of epistemic opinion, which manifests as epistemic 
violence. Semiotic results substantiated this theoretical observation. Knowledge producers 
are sovereign agents especially when they become entrenched insiders in the policymaking 
community. Since values embody knowledge and knowledge produces values (Bush 1983; 
1987; 2009, Dewey 1939, Foster 1981a), knowledge producers have significant potential to 
define the value frontier. The problem arises when the knowledge producers become part 
of the value trade-off problem as the ordonomic argument states. 
There is a striking agreement between the ordonomic conclusion and the thesis’s findings. 
First, the trout sector was more inclined to non-confrontational regulatory reform processes 
between 2005 and 2012 and it proposed some of the most balanced and well thought out 
proposals. In this case, ceremonial and instrumental interests in the trout sector self-
initiated into instrumental enquiry processes, which really made it easy for the DEA to 
abolish/modify environmental entitlements allocated to the sector by the 1867 Act 
consensually, if the DEA had chosen to do so.  
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Secondly, the trout sector required a credible justification for changing the status quo. The 
credibility of the institutional change, as the sector demanded, had to be demonstrated in 
two ways. Criteria used to decide the listing of trout or any other species as an invasive 
species had to be democratically evaluated and be able to pass wider scientific scrutiny. 
Scientific evidence used to inform proposed regulatory decisions, as econometric estimates 
illustrated, had to be context-relevant and credible, thus increasing the likelihood of the 
regulatory proposals being perceived to be reasonable. Essentially this is the instrumental 
warrantableness of the knowledge used in institutional design that Hielscher et al. (2012) 
argue for. Bromley’s (2004b; 2006, 2008a; 2008d) volitional pragmatism actually insists that 
it is not just the instrumental warrantableness, but also the instrumental valuableness of the 
knowledge that mainly matters in public policy. Warrantableness implies certification of a 
theoretical claim by the wider membership of a particular epistemic community. 
Valuableness implies that other related and non-related epistemic communities and the 
polity, at large, give their consent to the warranted claim. Volitional action in public policy is 
premised on valuable knowledge (Bromley 2004b; 2008d).  
9.1.3. Institutional entrepreneurship and the planning curse 
The use of a tit-for-tat strategy by the trout sector was premised on regulatory 
unresponsiveness to recommendations that were repeatedly made since 2005 and the 
cheating, as perceived by the FOSAF, that happened when the July 2013 interim AIS 
regulations transferred trout to a stringent category without justification and reason-giving 
for the transfer. The DEA created a sense of fear in the trout sector, which the ordonomic 
approach, would consider a poor approach to policymaking because ordonomic 
policymaking requires “giving the privileged classes no reason to fear any explicit disavowal 
of their self-interest” (Hielscher et al. 2012, p.782). When there is a stronghold and the 
entrenched insiders show no willingness to negotiate genuinely and “public policy … [is] 
held hostage to the prescriptive truth claims imposed on it” by the entrenched epistemic 
community (Bromley 2008a, p.237), how can reasonable value be realised? On this 
question, institutionalist and ordonomic literature is silent. 
While the thesis considered a minimum level of ceremonial power to be necessary to ignite 
the process of disbanding a limited access policymaking order, the ordonomic approach, and 
indeed, the institutionalist literature in general, do not consider such a possibility. Whether 
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it is scientists fighting institutions of the leisure class or the socio-economic sector fighting 
an epistemic community that ideologically controls the policy process, ceremonial power 
has a role. Institutionalist literature of the Veblenian tradition has not explored this 
potential channel of power. Ceremonial power is generally regarded as bad because it 
hinders instrumental progress (Ayres 1996, Bush 2009, Rutherford 2011). To the 
Commonsian school, ceremonial power is merely the exercise of the negotiational 
psychology of argumentation and pleading as well as coercion or persuasion (Commons 
2009, Hiedanpää and Bromley 2012). Thus, to the Commonsian theory, ceremonial power is 
not necessarily bad as long as it satisfies the dictates of performance, avoidance and 
forbearance (Commons 2009, Ramstad 1986).  
 
Figure 9-1: Distribution of transaction cost burden of controversial policy process 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The precise reason for the dominant coalition’s unwillingness to negotiate, which means 
heightened epistemic violence, can be explained in a number of ways. Figure 9-1 serves to 
illustrate the argument. From an academic point of view, it costs “nothing” to intensify 
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debate about a particular policy issue both intellectually and ideologically. It affords the 
scholars that are fuelling the debate a favourable international epistemic standing, 
especially if the controversial policy issue is an internationalised research issue. The fiercer 
the controversies, the more members of that entrenched epistemic community publish 
papers, and the more they enhance their reputations. The benefits arising from increased 
research output, sustained research funding and academic prestige as well as the possibility 
of becoming global epistemic arbiters for such policy issues all serve to make transaction 
costs negative. Thus, policy controversy generates positive externalities for the entrenched 
epistemic community. The political and economic transaction costs of adopting a 
fundamentalist ideological position for the entrenched community, under conditions of 
positive externalities received by the epistemic community, are likely to be zero or negative. 
If the governmental agency is not under pressure to implement the policy immediately, it 
can wait and allow “sufficient uni-disciplinary evidence” to accumulate to sanctify its 
decisions (Bromley 2004b; 2007; 2008a). Although the agency bears positive economic 
transaction costs of public policy (Coggan et al. 2010, Marshall 2013, McCann 2013, McCann 
et al. 2005), it cares less if there is weak monitoring of the quality and relevance of its 
expenditures and if the planning curse is not yet severe. Because of the use of the sanction 
of ignorance, the transaction cost burden borne by the administrative agency initially might 
be negative because the burden of proof is shifted to the non-insider group. The transaction 
cost burden is also negative because of two other major reasons: first, the agency relies on 
open access global research evidence that the entrenched epistemic community supplies 
and recommends for use and second, the principal-agent problem is severe in the initial 
phases of the controversy until the planning curse reveals regulatory failures to the 
legislature. 
Once the planning curse sets in, the taxpayer bears the burden of those avoidable public 
policy transaction costs.  However, the real sector that produces goods and services, which 
is to be affected by that proposed policy, bears a strictly positive transaction cost burden 
(Mettepenningen et al. 2009). It is evident that there is no reason why entrenched insiders 
can ever be willing to negotiate genuinely without some minimal level of ceremonial 
coercion and intervention by an external sovereign agent. When the stronghold is 
characterised by epistemic violence and fundamentalism, there is no hope for using non-
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confrontational approaches in the initial stages. Non-confrontation approaches only work at 
some later stage. The problem is that the entrenched epistemic community often lacks self-
introspection or what Rodríguez de Francisco and Boelens (2015, p.483) call the lack of 
“epistemic reflexivity of its members, [which] reduce the capacity of its members to analyse 
critically their own theoretical and methodological presuppositions.” James (1907, p.78) 
more emphatically discusses lack of epistemic reflexivity stating that 
“the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. Truths 
have once for all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of desire to 
extinguish whatever contradicts them” (emphasis added).  
However, once there are some warrantable/warranted assertions to the contrary, existing 
truths no longer are truths because they begin to be doubted (Peirce 1877; 1878; 1905, 
Rorty 1998). The instinct of self-preservation becomes an ideological and fundamentalist 
issue, which is wooden-headedness in essence. In such cases, “disagreeing with official 
policy may lead not merely to a certain coolness in relationships but even to total exclusion” 
(Rootes 2013, p.703). 
The role of minimal ceremonial power is to raise political transaction costs, in a policy 
process, for the hegemonic coalition of insisting with its ideological position (Figure 9-1). 
The policy process degenerates into “a dilemmatic situation … [which] is a situation of 
collective self-damage among rational actors” (Hielscher et al. 2012, p.784). The greater the 
burden of the political transaction costs, the greater the likelihood of the dominant coalition 
expressing willingness to negotiate. This depends on the severity of the planning curse, 
which is the case when the department now bears a higher transaction cost burden than the 
regulated sector (Figure 9-1). Semiotic analysis revealed that the propaganda campaign 
waged by the trout sector damaged the DEA’s public image resulting in unbearable political 
transaction costs of remaining intransigent. 
Figure 9-2 illustrates the role of a contest of ceremonial interests in impoverishing society. 
The hypotenuse side is based on the win-lose paradigm; it is based on a win it all or lose it all 
principle. It is a trade-off framework of policymaking – a zero-sum game (Hielscher et al. 
2012, Petrick and Pies 2007, Pies and Petrick 2005). The bold vertical arrow indicates that it 
is in the interests of the biocentric/ecocentric ceremonial interests to increase the sanction 
301 | P a g e  
 
of ignorance against sectors that utilise alien and invasive species. The dotted arrow shows 
that the sectors that utilise alien and invasive species find it in their interest to use 
ceremonial power increasingly until the policy elite is weakened.  Both contestants choose 
to exert as much ceremonial power as they can to defend/realise their interests.  
 
Figure 9-2: Impoverishing Nash policy equilibrium in a limited access policymaking order 
Source: Author’s analysis 
Petrick and Pies (2007, p.262) argue that the wickedness of the policy problem necessarily 
follows from the fact that the policy scientists position themselves “within the value trade-
off”. Their recommendations become inconsistent with reasonable value because they tend 
to be ideologically driven rather than being consensually driven. This is typical of the 
biocentric-anthropocentric dilemma in the South African biodiversity regulatory reform. The 
core of the problem was the reliance on uni-disciplinary approaches to policymaking. 
However, the working institutionalist paradigm in Figure 3-2 illustrated that 
transdisciplinarity is the desirable valuable knowledge generation and value generation 
framework. The contribution of the thesis to the ordonomic and intuitionalist debate is to 
illustrate that there is an unexplored possibility of knowledge producers and knowledge 
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users becoming one social agent. Once an epistemic community becomes intellectually, 
ideologically and physically entrenched in policymaking structures, the line of distinction 
between knowledge producers and users becomes blurred and instrumentally warrantable 
assertions graduate into new institutions before they have been subjected to the test of 
valuableness or public reasoning.  
Econometric estimates suggested that a policy process that was anthropocentric usually 
faced little resistance because those who would bear the incidence of the policy considered 
it to be reasonable. Consideration of cultural, social, developmental, economic, livelihood 
and spiritual interests of affected parties made a policy instrument anthropocentric. Mueller 
(1938, p.324) emphasised that dominant group-driven legislation often neglected the fact 
that “readjustments are not unilinear, but carry multiple ramifications”, which often 
generated Nash inefficient outcomes (Figure 9-1, Figure 9-2). A tempered ecocentricism 
would probably have been accepted as reasonable. However, the anti-alien lobby justified 
the intensity of its ideological position by emphasising that there was a cultural lag – that is, 
“vestigial ceremonial remnants” (Glade 1952, p.432) – caused by the refusal of the trout 
sector to conform to societal norms. In a win-lose policymaking paradigm, the standard 
solution is to “apply some sort of whip to the slower process! And there are as many 
“whips” suggested as there are propagandists…,” (Glade 1952, p.427). Thus, entrenched 
policy elites recommend some form of whipping to deal with pecuniary systems.  
Epistemic violence destroys social DNA. Participation increases the robustness of the ideas 
that shape a policy, and in the process, reduces ideological content in the final policy 
instrument. However, by its nature a limited access policymaking order is an anti-
participation system. Econometric analysis revealed that a policy process that was 
participatory and inclusive in terms of the knowledge base from which it drew its ideas was 
deemed reasonable. According to Brinkman and Brinkman (2006), the cultural lag 
hypothesis has been critical in sociological literature in detecting social problems and power 
structures. However, they also argue that the Veblenian Dichotomy utilises the cultural lag 
hypothesis to build consensus by allowing for “the origination and innovation of a social 
DNA to promote a synthesis of the disparate parts of culture via instrumental knowledge” 
(Brinkman and Brinkman 2006, p.1009). The subtle point here is that in a limited access 
policymaking order, the social DNA cannot be created since uni-disciplinary knowledge 
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defines the institutional adjustment path and, more so, a considerable content of ideology, 
rather than instrumental knowledge, enters into policy design.  
Without some external intervention, a prolonged phase of increased propaganda by the 
socio-economic sectors and fundamentalism in epistemic claims (epistemic violence) 
evolves (Figure 9-1). The result is the planning curse precisely because large amounts of 
resources are devoted to planning and continuous re-planning of change without 
successfully changing existing institutional arrangements. Since legislators (the principals) 
often have incomplete information such that it is difficult to monitor the regulatory 
behaviour of the administrative agency, the minimal ceremonial power of affected parties 
helps to shed light on the often latent problematic regulatory behaviour of the agency. The 
moment the public image of the governmental agency has been damaged, and legislators 
(the principals) have increased information at their disposal, conditions for successful 
lobbying become apparent if the non-coalition members choose to do so. 
Once the principal (external sovereign agent) intervenes, the ordonomic argument sets in. 
The dominant coalition is now willing to engage in earnest negotiations because it is under 
an order to do so (Table 8-2C).  The final outcome for the South African regulatory reform 
process was an instrumentally feasible-instrumentally feasible configuration (Table 8-1, 
Table 8-2C), which was an instrumental consensus, which balanced conservation and socio-
economic outcomes. The outcome fundamentally diverged from the initial administrative 
position and that of its scientific advisory elites prior to the intervention of the external 
sovereign agent. Instrumentality of the consensus was indicative of progressive institutional 
change. The instrumental consensus was exactly what the trout sector had proposed since 
2005. Thus, it was evident that Federation of Southern African Flyfishers, Trout South Africa 
and Trout Interest Group were successful institutional entrepreneurs. They became the 
agents of institutional change that proposed institutional innovations, which, in their various 
shades, were adopted wholesale or partially.  
Figure 9-3 transforms the problem in Figure 9-2 orthogonally. The process of transformation 
is a deliberative process, which the ordonomic approach and the institutionalist approach 
discuss as a “profound societal learning process” (Hielscher et al. 2012, p.783). Institutional 
change is regarded as progressive to the extent that “societal actors succeed in solving 
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occurring social conflicts with the help of institutional arrangements that meet broad 
consensus” (Hielscher et al. 2012, p.783). The real issue is that consensus is a function of 
effective participatory policymaking (Waller Jr and Robertson 1991). Effective participatory 
policymaking engenders equity, which Béné and Neiland (2006) characterised as a four 
dimensional concept consisting of institutional equity, endowment equity, political equity 
and economic equity. Institutional equity ensures a fair distribution of the burden of 
transaction costs of the proposed regulatory arrangement. Political equity ensures that 
there is equal opportunity to participate and have one’s voice seriously considered in the 
policy process.  
 
Figure 9-3: Orthogonal transformation of a wicked policy problem into a manageable policy 
problem 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The dotted arrow in Figure 9-3 illustrates that the problem becomes a 
cooperative/assurance policy game in which parties can choose to realise as much of the 
instrumental outcomes as are possible, while restraining ceremonialism to its bare 
minimum. Only that which generically advances the human life process in an impersonal 
way becomes the focus of the deliberations (Hielscher et al. 2012, Veblen 1898b; 1898c; 
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1914; [1899] 2005). That is why the axes in Figure 9-3 now have instrumentally-dominated 
interests. Unlike Figure 9-2 which illustrates the problem of unidisciplinary policymaking 
approaches, Figure 9-3 depicts transdisciplinary processes where there is constructive 
competition of ideas and reasonable/instrumental valuation of what it is society finds the 
best thing there is to do in the present circumstances.  
While the DEA sought advice from the epistemic community that aligned to its 
administrative preferences and ideology (trade-off paradigm, Figure 9-2), in Figure 9-3 
policy “advice is sought orthogonally to, not as a compromise in the conflict” (Petrick and 
Pies 2007, p.262). Hielscher et al. (2012, p.794) argue that “[e]very orthogonal position is a 
contribution to realizing this instrumental vision of social value.” This orthogonal 
transformation is possible because the conceptual space for the policy discourse is first 
transformed into one that uses the terminology of deliberative, consensual and 
transdisciplinary knowledge (Gual and Norgaard 2010, Max-Neef 2005, Norgaard 2007, 
Waller Jr and Robertson 1991). Transdisciplinarity creates “semantic innovations [that] open 
up new trajectories of social evolution via orthogonal positions” (Hielscher et al. (2012, 
p.794). Semantic innovations, as it were, create social DNA. 
Hiedanpää and Bromley (2011, p.100) discuss the problem of governance failure in wolf 
management in Finland, which was one of “authoritarian tendencies of the EU that fail[ed] 
to understand the context of wolves for rural livelihoods in Finland” combined with the 
failure of Finish authorities “to involve the public in the formulation of policy”. Political 
equity was not promoted and endowment equity was endangered by the EU’s win-lose 
paradigm.  The South African AIS regulatory reform process suffered from the problem of 
uni-disciplinarity because the regulatory process was conceived as a natural science process 
by the Minister from the onset. The faulty conception of the problem gave multiplied power 
to entrenched invasion biologists. But the neglected problem was that designing regulations 
for alien and invasive process had inescapable anthropological, sociological and economic 
dimensions to it. South Africa’s National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998, 
section 2(4)(g) provides that “Decisions must take into account… all forms of knowledge, 
including traditional and ordinary knowledge” (emphasis added). This is a clear mandate to 
foster transdisciplinary approaches to policymaking. Semantic innovations can easily emerge 
in such a framework that considers all knowledge forms – scientific and non-scientific.  
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To sum up, the prevalence of the limited access policymaking order created an albatross of 
large private and public transaction costs of biodiversity regulatory reform in South Africa. 
With the invasion biology epistemic community ideologically, physically and intellectually 
entrenched in the environmental policymaking community, and expressing no willingness to 
transform the conceptual space to a transdisciplinary one, impoverishing Nash outcomes 
emerged. No amount of deliberation could change the will of the dominant coalition. As 
such, some ceremonial power coupled with intervention by exogenous sovereign agents 
orthogonally transformed the problem into an assurance policy game that produced the 
most balanced instrumentally consensual institutional arrangement after August 2014. 
9.2. Exclusive deal negotiation and premature closure 
Institutional change at its core is a negotiation of socio-economic deals. Hiedanpää and 
Bromley (2011) conceptualise the legislative phase as the realm of reasons. In the realm of 
reasons, reasons are given and justifications tendered for changing the prevailing 
entitlement structure of society. Findings showed that the legislative process for the 
NEM:BA was a limited access policymaking order and, largely, was shaped by administrative 
preferences of the directorate of the DEA. Results showed that some impractical theoretical 
issues shaped the NEM:BA and fundamentalism (ideology) in the scientific foundations of 
the Act had made the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter an unreasonable law. Fundamentalism defies 
reason and is transcendental as the Ayresian view postulates (Ayres 1996, Bromley 2012, 
Hayden 2006), but it can only be changed when a third-order change process occurs 
(Bartunek and Moch 1987). Such a change requires some ceremonial power to challenge the 
dominant epistemological system and can be magnified by the intervention of an external 
sovereign agent. 
Forasmuch as the realm of reasons was actually the realm of fundamentalism or realm of 
ideology, it follows that the deal negotiation process was prematurely closed. The 
premature closure implies that the stopping rules in the design of new institutions were not 
informed by instrumental/reasonable value, but by ideological positions and the ceremonial 
adequacy standard of administrative convenience (Dawson 1994, Hielscher et al. 2012, 
Ramstad 1991). Because of the ceremonially determined closure rules, the development of 
regulations suffered major setbacks as groups that were marginalised in the realm of 
reasons took the regulatory phase (realm of rules) to be an opportunity to negotiate for 
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favourable deals. Sectors that utilise alien and invasive species were the most vocal and, in 
particular, the trout sector made the most noise. Recommendations that were rejected in 
2003 when the NEM:BA was being drafted, which could have promoted a consensual 
solution were brought up again at the regulatory phase. 
It was argued in Chapter 3 that whenever the legislative phase is a limited access 
policymaking order the regulatory phase becomes a contest of interpretive schemes. One 
typical sticky point was the definition of an invasive species. Econometric estimates 
indicated that as the invasive species listing framework broadened from being “alienness 
only” to being inclusive of “alienness, ecological criteria and socio-economic criteria”, the 
probability of perceiving trout to be invasive decreased by 87% (Table 7-18). Invasion 
biologists and the DEA maintained that invasiveness must be defined ecologically. The trout 
sector insisted that it had to be defined by jointly considering ecological and socio-economic 
criteria as the NEM:BA provided for. By dimensionalising the definition of invasive species, 
the thesis revealed that the DEA followed an biocentric approach, which led to 
administrative over-classification of invasive species (Table 5-2). Administrative focus on 
ecological criteria only was an instance of redefinition of legal entitlements. The 
dimensionalisation also revealed that an entirely anthropocentric framework, that focused 
on socio-economic criteria only, led to administrative under-classification of invasive species 
(Table 5-2). If both dimensions were simultaneously considered, consensus would have 
been achieved without resorting to costly policy contests characterised by a planning curse.  
Because of the polarisation, the DEA amended the NEM:BA claiming that the NEM:BA, in its 
original form, was disenabling. Although the NEM:BA failed to provide for a differential 
approach to invasiveness, it required the listing of only those species that deserved 
eradication. The DEA did not like the original legal scheme as semiotic analysis in Chapter 8 
revealed. This led to the re-definition of legal entitlements (realms of economic freedom) at 
the administrative level. Whereas the DEA argued that fundamentalism in science and 
administration made the NEM:BA’s fifth chapter a disenabling law, the thesis, however, 
found that the DEA’s quest for having as many alien species as possible listed as invasive 
was a manifestation of fundamentalism and strong biological nativism. Peretti (1998; 2010) 
called strong biological nativism the green apartheid hypothesis. The theoretical insight 
suggests that the phenomenon of institutional isolation had its genesis in the redefinition of 
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the Act for what the DEA presumed to be total lack of enabling provisions. Even the Durban 
High Court doubted the reasonableness of this alleged lack of enabling provisions. Both the 
pro-alien species lobby and some anti-alien species lobbies agreed that the DEA had 
misinterpreted the Act.  
The realm of rules, simply put, made new law without reason giving and justification even 
though approval of the amendments from the realm of reason was sought. In a revealing 
discussion, Cortner (1976, p.323) argued that “Policy adopted by the legislature is not self-
executing. Administrators… exercise discretion as to how and to what extent their actions 
comply with statutory provisions” (emphasis added). Similarly, Dreyfus and Ingram (1976, 
p.243) emphasised that “Policy performance usually falls short of policy promise” because 
policy intentions “become diluted and deferred in the practical chore of translating what 
legislatures say into what government does”. The core of their argument was that 
administrative systems imposed major frictions and setbacks to all the good intentions of 
the legislature so much so that regulatory practice diverged from policy objectives. In 
essence, the “frustration in application” (Dreyfus and Ingram 1976, p.243) is an implicit 
manifestation of institutional isolation in the sense that a choice not to implement the 
legislative will fully is an implied re-definition of the legal entitlements. Social groups whose 
interests caused the legislature to draft the law the way it currently appears become 
institutionally isolated because of problematic regulatory practice.  
The case for South Africa, however, is different from what Cortner (1976) and Dreyfus and 
Ingram (1976) discuss. Instead of the DEA exercising discretion in evaluating how and to 
what extent its actions complied with statutory provisions, it used its discretion to evaluate 
the extent to which the NEM:BA fitted its ceremonial adequacy standard of administrative 
convenience. Thus, the DEA wanted the Act to comply with its administrative preferences as 
semiotic analysis in Chapter 8 revealed. The Kloof Conservancy (2013, p.7) described the 
dilution and deferment of legislative intent as a misreading of the DEA’s duties under the 
NEM:BA to publish “regulations that fit NEMBA, not to remain supine while the [DEA] 
endeavoured to make NEMBA fit the [DEA’s] proposed regulatory regime.” The rewriting of 
the legislation represents a deep-structure system of institutional isolation. Since all species 
considered in an ecological sense to be invasive despite being ineligible for eradication were 
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to be listed as invasive, the transaction cost burden to be borne by sectors utilising some of 
these species suddenly increased. 
It is interesting to note that once the Act was redefined, the DEA began to argue that the 
trout sector’s legal arguments were legalese and legal nit picking. Following the NEM:BA 
amendment, fish sanctuaries were designated unilaterally. The problem was that fish 
sanctuaries were another indirect way, without giving reasons and justification or 
declaration of the criteria used to determine the sanctuaries, of re-claiming waters where 
trout traditionally have been utilised socio-economically. By completely undermining the 
assurance the trout mapping process had achieved, fish sanctuaries became an imbecile 
institution (Veblen 1914) and significantly altered economic equity, institutional equity, 
political equity and endowment equity (Béné and Neiland 2006).  
Whenever the trout sector queried the determination of fish sanctuaries with observational 
evidence, entrenched scientists dismissed the claims as invalid because they were 
generated through a “pub review system” unlike their claims that had passed through a 
“global peer review system”. This was a manifestation of epistemic violence. Rodríguez de 
Francisco and Boelens (2015) also observed that in the face of phenomenological evidence 
that undermined scientific claims, policy elites chose to remain indifferent in the interest of 
sustaining their epistemic claims, assumptions, models and ideologies. It is evident that the 
claims of one epistemic community were being taken for absolute truth just because, as 
James (1907, p.78) emphasised, established truths have the “instinct of self-preservation 
and of desire to extinguish whatever contradicts them.” 
9.3. Nature and cause of institutional isolation 
Institutional isolation was found to assume three forms: departmental, epistemic and 
sectoral. The degree of imbecility of rationing transactions at the regulatory phase was a 
function of the absence of transdepartmental and transdisciplinary activity in the 
policymaking order. The cornerstone of the integrated institutionalist framework proposed 
in Chapter 3 is transdisciplinarity (Figure 3-2). Insofar as departmental policies are 
warranted and valuable assertions metamorphosed into institutions, it follows that 
transdisciplinarity is also mirrored in transdepartmentalism in policy processes.  
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The foundational environmental governance framework for South Africa demands 
transdisciplinarity and transdepartmentalism. For example, the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) of 1998, which is the foundational environmental legislation, 
provides for “co-operative … environmental governance” (preamble) and that there “must 
be intergovernmental co-ordination and harmonisation of policies, legislation and actions 
relating to the environment” (NEMA 1998, section 2(4)(l), emphasis added). The Republic of 
South Africa Constitution of 1996, section 41, also provides that “[a]ll spheres of 
government and all organs of state within each sphere must … co-operate with one another 
in mutual trust and good faith by … co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one 
another.” 
Harmonisation is a process of building institutional coherence (Coglianese 2001, Hayden 
2006) and, in particular, comparative coherence. Coglianese (2001, p.1223) emphasises that 
“a regulation fails to make sense comparatively if it turns out to be inconsistent with other 
regulations of … the same general type”. Institutional coherence can only happen if laws and 
regulations that are related, in the sense that they deal with the governance of related 
issues, have a reasonable level of correspondence. The incentive structures, the realms of 
individual freedom, the prohibitions and permissions must be reconciled. The relatedness 
might mean that one piece of legislation is about socio-economic utilisation of biodiversity, 
while another is about conservation of biodiversity. These two pieces of legislation are 
related in an antagonistic framework. Harmonisation, therefore, is transdepartmental and 
transdisciplinary at its very core and seeks to locate common instrumental interests and 
eliminating inter-departmental and inter-epistemic pride and conflicts in the institutional 
design process (Hielscher et al. 2012, Petrick and Pies 2007, Pies and Petrick 2005).  
Qualitative analysis established a crucial point that the first iteration of draft alien and 
invasive species regulations in 2005/2006 was multi-departmental, but it was not multi-
disciplinary in a holistic sense. Multi-departmental and multi-disciplinary processes are far 
less integrated and demanding than transdepartmental and transdisciplinary processes 
(Max-Neef 2005). The inter-disciplinarity that characterised the AIS regulatory reform 
process was that of conservation biological sciences to the exclusion of social sciences. 
Some ecological economists and political scientists believe that such forms of exclusive 
inter-disciplinarity create wicked policy problems (Balint et al. 2011, Degnbol et al. 2006, 
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Gray and Gill 2009, Hartmann 2012, Jentoft 2006, King 1993, Norgaard 2007, Ostrom and 
Cox 2010, Rittel and Webber 1973). Based on opinions of experts who participated in 
process as decision makers, the thesis also established that the DEA rejected the regulations 
because the process had become too multi-departmental and overly complex for the 
scheme the DEA preferred. The 2005/2006 draft regulations, however, had managed to 
identify joint rule interests; hence, their wider acceptance by departments with socio-
economic mandates, socio-economic sectors as well as conservation and invasion biologists. 
By rejecting the 2005/2006 regulations that were developed through a multi-departmental 
process, the DEA’s behaviour substantiated the hypothesis that the first level of institutional 
isolation is departmental. The period 2004-2009 was the era of managing things the 
apartheid way as empirical findings revealed (Table 8-1). It is from this time that the 
harmonisation vision failed. Dreyfus and Ingram (1976) argue that “[c]reative and innovative 
intentions boldly stated in the preambles of legislation… face frustration in application.” The 
Department of Environmental Affairs became hegemonic or as two strategic informants 
stated it, “the NEMA is saying you guys you all need to sing from one hymn book… but that’s 
the big challenge for government because they are operating in their silos” (Expert 4 2014, 
pers comm, emphasis added) and they work “in a very paradigmatic, narrow way” (Expert 3 
2014, pers comm, emphasis added). 
Many of the subsequent drafts were not supported by the Department of Water Affairs, the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and the Department of Trade and 
Industry. It was only in 2014, after the intervention by the Ocean Labs Planning Processes, 
that true harmonisation began leading to the instrumental consensus (Table 8-1). As Expert 
4 observed, the cacophony of voices singing from different policy hymn books remains a big 
problem. Operating in silos means transdepartmentalism is far from being a reality. The 
problem goes back to the legislative process itself. During the drafting of the NEM:BA the 
forestry sector asked for clarification as to whether the DEA had harmonised the draft with 
legislation in other departments. The Director General of the DEA “responded that they 
could cross-reference” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2003, emphasis added). It is 
evident that the DEA had not followed transdepartmental or even inter-departmental 
legislative making processes. The view in the quote was that there was a possibility for 
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cross-referencing and not necessarily harmonising, but the directorate behaved as though it 
was not legally bound to harmonise. It behaved as though harmonisation was optional.  
A department that is hegemonic is associated with a hegemonic epistemic community 
simply because the department sanctifies particular types of knowledge claims as absolute 
truth and every other epistemic claim from other epistemic communities as non-truth. 
There is an investigable causal link between departmental isolation and epistemic isolation. 
Since each of the departments stated above had a team of scientists, the real seat of power 
behind each department’s behaviour was the epistemic community informing its decisions. 
The ideas and ideologies of that community served as a value framework. The combination 
of regulatory hegemony, the sanction of poverty, monopsonistic demand for such truths 
and monopoly in the supply of such truths create a powerful vicious circle of institutional 
isolation and a deeply-rooted limited access policymaking order maintained by the sanction 
of ignorance. 
To the extent that institutions are designed through rationing transactions of sovereign 
agents and the rationing transactions are shaped by particular ceremonial and instrumental 
knowledge claims, the interactional effects of departmental isolation and epistemic isolation 
cascade down to socio-economic sectoral isolation. The extent to which a sector’s interests 
are incorporated into policy design depends on the extent to which that sector has been 
researched. The conclusion has important implications because the thesis’ empirical results 
illustrated that the DEA and other funding agencies only funded research into ecological 
invasion and under-funded or never provided funds for socio-economic analysis of the trout 
sector. Yet, the NEMA requires the carrying out of a cost benefit analysis to inform policy 
decisions. So how was the cost benefit analysis carried out without holistic assessment of 
the trout sector? The bottom line is that the knowledge base that defined the value frontier 
was uni-disciplinary. 
In a context of regulatory incoherence  and  domination,  it  is  likely  that  a  sector  whose  
regulator  is  dominated  suffers gradual  economic  isolation  and  low  socio-political  
priority. The dominated regulators and their sectors will not be able to effectively 
appropriate and participate in the determination and exercise of sovereign will and power. 
This view summarises the evolution of the problem of institutional isolation. In a non-
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ordonomic policymaking system, a sector’s interests are defended by its regulator. 
However, when the regulator is excluded from the policymaking arena as a limited access 
policymaking order emerges, the interests of the sector become marginalised. The sector 
becomes of low socio-political priority. The sector is excluded from participating in the 
determination of the sovereign will. 
9.4. Conclusions 
In the problematisation of the concept of institutional isolation, the introductory chapter 
discussed the phenomenon of institutional hegemony that had occupied Original 
Institutionalists since the birth of Institutional Economics as a research paradigm. Because 
of the prevalence of asymmetrical power relationships in institutional spaces and processes, 
Original Institutional Economics theorised about the inhibitive influence of ceremonial 
systems. Generally, ceremonial systems, as the Veblenian Dichotomy suggests, manifest in 
pecuniary systems.  Ceremonial systems also manifest in value systems, belief systems, 
attitudinal systems and spiritual proclivities, which feminist literature conceptualises as the 
instituted social imaginary. The instituted social imaginary creates a cultural lag. 
The thesis set out to contribute to the theory of institutional change by investigating a 
perceived phenomenon of institutional isolation and its economic implications. The study 
affirmatively answered the research question finding that institutional isolation had evolved 
as a three dimensional phenomenon in the NEM:BA process: regulatory (administrative) 
domination, epistemic domination and sectoral marginalisation in the alien and invasive 
species regulatory reform process. 
By conceptualising the policymaking process as either of the two social orders – limited and 
open access orders – and by illustrating the possibility of their coexistence, the study 
broadened the scope of application of the Northean model from physical violence to more 
intricate forms of violence in institutional design processes. It was shown that the 
policymaking system was a limited access order right from the drafting of the NEM:BA to 
the regulatory process. An area which the thesis discussed in some greater detail was the 
mechanisms by which a limited access order was maintained. The Commonsian theory of 
sovereignty played a significant role in reading these mechanisms from the qualitative data. 
The sanction of ignorance, the sanction of poverty, and careerism were found to be 
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important in the emergent order and its sustenance. The sanction of ignorance is a new 
concept the study added to the edifice of the Commonsian theory of sovereignty. The 
limited access policymaking order was controlled by a specific epistemic community – 
invasion biology – and the limited access order was largely sustained by the sanction of 
ignorance (epistemic violence). Former academics who found themselves in governmental 
positions of authority, as it were, placed the foot in the door so as to create greater access 
for their epistemic community to the policymaking structures. The evident result was a deep 
ideological, intellectual and physical entrenchment of one epistemic community in the 
policy process.  
The emergent limited access policymaking order was such a stronghold that it took an 
external sovereign agent to break it. The planning curse brought the problematic behaviour 
of the administrative agency to light, thus raising the political transaction costs of remaining 
intransigent. Application of some ceremonial power by non-coalition members was pre-
requisite to the disbandment of a limited access policymaking order. Multiple epistemic 
identities and identity switching facilitated the disbandment of the limited access 
policymaking order although the same channels were responsible for the persistence of that 
policymaking order. These findings added a dimension to the Ordonomic and Northean 
theories that endogenised the force of transition from a limited access order to an open 
access order.  
The integrated intuitionalist framework proposed in Figure 3-2 dissected knowledge into 
ceremonial and instrumental knowledge systems. This conceptualisation resurrected an 
almost forgotten Ayresian tradition that ideas and ideology are inseparable and that 
ideology is ceremonial whilst ideas are instrumental. The discussions made the point that 
ideology provided the arsenal for epistemic violence, which was also a manifestation of 
sovereign power. Ideological approaches to policy problems make it harder than ever to 
orthogonally transform a problem into a win-win paradigm. 
By conceptualising the valuation framework as transdisciplinary rather than uni-disciplinary, 
the study was able to uncover a dominant epistemological system that is deep-rooted in 
South African environmental policy practice, namely that environmental policy is conceived 
as a natural science process. This in itself is a spiritual proclivity dominating the DEA’s 
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instituted social imaginary because natural scientists are charged with the responsibility for 
making the rules society must live by. Conceptualising environmental policy as a natural 
science process resulted in institutional isolation, the major economic implication of which 
was the increased transaction cost burden of the proposed regulatory regime and of 
institutional entrepreneurship to oppose it. However, after external intervention, an 
instrumental consensus based on multidisciplinary thinking emerged, which went back to 
the 1986 solution with a few more institutional innovations.  
The question then remains of why it took ten years to solve a problem that had a readily 
available solution. The answer is uni-disciplinarity, fundamentalism and ceremonial 
encapsulation of the existing knowledge fund by the entrenched scientific community and 
the administrative agency. A logical conclusion is that the South African taxpayer bore a 
large deadweight loss that was imposed by fundamentalism in administrative processes. 
More so, socio-economic sectors were exposed to a large transaction cost burden as they 
lobbied for reasonable and balanced polices. However, the ultimate solution which created 
trout-specific regulations implied a favourable transaction cost burden on the trout sector. 
The study also set out to establish how, in the face of institutional isolation, the trout sector 
responded. The study found significant levels of investment in institutional 
entrepreneurship, which included proposals for balanced regulatory regime for trout and, 
indeed, any economically useful alien species. The institutional entrepreneurship also took 
the form of propaganda/tit-for-tat strategies that created an impoverishing Nash 
institutional adjustment path. In the context of the transformed Bushian model, such a 
strategy indicated a confrontation between ceremonial interests or ceremonial and 
instrumental interests. The equilibria were unstable. The trout sector sought nothing short 
of transference of trout to an anthropocentric, credible, predictable and stable 
administrative regime of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries as opposed 
to the biocentric administrative regime of the DEA. The increase in political transaction costs 
for the DEA of persisting with its envisaged regulatory regime and external intervention by 
the Ocean Labs Planning process brought the controversy to rest and converged to 
institutional solutions that the trout sector had been advocating since 2005, and in fact as 
far back as 1986. 
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Overall, the study’s argument that the interaction between knowledge and power in 
defining the extent, speed and character of institutional adjustment, shed additional light on 
the institutionalist conception of how knowledge shapes policy. The general tendency in 
Original Institutional theory is to view all knowledge as good for institutional design, yet 
even good knowledge can become bad knowledge if it is dominated by ideological interests 
in institutional design processes. The study demonstrated that the coexistence of a limited 
and open access order was a reality in policy processes. Knowledge producers and more so, 
if they become knowledge implementers, have significant power in defining the institutional 
adjustment path. This argument implies that the concept of sovereignty had to be extended 
beyond the three manifestations of sovereignty that the Commonsian theory postulates. 
Knowledgeable agents are the new sovereigns in a knowledge economy. They define the 
technological frontier; they define the value frontier; they define the ideological frontier; 
and they convert warranted assertions into new institutions without subjecting them to the 
test of valuableness. 
9.4.1. Implications for institutional theory 
While reviewing institutionalist theories of change, it was argued that literature had focused 
on the role of technology in shaping institutional change. Literature had also focused on the 
role of the cultural lag in hindering progressive institutional change. A general assumption in 
the OIE of the Veblenian tradition is that all knowledge produced by the arts and sciences is 
instrumental. However, Clarence E Ayres demonstrated the distinguishable role of ideology 
and ideas in shaping institutional change. The Northean School later identified the distinct 
role of knowledge and ideology in shaping institutional change. Even with the Ayresian and 
Northean contributions, there was another undeclared assumption that knowledge 
producers and knowledge users in institutional design processes were different social 
agents. The study’s findings, however, imply that institutional economic theorists have to 
realise that the conventional knowledge producer-user dichotomy is not always relevant. 
Since it is sometimes seamless, several implications follow.  
With the prevalence of the mechanisms of institutional hegemony, such as epistemic 
entrenchment in the policy community, epistemic violence, identity switching and epistemic 
arbitrage, a real danger to the Deweyan/democratic instrumental knowledge production 
system is posed. This observation implies that North et al.’s (2007; 2012) social orders have 
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wider application than the macro-level that they have been limited to. The social orders are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive as the Northean theory presumes; there is a possibility 
for the realm of reasons to be an open access policymaking order, while the realm of rules is 
a limited access policymaking order. The converse is also possible. The Northean social 
orders provide an ontological framework for the type of the Commonsian negotiational 
psychology that prevails. This seems to be a tentative convergence of John R Commons’ 
negotiational psychology and Douglass C North’s socio-cognitive analysis of institutional 
change. 
While the Commonsian School and the Veblenian School have generally considered power 
holders to be property owners and those in influential political positions or some religious 
and cultural estates of significance, the study demonstrated that knowledge producers are 
holders of significant power in a knowledge economy. If knowledge producers are power 
holders, then Fagg J Foster’s conceptualisation of purposeful institutional adjustment as a 
problem resolution process and a problem as the difference between ‘what ought to be’ 
and ‘what is’ imply that knowledge producers determine the value frontier. Insofar as they 
define the value frontier, they determine the path, speed and extent of institutional change. 
The problem arises when the problem to be resolved is multidimensional and has many 
trade-offs. The problem can further be compounded when the knowledge producer and 
user becomes one social agent, which means that warranted assertions and the ideology of 
a particular epistemic community graduate into new institutions before they are tested for 
valuableness. Wicked problems easily follow and impoverishing institutional adjustment 
processes logically follow. 
The OIE of the Veblenian tradition generally presumes that some social groups are holders 
of ceremonial interests and others are holders of instrumental interests. This assumption is 
traceable in every study that applies the Veblenian Dichotomy to policy analysis. The study’s 
findings are that each social group simultaneously possesses ceremonial and instrumental 
interests. Using this modified assumption, which was abductively derived, the study 
extended the Bushian concept of institutional spaces and two stable equilibria where 
identified. A convergence of ceremonial interests between governmental authorities and a 
powerful social group was a stable equilibrium, which naturally corresponded to a limited 
access policymaking order. Ordonomic research identified such a stable equilibrium as the 
318 | P a g e  
 
only instance where cooperation is undesirable. Usually such an undesirable state of 
cooperation is characterised by unidisciplinary knowledge and a concerted use of the 
sanction of ignorance. A convergence of instrumental interests between governmental 
authorities and some social groups was another stable equilibrium and naturally, 
corresponded to the open access policymaking order. In this case, transdisciplinary and 
transdepartmental approaches to public policy determined the path of institutional change. 
Reasonable value guided policy evolution.  
The general assumption in the Veblenian Dichotomy literature holds that ceremonial 
systems are past-binding. The thesis’ findings suggested that ceremonial systems also do 
cause path independent change, usually underpinned by the principles of scarcity and 
futurity. They have a forward looking component. It was shown that Lysenkoism is a 
powerful ceremonial encapsulation mechanism that institutionalists have not extensively 
applied to evolution of institutional arrangements since Bush’s (1987) introduction of the 
concept into the theory of institutional change. The study even demonstrated that Veblen 
had in mind a far more complex system in which imbecile (that is, Lysenkoan) institutional 
systems initially were forward-binding, and once they attained the Commonsian sovereign 
power, they became past-binding. Usually, in their advanced stages, Lysenkoan systems 
become comparable to the Northean limited access policymaking order. 
It logically follows that Lysenkoan systems cannot be disbanded by deliberative efforts; it 
takes some ceremonial power to break a limited access policymaking order. The fall of 
Lysenko had everything to do with a subsequently hostile political environment to 
Lysenkoan ideas and ideology, yet political support initially buoyed the rise of Lysenkoism 
into epistemic power in the Soviet Union. Similarly, limited access policymaking orders can 
only be disbanded by the intervention of an external sovereign agent following aggrieved 
parties’ concerted investment institutional entrepreneurship employing ceremonial and 
instrumental means. Institutionalist theory often takes it for granted that ceremonial power 
is bad. However, the study found that when an entrenched system is blocking access to 
institutional arenas in every way it can, marginalised groups mobilise and sometimes 
exaggerate their grievances to attract political attention which eventually raises political 
transaction costs of maintaining the limited access policymaking order. Exaggeration is a 
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propagandist strategy; a tit-for-tat strategy. This logically leads to the disbandment of the 
limited access order. 
9.4.2. Policy implication for South Africa 
a. Setting up institutional design processes 
The most important implication of the study’s findings for policymakers, legislators and 
regulators is that policy adjustment has many social ramifications that usually become 
evident during the implementation of the policy. The harmonisation vision that the NEMA of 
1998 and the Constitution of 1996 propose have been mutilated in many ways because of 
faulty policy design process. The major implication of the present study is that 
harmonisation demands transdepartmentalism and transdisciplinarity if wicked 
environmental policy problems and, indeed, any other policy problems are to be resolved.  
The findings suggest that a policy process should not be initially conceptualised as a 
unidisciplinary process no matter how unidisciplinary it might seem to be because social 
systems and ecological systems interact and co-evolve.  How certain are policymakers that a 
single epistemic community will competently address the demands of both systems? 
Unidisciplinary thought shaped the NEM:BA and, again, it shaped the regulatory phase. 
Findings of this study suggested that the DEA, and so all other departments, could do well 
by contextualising scientific evidence; prioritising local scientific evidence; systematically 
studying socioeconomic aspects of the policy issue (anthropocentrism) as the natural 
science aspects have conventionally been given systematic attention; and promoting 
effective participatory policymaking. Effective participation was found to result in 
reasonable and empirically balanced policy propositions that would engender, as the NEMA 
of 1998 requires, political equity, institutional equity, endowment equity and economic 
equity. These aspects were inadequately attended to in the NEM:BA processes because of 
the reliance on unidisciplinary knowledge. 
The implications of the study’s findings indicate that government departments have 
difficulties in achieving harmonisation. Power struggles and competition amongst 
departments has compartmentalised institutional design processes. An interesting finding of 
the study was that unidisciplinarity eventually led to the redefinition of opportunity sets 
based on the argument that the NEM:BA was disenabling. Yet, in 2003 Members of 
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Parliament were praising the NEM:BA as the best ever drafted piece of legislation that only 
required an enabling regulatory regime. The administrative redefinition of opportunity sets 
was the genesis of the deep-structure problem of institutional isolation. This conclusion is a 
new insight into the emergence of new institutions, which suggests that much of the 
national legislation is not made by legislatures, but by the directorates of governmental 
departments. The legislature sanctifies the will of these administrative authoritative agents. 
b. Transaction costs of public policy 
The divergence between legislative intent and administrative preferences, as the study 
found, suggests that the study’s findings also imply that there is weak monitoring of 
administrative/regulatory behaviour in South Africa. There is a principal-agent problem. This 
structural weakness has important implications for the extent of efficiency in the utilisation 
of public resources. The study illustrated that there exists a measurable planning curse. 
Between 2004 and 2014, legal experts, invasion biologists and international experts as well 
as other professionals were hired to offer consultancy services to the DEA, yet the final 
solution came back to ideas that already existed or were rejected in 2003 when the NEM:BA 
was being drafted. The question that remains unanswered, which the present study has only 
touched on is: “Was it necessary to spend significant resources in planning processes for 10 
years without solving the problem?” If scholars had been granted access to sufficient 
information, an empirical investigation could have been launched to measure the size of the 
planning curse which was attributed to ideological battles in institutional design processes.  
In a country that has several social problems competing for the same funds, the legislature 
would need to set up a mechanism for monitoring departmental performance and 
compliance with statutory requirements. Similarly, such a mechanism has to evaluate the 
quality of expenditures in terms of their rational link to public purpose. Similarly, the fact 
that institutional adjustment processes experience planning curses suggests there is need 
for a centralised monitoring agency. The National Planning Commission could be 
reconstituted into a transdisciplinary body that oversees implementation of all government 
policy, legislation and regulations as well as facilitating harmonisation of governmental 
actions. 
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With a central coordinative agency, the policy ecology would not experience administrative 
discontinuities because of the succession of directors and ministers. The study illustrated 
that administrative discontinuities always led to a succession of scientific and political 
ideologies as well as governance styles, which resulted in sudden policy reversals and 
redefinition of opportunity sets. The political ideology of the incumbent minister had a 
bearing on the institutional adjustment path and the apartheid style of doing and managing 
things prevailed from 2004-2009. Because the drafting of the regulations spanned several 
generations of directors/ministers it experienced the planning curse due to conflicting 
ideologies between the predecessors and successors. A central council mandated with 
monitoring the harmonisation processes would ensure continuity by providing coordinative 
leadership. 
Apart from a coordinative agency, funding strategies that promote transdisciplinary policy 
research can facilitate weakening dominant epistemological systems. Since scholars agree 
that uni-disciplinarity is often driven by the need to maintain independence, academic 
prestige and sustained flow of research grants, funding strategies logically become the 
starting point for encouraging transdisciplinarity, while a coordinative agency facilitates 
transdepartmentalism. Semantic innovations, due to transdisciplinarity and 
transdepartmentalism, create social DNA, but epistemic violence destroys social DNA. 
9.4.3. Suggestions for future research 
There are some tentative results that the study established which deserve further 
systematic research. The planning curse associated with a contested institutional 
adjustment process is a potentially investigable area to determine the size of the 
deadweight loss. This deadweight loss becomes part of avoidable transaction costs of 
changing institutions. The revolving door phenomenon between senior governmental 
employment positions and academic professional practice as tentatively established in the 
thesis is an important area of institutional research. This area is fertile for research for the 
precise reason that it facilitates the evolution of a deep-rooted limited access policymaking 
order. Once the order emerges, manifestations of institutional hegemony through epistemic 
violence and domination naturally follow. The combination of the revolving door, careerism, 
sanction of ignorance and sanction of poverty effectively sustain a limited access 
policymaking order.  
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Appendix 2: Online survey questionnaire 
 
 
Dear Trout fly-fisher, trout farmer, and others 
My name is Juniours Marire, a PhD student at Rhodes University. This survey is part of a 
Doctoral study in Economics examining the current process of establishing  Alien and 
Invasive Species Regulations of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 
[NEM:BA] of 2004 and their probable economic implications for the trout industry. 
Government's intentions in the regulations are to manage, control and/or eradicate alien 
and invasive species with the ultimate objective of conserving indigenous fish species. This 
questionnaire seeks to solicit information about your views about socioeconomic factors 
related to trout fly fishing and the NEM:BA regulations. The results of the study will be used 
for the thesis, for academic publications in journals and as input to government policy. You 
retain the right to drop out of the survey at any time or to leave out questions you do not 
want to answer. The survey is anonymous. This survey will take about 10-15 minutes. This 
survey begins now in May and ends on 31 July 2014. Thank you for supporting my study. 
Given the above information are you willing to participate in the survey? 
*Required 
 yes 
 no 
About NEM:BA 
Have you ever heard about the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act? It 
is a South African law that focuses on managing, conserving and protecting biodiversity. 
Biodiversity plainly means variety and abundance of biological life forms 
 yes  
 no 
If yes, how would you rate your understanding of the National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act? In the scale, 1=no understanding ; 2=basic understanding; 
3= good understanding; 4=excellent understanding 
 
1 2 3 4 
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no understanding     excellent understanding 
Have you ever heard about the Alien and Invasive Species regulations of the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act? A series of draft regulations have been 
published for public comment since 2007. Interim regulations were published for 
implementation in July 2013. Another draft was published for public comment in February 
2014. These regulations are supposed to put into effect Chapter Five of the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 2004 
 yes 
 no 
If yes, how would you rate your understanding of the Alien and Invasive species 
regulations? In the scale, 1=no understanding ; 2=basic understanding; 3= good 
understanding; 4=excellent understanding 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
No understanding     Excellent understanding 
 
Controversies in the process of developing the regulations 
The Alien and Invasive Species Regulations have been under discussion for nearly a decade 
so far, and they are yet to be finalised. Controversies have characterised the whole process 
of creating the regulations. One major controversial issue is the listing of trout as invasive. 
Kindly respond to the following statements by choosing the appropriate answer. In the 
scale, 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
In my opinion, the Department of Environmental Affairs has not conclusively relied on 
international research evidence on the invasiveness of trout in order to decide on its 
invasiveness in South Africa e.g. academic research done overseas or the global list of worst 
invasive species 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
In my opinion, a South African research-driven implementation of the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act has been at the forefront of the Department 
of Environmental Affairs' alien and invasive species management concerns e.g. Research 
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to create a conclusive and comprehensive database of invasive traits and impacts of alien 
and invasive species within South Africa 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
In my opinion, the Department of Environmental Affairs has not adequately researched 
the nature of threat posed by trout on indigenous species, habitats and ecosystems before 
listing them as invasive 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
In my opinion, scientists in, or advising, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
developed the Alien and Invasive species regulations in consultation with interested and 
affected parties such as fly-fishers 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
In my opinion, the Federation of Southern African Flyfishers (FOSAF) lacks the specialised 
knowledge necessary to contribute towards alien and invasive species regulations. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
My trust in the Department of Environmental Affairs has increased as a result of the 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act decision processes. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
The Department of Environmental Affairs justified to interested and affected parties the 
rationale for the listing of trout/or any alien species as invasive 
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1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
I think the Department of Environmental Affairs has not equally taken responsibility for 
researching the socioeconomic benefits of trout species as it has researched on the 
ecological invasiveness of trout. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
In my opinion, all species regardless of whether they are indigenous or alien, have a 
permanent place in the ecology and economy of South Africa 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
I believe that the regulations strike a balance between conservation of indigenous fishes 
and economic utilisation of the trout. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
In my opinion, trout should be listed as invasive if it can be demonstrated that in a given 
catchment the benefits of conserving indigenous fishes exceeds the economic 
contribution of trout. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
In my opinion the sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive is that 
 they must be alien and established outside their natural distribution range 
 they must be alien and established outside their natural distribution range, and 
 threaten or can potentially threaten ecosystems, habitats and species 
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 they must simultaneously be alien and established outside their natural distribution 
range; threaten or can potentially threaten ecosystems, habitats and species; and do cause 
economic, human health and environmental harm 
 
Based on the sufficient condition for invasiveness, can trout be possibly classified as 
invasive? 
 Yes 
 No 
Which of the following factors are likely to be hindering achievement of consensus on 
how to manage trout? you can tick more than one response 
 absence of an aquatic biodiversity policy framework which leads to policy uncertainty 
 the Department of Environmental Affairs withhold strategic information from 
stakeholders 
 an ineffective consultative processes 
 too much discretionary powers in the regulation of alien and invasive species given to 
the Minister by the NEM:BA 
 domination of ecological invasion science over the implementation of the NEM:BA 
 inconclusive scientific evidence about the current invasive capacity of trout 
 environmental greed on the part of the trout industry 
 lack of provisions for the economically productive use of trout 
 environmental activism that seeks to purify South Africa's environment from anything 
considered as alien 
 reliance of officials on scientific definition of invasive species rather than the definition 
in the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 
 Other:  
 
In my opinion, the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Alien and Invasive 
Species Regulations, in their current state, are  
In the scale, 1=completely not reasonable; 2=not reasonable 3= reasonable; 4=very 
reasonable 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
not very reasonable     very reasonable 
What is your profession/occupation? e.g. aquatic scientist, lawyer, economist, government 
official etc 
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 Are you a trout fly-fisher? 
 yes 
 no 
 
Social aspects of trout flyfishing 
In this section, I just want to understand more about your perceptions of, beliefs about and 
interests in trout fly-fishing. On a scale of 1-5, with 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 
3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree, kindly respond to the following statements 
Trout fly-fishing is a way of getting intimate with nature 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
I consider trout to be significant cultural symbols in South African fly-fishing circles. 
Broadly defined, culture is a commonly shared way of life in a given community such as the 
fly-fishing community. It has its own symbols such as species, language, writings and 
customs and traditions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
Trout is still significant social status symbols in South African fly-fishing circles.  
Status symbols are artefacts/species that are regarded with high respect in given 
community/social groups. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
Roughly, what percentage of your friends did you get to know as a result of trout fly-
fishing? this question seeks to understand how trout fly-fishing is critical for your social 
belonging 
 0% 
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 1% to 10% 
 11% to 20% 
 21% to 30% 
 31% to 40% 
 41% to 50% 
 51% to 60% 
 61% to 70% 
 71% to 80% 
 81% to 90% 
 91% to 100% 
The alien and invasive species regulations provide for my spiritual, cultural, social, 
physical, economic and development needs1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 
4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
Even if the regulations promote conservation of indigenous fishes, their livelihood impact 
should not be neglected. 
1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly disagree      strongly agree 
 
Economic aspects of trout flyfishing 
In this section I want to have a rough understanding of your fly-fishing expenditure patterns 
For how long have been a fly-fisher? 
 
 In the last 12 months, did you make a trip or vacation that involved fly fishing for trout? 
 yes 
 no 
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On average how many trips did you make in the past 12 months? 
 
 On average how much do you spend on accommodation per trip? 
 
 On average how much did you spend on guiding services per trip? 
 
 On average how much did you spend on fly-fishing literature such as magazines and 
books within the last 12 months? 
 
 On average how much did you spend on food and drink per trip? 
 
 On average how much did you spend on fishing tackle in the last 12 months? 
 
 On average how much did you spend on access fees to fish on trout waters per trip? 
 
 On average how much did you spend on fuel and transport travelling to your preferred 
trout fly fishing destination per trip? 
 
 What is you most favourable trout fly-fishing destination? 
 
 Do you own a second home in your most favourable destination? 
 yes 
 no 
 
Are you a member of a fly fishing association or club? 
 yes 
 no 
364 | P a g e  
 
If yes, which of the following describes your club? 
 My club negotiated exclusive access to trout waters 
 My club owns private trout waters 
Which other fish species do your club waters have? 
 
 Socio-demographic profile 
Rhodes University fully supports, and itself practices, a policy of non-discrimination. The 
information you are asked for in this section will help in analysing the data and to track 
progress in reaching transformation goals. Note that the survey is anonymous and that you 
can choose not to answer any of the questions. 
You are 
 male 
 female 
You are 
 Coloured 
 Indian 
 White 
 Black 
 Other 
 
Your highest level of education is 
 less than matric level 
 matric level 
 certificate level 
 diploma level 
 undergraduate level 
 postgraduate level 
 
How much is your after tax income per month 
 less than R10 000 
 R11 000 to R20 000 
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 R21 000 to R30 000 
 R31 000 to R40 000 
 R41 000 to R50 000 
 greater than R50 000 
 
Thank you very much for supporting me in my study 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide for government officials 
 
 
Interview Guide for DEA official 
My name is Juniours Marire, a PhD student at Rhodes University. This interview is part of a 
Doctoral study in Economics examining the process of institutional change and its potential 
effects (positive or negative) on the economic potential of the trout sector. Government's 
proposed regulatory regime is to control, manage and/or eradicate trout with the ultimate 
objective to conserve indigenous fish species. The main objective of this study is to evaluate 
the reasonableness of the regulatory regime in the context of the trout sector. The results of 
the study will be used for the thesis and for scholarly publications in academic journals. The 
interview will be kept confidential and all results will be anonymous unless you choose to be 
identified in some capacity. Once the interview is done, if you choose to be identified by 
personal name or organisational name, I shall transcribe the interview and send to you the 
transcript for review before I use it in my thesis.  
Thank you for supporting me. 
Introduction 
In recent years the debate about management of alien and invasive species has been 
deepening because of a worldwide realisation of high extinction rates of species due to, 
among other things, invasion. In South Africa, a classic case is the controversy surrounding 
the management of trout species (Brown and Rainbow). The debate seems to gravitate 
around the invasive capacity of trout and the regulatory regime the DEA is proposing. 
1. There seems to be divergent views about what an invasive species is in South Africa. 
How does the DEA define it?  
2. Some intellectuals have read a spirit of eco-nationalism in this new terminology in 
that it seems to privilege translocated indigenous species regardless of their invasive 
capacity. What is your view on this? 
3. What is your view of the invasive capacity of trout relative to other threats to 
indigenous species? Is your scientific evidence conclusive about the invasiveness of 
trout? 
4. The trout sector argues that the DEA has not declared to stakeholders the criteria it 
used to classify trout as invasive. What criteria did you use? 
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5. What difference does it make if trout is managed as an alien species under a 
permitting system rather than to declare them invasives managed under a 
permitting system? 
6. Does the DEA have an aquatic biodiversity policy framework? 
7. What management framework has DEA finally settled for and what is your 
evaluation of the magnitude of the regulatory burden on the sector of the proposed 
framework? 
8. Taking the discussion further, I note that in 2009/2010, the DEA through SANBI 
funded a trout mapping process that was led by Dr Ernst Swartz. The process 
produced maps that were going to be the basis for a reasonable regulatory regime 
for trout. How does this process relate to the mapping of fish sanctuaries, which 
seems to be an entirely different process? 
9. There is a claim that the fish sanctuaries coincide with trout zones that were 
produced by the trout mapping process. On that basis, the major point of 
controversy is that the DEA has marginalised the trout sector and may destroy it in 
the end, and that the science informing the regulatory process is not credible. What 
is your view on these claims? 
10. The NEMA requires governmental departments to carry out cost-benefit analysis in 
order to inform administrative and regulatory actions. Has there been a cost-benefit 
analysis surrounding trout species? How much economic value do they contribute to 
South Africa vs. how much ecological cost do they impose? 
11. The NEMA requires that government departments harmonise their policies. To my 
mind, comes policies such as the aquaculture policy of the DAFF (and similar 
initiatives of the DTI), the biodiversity conservation instruments of the DEA. A major 
complaint is that government departments are sending conflicting signals. Have 
there been attempts to harmonise these policies? 
12. Related to the previous question, the claim has been that the DEA has put 
biodiversity conservation interests at the forefront of its concern and in the process 
has marginalised socioeconomic interests. Would you say the DEA has managed to 
locate a trade-off in this matter or it is an either-or issue? 
13. In your personal capacity as the DDG, what would you say has been the most difficult 
part in trying to regulate the trout industry? Similarly, what have you found to be 
more interesting in the whole process?  
Thank you very much, DDG,  for giving me this opportunity to hear your views/story about 
this very important but interesting political economy question. 
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Appendix 4: Interview guide for aquatic scientists 
 
 
Aquatic and biological invasion scientists – Interview Guide 
My name is Juniours Marire, a PhD student at Rhodes University. This interview is part of a 
Doctoral study in Economics examining the likely (positive or negative) economic impact  on 
fishing tourism of the  Alien and Invasive Species Regulations published by the Government 
of South Africa on the February 2014 under the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act [NEM:BA] 10 of 2004. Government's intentions in the regulations are to 
control and/or eradicate trout with the ultimate objective to conserve indigenous fish 
species. The main objective of this study is to evaluate the reasonableness of the regulations 
in the context of the trout sector. The results of the study will be used for the thesis, for 
academic publishing in journals and possibly for influencing government policy. The 
interview will be kept confidential and all results will be anonymous unless you choose to be 
identified in some capacity. Once the interview is done, if you choose to be identified by 
personal name or organisational name, I shall transcribe the interview and send you the 
transcript for review before I use it in my thesis. You will get a summarised version of the 
results when the study is complete. 
Given this information, are you willing to participate as a key informant in this research?
 Yes/No (delete the inapplicable) 
Would you allow me to audio-record this interview? Yes/No (delete the inapplicable) 
Are you happy being identified in the interview and research output 
a. As an aquaculture scientist of your institution  
b.  by your name or  
c. Anonymous aquaculture scientist 
1. An argument has been put forward that the NEMBA regulations are framed on a weak 
and misleading biological foundation in that a species that cannot reproduce cannot be 
invasive, and they say trout is such for the greater part of South Africa. What is your 
response to this claim?  
2. What do you consider to be a sufficient condition for resolutely concluding that a species 
is invasive? 
3. In the South African context, would you consider the sufficient condition to still hold?  
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4. In your opinion, which of the three components [(a) alien that is established (b) threatens 
ecosystems, species and habitats (c) causes economic, human health and environmental 
harm) of the legal definition of invasive species is the most important?  
5. De Moor and Bruton (1988) have argued that surely trout have a permanent place in 
South Africa’s culture and economy. In your opinion, is there really a place for alien 
invasive species such as trout in the South African society? 
6. The government has published NEM: BA AIS regulations for 2013 and 2014 that listed 
trout as invasive and so sanctioned the eradication and/or control of trout. But, these 
regulations have faced resistance from the fly fishing sector. What is your overall 
evaluation of the regulations? 
7. The NEMA 1998 provides that “Environmental management must place people and their 
needs at the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, 
developmental, cultural and social interests equitably.” In your view, would you say the 
regulations pass this test and why? 
8. In the 1986 Colloquium hosted by JLB Smith Institute and Department of Ichthyology and 
Fisheries Science at Rhodes, P.B.N Jackson asserted, “the argument that no indigenous 
fish species served the same purpose as well as the introduced alien still holds good.” 
How realistic is this hypothesis? If it is realistic, how can NEM:BA regulations succeed 
without providing for the perpetual existence of the AIS such as trout? Would the 
psychological, social, physical, spiritual, cultural and developmental needs of the people 
be met? 
9. Some aquatic scientists (e.g. Paul Skelton, Jim Cambray) have argued that the major 
problem associated with resistance by trout fly fishers is “environmental greed”. Would 
you elaborate on the forms this greed assumes?  
10. The trout industry has argued that aquatic scientists do indeed acknowledge that 
there is a scarcity of conclusive knowledge about the invasiveness of trout. What is your 
opinion on the claim that much of the scientific evidence presented about the 
invasiveness of trout in SA is by way of assumptions?  
11. The general consensus among aquatic scientists is that the scattered evidence of 
economic contribution shows that trout are important to the SA economy, but they 
should be actively managed. What do you imply by active management? Is it a species 
management programme? Is it a zonation system? 
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12. The trout sector lobbied for a trout zonation/mapping process which was later on 
carried out between 2009 and 2010. In your view, was it necessary to zone trout? Would 
this facilitate the conservation of indigenous fish species since many upper catchments of 
conservation concern are the very zones of interest to trout fly fishers?  
13. Do you see any potential for consensus on how to manage alien invasive species 
especially trout? Elaborate. 
14. What is your evaluation of the claim that in net terms, land/rivers with trout sport 
fisheries have higher biodiversity conservation rates than land/rivers without trout 
flyfishing tourism? (e.g well conserved landscapes that leave land relatively undisturbed 
thus saving much more in terms of terrestrial species) 
15. Do you have any other information that you want to share that you perceive to be 
helpful to my study? 
16. Are you happy being identified in the interview and research output 
a. As an aquaculture scientist of your institution  
b.  by your name or  
c. Anonymous aquaculture scientist 
Thank you very much for supporting my study 
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Appendix 5: Interview guide for trout sector players 
 
 
 
Interview guide on the NEM: BA Alien and Invasive Species Regulations process 
FOSAF/Trout sector players 
 
My name is Juniours Marire, a PhD student at Rhodes University. This interview is part of a 
Doctoral study in Economics examining the likely (positive or negative) economic impact  on 
fishing tourism of the  Alien and Invasive Species Regulations published by the Government 
of South Africa on the February 2014 under the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act [NEM:BA] 10 of 2004. Government's intentions in the regulations are to 
control and/or eradicate trout with the ultimate objective to conserve indigenous fish 
species. The main objective of the study is to evaluate the reasonableness of the regulations 
in the context of the trout sector. The results of the study will be used for the thesis, for 
academic publishing in journals and for influencing policy. The interview will kept 
confidential and all results will be anonymous unless you choose to be identified in some 
capacity. Once the interview is done, if you choose to be identified by personal name or 
organisational name, I shall transcribe the interview and send you the transcript for review 
before I use it in my thesis. You will get a summarised version of the results when the study 
is complete. 
Given this information, are you willing to participate as a key informant in this research?
 Yes/No (delete the inapplicable) 
Would you allow me to audio-record this interview? Yes/No (delete the inapplicable) 
Are you happy being identified in the interview and research output 
d. As a FOSAF/YWG member or  
e. As a FOSAF/YWG official or 
f.  by your name or  
g. As an official in the flyfishing sector (anonymity)? 
 
1. Can you tell me about FOSAF (its history, achievements, obstacles and vision & values)? 
2. Why do fly fishers treasure trout so much above any other species – indigenous or 
alien? 
3. What is your evaluation of the process of coming up with the NEMBA act itself?  
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4. FOSAF and Trout SA do mention that South African Environmental Law (NEMA in 
particular) is anthropocentric, but the NEM:BA seems to be ecocentric. In your view 
where did the whole process of coming up with the NEMBA miss it (if at all it did)? 
5. Chapter 5 of NEM:BA focuses on management of alien and invasive species. This 
chapter was due for implementation by August 2006, but it has not yet been 
implemented. In your opinion, what do you consider to be the real problem with this 
legislation? Is it any issue of challenges with drawing up regulations or the NEM:BA 
itself is a flawed law?  
6. Now that the NEM: BA regulations are out, what is your overall evaluation of the 
regulations? 
7. What were (and are) your expectations as you engaged (engage) in this process? 
8. In FOSAF’s various submissions to DEA, there is a consistent reference to NEMA’s 
provision that environmental management must serve people’s “socio-cultural, 
physical, psychological, spiritual, developmental needs”. Can you explain to me what 
this provision mean to an average flyfisher?  
9. Let’s look at the process of arriving at the promulgated NEM: BA regulations. 
i. From reading your various submissions to DEA since 2007, I note that one of the 
contentious issues in the regulatory reform process is the listing of trout as 
invasive. What is your view of the invasive capacity of trout?  
ii. In your opinion what are the implications to the trout fishing tourism sector of the 
listing of trout as invasive?  
iii. Paul Skelton (2000: 39) has argued that one of the behavior factors undermining 
conservation of indigenous fish species is “environmental greed”. Jim Cambray 
(2003, 2009) has taken that argument further arguing that essentially most trout 
fisheries exist in mountain catchments that are favourable for trout, yet they are the 
very habitats of conservation concern for indigenous fishes. He argues that the 
catchments are syndicated and he infers that environmental greed of this form 
buttresses the resistance of the sector to regulations that target trout 
eradication/control. [a] What is your opinion on this hypothesis? [b] Does the 
distribution of fish sanctuaries seem to coincide with the distribution of trout 
waters? [c]How were the fish sanctuaries determined? [d]If there is such a clash 
between fish sanctuaries and trout waters, what in your view, should be the most 
reasonable course of action? 
iv. FOSAF pioneered the concept of trout zonation. How successful was the trout 
mapping process in the development of the regulations? How well did the 
regulations incorporate the zonation system?  
10. FOSAF’s submissions to the DEA since 2007 claim that the NEM: BA regulations are 
unduly burdensome on the sector. In what ways/aspects are the regulations likely to 
be burdensome? 
11. In your opinion, what has been preventing a consensus arrangement for managing trout 
in South Africa from being reached? In comparison to the 1985/6 trout deregulation 
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saga, do you see a compromise solution coming forth now? What aspects of the 
compromise solution to the trout deregulation controversy of the late 1980s do you 
think should have been maintained in the 2013 regulations? (probe why they should 
have been maintained) 
12. Do you have any other information that you want to share that you perceive to be 
helpful to my study? 
13. Are you happy being identified in the interview and research output 
a. As a FOSAF/YWG member or  
b. As a FOSAF/YWG official or 
c.  by your name or  
d. As an official in the flyfishing sector (anonymity)? 
Thank you very much for the assistance and cooperation. 
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Appendix 6: Items excluded from Cronbach's alpha and subsequent analysis 
1. Have you ever heard about the NEM:BA Alien and Invasive Species regulations? 
2. If yes, how do you rate you understanding of the alien and invasive species 
regulations? 
3. If yes, how do you rate your understanding of the NEM:BA? 
4. Trout can be listed as invasive species IF it can be demonstrated that the benefits of 
conserving indigenous fishes in a given catchment exceed the economic benefits of 
trout. 
5. All species regardless of whether they are indigenous or alien have a permanent 
place in the ecology and economy of South Africa. 
6.  Trout fly-fishing is a way of getting intimate with nature. 
7. Trout is an important cultural symbol in South African fly-fishing circles. 
8. Trout is an important status symbol in South African fly-fishing circles. 
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Appendix 7: Principal component factor analysis 
Factor analysis/correlation                          Number of obs       =       87 
    Method: principal-component factors             Retained factors    =        4 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                            Number of parameters =       46 
 
Factor Eigen value Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 3.78753 2.33702 0.2913 0.2913 
Factor2 1.45051 0.13184 0.1116 0.4029 
Factor3 1.31867 0.17155 0.1014 0.5044 
Factor4 1.14712 0.24728 0.0882 0.5926 
The first four factors have Eigen values >1 
Factor5 0.89984 0.11028 0.0692 0.6618 
Factor6 0.78956 0.00731 0.0607 0.7226 
Factor7 0.78225 0.05071 0.0602 0.7827 
Factor8 0.73154 0.12166 0.0563 0.8390 
Factor9 0.60988 0.12652 0.0469 0.8859 
Factor10 0.48336 0.05014 0.0372 0.9231 
Factor11 0.43322 0.13904 0.0333 0.9564 
Factor12 0.29418 0.02181 0.0226 0.9790 
Factor13 0.27236 - 0.0210 1.0000 
 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(78) =  275.35 Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
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Appendix 8: Factor loadings (unrotated pattern matrix) and unique variances 
Variable 
Fa
ct
o
r1
 
Fa
ct
o
r2
 
Fa
ct
o
r3
 
Fa
ct
o
r4
 
U
n
iq
u
en
es
s 
DEA researched socioeconomics of 
trout 
0.6469    0.5710 
DEA consulted in developing AIS 
regulations 
0.6922    0.3966 
Fosaf lack specialised knowledge 
to contribute to AIS regulations 
0.6365    0.4138 
Trust in DEA increased due to AIS 
regulations process 
0.7893    0.2834 
DEA justified rationale for listing 
trout as invasive 
0.7526    0.3349 
AIS regulations strike trade-off 
between conservation and alien-
based  economic activities 
0.4828    0.4195 
Is trout invasive?  -0.4269 -0.5323  0.3843 
DEA conclusively relied on 
international evidence to list trout 
  0.5444  0.4468 
What is sufficient criterion for 
listing a trout as invasive? 
 0.7000   0.3696 
DEA researched the nature of 
ecological threat posed by trout 
0.4799   -0.5428 0.4313 
AIS regulations NEMA 2.2 needs 0.4625  0.4932  0.3978 
Even if regulations promote 
conservation of indigenous fish, 
their livelihood impact should not 
be neglected  
 -0.5224   0.4705 
DEA followed a science driven 
process in AIS regulations 
0.5307   0.4959 0.3768 
*blanks represent loadings < .4 
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Appendix 9: Oblique factor rotation 
Factor analysis/correlation                          Number of obs       =       87 
    Method: principal-component factors             Retained factors    =        4 
    Rotation: oblique promax (Kaiser off)           Number of parameters =       46 
 
Factor Eigen value Proportion Rotated factors are correlated 
Factor1 3.24592 0.2497  
Factor2 1.94091 0.1493  
Factor3 1.78944 0.1376  
Factor4 1.73258 0.1333  
 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(78) =  275.35 Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 Factor rotation matrix 
 Participatory Evidence Anthropocentric Contextualise 
Participatory 0.8796 -0.4716 0.4545 0.4448 
Listing trout 0.3747 0.7551 -0.3923 -0.1299 
Anthropocentric -0.2808 0.4417 0.5410 0.5814 
Contextualise -0.0842 -0.1110 -0.5889 0.6688 
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Appendix 10: Proportionality of odds assumption test - reasonableness of 2014 draft AIS 
regulations 
Ordered logit estimates                             Number of obs    =         77 
                                                      LR chi2(11)       =      24.75 
                                                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0099 
Log likelihood = -42.706411                         Pseudo R2         =     0.2247 
Reasonableness of draft AIS regulations 
2014  
Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Participatory  .974 .367 2.65 0.008 
Evidence .552 .340 1.62 0.104 
Anthropocentric .407 .338 1.20 0.229 
Contextualise .602 .348 1.73 0.084 
Log of years of fly-fishing -.039 .512 -0.08 0.939 
Education .134 .266 0.50 0.615 
Percentage of friendships made from trout 
fishing 
.227 .142 1.60 0.109 
Salary -.021 .249 -0.09 0.932 
Clubmember .346 .827 0.42 0.675 
Second home owner 1.662 .970 1.71 0.087 
Female  -.061 1.490 -0.04 0.967 
_cut1 -1.091188 2.173987 (Ancillary 
parameters) _cut2 4.639868 2.327255 
_cut3 7.114636 2.511832 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories: 
         chi2(19)      =     45.45 
       Prob > chi2  =    0.0006 
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Appendix 11: Binary logistic model for reasonableness of 2014 draft AIS regulations 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -27.771472   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -13.781237   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -8.0049429   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -4.8663396   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2.8043635   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =          0   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood =          0   
 
Logistic regression                                 Number of obs    =         77 
                                                      LR chi2(-1)       =      55.54 
                                                     Prob > chi2       =          . 
Log likelihood =          0                         Pseudo R2         =     1.0000 
Reasonableness of draft AIS regulations 
2014  
Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Participatory  501.425 . . . 
Evidence 768.397 . . . 
Anthropocentric 343.992 . . . 
Contextualise 656.854 . . . 
Log of years of fly-fishing -149.792 . . . 
Education 218.307 . . . 
Percentage of friendships made from trout 
fishing 
99.427 . . . 
Salary -47.324 . . . 
Clubmember -394.235 . . . 
Second home owner 455.668 . . . 
Constant  -1974.095 . . . 
*Note: 68 failures and 9 successes completely determined. 
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Appendix 12: Factorial Logistic model 
Logistic regression     Number of observations  = 79 
       LR chi2 (21)    = 40.74 
       Prob > chi2    = 0.0060 
Log likelihood = -23.2098    Pseudo R2    = 0.4674 
Is trout invasive? Coeff Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Trout threatens species, habitats and ecosystems -1.1430 1.7342 0.66 0.510 
Trout may cause harm to health or economic harm 
or environmental harm 
-5.1993 1.8854 -2.76 0.006 
Has basic understanding of AIS regulations -5.2622 2.3759 -2.21 0.027 
Has good understanding of AIS regulations  -6.7200 2.7868 -2.41 0.016 
Has excellent understanding of AIS regulations  -6.5491 3.1860 -2.06 0.040 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Disagree) 
3.9005 2.3244 1.68 0.093 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Neutral) 
5.6293 2.5129 2.24 0.025 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Agree) 
3.4108 2.0742 1.64 0.100 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Strongly agree) 
6.6293 2.4644 2.69 0.07 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Disagree) 
-2.8879 1.4990 -1.93 0.054 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Neutral) 
-4.9479 1.9290 -2.56 0.010 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Agree) 
-6.1513 2.1524 -2.86 0.004 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Strongly agree) 
-7.1041 2.4849 -2.86 0.004 
Livelihood impact of AIS regulations is important so 
long as they promote conservation of indigenous 
fishes (Disagree) 
-3.7231 1.7639 -2.11 0.035 
Livelihood impact of AIS regulations is important so 
long as they promote conservation of indigenous 
fishes (Neutral) 
-2.0233 1.4662 -1.38 0.168 
Livelihood impact of AIS regulations is important so 
long as they promote conservation of indigenous 
fishes (Agree) 
0.8338 1.2158 0.69 0.493 
Livelihood impact of AIS regulations is important so 
long as they promote conservation of indigenous 
fishes (Strongly agree) 
-2.3954 1.6325 -1.47 0.142 
Percentage of friendships gained from trout 
flyfishing 
0.5202 0.2624 1.98 0.047 
Level of education -0.7329 0.4383 -1.67 0.095 
Salary 0.0553 0.3439 0.16 0.872 
Log of years of fly-fishing -2.2226 1.0426 -2.13 0.033 
Constant  16.6802 6.0161 2.77 0.006 
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Appendix 13: Goodness of fit test for factorial logit model 
 True  
Classified Trout is invasive =1 Trout is not invasive =0 Total 
+ 13 4 17 
- 6 56 62 
Total 19 60 79 
Percent correctly classified = 87.34% 
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Appendix 14: Odds ratio for factorial logistic model 
Logistic regression     Number of observations  = 79 
       LR chi2 (21)    = 40.74 
       Prob > chi2    = 0.0060 
Log likelihood = -23.2098    Pseudo R2    = 0.4674 
Is trout invasive? Odds ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Trout threatens species, habitats and ecosystems 0.3189 0.5530 0.66 0.510 
Trout may simultaneously cause ecological harm 
and socio- economic or environmental harm 
0.0055*** 0.0104 -2.76 0.006 
Has basic understanding of AIS regulations 0.0052** 0.0123 -2.21 0.027 
Has good understanding of AIS regulations  0.0012** 0.0034 -2.41 0.016 
Has excellent understanding of AIS regulations  0.0014** 0.0046 -2.06 0.040 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Disagree) 
49.428* 114.89 1.68 0.093 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Neutral) 
278.454** 699.7178 2.24 0.025 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Agree) 
30.289 62.8526 1.64 0.100 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive (Strongly agree) 
756.917* 1865.363 2.69 0.07 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Disagree) 
0.557* 0.0835 -1.93 0.054 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Neutral) 
0.0071** 0.0137 -2.56 0.010 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Agree) 
0.0021*** 0.0046 -2.86 0.004 
All species have a permanent place in the ecology 
and economy of South Africa (Strongly agree) 
0.0008*** 0.0020 -2.86 0.004 
Even if the regulations facilitate conservation of 
indigenous fishes their livelihood impact should 
not be neglected (Disagree) 
0.0242** 0.0426 -2.11 0.035 
Even if the regulations facilitate conservation of 
indigenous fishes their livelihood impact should 
not be neglected (Neutral) 
0.1322 0.1939 -1.38 0.168 
Even if the regulations facilitate conservation of 
indigenous fishes their livelihood impact should 
not be neglected (Agree) 
2.3021 2.799 0.69 0.493 
Even if the regulations facilitate conservation of 
indigenous fishes their livelihood impact should 
not be neglected (Strongly agree) 
0.0911 0.1488 -1.47 0.142 
Percentage of friendships gained from trout 
flyfishing 
1.6824** 0.4414 1.98 0.047 
Level of education 0.4805* 0.2106 -1.67 0.095 
Salary 1.0568 0.3634 0.16 0.872 
Log of years of fly-fishing 0.1083** 0.1129 -2.13 0.033 
Note: *** means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10% 
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Appendix 15: Testing whether simple logistic model is nested in factorial logistic model 
Logistic regression     Number of observations = 79 
       LR chi2 (9)   = 24.52 
       Prob > chi2  = 0.0035 
Log likelihood = -31.319691    Pseudo R2   = 0.2814 
Is trout invasive? Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Sufficient condition for listing trout as invasive -1.74 .599 -2.91 0.004 
Level of understanding of AIS regulations -.808 .503 -1.60 0.109 
List trout as invasive if net benefits of conserving 
indigenous species are positive in a given locality 
.612 .279 2.19 0.029 
All species regardless of origin have a permanent 
place in the ecology and economy of South Africa 
-.842 .321 -2.62 0.009 
Even if AIS regulations facilitate conservation of 
indigenous fishes, their livelihood impact should 
not be neglected  
-.039 .250 -0.16 0.875 
Percentage of friendships gained from trout 
flyfishing 
.092 .159 0.58 0.563 
Level of education -.430 .266 -1.62 0.106 
Salary -.116 .240 -0.48 0.629 
Log of years of fly-fishing -1.236 .663 -1.86 0.062 
Constant 11.371 4.204 2.70 0.007 
 
H0: logistic model treating categorical predictors as quantitative is nested in factorial logistic 
model 
H1: logistic model treating categorical predictors as quantitative is not nested in factorial 
logistic model 
Likelihood-ratio test LR chi2(12)  =     16.22 
 Prob > chi2  =    0.1814 
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Appendix 16: Examination of outlier residuals on model estimates 
 
The figure reveals that observations 90 and 96 had the largest influence on the residuals of 
the estimated model. They were outliers. However, the question of which observations have 
the greatest influence on the estimated coefficients is not addressed in the figure. Cook’s 
statistic does that well (Long, Freese 2006).  
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Appendix 17: Cook's statistic for assessing influence of residuals on estimated coefficients 
 
The Cook’s statistic reveals that observations 14, 37 and 96 had the largest influence on the 
estimated coefficients. After dropping these observations, two variables (understanding AIS 
regulations and the perception that the livelihood impact of the regulations should not be 
neglected even if they facilitate the conservation of indigenous fishes) were now perfectly 
predicting the response variable. Thus, the resolution was to retain the observations and 
use the results with caution. 
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Appendix 18: Dot plot of predicted probabilities 
 
The majority of the predicted probabilities in the Figure lie between zero and 0.4. The 
estimated model seems reasonable. 
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